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The Cult of the Market
Introduction
Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their
frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back.
— J. M. Keynes1
Let us clear from the ground the metaphysical or general principle upon
which, from time to time, laissez-faire has been founded. It is not true
that individuals possess a prescriptive ‘natural liberty’ in their economic
activities. There is no ‘compact’ conferring perpetual rights on those
who Have or those who Acquire. The world is not so governed from
above that private and social interests always coincide. It is not a correct
deduction from the Principles of Economics that enlightened self-interest
always operates in the public interest. Nor is it true that self-interest
generally is enlightened; more often individuals acting separately to
promote their own ends are too ignorant or too weak to attain even these.
Experience does not show that individuals, when they make up a social
unit, are always less clear-sighted than when they act separately.
— J. M. Keynes2
There are many others who are much better equipped than I am to write this
book. Many sympathetic social theorists and economists schooled in philosophy
and economics could have unravelled the complex issues underpinning economic
fundamentalism and its perverse influence on public policy. While there is a
huge literature critiquing libertarian philosophy and mainstream economics in
great depth from every possible angle, I found few texts that provided an
overview that addressed my needs as a policy analyst and none that covered
the field as I would have liked. I am therefore writing my own broad-ranging
multi-disciplinary account to explain how we arrived at this point and what is
wrong with it. I initially wrote primarily for my own benefit so as to better
understand the critique that was lurking somewhere in my subconscious, and
in a wide range of literature, and which underpinned the widely shared concern
that mainstream economics and its derivative—economic fundamentalism—was
simply ‘bullshit’. In doing so, I make few claims to originality other than in
respect of the selection and organisation of the material. I leave it to economic
fundamentalists and mainstream economists to defend their positions.
In his paper and subsequent book On Bullshit,3  leading American philosopher
Harry Frankfurt has described bullshit as a form of bluffing, arguing that it is
a greater threat to truth than lies. He believes that the production of bullshit is
stimulated whenever a person’s obligations or opportunities to speak about some
topic are more extensive than his or her knowledge. This is consistent with the
popular use of the term ‘mumbo jumbo’, in which technical language is used to
enhance the authority of the user and to render his or her claims less susceptible
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to public scrutiny. Indeed, it has been shown recently that many healthy people
confabulate routinely when pressed to talk about something they have no
knowledge of, or when they try to rationalise decisions or justify opinions—that
is, they invent stories that they recite with complete conviction, seeming to
believe what they say.4  Some neuroscientists believe that we confabulate all
the time as we try to make sense of the world around us. Since story-telling is
central to human life and intelligence, this tendency should come as no surprise.
Herein lies the danger of the compartmentalisation of knowledge and the rise
of the expert economist who pronounces on public policy claiming a special
relationship with the truth. As I detail in Chapter 1, this particular
confabulation—economic fundamentalism—has underpinned much public policy
formation throughout the world in recent decades. It is dangerous because it is
diminishing our understanding of ourselves and undermining many of the
institutional protections erected with such struggle to protect the vulnerable in
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
An additional strong driver for this work is my belief, based on my own
experience, that economics, as I was taught it, fails to come to grips with
reality—the way the economy really functions. The idealisation of the market,
which lies at the heart of neoclassical economics and the associated mathematical
deductive formalism, disregards the gross imperfections of this very human
activity and describes a world that does not exist and that is radically different
from the one we inhabit. My work also reflects my frustration with the resultant
crude policy advice provided to government ministers and with the constraint
it imposes on policy options. Important policy decisions are made on the basis
of a very superficial understanding of economic ‘principles’ and crude political
theorising, rather than a detailed understanding of particular problems and their
origins. In particular, policy problems are analysed in terms of ‘market failure’—a
concept arising out of the neoclassical idealisation of markets with its patently
false assumptions. Not only do market-failure arguments have the perverse effect
of reinforcing the dominant paradigm, they fail to gain policy traction in practice.
I am concerned particularly with the misuse of this school of economic thought
to justify the excesses of the pro-market ‘reforms’ and the mean-spirited social
policies that are occurring throughout the world.
While critiques of neoclassical economics are common, most are highly
specialised, addressing particular concerns within a Newtonian/Enlightenment
framework. They are not accessible to most readers and, on the whole, they have
failed to influence policy makers. This failure reflects the entrenched power of
this school in policy circles. In any event, I feel that the problem lies at a more
fundamental level. What is required is a change of paradigm, licensing multiple,
partial perspectives, rather than a more refined dominant formalism based on
stylised assumptions. Consequently, my research has been directed at trying to
x
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articulate that more fundamental critique to myself, and then to communicate
it to a wider audience. While I don’t expect to convince many committed
economic fundamentalists and mainstream economists of the error of their ways,
I do hope to persuade the rest of us to stop listening to them.
The book sets out to examine the claims of economic fundamentalism from a
number of complementary perspectives, building a case for a less dogmatic and
more eclectic and pragmatic approach to public policy formation. Chapter 1,
‘Setting the Scene’, begins our journey proper by describing the problem as I
see it. It describes the strong influence of economic fundamentalism on
contemporary public policy and emphasises the way in which a fundamentalist
vocabulary derived from mainstream economics now dominates public policy
discourse, forcing out other vocabularies.
Chapter 2, ‘The Creation of Social Order is Irreducibly a Moral Project’, begins
the critique proper by criticising the economic fundamentalist view that the
social order is based wholly on self-interest. It takes an evolutionary and
constructionist approach, pointing out that we are social animals, creating our
social worlds, our moral order, through language and stories. It goes on to criticise
the Enlightenment optimism that human beings are perfectible, drawing on some
traditional religious ideas and some recent experience to illustrate the point.
Chapter 3, ‘The Relationship Between the Economic System and the Social Order’,
continues the critique begun in Chapter 2. It draws, in particular, on Towards
a Just Social Order by Derek L. Phillips5  to provide a summary account of recent
theoretical approaches to social order, suggesting, however, that there is no need
to adopt a unicausal account of that order, or to take such speculative theoretical
stories too seriously. Importantly, the chapter concludes by arguing that the
moral order cannot be reduced to a social contract. Chapter 4, ‘A Brief Account
of the Historical Origins of Economic Fundamentalism’, goes on to give a historical
account of the development of the social-contract ideas that underpin economic
fundamentalism. In giving this account, I have drawn on work by Charles M.
A. Clark6  and Patrick Atiyah7  in particular.
Chapter 5, ‘A Critique of the Conceptual Foundations of Economic
Fundamentalism’, critiques the Enlightenment and modernism and the attempt
to find a foundation for certain knowledge. It points to the dissolution of the
modern world-view and the false certainty that comes with it. There is no certain
knowledge and such knowledge as we possess is constructed socially from a
particular point of view. Chapter 6, ‘The Privileged Status of “Science”’, builds
on the above critique of the Enlightenment to criticise the crude
nineteenth-century positivist understanding of ‘science’ on which economic
fundamentalism relies. It draws on the account given in Blaug’s Methodology of
Economics8  in particular, supplemented by the accounts of numerous other
theorists to emphasise that scientific knowledge is always constructed socially
xi
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from a particular perspective, that there are no privileged perspectives and such
knowledge is forever subject to revision. It concludes that the claim that science
has a privileged epistemological status in virtue of its empirical basis cannot be
sustained. Rather, scientific inquiry and normative theorising use much the same
practical reasoning. The chapter then extends to a discussion of the social
disciplines, seeing the claims of social science as being even more open to
question.
Chapter 7, ‘What, Then, Can We Say of the Status of Economics?’, goes on to
suggest that there is no such thing as a value-free social discipline. Economics
should, therefore, be seen as a moral discipline, rather than as a quasi-natural
science. I go on to criticise recent suggestions that economists should study
moral philosophy on the basis that it is an appeal from one failed Enlightenment
project to another. This is not to suggest that a morally aware economist is a bad
thing, rather that moral and political theorising should have no privileged status
in policy making. These are only two of the numerous sources of the stories that
form the values of our society.
Chapter 8, ‘The Critique of Neoclassical Economics and its Influence on Policy
Decisions’, provides a critique of neoclassical economics on the basis that it is
largely a failed attempt to give a mechanistic account of the functioning of the
economic system. What we need is not a reformed neoclassical economics—a
reformed Newtonian theory—but rather a richer set of metaphors for describing
economic life. While experimental, behavioural economics, information economics
and new growth theory have all contributed important new insights that act as
correctives to neoclassical theorising, we need to get beyond the idea that
economic theorising can describe or legislate an ideal form of economic
organisation. Consequently, we need to recognise that policy decisions are policy
experiments, rather than deductions from well-established deterministic theory.
This should take us towards a more evolutionary approach that attempts to take
the complexity of economic life seriously. Nevertheless, it needs to be kept in
mind that there are no privileged perspectives, only more or less useful ones,
and neoclassical theorising will still have a place in particular situations. The
chapter concludes by suggesting that the teaching of economics should be altered
so that the core content of undergraduate courses consists of the philosophy of
the social disciplines, the history of economic thought, contemporary schools
of economic thought—and then, and only then, a more detailed study of
particular schools.
Chapter 9, ‘The Doctrine of Freedom of Contract’, is intended to provide an
important example of the influence of economic ideas on a fundamental legal
institution: the law of contract. An extreme version of this doctrine underpins
much of economic fundamentalism. The chapter gives a historical account of the
attitude to contract law and fair-trading issues in the United Kingdom and the
xii
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United States in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries—attitudes that we in
Australia have inherited. Chapter 10, ‘Some Normative Reflections’, is a normative
reflection on what has gone before. Taking something that is a good—such as
economic analysis, markets, human rights, liberty or money—and turning it
into an absolute is the essence of a new idolatry.
I would like to acknowledge the support and encouragement I have received
from a large number of people. I owe a debt of gratitude to my close friend Ken
Lees, who, while not a professional academic, is a man of deep learning who
first encouraged me to resume my studies. He has been a sounding board
throughout this journey. Special thanks are also due to Professor Don Lamberton,
a leading information economist who has guided me through much of my studies
and has tolerated my vehement criticism of his profession. Don has been generous
with his friendship, knowledge, time and books, and has been a source of
constant encouragement and stimulus. I am also grateful for the encouragement
and friendship of the late Professor Peter Self. Numerous others have encouraged
me in this task. These include Dr Evan Jones, David Hull and Harvey Anderssen,
who have read, corrected and commented on numerous drafts of the chapters,
and Professor Frank Stilwell, Daniel Wells, Chris Hayward, John Revesz, Janet
Pagan and Professor Jim Davis. Professor Pat Troy and his colleagues at The
Australian National University provided hospitality and encouragement at a
crucial moment when I first resumed my studies. I am grateful also for the
constant encouragement and tolerance I have received from my wife, Vicki
Boldeman, and our offspring in what has been a long journey. Emily Boldeman
designed the cover.
ENDNOTES
1  Keynes 1936, p. 383.
2  Keynes 1926, p. 39 (emphasis in original).
3  Frankfurt 1992.
4  Philips 2006.
5  Phillips 1986.
6  Clark 1992.
7  Atiyah 1979.




Chapter 1: Setting the Scene
The life of the avaricious resembles a funeral banquet. For though it has
all things requisite to a feast, yet no one present rejoices.
— Pythagoras1
Money, gentlemen, money! The Virus
That infects mankind with every sickness
— Sophocles2
Without justice, all kingdoms are but bands of robbers.
— St Augustine3
Justice…is the main pillar that upholds the whole edifice. If it is removed,
the great, the immense fabric of human Society…must in a moment
crumble into atoms.
— Adam Smith4
In this book, I dispute the value of the shallow, all-encompassing, dogmatic
economic theories advanced by economic policy elites in recent public policy
debates, along with their gross simplifications and sacred rules. Economics cannot
provide a convincing overarching theory of government action or of social action
more generally, and should not be used for that purpose. Nor can economics
define an ideal form of social or economic organisation against which to measure
our institutional and organisational arrangements.
This critique should not be taken to mean that I believe that markets, prices and
property are unimportant economic institutions. Rather, these institutions
perform very useful roles in the coordination of economic activity. Nor should
my critique be interpreted as meaning that I think macroeconomic stability is
not an important policy goal. There is, however, more to successful economic
management and welfare creation than macroeconomic stability—and there is
a lot more to governing a country than economic management. Rather, my
critique is directed against the mainstream, dogmatic, mechanistic, imperialist
and fundamentalist framework that is currently being used to analyse the
economic system and to justify policy decisions. This framework has its origins
in libertarian political philosophy and in neoclassical economics and the excessive
faith in markets that they promote. It is simply not true that the so-called invisible
hand of the market will operate unaided to maximise individual and social welfare
even within the false, crude and positivist understanding of welfare used in
economics. There is much more to human welfare and happiness than economic
welfare. It means that we should not become slaves to these institutions.
In rejecting the false certainty of naïve, simplistic, fundamentalist economic
theorising—and the dehumanising and stupid policies that flow from it—I
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advocate a more overtly experimental, eclectic and pragmatic approach to policy
development. This is an approach that takes much more seriously the complex,
interdependent, evolving nature of society and the economy, and the important
roles played in our society by our traditions, our values and by political
compromise. Importantly, it is an outlook that recognises the pervasive influence
of asymmetries of wealth, power and information on bargaining power and
prospects throughout society. As Martin Hollis and Edward Nell tell us:
Individual incomes do not result from individual hard work but from
exercises of power, political decisions, tradition and other social forces,
not least the hierarchical organisation of productive work…The clear
implication is that there is no natural nor any efficient allocation of
incomes. A competitive scramble for incomes is simply a power struggle
and there is no hope of basing an ‘incomes policy’ on the notion of
‘productive contribution’ or ‘efficiency’.5
Mine is an outlook that also pays adequate regard to the wide diversity of
economic schools and views, rather than adhering slavishly to the narrow,
contentious, contemporary orthodoxy. Importantly, I believe that the value
judgements that are at the heart of public policy decisions should not simply be
the province of manipulative fundamentalist economic technocrats and their
political allies; they are truly matters for decision by a properly informed
democratic polity. We have allowed economic rationalists and economists more
generally to usurp a role that rightly belongs to all of us!
Recent public policy debates throughout the world have been influenced heavily
by that complex of ideas known variously as Thatcherism, Reaganism,
neo-conservatism, neo-liberalism, and, in Australia, economic rationalism and,
in New Zealand, Rogernomics. Like all such complexes, the terms lack precision,
but they all attach to a misuse of basic economic concepts to justify a strong
faith in unregulated markets and an associated distrust of governments, politics,
politicians, government bureaucrats, government services and welfare provision.
Some critics see this lack of precision as a fatal flaw, but in doing so reveal their
ill-founded essentialist and positivist leanings.6  Rather, definitions should not
be judged as right or wrong, but only as helpful or unhelpful in delineating
useful categories.7  In this regard, Keith Webb warns us in his Introduction to
Problems in the Philosophy of Social Sciences that the very idea that any social
science can be built on shared and agreed concepts by careful definition has
been lost forever.8  Indeed, the great philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein
(1889–1951) taught us ‘[i]f you want to know the meaning of a word, look to its
use’.9
John Stone, the Secretary to the Treasury from 1979 to 1984 and a prominent
economic rationalist, has no such definitional problems. He says that the central
proposition of economic rationalism is that ‘markets will, generally speaking
2
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and over time, always provide more economically advantageous outcomes than
governments’.10  I, along with many others, view this as an extreme position
that is demonstrably untrue. Long experience in Australia and overseas
demonstrates that there are forms of government coordination that are welfare
enhancing. Nor does the claim follow logically from mainstream economic
analysis.11  As Joseph Stiglitz—a Nobel Prize-winning economist and the former
chairman of President Clinton’s Council of Economic Advisers and then Senior
Vice-President and Chief Economist of the World Bank—says of America’s recent
experience:
No one who has watched the corporate scandals, the wasted investments
of America’s boom, the idle resources of America’s bust, can truly believe
that markets, by themselves, result in efficient outcomes…The central
lesson that emerges from this story of the boom and bust—that there
needs to be a balance between the role of government and of the
market—is one which evidently the world has had to learn over and
over again.12
Consequently, Stiglitz is a strong critic of ‘deregulation run amok’.
Furthermore, Stone’s claim assumes the existence of clear, sharp, non-problematic
boundaries between markets and governments and between economic and
non-economic outcomes. These boundaries are, however, different legal, political
and intellectual constructs in different countries—not natural entities—and
they are open to continuing question. In any event, as I will argue in Chapter
2, the economic system is a subset of a broader, evolved and complex
interdependent social system in which governance in all its forms performs an
enabling coordinating role. Because it is a complex system, the distribution of
that coordinating role across various mechanisms cannot be determined on the
basis of simplistic reductive analysis. There is unlikely to be one unique ‘optimal’
solution to that distribution.
Additionally, many—if not most—economists agree, on the basis of long
experience and simple reasoning, that the government has a legitimate role to
play in the provision of public goods such as security, law and order, emergency
services, education and the creation and diffusion of new knowledge. Since
economic development is heavily dependent on knowledge processes—and since
it is generally conceded that knowledge has many of the properties of a public
good—government involvement would appear to be central to many
‘economically advantageous outcomes’. Nevertheless, no one—let alone Stone—is
arguing that the Department of the Treasury should be privatised.13  So we can
take it as read that the ‘generally speaking’ is far less general than might appear
at first sight. Herein lies the source of unending political debate. One might
notice in passing that economically advantageous outcomes—interpreted as
3
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static economic efficiency—have acquired a privileged status as a criterion for
policy action against other considerations.
The financial media promote the policy directions that flow from these extreme
attitudes: ‘as well as fiscal discipline, Australia needs continued economic reform.
More competition and deregulation, further privatisation and labour market
liberalisation and a smaller public sector are all imperative.’14  And, again, more
recently:
[T]here is a harder and politically important battle awaiting the Prime
Minister at home. This is the battle to maintain the momentum of
economic reform…The question is not whether the government has an
adequate reform agenda…it is whether it has the will to impose genuine
change on reform-resistant industries, with only lukewarm support from
a reform-weary parliament and public.15
One consequence of these attitudes in the United States is the proposal developed
in Congress after Hurricane Katrina for a substantial cut in services for the poor,
big tax cuts for the rich and increased budget deficits. It was the obsession with
budget cuts, however, that led to the poor response of US emergency authorities
to Katrina in the first place. These attitudes are reflected also in earlier madcap
and anti-democratic proposals from public-choice and libertarian circles to place
fiscal policy in the hands of ‘independent experts’, and for constitutions to be
amended to limit the size of the public sector. These proposals have generated
stillborn copycat proposals here from the Business Council of Australia and the
Centre for Independent Studies. The latter would limit the public sector in
Australia to 25 per cent of gross national product (GNP)—down from the current
level of about 32 per cent, which is already at the bottom of the league table of
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries and
about the same level as in the United States. In contrast, public expenditure in
the 15 original European Union countries amounts to 44 per cent of gross domestic
product (GDP). The effect of the proposal would be to reduce an already relatively
small public sector substantially to a level significantly lower than in most other
developed countries. Interestingly, the recent Australian economic ‘reform’
experience is now being touted as a model for European governments reluctant
to undertake similar reforms in the face of voter opposition.16
In the above description of our subject matter, I have been content to defer to
popular Australian usage and use the term ‘economic rationalism’. This usage
focuses attention on the inflated rationalism in economics and political theory
that underpins an excessive faith in the market. Other terms have, however,
been suggested. For example, Peter Self used the term ‘market ideology’,17
Stiglitz18  and George Soros19  used ‘market fundamentalism’ and John Quiggin
sometimes used ‘free-market radicalism’.20  Some readers could prefer one of
these alternatives because they have the virtue of focusing attention directly on
4
The Cult of the Market
an uncritical and excessive adulation of markets. Such adulation is not confined
to the economics profession—and the association could unfairly condemn many
economists. There are many economists who are trying to untie the Gordian
knot of neoclassical economics. Furthermore, there are many fine neoclassical
economists—including Nobel Prize winners—who have been critics of
unrestrained pro-market policies. They have, however, been voices crying in
the recent economic policy wilderness.
Some could argue that there is no necessary logical connection between
mainstream or neoclassical economics and such market adulation—a view that
is implicit in my use of the term ‘misuse’ in preference to ‘use’. This argument
is, however, beside the point. In my long policy experience, economists and
some political scientists use neoclassical economics on a daily basis as a
justification for extreme pro-market policies within government, academic
institutions and the media. Such attitudes seem to be a common outcome of
neoclassical economic training. For my part, I want to emphasise the
fundamentalist and religious nature of these beliefs and include these ideas in
my title. Throughout the book, I use the shorthand term ‘economic
fundamentalism’—the term used normally by John Langmore and John Quiggin21
—because it focuses attention on the leading source of these extreme ideas.
In this regard, it is important to recognise that the exaggerated claim of economic
fundamentalism is a claim to moral authority: authority to determine policy
directions based on an assertion of superior economic knowledge—knowledge
of the way in which the economy operates and should operate. Economics
constitutes the powerful thought collective, an institutionalised community
providing the interpretive strategies on which this fundamentalism depends.
As contemporary historian of economic ideas and economic methodologist Mark
Blaug tells us, however, economics is sick, having abandoned any genuine
attempt to understand how real markets work for the soporific scholasticism
and empty formalism of esoteric intellectual models.22 This reflects a bias in
ancient Greek, Christian and Enlightenment thought in favour of contemplation
and theory over practice. Indeed, Joseph Needham (1900–95), the famous
historian of Chinese science, warns us that ‘there has always been a close
connection between these rationalist anti-empirical attitudes and the age-old
superiority complex of administrators’.23
In this spirit, I argue that the idealisation—even idolisation—of markets and of
the individual economic actor, which is at the heart of mainstream economics,
elevates and distorts their place in the economic system. As we will see later,
modelling economic processes as if they were a mechanical system is a
fundamentally flawed research strategy. Inappropriate policies derived from




Again, such attitudes are reinforced by the triumphal and imperialist pretensions
of economics as illustrated by the following recent claims by Jack Hirshleifer,
which fly in the face of daily experience: ‘There is only one social science…What
gives economics its imperialist invasive power is that our analytical
categories—scarcity, cost, preferences, opportunities, etc—are truly universal
in applicability…Thus economics really does constitute the universal grammar
of social science.’24
Consistent with the above, Hirshleifer earlier revealed social Darwinist tendencies
with his adulation of the survival of the fittest when, failing to notice the
fundamental importance of social cooperation in human evolution, he claimed
falsely that ‘the evolutionary approach suggests that self-interest is ultimately
the prime motivator of humans as of all life’.25
Gary Becker, another Nobel Prize winner, expresses similar sentiments in his
Treatise on the Family:
[The] economic approach is not restricted to material goods and wants
or to markets with monetary transactions, and conceptually does not
distinguish between major and minor decisions or between ‘emotional’
and other decisions. Indeed…the economic approach provides a
framework applicable to all human behaviour…all types of decisions
and to persons from all walks of life.26
Consequently, Becker makes the wild claim that there is a market in marriages.
To conceive of the social, legal institution of marriage in such terms is, however,
to debase marriage into long-term prostitution, and human beings into
commodities. Becker claimed that his Nobel Prize reflected an official institutional
recognition within economics of the extension of the domain of microeconomic
analysis to a wide range of non-market behaviours.27  It is this overblown
confidence in the capacity of economics to analyse all issues and solve all
problems that leads to such policy nonsense as the following from leading
American economist and legal theorist Judge Richard Posner: ‘The baby shortage
and the black market are the result of legal restrictions that prevent the market
from operating as freely in the sale of babies as of other goods. This suggests as
a possible reform simply eliminating the restrictions.’28
One is reminded of Jonathan Swift’s (1667–1745) satirical proposal that the Irish
poor breed their babies for the table. That the overwhelming majority of the
population rightly regards the sale of babies as morally repugnant and utterly
unacceptable seems to have passed Posner by. One wonders whether—following
the same logic—he is prepared also to deregulate the market for judicial
judgements, or does he somehow consider the moral and legal obligations of
judicial officers to be more sacred than the moral and legal obligations of parents
for their babies?
6
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Importantly, not all prominent economists share these sentiments. For example,
Joseph Schumpeter (1883–1950) told us ‘[n]o social system can work which is
based exclusively upon a network of free contracts between [legally] equal
contracting parties and in which everyone is supposed to be guided by nothing
except his own [short-term] utilitarian ends’.29  Similarly, contemporary English
economist Paul Ormerod warns us: ‘The ability of economists to claim
omniscience, to believe that the discipline is the first to explain anything worth
knowing, really is extraordinary and can only serve to irritate both students
and non-economists.’30
In short, such intellectual arrogance rightly infuriates everyone else. Implicit in
this imperialism is the positivist aspiration for economics to become the physics
of the social disciplines, with the status of the overarching and privileged social
theory. As we will see later, this aspiration has its roots in the Enlightenment31
and the particular form of social and political theorising that it spawned. In
addition to enhancing the self-importance of such economists, this aspiration
has the added advantage of saving them from the trouble of listening to what
other social theorists have to contribute to our understanding of human society.
It also saves them from having to deal with a vast literature challenging their
knowledge claims. A wide range of opinion from leading social scientists and
philosophers will be cited throughout this book to illustrate the point. The
simplistic attempts to explain the operations of our various political systems and
constitutional arrangements using neoclassical economic principles are examples
that give rise to particular concern. Much opposition to government coordination
and regulation flows directly from these crude attempts.
While this fundamentalism involves a misuse of mainstream economic analysis,
the economics profession as a whole cannot avoid some responsibility for this
misuse of its analysis to undermine confidence in collective decision making and
action. After all, even libertarian philosopher and economist Friedrich von Hayek
(1899–1992) warns us that an ‘economist who is only an economist is likely to
become a nuisance if not a positive danger’.32
The intellectual arrogance noted above contrasts with the more usual and more
modest understanding that the social sciences ‘are composed of “schools”,
“paradigms”, “research programmes”, “approaches”, or “theories”, none of
which has a monopoly on knowledge’. Consequently, ‘a knowledge of social
science involves acceptance of eclecticism and a multitude of ways of knowing’.33
The very study of mainstream economics, however, involves an insidious
commoditisation by which all human activity is reduced to a single
motive—individual gain—with all social institutions to be derived from that
motive. As Edgeworth claimed in 1881: ‘The first principle of Economics is that
every agent is actuated only by self-interest.’34  As Nobel Prize-winning
economist Amartya Sen has confirmed, while this attitude reflects particular
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formulations of certain general philosophical questions posed in the past, it
survives intact in much modern economic theory.35  Mainstream economics has
failed to pay regard to the institutional frameworks that discipline self-interest
and individual choice, enable economic activity and underpin society.
Furthermore, such economists have failed to notice that—on their own
account—we ought to conclude that their arguments reflect only their own
self-interest, having no necessary relation to the truth.36  Furthermore, if the
rational-expectations theory were true there would be no need for economists
at all.37 Their own conduct gives the lie to what they are saying.
Importantly, modelling human beings only as self-interested utility maximisers
is inherently debasing. This is no new objection. John Stuart Mill (1806–73),
one of the heroes of liberalism, in criticising similar assumptions made by
utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832), had this to say in 1861:
Nothing is more curious than the absence of recognition in any of his
writings of the existence of conscience…Nor is it only the moral part of
man’s nature, in the strict sense of the term—the desire for perfection,
or the feeling of an approving conscience or of an accusing
conscience—that he overlooks; he but faintly recognises, as a fact in
human nature, the pursuit of any other ideal end for its own sake. The
sense of honour, and personal dignity—that feeling of personal exaltation
and degradation which acts independently of other people’s opinion, or
even in defiance of it; the love of beauty, the passion of the artist; the
love of order, of congruity, of consistency in all things, and conformity
to their end; the love of power, not in the limited form of power over
other human beings, but abstract power, the power of making our
volitions effectual; the love of action, the thirst for movement and
activity, a principle scarcely of less influence in human life than its
opposite, the love of ease—none of these powerful constituents of human
nature are thought worthy of a place among the ‘Springs of
Action’…Man, that most complex of being, is a very simple one in his
eyes.38
I would go further. It is not so much that such an account of human motivation
is partial but that it is grossly distorted and destructive of human sociability. It
leaves out and undermines our most important qualities—the qualities that make
us human and life worthwhile. In particular, it leaves out the capacity to love
and care for our families, our friends and neighbours, broadly defined. It is those
loving relationships that guide and nurture our developing consciousness in the
first place.
When one takes a serious look at the care and attention being poured into our
family, friends, colleagues and fellow citizens, the economic aspects of our lives
beyond the basic level of sustenance pale into insignificance. In short, modelling
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human beings as essentially self-interested utility maximisers misconceives
radically the nature of humankind. When have any of us attended a funeral to
hear the deceased described with approval as the essential human being: ‘a utility
maximiser, with a healthy self-image’? To the extent that we harbour such
thoughts, we are more likely to think: ‘he was a selfish bastard, who won’t be
missed’. Much—if not most—of life is taken up with the very long-term care
of those closest to us and this everyday, complex experience defies reasonable
description as self-interest. When it comes to the crunch, we expect our
emergency services and military personnel to place their lives at risk in the
service of their communities, in their line of duty—and they do! Ordinary people
rise to great heights of heroism to help and save complete strangers. We talk,
write and make films endlessly about this extraordinary aspect of human life,
so there is no excuse for so-called ‘scientific theorists’ to downplay or ignore it
in the interest of their half-baked parsimonious explanations. Importantly, this
modelling also leaves out of the equation the continuing conflict between that
capacity to love and care and our greed and lust for power—tendencies that
have to be disciplined if human society is to survive and flourish.
This social theorising, this particular form of story-telling, this attempt to make
sense of particular aspects of human experience, is closely related to the question
of who we are—a question that has exercised the imaginative, speculative
narratives of human beings since the dawn of time. Stories of the gods, therefore,
helped ancient societies to introduce a narrative unity into the diversity of
observed events, simplicity into complexity and order into disorder.39  More
recently, this story-telling has been motivated in part by a general desire to find
secular substitutes for the certainty and existential comfort that we derived
formerly from religion and its stories40  in the face of the mystery of existence,
the fear of death, the trials of daily life and the sense of alienation we feel in our
contemporary, individualistic, technological civilisation. This mystery and the
attendant fears are always with us,41  along with a pressing desire to find meaning
in life and to control our destinies. This search for meaning necessarily involves
reference to something or someone beyond the self42  and seems to be the
inevitable result of the development of consciousness, language and narrative,
and the associated attempt to ascribe meaning and intentionality to what we
perceive, including our perception of ourselves. As leading symbolic
anthropologist Clifford Geertz (1926–2007) explains, the problem of meaning
raises the threat of chaos, creating in us an intolerable sense of analytical,
emotional and moral impotence.43  Furthermore, as Israeli sociologist Shmuel
Eisenstadt argues, the radical division that exists between the heavenly ideal
world and the everyday world in the Western tradition has exacerbated the
above tensions, rendering grace unattainable and spawning a this-worldly
asceticism in the search for secular substitutes for grace.44
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Similarly, American philosopher David Loy—arguing from a Buddhist
perspective—suggests that in the West we have been engaged in an increasingly
this-worldly search for somewhere to ground our sense of self in the face of the
breakdown in traditional beliefs. He tells us: ‘[I]nsofar as we think we have
escaped such a spiritual drive we are deceiving ourselves, for that drive…still
lives on in uncanny secular forms that obsess us because we do not understand
what motivates them.’45  In particular, lacking a traditionally religious conception
of sin, we are left without a means of expiating our sense of guilt and the
emptiness at our core. Loy goes on to argue that many of our modern worldly
values acquire their compulsiveness—and many modern institutions their
authority—from this misdirected spiritual drive.
These tensions demand some response, some faith to somehow secure our network
of beliefs and to justify our practices. Consequently, society remains theological
because its values and institutions cannot help being based on some ultimate
view about human nature. Consistent with this view, Geertz defines religion as
a system of symbols that acts to establish powerful, persuasive and long-lasting
moods and motivations in people by formulating conceptions of a general order
of existence and clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that
the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic.46  In this sense, religious
beliefs remain inescapable47  and act to justify and sustain our socio-economic
order. In pre-literate tribal life, oral and other symbolic forms were considered
openly magical and complex social differentiations were employed to ensure the
proper use of symbolic and oral language. In these earlier societies, religious
specialists, shamans, astrologers and medicine men were the guardians of the
most powerful words, symbols and stories about the conduct of social life,48
and were, as a result, the most respected and powerful members of those
societies.49  In our society, however, it is the scientist who has displaced the
priest as the moral exemplar and the person who keeps humanity in touch with
something beyond us50  —the ‘really real’. This explains the desperate anxiety
of numerous disciplines, including economics, to be seen as being ‘scientific’.
This becomes particularly dangerous when combined with intellectual and
spiritual arrogance and the desire to work policy magic. This does not mean that
these religious are insincere; they truly believe they are serving the greater
good—but so were the Mayans as they ripped the hearts out of their sacrificial
victims.
This particular economic faith—economic fundamentalism, which is an
institutionalised and extreme form of secularised Calvinism—arises under the
influence of the pseudo-religious beliefs of the Enlightenment and the associated
erosion of traditional religious beliefs. This faith resonates in modern materialistic
societies where material success is equated with moral virtue and high status.51
The need to erect new faiths as old faiths are eroded has been compounded by
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modernity’s misplaced confidence that science can deliver certain knowledge
to produce a secularised form of religious fundamentalism based on an excessive
faith in the justice, efficiency and rationality of market processes and determined
to root out what it sees as the evil of excessive government. Given the extent to
which other forms of fundamentalism have caught on in the United States—and
the historical influence of Calvinist theology, possessive individualism and
Lockean political thought in forming that country’s unique understanding of
itself—it is not surprising that this particular form of fundamentalism has a
strong grip there. In this regard, Martin Marty and Scott Appleby describe
fundamentalism as a habit of mind found within religious communities among
beleaguered individuals who feel that their identities are at risk.52  In the search
for doctrinal simplicity, certainty and right behaviour, fundamentalists are
driven to a selective retrieval of doctrines, beliefs and practices from a sacred
past. Renewed religious identity therefore becomes the absolute basis for
recreating the political and social order by an authoritarian leadership. The
evangelical, proselytising nature of such fundamentalism makes a particularly
powerful brew when married to the American understanding of themselves as
the new Chosen People, occupying the new Promised Land with a special mission
in the world sanctioned by God.53
Going much further than can be justified, feigning scientific objectivity and
claiming certainty, the dogmatic prophets of profit behave, on the whole, like
the priestly class of an exotic cult, waging holy war to create new theocratic
states in which their interpretation of neoclassical economics and libertarian
philosophy provides the core theology. In common with other cults, other
fundamentalisms, other emotional bolt-holes, this theology involves an exotic
closed system of knowledge beyond the understanding on non-initiates whose
protests are dismissed arrogantly as the bleatings of the ignorant. Having erected
a disciplinary edifice as elaborate as any created by medieval scholastic theology,
the devotees stand fearful behind walls built on simplistic and unrealistic
assumptions ready to repel all critics through obscure terminology and
labyrinthine reasoning—a new Tower of Babel resplendent with intellectual
pride.
Wielding significant influence over government, such economists are the new
theocracy, the contemporary manifestation of Plato’s guardians. Economics
provides true believers with a new faith tradition complete with values, ideas
of welfare54  and of progress, which dominate public discourse and which seek
to reshape our institutions and organisations.55  Indeed, the similarity between
economics and religion has often attracted comment. For example, American
theologian Harvey Cox56  recently reported that most of the concepts he came
across when reading the business pages were quite familiar. He tells us that the
language of those pages bears a striking resemblance to Genesis, the Epistle to
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the Romans and Saint Augustine’s ‘City of God’. Cox is not alone in detecting
in such pages an entire theology, a grand narrative about the inner meaning of
human history, why things went wrong and how to put them right. What he
finds in the business pages—in only thin disguise—are the theologian’s myths
of origin, legends of fall and doctrines of sin and redemption: chronicles about
the creation of wealth, the seductive temptations of statism, captivity to faceless
economic cycles and, ultimately, salvation through the advent of free
markets—with a small dose of ascetic belt tightening along the way. There were
even sacraments to convey salvific power to the lost, a calendar of entrepreneurial
saints, an evangelising group and a teaching about the end of history or what
theologians call eschatology. Then there are the heretics and infidels, those who
refuse to bow down before these religious beliefs and who have been cast into
outer policy darkness.
The consequence has been that the market system—which is only an evolved
organisational technique for coordinating a disparate set of ‘economic’ activities,
a cultural artefact—has become an end in itself, the object of excessive devotion
and the source of our identity. Economists and libertarians have helped turn a
useful, if flawed, tool into a god—THE MARKET—which we all must serve.
Such conduct used to be called idolatry, a demonic perversion of true religion,
something that used to be considered the gravest of all human failings. This
idolatry threatens to enslave us all by misleading us about what is necessary to
a worthwhile life.57 This cult is creating a vicious cycle of commoditisation,
undermining other values and promoting an ever-increasing culture of production
and consumption under the delusion that this is the path to true happiness, the
path to a secular salvation.58 This is, however, a spiritual need that production
and consumption cannot meet. As William Barrett warns us: ‘Nothing is more
compelling, and more dangerous, than the idea that is all-embracing, unqualified,
and so simple that it appears to settle all doubts.’59 The result for Loy is that
‘the market’ cult has become the most successful religion of all time—achieving
an almost universal hegemony.
This is no idle comparison. Economists in contemporary capitalist states exercise
as much power as the high priests of old or as the Inquisition in Medieval Europe.
Developing countries, for example, have been subjected to enormous pressure
to ‘liberalise’ from economists in international economic institutions such as the
World Bank, backed by sanctions every bit as effective as those exercised by
earlier religious authorities—even if they are less overtly violent—and often
with catastrophic results.
My preference for the term economic fundamentalism has the added advantage
of not being as open to vicarious insult from economic fundamentalists claiming
that their critics are economic irrationalist—the ‘trick of charging anyone who
does not agree with a particularly narrow version of French rationalism or British
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empiricism as an “irrationalist”’.60  As Quiggin points out, dogmatic assertions
and the claim that anyone who holds contrary views is not a real economist are
standard features of economic fundamentalist rhetoric.61 This dogmatism flows
from an ill-founded belief that neoclassical economics provides us with the
scientific explanation of economic phenomena—an explanation that aspires to
the status of absolute scientific truth. As John Ralston Saul has pointed out,
however, such certainty is simply a form of bullying.62  As we will see later, it
is the economic fundamentalists who are the poor economists and philosophers.
The infiltration of economic fundamentalism into public policy debates in recent
decades has seen the adoption of a new radical ‘conservatism’63  and the
progressive slide of Western democracies towards the political Right. In that
slide, the very different terms ‘democracy’ and ‘market economy’ have been
conflated in the minds of many analysts—particularly in the United
States—despite the tensions between them. Words such as ‘choice’, ‘liberty’,
‘freedom’, ‘democracy’, ‘reform’, ‘progress’, ‘rationality’ and ‘man’—symbols
that have resonated powerfully in the Western tradition—have become some
of the more abused terms in political discourse as a result of the attempt to
appropriate them to serve these radical views. The consequence has been that
a small, privileged, insulated, economic and political elite—hiding behind the
claimed value neutrality of and ‘scientific’ status of economics—has imposed its
impoverished political philosophy, values and sectional interests on the wider
community under the rubric of ‘economic reform’.
This slide to the Right has been assisted by the process of globalisation—a process
tending to homogenise Western capitalism and cultures around what are claimed
to be American models and values with the very strong support of international
economic agencies and the US government. In this regard, Stiglitz forthrightly
acknowledges and rejects the recent ideologically driven, self-serving hypocrisy
and the bullying involved in US advocacy of deregulated markets and in US
trade policies and their inconsistency with the principles of social justice and
democracy.64  Of course, those who see the United States as an exemplar have
forgotten that it was only a little time ago that the US economy was performing
very poorly compared with the then exemplars of Japan and Germany. In this
regard, it is important to emphasise that capitalism is only a relatively recent
development and that it is not a monolithic system, the same in every
manifestation. There have been significant differences in the institutions, values
and traditions underpinning the market systems of different countries. In
particular, America’s Puritan heritage and her Lockean political philosophy have
involved a strong emphasis on legalistic property and individual rights. This
has led to the idea of ‘America’ and her moral values, her distinctive civil religion,
her particular construction of a collective identity, being centred on the
individual and on individual instrumental reasoning, rather than in the public
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sphere as in some other countries. The American secularised Calvinist search for
signs of ‘divine election’, signs of participation in a secularised ‘Kingdom of
God’ on Earth, has become centred on individual economic status. These factors
have shaped America’s particular understanding of capitalism as a system with
special moral status. That system has increasingly occupied the central place in
the US version of modernity and has led to enormous pressure on other US
institutions such as the State, the family and the Church to accommodate
themselves to the logic of the market, while undermining the idea of politics as
a shared search for the good of society.65
The United States is not, however, the Kingdom of God, or Augustine’s ‘City of
God’; it is just another human construct with all the imperfection that this
implies. For Robert Bellah, this ethic of individualistic self-interest66  has resulted
in the loss of the American vision of good. Similarly, Ann Swidler detects a
depletion of America’s cultural, institutional and social infrastructure.67 They
argue that US coherence as a society depends to a significant extent on its
pre-modern and early modern religious inheritance—an inheritance that is
eroding in the face of the competition for wealth and power and the atomising
tendencies inherent in possessive individualism. Similarly, leading American
theologian Stanley Hauerwas believes that the American experiment is in deep
trouble.68  In effect, THE MARKET demands devotion in all realms of life.
Nevertheless, the dominant position of the United States as the most significant
economic and military power in the contemporary world is playing a key role
in spreading these particular individualistic values—with their anti-statist bias,
their relative indifference to equity and a particular interpretation of
capitalism—to other countries on the unexamined assumption that the United
States and its particular institutional arrangements provide a universal model
for the rest of us.
One mechanism for the dissemination of US values is the current dominance of
the economics profession by Americans. As Stiglitz confirms, the basic tendency
of most American economists is to presume that markets work generally by
themselves and that there are just a few limited instances in which government
action is needed to correct ‘market failure’. He also reminds us that the economic
foundations for these assumptions are weak:
In a market economy with imperfect and asymmetric information and
incomplete markets—which is to say, every market economy—the reason
that Adam Smith’s invisible hand is invisible is that it does not exist.
Economies are not efficient on their own. This recognition inevitably
leads to the conclusion that there is a potentially significant role for
government.69
This resort by American economists to a culturally specific framework should
come as no surprise, as one of the themes in the philosophy of the social
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disciplines is the very difficulty of stepping outside one’s cultural framework.
In any event, the tacit assumptions of more conventional American economists
have largely shaped the creation of economic ‘knowledge’ and its dissemination
in recent decades. There is also the particular danger that, in a world
characterised by high mobility of capital, skilled labour and ideas, the
neo-conservative policies and practices of the United States are inducing a
competitive rush to the bottom—to the lowest common denominator—in the
same way that the Great Depression was exacerbated by the
beggar-thy-neighbour policies adopted throughout the world at that time.
The reality of American life, however, falls far short of its democratic ideals and
its image of itself as God’s own country. The United States—with its ‘weak’
State, its government captured by business interests, its declining public
infrastructure, its large exploited underclass, its huge disparities in income and
wealth, its high levels of economic insecurity, its 46 million citizens without
health insurance, its high levels of crime and violence, its very high murder rate
and its disproportionately high prison population—is not necessarily a country
that everyone else, let alone God, wants to emulate. What’s more, recent research
has shown that the belief that the US system promotes a high level of social
mobility is untrue.70 This is a country awash with arms and whose popular
culture glorifies violence. The consequence, as John Gray points out, is that the
United States and Russia are the only advanced countries in the world to use
mass incarceration as a means of social control.71 This mass incarceration reflects
the weakened condition of the other institutions on which social cohesion
depends. This criticism is not intended to deny the many great achievements of
US society, or the fine quality of many of its citizens and institutions, including
its tradition of private philanthropy. Rather, it is to balance any excessive
adulation of that society and its market system.
The danger is that the dissemination of these impoverished US values across the
world will ultimately undermine the sense of social solidarity and social trust
on which the continued existence of societies and nations depend. Globalisation
also uproots traditional forms of work, family and community life and brings
the risk of polarising communities between a small group of winners and a large
group of losers.72  Consequently, globalisation is a movement many fear as
economic and cultural imperialism—a process undermining values important
to particular societies while imposing other values espoused by a small imperialist
elite, particularly in the United States. Ironically, while being the leading
advocate of libertarianism and minimalist government, the United States does
not have a purely laissez-faire economy. While social policy in much of the
United States is mean-spirited and there is much economic exploitation, US
governments are highly active when it comes to agricultural, industrial and
innovation policy, heavily subsidising new business formation and industrial
innovation particularly through the defence budget and through tax policy.
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The slide to the Right has had the practical effect of limiting the range of political
choices available to us, and of altering the range of political solutions that are
viable. For example, there is a significant danger of creating a vicious cycle
undermining the public provision of services. The more public services are seen
as inferior social safety nets subject to arbitrary rationing—rather than the usual
source of high-quality services—the more likely it is that the quality of those
public services will be allowed to deteriorate, further eroding public and political
support for them. There is a very real possibility of arriving at a tipping point
where the public provision of such services is no longer an option. This provides
a good reason to oppose the public subsidisation of private services offered in
competition to publicly provided services such as we see in mixed public and
private health and education systems. A cynic might see here the potential for
a political strategy to undermine the public provision of health and education.
That same cynic, if he or she were an Australian observer, might wonder whether
we are currently witnessing the slow destruction by stealth of Australia’s
universal health-care system, Medicare, and our public education systems.
No wonder we see Australia as having become a meaner and trickier country in
recent years. This slide to the Right has resulted already in the incremental,
proximal unravelling of the class compromise achieved shortly after Federation
in 1901; the post-World War II government commitment to maintaining full
employment; the abolition of our unique industrial arbitration system; a
significant widening of income inequalities; an erosion of political commitment
to welfare provision—and to egalitarianism more generally; a reluctance to
undertake public borrowing for infrastructure investment; and an excessive
government focus on narrow financial considerations at the cost of broader
economic and social concerns. Let us be quite clear, however, about those narrow
financial considerations. No special economic virtue attaches to very low levels
of public-sector borrowing. Rather, it is responsible for governments to borrow
for investment in long-lived capital. What matters for macroeconomic
management is the total demand on resources and the productive capacity of
the economy and its growth. That management involves a balanced application
of monetary and fiscal measures and not an exclusive focus on monetary
measures.
Economic fundamentalism has also elevated the corporate sector to a privileged
position in economic life in which private enterprise is claimed to be inherently
superior to government action73  —an elevation reflected in the absurd, but
widely promoted, belief that the private sector is the source of all economic
welfare. In its exaggerated admiration for efficiency, flexibility, all things private
and the American way, economic fundamentalism brings with it what is known
as ‘managerialism’—a process in which private-sector methodologies and
language have invaded the public sector, transforming the way it is organised
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and operates. This managerial fad, while claiming to be democratic and
responsive, is in fact extremely conformist and authoritarian.74
Economic fundamentalism is associated also with a privileged vocabulary, which
is used to frame contemporary policy debates, to provide simple, pre-constructed
answers to complex questions and as clinchers to particular policy arguments:
terms such as ‘government intervention’ (the characterisation of government
activity on behalf of the community as an intrusion into the proper order,
justifiable only by special economic circumstances); ‘fiscal consolidation’ (the
advocacy of balanced government budgets at low levels of spending);
‘globalisation’ (close international economic integration, bringing with it the
potential loss of the ability to manage our economic affairs); ‘the level playing
field’ (the use of a trivial sporting analogy to oppose government assistance to
firms or industries); ‘microeconomic reform’ (the wholesale scrapping of
organisational arrangements developed over decades); ‘privatisation’ (the
government’s sale of the public’s interests in a range of infrastructure services,
sometimes at discounted prices); ‘competition policy’ (the unjustified assumption
that unbridled competition between business entities will necessarily improve
the lot of consumers and consequently general welfare, and the extension of
that assumption to government business enterprises); ‘deregulation’ (the removal
of government constraints on business activity imposed originally to serve
competing values, including limiting the abuse of market power, protecting
public safety and ensuring equitable treatment); ‘labour-market reform’ (the
reduction of human labour to a commodity, a concerted attack on unionism and
the dismantling of institutional protection for workers, bringing with it the
potential for a resumption by business of class warfare); ‘public–private
partnerships’ (justifying the private provision of basic infrastructure services
in return for monopoly rents); and, most recently, ‘mutual obligation’ (a new
version of the concept of the deserving poor). As such, they operate as rhetorical
devices to persuade policy makers and to quieten critics.
In short, economic fundamentalism provides the dominant vocabulary, the
group-think and the narrative frameworks that we use currently to legitimise
public policy decisions. They operate as blinkers to close minds to other
influences, other possibilities and other better worlds. In particular, these
pre-digested policies relieve us of the need to attend closely to the stories of our
people in their daily circumstances, rather than the speculative stories of our
economists. The heroic faith in progress inherent in these latter stories also
relieves us of the need to examine our past experience because, by definition,
that past is incapable of challenging the present. They also encourage us to forget
that, even in rich Western countries, let alone in underdeveloped countries,
Lazarus still sits at our gate. We have, however, forgotten the story of Lazarus,
which once challenged us to abandon the ancient self-righteous belief that
material success is a sign of individual moral virtue and of God’s favour.75
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This political language has been developed in a radical attempt to redefine
Australian society and its institutions, and the values that underpin them. This
is because the stories we tell, and the language we use to create our understanding
of who we are, how things are to be explained and how we should act. They
provide the ‘master narratives’ or the ‘master plots’ by which we structure our
lives, and by which ‘good’ and ‘evil’ can be identified—creating views of the
world out of which it is very difficult to break.76 They also define the
communities to which we can belong. In particular, participation in contemporary
policy communities involves a mastery of a particular form of language
game—economic stories derived from neoclassical economics and its associated
vocabulary and a willingness to use them to the exclusion of other stories and
other vocabularies. Through these stories and their slogans, economic
fundamentalists seek to control the ways in which we think about the human
condition and how we frame questions. These slogans are, therefore, instruments
of power, providing a contemporary version of George Orwell’s ‘Newspeak’.
Like Newspeak, this is language designed to narrow the range of thought and
to eliminate the possibility of expressing contrary ideas, feelings and qualities.77
As guardians of these powerful sacred words and symbols, economic
fundamentalists—like previous priestly classes—are among the most powerful
members of contemporary society, obliging our politicians to invoke their sacred,
magic words to justify their decisions. They have influenced heavily the
trajectory of government action in many countries, including in Australia since
the beginning of the Hawke government. It explains the desperate continuing
need of political leaders and aspiring leaders to appear to be economically literate
and fiscally conservative. Worse, much worse, they are also influencing the
activities we legitimise to ourselves, and the way in which we understand
ourselves.
A similar movement in the nineteenth century—which remained influential
until the Great Depression of the late 1920s and 1930s utterly discredited its
disastrous policy prescriptions—went under the name of laissez-faire. The two
movements share much in common, and economic fundamentalism can be seen
as a return to the values advanced by laissez-faire. For example, contemporary
Australian sociologist Michael Pusey, in Economic Rationalism in Canberra, sets
out to account for what he calls a ‘new and minimalist laissez-faire state set in
norms that come from a dominating neoclassical economic rationalism that is
anti-statist, anti-union and either asocial or anti-social in its basic orientation to
policy’.78
It is important to recognise, however, that economic fundamentalism arises from
a number of separate, though interrelated, sources, supported by powerful
interests and strong propaganda, providing ‘erroneous interpretations of the
18
The Cult of the Market
past, simplistic nostrums for the present and promises of universal benefits in
the future’.79 Those sources include:
• the attempt of neoclassical economics to provide ‘natural laws’ of economic
activity modelled on the formalisms of the classical physics of about the
1850s
• a parallel attempt of political and moral philosophy in the Enlightenment
tradition, particularly in Britain and the United States, to provide a
comprehensive ‘rational’ or ‘scientific’ justification of political and moral
arrangements and to rebuild those arrangements
• a related exultation of a particular negative view of freedom and of rugged
individualism, along with the promotion of fear of big government, by
Libertarian philosophers, the extreme contemporary followers of John Locke
(1632–1704), as exemplified in the writings of Friedrich Hayek (1899–1992),
James Buchanan (b. 1919), Ayn Rand (1905–82) and Robert Nozick
(1939–2002)
• a related application of crude social Darwinist ideas to political and social
systems
• the use of these ideas as an ideological justification of the capitalist system,
particularly in the face of the challenge posed by Marxism during the Cold
War
• the exploitation of those writings by business and political elites as a form
of self-justification for their privileges and obscene salary levels,80  and as
a means of undermining close government regulation of their activity.
Importantly, economists speak about contemporary public policy issues with
an apparent authority—an authority they claim to derive from their economic
expertise. Webb, however, claims that what ‘the social scientist cannot do is
either take over the policy-making process with a legitimacy derived from being
a social scientist, or act as an eminence grise behind the policy-making throne
while pretending to remain a social scientist’.81
Nevertheless, economists have been active and influential in public policy debates
from the dawn of the profession—very often in opposition to social initiatives
to improve the lot of the underprivileged. Such was this influence that British
statesman and political philosopher Edmund Burke (1729–97) described the
eighteenth century as the age of the economist.82  Indeed, Smith’s The Wealth
of Nations, published in 1776, had a major impact on political thought and on
leading politicians, including the then Prime Minister, Pitt the Younger
(1759–1806). Unfortunately, the parts of Smith’s thought that suited the
propertied ruling class were appropriated while his concern for moral sentiments
and justice for the poor were ignored.83
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Similarly, Bentham’s Defence of Usury of 1796 provided the intellectual
foundations for later efforts to repeal usury laws in England and the United
States.84  By the end of the century, the classical economic literature was well
known to the educated public and was influential in policy making generally.
Given the proliferation of a wide range of technical and scientific information
in the same period, it is not surprising that these speculations and the associated
policy ideas took on the authority and prestige of the science and technology
of the time. Paul Mantoux, writing about the same period, tells us:
The policy of laissez-faire was supreme and went unchallenged in the
Courts as well as in Parliament. While that policy, at first, had been
purely empirical, and had not been followed in all cases, it was now
supported by the peremptory formulas of political economy: there it
found its theoretical justification while its actual raison d’etre and its
practical power was derived from the interests of the capitalist class.
Theory and interest, walking hand in hand, proved irresistible.85
The result was an intensification of economic exploitation and political
oppression.86  Edward Thompson, for example, described the enclosure
movement—a movement that had been under way for a long time—as a plain
case of class robbery. Stretching back into Tudor times but intensifying in the
late eighteenth century, that movement occurred under rules established by a
parliament of property-owners and lawyers in which new capitalist property
definitions were imposed on rural villages, dispossessing the occupiers of
common-right cottages of their customary rights and converting some of those
rights to theft, which was severely punished. It was, however, these customary
rights that had enabled the rural poor to subsist. The result was the destruction
of traditional English peasant society, a radical sense of displacement and the
proletarianisation of a growing army of labourers.87  Gray calls this period a
far-reaching experiment in social engineering designed to free economic life
from social and political control, breaking up the socially rooted market that
had existed in England for centuries.88  It was an experiment that threatened to
undermine social cohesion.
It was a harsh time for the working class and the poor in England, reflecting the
very uneven distribution of power and wealth; they were generally held in
contempt by an arrogant, indolent, ruling elite—the propertied class—who saw
the working class as idle and depraved. Consequently, working people were
denied basic political rights and their agitation for such rights was suppressed
violently in the panic generated by widespread unrest and by the French
Revolution.89  Pitt the Younger, the admirer of Smith, was responsible for a
series of repressive actions and legislation between 1793 and 1801.90  For example,
the 1793 Aliens Act prevented any French Republican from coming to England.
The leaders of the London Correspondence Society were arrested in 1794,
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questioned by the Privy Council—including Prime Minister Pitt—and charged
with high treason, the penalty for which was hanging, drawing and quartering.91
The society itself was outlawed.
In 1794, the suspension of habeas corpus also allowed the arrest and
imprisonment of people ‘on suspicion’, without requiring charges or a trial.
Local Justices of the Peace (JPs), who came from the propertied class, were
ordered to investigate and prosecute leaders of the Correspondence Societies.
Many were imprisoned as a result. Tom Paine’s Rights of Man of 1791–92, which
attacked the monarchy, class privilege and the barbarity of the penal code, and
which advocated income tax, family allowances, public education, old-age
pensions and maternity benefits, was banned as seditious libel and he was driven
into exile. Similarly, the 1795 Treasonable Practices Act made a vicious attack
on personal liberties, extending the definition of ‘treason’ to include speaking
and writing, and attacking public meetings, clubs and the publication of
pamphlets. In 1795, the Seditious Meetings Act required public meetings of more
than 50 people to be authorised by a magistrate, while JPs were given
discretionary power to disperse any public meeting. In 1797, taxes on printed
matter were increased vastly to price cheap periodicals out of the market. In
1799 and 1800, the Combination Acts forbade societies or amalgamations of people
for the purpose of bringing about political reform, while interference with
commerce and trade became illegal. This legislation was not repealed until 1824.
The breaking of machines in the face of widespread economic distress induced
by the competitive pressures of industrialisation was made a capital offence in
1812. At least 33 men were executed as a result, including one Abraham
Charlston, who was only twelve years old and who reportedly cried for his
mother on the scaffold.92  Others were transported to New South Wales. The
Scottish courts were even more repressive than the English courts.93  In summary,
it can be said that not only was the working class subject to severe economic
exploitation and distress, the attempt on its part to combine to obtain better
wages and conditions was ruthlessly opposed. As recently as 1844, the minimum
age for entering factory work was reduced to eight years of age under pressure
from mill owners.94
Another important early economist was Thomas Malthus (1766–1834). He claimed
in 1798 that economic science had found that ‘man’—with his inherent
self-interest—was inert, sluggish and averse to labour unless compelled by
necessity to be otherwise. For Malthus, the problem of the poor was the problem
of over-population. For him, there were too many poor people—they were
redundant! In this view, poverty was the natural condition of life for most
people.95  He attributed this problem to the failure of the poor to restrain their
sex drives, outstripping the ability of the Earth to provide sustenance, bringing
in turn numerous miseries that governments were powerless to prevent. He went
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on to assert that the only way to eliminate pauperism was to eliminate the
humanitarian reforms that permitted the poor to maintain themselves and to
propagate.96  In practice, the most potent check on over-population was high
infant mortality in poor families. He went on to claim that the ‘infant is,
comparatively speaking, of little value to the society, as others will immediately
supply its place’.97
To our eyes, these claims are morally bankrupt. Malthus, however, failed also
to appreciate the impact that increasing productivity would have on enhancing
the lives of subsequent generations and the way the birth rate would fall as a
result. Nor did he appreciate the need for the poor to have numerous children
to ensure that some survived to support their parents in their old age—they had
large families because they were poor. Furthermore, the issue of the time probably
had more to do with the distribution of the benefits of productivity growth than
with population growth outstripping productivity. Nevertheless, his views were
used to bolster the case for harsh treatment of the poor and unemployed.98 This
influence led William Hazlitt to say about Malthus and the poor in 1807:
His name hangs suspended over their heads, in terrorem, like some baleful
meteor. It is the shield behind which the archers take their stand, gall
them at their leisure. He has set them up as a defenceless mark, on which
both friends and foe may exercise their malice, or their wantonness, as
they think proper…Their interests are at best but coldly and remotely
felt by the other classes of society. Mr Malthus’s book has done all that
was wanting to increase this indifference and apathy.99
These attitudes helped fuel the belief on the part of the politically influential
that relief over and above dire necessity led to an excessive rural population
and to idleness. Such moralising was reflected, for example, in the invention of
the distinction between the ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ poor with the Poor
Law Amendment Act of 1819. Some Malthusian crank in 1838 even proposed the
infanticide of every third child to deal with the population explosion.100
Another famous pioneering English economist and parliamentarian David Ricardo
(1772–1823) endorsed explicitly laissez-faire doctrines.101  According to his ‘Iron
Law of Wages’, all attempts to improve the real income of workers were futile:
of necessity, wages remained near the subsistence level. Ricardo, like Malthus,
was a strong advocate of the abolition of the Poor Laws and the abolition of
outdoor relief: ‘While the present laws are in force, it is quite the natural order
of things that the fund for the maintenance of the poor should progressively
increase till it has absorbed all the net revenues of the country.’102
According to Ricardo, the Poor Laws simply moved money from the workers to
the idle, while Malthus claimed that they were an inhuman deceit. Not only did
Ricardo believe that all contracts should be left to the freedom of the market,
22
The Cult of the Market
he believed that the law needed to facilitate exchange: ‘Like all other contracts,
wages should be left to the fair and free competition of the market, and should
never be controlled by the interference of the legislature.’103
As we will see later, this attitude pays no attention to asymmetries of power and
knowledge in such relationships; and those Poor Laws were very harsh. For
example, some of the transactions between factory owners and the Poor Law
authorities regarding the employment of pauper children resembled the slave
trade.104 The slave trade itself was abolished by Britain only in 1807 and slavery
more generally only in 1833.
Ricardo also opposed the Usury Laws in 1818 and the renewal of the Truck Act
in 1822—the latter banning payments in kind. In turn, Nassau Senior (1790–1864)
was an adviser to Whig politicians in the 1830s and 1840s.105  He was also an
advocate of laissez-faire and was one of the commissioners responsible for the
Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834. Senior opposed trade unionism and reductions
in working hours. Influenced by these advisers, Lord Melbourne, Prime Minister
for seven years in the 1830s, believed that the whole duty of government was
to prevent crime and to preserve contracts.106
This direct influence of the major classical economists was supplemented in the
early decades of the nineteenth century by economic popularisers such as James
Wilson, the editor of The Economist, and Harriet Martineau. They convinced
the general public that laissez-faire was the practical conclusion of orthodox
political economy.107  As John Maynard Keynes confirms, the doctrine was
disseminated by the educational system.108  One of the strongest and most
influential advocates of laissez-faire and freedom of contract was social Darwinist
Herbert Spencer (1829–1903). He saw close similarity between laissez-faire and
Darwinism. In his Social Statics, Spencer idealised freedom of contract as the
supreme mechanism for maintaining the social order with the minimum of
coercion. His views were quite extreme—objecting, inter alia, to state-aided
education, sanitation and public health laws and the licensing of doctors. Indeed,
for Keynes, the survival of the fittest could be regarded as a vast generalisation
of Ricardian economics.109
These attitudes had important social consequences. They contributed to the
decline of equity in English common law and the rise of the doctrine of freedom
of contract, and therefore to the many abuses tolerated in the name of that
doctrine. Opposition to poor relief led to the English Poor Law Amendment Act
of 1834—the new Poor Laws. The right to poor relief was the last of the rights
traditionally enjoyed by the rural poor. The Poor Law Commissioners, using the
language of Malthus, described the poor rate as a bounty on indolence and
vice.110 The new Poor Laws were designed to ensure more uniform and harsher
treatment of those unfortunate enough to fall within its provisions in the face
of more lenient treatment under the decentralised administration of the former
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laws. In particular, the act abolished outdoor relief, making it clear that no
able-bodied person was to receive assistance from the Poor Law authorities
except in a workhouse.
The conditions in the workhouses were deliberately very harsh to discourage
people from seeking assistance. This treatment under the 1834 act contrasted
with the treatment under the Speehamland System of 1795, ‘which sought to
maintain the integrity of family, village and parish centres of solidarity and the
mutuality of relief and welfare’.111  Among this harsh treatment was the splitting
up of families. The workhouses themselves were little better than prisons. The
conditions inspired Thomas Carlyle, in Past and Present, to compare the
workhouses with Dante’s Hell. Consequently, relief under the 1834 act involved
the loss of the normal rights of citizenship and of communal ties. British Marxist
historian Eric Hobsbawm argues that because the intention was to stigmatise
the self-confessed failures of society—rather than helping them—there have
been few more inhuman statutes.112
It is possible to trace the influence of these attitudes further in the response of
the UK government to the potato blight-induced Irish famine of 1845–51. As
acclaimed British historian Cecil Woodham-Smith (1896–1977) tells us:
The influence of laissez-faire on the treatment of Ireland during the
famine is impossible to exaggerate. Almost without exception, the high
officials and politicians responsible for Ireland were fervent believers in
non-interference by Government, and the behaviour of the British
authorities only becomes explicable when their fanatical belief in private
enterprise and their suspicions of any action which might be considered
Government intervention are borne in mind.113
One million people died, half a million people were driven from their
smallholdings and two million people emigrated from Ireland as a result—the
total population falling by about 25 per cent. Recent British Prime Minister Tony
Blair described this tragedy in the following terms:
The famine was a defining event in the history of Ireland and of Britain.
It has left deep scars. That one million people should have died in what
was then part of the richest and most powerful nation in the world is
something that still causes pain as we reflect on it today. Those who
governed in London at the time failed their people through standing by
while a crop failure turned into a massive tragedy.114
Blair was much too polite; it must rank as one of the worst crimes ever
perpetrated by a British government—and it did this in the full knowledge of
the extent of the tragedy. This led Edward Twistleton—who early on had shared
the prevailing prejudices—to resign as the Chief Poor Law Commissioner in
March 1849 because ‘the destitution here is so horrible, and the indifference of
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the House of Commons to it so manifest, that he is an unfit agent of a policy that
must be one of extermination’.115
The punitive Irish Poor Laws of 1838 were also an important contributor to the
tragedy. Modelled on the English Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834, they are
said to have been even harsher.116
The head of the British Treasury during the famine, Charles Trevelyan—who
assumed control of the administration of the relief effort—played a major part
in inhibiting greater relief efforts by the government. In his view:
The only way to prevent people from becoming habitually dependent
on the government is to bring [relief] operations to a close. The
uncertainty about the new crop only makes it more necessary. Whatever
may be done hereafter, these things should be stopped now, or you run
the risk of paralysing all private enterprise and having this country on
you for an indefinite number of years.
Furthermore, he claimed with all the compassion of an Osama bin Ladin that the
‘judgment of God sent the calamity to teach the Irish a lesson, that calamity must
not be too much mitigated…The real evil with which we have to contend is not
the physical evil of the famine, but the moral evil of the selfish, perverse and
turbulent character of the people.’
All of this happened while Ireland continued to export food guarded by British
soldiers and while there was sufficient food to feed the population had it been
distributed adequately.117
Of course, we can always respond to this record by claiming that our economists,
our governments and we are innocent of a similar indifference. Before we do,
however, we should listen to Stephen Lewis’s 2005 Massey Lectures and his
powerful condemnation of the indifference of wealthy Western countries to
gross poverty and the HIV/AIDS pandemic in Africa.118  His description of the
recent policies of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank
as capitalistic Stalinism—rending the fabric of African society under the influence
of a rabid economic dialectic—has a striking resonance with the attitudes of the
British government in 1848. As he tells it, ‘I have spent the last four years
watching people die.’119
We have seen more distant echoes of these morally bankrupt attitudes in many
countries recently, including Australia: for example, the effective reinvention
of the concept of the ‘deserving poor’. This has brought with it increasing
pressure on selected categories of welfare recipients, particularly sole parents
and the unemployed. In this view, poverty and unemployment are again being
seen as the result of individual moral failure, rather than a failure of the economic
system, the structures of society and of government management to provide
adequate income and employment opportunities for all people.
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In 1943, prominent Australian economist Ronald Walker noted the increasing
influence of economists on public policy in Australia—an influence that has
continued to grow.120 This development reflected the gradual acceptance by
the Australian government of responsibility for managing the economy. It
brought with it an increase in the already substantial influence of the Australian
Treasury and a development of its former accountancy-based culture and
expertise—a change reflected in its recruitment pattern.121  Like treasuries
everywhere, that department occupied a pivotal role in the machinery of
government, having been responsible for the provision of economic advice and
for the scrutiny of other departments’ expenditure proposals for much of the
twentieth century.122  Its advice played a dominant role in shaping government
attitudes and policy decisions for most of that period. The experience of the
Great Depression and then World War II had a seminal impact on economic
policy attitudes, culminating in the adoption in 1946 of the goal of full
employment in Australia—a development influenced by the British Beveridge
Report of 1942 and the resultant reforms. There was, however, a gradual shift
in Treasury’s advice from the early 1970s away from the maintenance of full
employment through counter-cyclical policies and demand management and a
rekindling of a strong faith in markets and in neoclassical economics. This
shift—combined with an ingrained hostility towards government expenditure
arising from its former role as the keeper of the public purse—has much to do
with the growth in economic fundamentalism in Australia and the dominance
of that doctrine in recent governments. This change was, perhaps, symbolised
by the seminar Hayek gave to the Australian Treasury in 1976.
This increasing influence of economists and of economic fundamentalism within
the Australian bureaucracy was reflected also in the progressive transformation
of the Tariff Board—the body established originally to advise on tariff assistance
to Australian industry—into a body ideologically opposed to such assistance.
This occurred over time and in stages. It was reflected in a change of title—first
to the Industry Assistance Commission in 1973, then to the Industry Commission
in 1989 and, most recently, to the Productivity Commission in 1996. In the
formation of the last, the Bureau of Industry Economics and the Economic
Planning Advisory Committee were abolished. Both bodies had provided
alternative sources of expert economic advice and had shown some capacity for
independent thought, including some tendencies to depart from the economic
fundamentalist orthodoxy.
The influence of economic fundamentalism in Australia was reflected also in the
1981 Campbell Report into the Banking Industry—a report that led ultimately to
the deregulation of the Australian banking industry.123  In this case, the members
of the committee had the honesty to declare their biases in the introduction to
their report, but biases they remained. A further important example is the Hilmer
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Report of 1993 into competition policy, which has been used as a justification
for the wholesale restructuring of government business enterprises at the
Commonwealth and the state levels.124  Both reports were written in Treasury.
Despite its admiration for competition as a means of delivering economically
‘efficient’ outcomes, the Hilmer Report’s shallow account of competition and its
benefits rests on a very uncertain conceptual base and a naïve faith in market
forces. The same could be said for the Campbell Report. These reports should be
seen as serving rhetorical political purposes rather than providing serious,
historically informed analysis of policy problems.
Accounts of the growing influence of economic fundamentalism on public policy
decisions in Australia often mention the influence of neo-conservative
think-tanks, such as the Institute of Economic Affairs in London, the American
Enterprise Institute and the Cato Institute in Washington, which have strong
links with similarly minded bodies in other countries. In Australia, we have
copycats in the form of the Australian Centre for Independent Studies and the
Australian Institute of Public Affairs. In Canada, they have the Fraser Institute,
which was founded by a disciple of Hayek and which claims pre-eminent status
among Canadian public policy research organisations. The Fraser Institute boasts
that it acts as an economic conscience reminding governments and their publics
of the limits of governmental competence.125  It also reminds us that its work is
far from done, and that, in its view, government activity is far too extensive,
strangling economic growth and impinging excessively on individual freedom.
Ian Marsh, speaking primarily about Australia, and noting the remarkable
proliferation of such think-tanks, has suggested that they point to the continuing
prestige and political importance of the norms of rationality in a society in which
other more traditional sources of authority and legitimacy have been discredited.
He tells us:
The neo-liberal or ‘new right’ group of think-tanks generally cluster[s]
around the strategic or agenda end of the policy process. The group has
been spectacularly successful in popularising a particular public policy
agenda for responding to the changed world economy—reduced public
expenditure, [a] lessened role for the state, ‘neutral’ industry policy,
weakened trade unions, etc…Some suggest this group has attained a
paradigm shift in conceptions of the role of the state held by political
and bureaucratic elites.126
More generally, political theorists have long pointed to the significant power
exercised by business in all capitalist democracies because of its privileged access
to policy makers and because of its capacity to finance significant research and
lobbying activities. Business associations play a significant role as intermediaries
in that process. The spread of these ideas has probably also been aided heavily
by the influence of the transnational economic organisations such as the World
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Bank and the OECD—organisations whose perverse influence over Third-World
countries has been criticised so savagely.
In Canberra, another popular explanation blames the strict neoclassical approach
of the Economics Faculty of The Australian National University, which has
trained a large number of public service economists in the past 40 years. Of
course, this is a particular example of the wider argument that it has been the
very narrow training of economists in recent decades that has been responsible.
For Pusey, it is the social selection and the social background of senior Australian
public servants that are the keys to that understanding.127  He claims that top
public servants are the ‘switchmen of history’ and that when they change their
minds the destinies of nations also change. He could well be right, but it could
be asked whether people who get to the top in bureaucratic organisations are
characterised by a capacity for deep thought—and, by the time they reach the
top, their knowledge of economic discourse is usually decades out of date.
While not discounting these influences, I suggest that a number of other factors
have also been important. Firstly, the impact of the Great Depression and World
War II on society has largely been forgotten. Consequently, there has been an
erosion of the sense of community developed through those crises, and of the
appalling costs involved. In particular, there has been an erosion of the sense
of gratitude due to servicemen and women and to the working classes for their
sacrifices during the war. These had moderated the commitments of political
elites to unregulated markets and limited the influence of the business lobby in
the immediate post-war period. It is as if doctrinaire capitalism—having survived
the crises of the 1930s and 1940s and their aftermath—has finally reasserted
itself. Of course, the decline of class-consciousness among wage earners has
contributed to this trend, as has the relative decline of the manufacturing sector
with its concentrations of relatively easily organised potential union members.
While business interests can still be mobilised easily, it is now much more
difficult to mobilise wage earners. The decline in class-consciousness has brought
with it a decline in knowledge of the long struggle involved in achieving political
rights and economic security for working people in the face of vehement political
and economic oppression.
The professionalisation of politics has also contributed to this trend because
fewer politicians have personal experience in anything other than academic
training and a political career. In the absence of a strong grounding in personal
experience, they are more likely to be influenced by theoretical speculation.
Furthermore, the relatively privileged lives of professional politicians and senior
public servants could also have played a part in insulating policy makers from
some of the harsher realities of the economic system. Here in Australia, the
isolation—geographically and sociologically—of the national capital also
contributes to this lack of understanding, but the cultural isolation of elites
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probably plays a role in all countries. As Soros argued recently in On
Globalisation, those who believe in what he calls ‘market fundamentalism’ ‘are
reluctant to accept that the system may be fundamentally flawed when it is
working so well for those who are in charge’.128  In this vein, it has often been
claimed by Marxist theorists that the state bureaucracy in capitalist societies
provides a crucial element in the structure of power and privilege inherent in
the capitalist system.129
At the end of the day, some of the responsibility for this development has to be
sheeted home to our particular political leaders and our systems of government.
The emerging defects in the Westminster system of government—with its recent
tendency to evolve towards an elected monarchy, in which the de facto monarch,
the prime minister, exercises excessive power, and which lacks the checks and
balances of the US system—mean that ultimately the responsibility has to be
sheeted home to the prime minister. Readers in the United Kingdom will have
no difficulty recognising the role of Margaret Thatcher and her government in
ruthlessly pursuing so-called economic reform in the face of widespread public
dismay, including, it is said, on the part of the Queen. Of course, this is not to
absolve the US political system and the US social and political culture from their
responsibility. The US political system seems to have been peculiarly open to
capture by big-business interests. Of course, for those governments lacking the
will or the wit to tackle such difficult problems as unemployment, entrenched
social deprivation, environmental degradation and the coordination of economic
development, the cult of the market acts as a convenient smokescreen.
The increasing influence of economists in public policy development is part of
a world-wide trend. Economists have come to dominate civil service recruitment
in many countries,130  with economics the essential policy science and an
important entry point to a successful public service career. Certainly, this has
been the case in Australia, particularly in what are now called the ‘central
coordinating agencies’: the departments of the Treasury, Finance and
Administration and Prime Minister and Cabinet. Economic fundamentalism
migrated from Treasury and its offshoot, the Department of Finance, to the
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet in the 1970s and 1980s, at a time
when the size and influence of that department was increasing rapidly. In part,
this was a result of attempts by ministers to create alternative sources of economic
advice to balance Treasury’s influence. The result has been perverse: three
sources of very similar, simplistic advice. Often acting in concert, these agencies
have extended their power greatly in recent decades. From these centres of
bureaucratic power, economic fundamentalism has colonised the senior levels
of most of the Australian Public Service.131  As a result, economic fundamentalism
exercises a disproportionate influence on the government’s policy agenda.
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This colonisation has been facilitated by the increasing influence of managerialism
and its associated ‘reform’ agenda on the Australian Public Service and by the
top-down control exercised over the selection process for senior positions,
particularly in the Senior Executive Service. One outcome has been the
amendment of the Public Service Act to make public servants the servants of the
government of the day, rather than the servants of the public. Furthermore, the
formation of the elite Senior Executive Service—and the terms under which the
members of that elite group are now employed—has tightened control over the
advice going to ministers. The key role played by the Department of Prime
Minister and Cabinet in selecting departmental secretaries—especially since the
abolition of the Public Service Board—has been an important influence in that
development. One consequence has been that departmental secretaries are now
frequently from central agencies and, in particular, from the Department of
Prime Minister and Cabinet. This process overvalues theoretical knowledge of
economics and ‘economic soundness’ ahead of the practical knowledge of program
administration or even of business affairs. Indeed, some departmental secretaries
have been known to boast of their economic expertise and their ‘dry’ views.
The loss of tenure for departmental secretaries and the curtailment of rights of
appeal in respect of appointments to the more senior levels—justified on the
basis of improving efficiency and responsiveness—have facilitated this
development. This has had a flow-on effect at lower levels. The result has been
substantial pressure for conformity, an erosion of the integrity of the service
and questionable personnel practices. The erosion of these rights can only
encourage risk-averse advice, sycophantic behaviour and
patronage—well-recognised dangers in bureaucratic organisations. Of course,
more subtle forms of social control such as social distancing also play a part in
achieving conformity.132
Of course, those at the top of the structure do not share these negative views of
recent public service reforms. For example, Dr Peter Shergold, Secretary of the
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet and Australia’s top public servant,
has a much more optimistic view, seeing these changes as part of a quiet
revolution that has transformed the way in which the bureaucracy works and
that has significantly increased its productivity.133  Shergold, however, as Public
Service Commissioner, played a leading role in promoting the legislative and
administrative reforms in the Australian Public Service so he might not be the
most objective of observers. At least there seems to be agreement that there has
been a revolution. In my view, in the absence of adequate tenure and effective
accountability for selections, the integrity and competence of the Australian
Public Service is being eroded. Readers will have to judge for themselves which
perspective better captures the balance of the changes; however, recent serious
scandals demonstrate that all is not well.
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Governments and their key advisers also exercise control over a large number
of other key appointments to statutory and non-statutory bodies and to public
inquiries, and this control has been an important factor in the spread of economic
fundamentalism. The selection of people to head major inquiries is not left to
chance. Such appointments are considered carefully in an attempt to ensure a
desired outcome. Consistent with this view, Pamela Williams tells us that the
legacy of the Howard government in Australia is an entrenched, hand-picked
elite:
[O]ne thing remains beyond the vagaries of chance: this is Howard’s
empire, and the men and women appointed to positions of power and
influence across the country form a conservative river as deep as it is
wide. It flows through the bureaucracy, government bodies and
regulators, tribunals for refugees and industrial relations, cushy
diplomatic posts, Telstra, the ABC, and arts bodies and cultural
institutions…It is the fountainhead of Liberal influence for years to
come.134
Furthermore, these economic fundamentalist views have also colonised many of
the private-sector lobby groups, including those that draw their staff from the
ranks of the Australian Public Service. A small number of economic consultancies
are also selling specialist economic expertise to government.
What remains for this chapter is to say something about the meaning of the term
‘public policy’. The term is one that will be familiar to politicians, journalists,
political scientists and public servants, but it is not one that keeps the average
citizen awake at night. Policy is not confined to the public sector, because even
private-sector bodies engage in governance activity that attracts the term ‘policy’.
Consequently, the adjective ‘public’ is used to make it clear that it is an aspect
of government activity that is being discussed. Given that the term is used during
election campaigns to describe significant statements of intentions, values and
aspirations, it clearly has to do with the way that we are governed, with aspects
of government action.135  It is not a term that is used with any great precision,
however, and is often applied erroneously to small-scale standardised
administrative procedures in the public and the private sectors to protect
administrators from having to constantly justify those procedures.
Hal Colebatch notes that discussion of ‘policy’ usually rests on three assumed
characteristics of organised action: coherence, hierarchy and instrumentality.
Coherence assumes that action forms part of a coherent whole, and policy has
to do with how this whole should be steered. Hierarchy assumes that the policy
is about how courses of action are authorised by the people at the top—that
policy rests on legitimate authority. Instrumentality assumes that policy is
concerned with the pursuit of particular purposes or goals, or the solution of
particular problems. Instrumentality brings with it an implied expertise, an
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expertise divided into functional areas, such as economic policy and educational
policy, with much effort expended in trying to achieve consistency between
different policy fields. Instrumentality also involves a belief that the causal
relationships involved in an area of activity—and the consequences of particular
actions—can be determined. Importantly, the claims of economic fundamentalism
to influence government action rest on this implied expertise. Part of the
arrogance of economic fundamentalism rests in its claim that neoclassical
economics is the primary, or even the sole, public policy ‘science’.
The usual way of talking about policy—described above—grossly over-simplifies
what happens in practice. For example, the extent to which coherence can be
achieved in practice across the whole ambit of government action is open to
significant question. Similarly, the above discussion assumes that policy involves
articulate, conscious choice, but that is also open to question. For example, it is
often difficult to separate actions into clear decisions and the activities necessary
to carry them out. Policy can be grounded in practice rather than an authorised
decision. In any event, a formal decision is often only a stage in the policy
process. A statement of intent on its own is valueless without the commitment
of significant resources. Therefore, policy must not be understood simply in
terms of officially proclaimed goals but in terms of the way activity is patterned
among a wide range of participants. Consequently, the emphasis in the literature
on policy as the exercise of legitimate authority is a non-neutral idealisation.
This view needs to be amended to take account of the involvement of an extended
array of people with interests in any particular policy question and of the activity
of gatekeepers controlling access to decision makers. Authority is diffused to
some extent throughout the system and consequently it is probably preferable
to speak of the mobilisation of authority in support of programs advanced by
participants in the policy community, including public officials, rather than
simply the exercise of authority. Who those participants are and the vocabularies
they regard as legitimate determine which policy issues are raised and how they
are addressed. Like all communities, there are tacit rules about participation, a
shared vocabulary and informal social controls that govern participation.
Consequently, the current dominant role of economic fundamentalists as decision
makers, gatekeepers and participants largely determines what is seen as a
legitimate policy problem, and who is accepted as a legitimate participant in any
policy community. These decisions are not neutral. What is more, central agencies
are vigilant in trying to shield ministers from well-developed advice with which
those agencies disagree. In the case of the present government, this process of
selection is reflected in the close involvement in many policy processes of
business lobby groups and the partial exclusion of unions, welfare groups and
consumer representatives.
It should be clear from what has been said above that the field of public policy
is a broad and confusing one, involving a gross lack of relevant information,
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contradictory approaches to similar problems, the neglect of others and gross
uncertainty about the likely outcomes of decisions. The recent film the Fog of
War—the autobiographical reflections of former US Secretary of Defence Robert
S. McNamara—makes a similar point about the uncertainty surrounding major
strategic and tactical decisions in major conflicts. In this respect, economic
fundamentalism could be likened to the strategic and tactical doctrines pursued
on the Western Front for most of World War I, providing the false certainty of
final victory, in which the terrible cost is overlooked. In his seminal work, On
the Psychology of Military Incompetence, Norman Dixon describes the symptoms
of group-think that all too often affect large organisations and authoritarian
leadership groups and which lead to such disasters:
• an illusion of invulnerability (or, more generally, the illusion of certainty)
• rationalising away information inconsistent with cherished assumptions
• an unquestioned belief in the group’s morality
• the stereotyping of opponents as stupid
• a shared illusion of unanimity
• self-appointed ‘mind-guards’ to protect the group from adverse
information.136
As we have seen above, all of these symptoms afflict Australia’s current policy
processes.
The focus of this book is not the sociology of the growing influence of economic
fundamentalism but the ideas underlying it. Many contemporary policy debates
involve fundamental questions bearing on the functioning of the capitalist system
and the relationship between economics, ethics and the law. Frequently, those
debates are impoverished by the failure of many of the participants to understand
fully that a dynamic and effective civil society is a basic precondition for an
effective capitalist system. This can be seen most clearly in the awful struggle
of many of the countries of the former Communist bloc to transform themselves
into successful capitalist societies. In their cases, the necessary civil and legal
prerequisites for a successful capitalist society are simply missing and are still
being created. There can be little doubt that the ill-conceived economic
fundamentalist recipe has been a catastrophe for much of the Russian population.
The consequence in that case appears to be a slide back towards an authoritarian
state.
The next chapter will begin an examination of these underlying ideas. To capture
an adequate understanding of the dependency of the capitalist system on civil
society, I will consider how social order, as such, is possible. It will be argued
that, in an effective civil society, the pursuit of individual and institutional
choice and self-interest is constrained by internalised moral codes and by
externally imposed social sanctions. In particular, I will argue that the so-called
free markets of the capitalist market system are not natural types, but are
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complicated cultural and legal artefacts, constructed over time and relying on
internal moral codes, a complex regime of legal instruments and are enforcement
by governments.137
Subsequently, I will show how economic fundamentalists have also failed to
understand the epistemological limitations of the economics discipline, the moral
assumptions they employ and the implications of the existence of asymmetries
of knowledge and power for the fairness of the market system. I will argue that
economic fundamentalism involves the making of an organisational
technique—the so-called market system—and the associated abstract knowledge
narrative into a theology. An elite group of technologists, a new vanguard of
economists and their allies is engaged in a utopian attempt to remake civil society
in the image of their idealised technique and their instrumental rationality. It is
a utopian project that has disturbing similarities with the utopian projects of
the twentieth century that caused so much suffering: the communist revolutions
in Russia, China and Cambodia and the fascist projects in Germany and Italy. In
particular, they share an exaggerated confidence in a pseudo-scientific ideology,
a determination to remake society, its institutions and humankind itself in the
image of that ideology, as well as strong anti-democratic tendencies and a lack
of compassion. As such, it is a logical consequence of the Enlightenment project
and its peculiar instrumental understanding of human reason. In that sense,
economic fundamentalists are the last of the Marxists.
My fear is not that economic fundamentalism is true, but that it might become
so. It brings with it the danger of the commoditisation of everything—the turning
of all values into market values, stripping the social world of love, compassion,
commitment and even scholarship, for what will sell. In particular, in conjunction
with ubiquitous advertising, it is promoting an excessive materialism in which
we draw our only sense of identity from our consumption and our possessions.
Economic fundamentalism—with its obsessive concern for easily measured
economic indicators and efficiency and flexibility in the service of production—is
engaged in a war on rest and leisure. It is encouraging an alienating culture of
exploitation and overwork, which threatens to undermine our relationships
with our spiritual needs, our families and our communities. In doing so, it is
undermining the moral basis of civic society and of the capitalist system itself.
In addition, it is threatening the natural ecological preconditions for the survival
of our civilisation.
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Chapter 2: The Creation of Social Order
is Irreducibly a Moral Project
The wise and virtuous man is at all times willing that his own private
interests should be sacrificed to the public interest.
— Adam Smith1
Assumptions Underlying Contemporary Public Policy
Debates
In the first chapter, I argued that recent public policy debates have been
impoverished by the failure of policy makers—under the influence of economic
fundamentalism—to appreciate the extent to which the market system depends
on, and is a sub-system of, the broader social system. Famously, it was Margaret
Thatcher who claimed that there was no such thing as society. She had failed to
notice that, by the very same peculiar logic, there was no such thing as a nation,
an economy or a market, either. Rather, civil society, the political system, the
market system and the broader culture are all involved in a complex mosaic of
interlocking, mutually supporting structures and activities that provide the
system of relationships, the social system within which we live.2 The interactions
between these elements resemble a complex, interdependent ecological system.
Importantly, the complex system of moral, social and legal constraints that
underpins our social order is an essential part of that ecological system. Threats
to that social order are, therefore, threats to the whole system. Because of this
interdependency, I argue that a healthy, just society that promotes human
flourishing and actively mediates commercial relationships is an essential
prerequisite to an effective, developed market system.
In contrast, economic fundamentalism tacitly assumes that social relationships
are reducible to transactions between self-interested individuals—that is,
economic relationships are the fundamental social relationships. It is this
assumption and the reductionist tendency in Western thought that has allowed
a particular economic methodology to become the dominant methodology for
the evaluation of public policy choices in our society. Implicit in this assumption
is the demeaning proposition that self-interest is the fundamental motivation of
human beings. Contrary to popular belief, however, Smith, the father of
economics, did not share this view, as the above quotation makes quite clear.
Similarly, leading positivist economist and sociologist Vilfredo Pareto (1848–1923)
acknowledged that ‘real men governed by purely economic motives do not
exist’.3
Nevertheless, the vocabulary of mainstream economics and its values now provide
the dominant vocabulary and values for policy evaluation, crowding out other
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vocabularies and other values. Furthermore, within that economic vocabulary,
‘economic efficiency’—the shorthand description of Pareto-optimality—has
become the dominant value to be served by government policy. This has been
true of most recent Australian policy debates, including the Australian
fair-trading debate to which I will turn in the discussion on the doctrine of
freedom of contract in Chapter 9. That debate raises in a direct fashion the
relationship between the economic system and the social system, and the role
of the State in supporting economic activity. It provides a good example of the
influence of economic ideas on a fundamental legal institution that is backed by
the coercive powers of the State, and which facilitates complex and longer-term
economic exchanges.
How is Social Order Possible?
Cooperative behaviour is a fundamental, ubiquitous feature of human life. Let
me say that again with emphasis in case you missed it: cooperative behaviour is
a fundamental, ubiquitous feature of human life! Our day-to-day relationships are
subject to a pervasive structuring of which we are largely unconscious. The
excessive contemporary focus on the role of competition in market economies
has concealed the fundamental significance of this cooperative behaviour.
Without it, no human behaviour—social or economic—of any significance is
possible. Let me emphasise the point again with an added twist: competition is
not the fundamental force in human affairs—social or economic. For the moment,
we will concentrate on how this cooperative behaviour, this structuring, this
social order, is to be explained, with that word ‘force’ to be the focus of some
attention in Chapters 5 and 8. The quest for such an explanation has long been
at the centre of religious, philosophical, sociological and anthropological
speculation. It is also related closely to the central questions of political life,
namely: how should society be organised? How should the resources of society
be distributed? What is the extent of our responsibility for others? Should
individual freedom be restricted, to what extent, and in what ways? In so far
as these questions ask what ought to be, they are moral ones: they ask about what
is good, what is bad, and involve the fundamental questions about who we think
we are.
Much academic discourse directed at these questions since the Enlightenment
has emphasised the primacy of the individual, contrasting a methodological
individualism with more corporatist notions. It has been something of an
academic fashion in Western circles in recent centuries. Contemporary research
has, however, shown that individuals are complex entities with internal states,4
and if a reductionist strategy is thought essential to scientific investigation then,
for consistency, one should not stop at the individual. This is not a position I
take. Rather, I start from a position that sees the individual as embedded in
society—an embedding that takes place through a continuing enculturation.
40
The Cult of the Market
Consequently, I see the extensive theoretical discourse focused on whether the
‘individual’ is ‘prior’ to society or vice versa as a sterile waste of time—the
product of obsessive Western dichotomous thinking. It seems clear to me that
individuals constitute—and are constituted by—society. Putting it another way,
the human ‘I’ discovers himself or herself only in encountering another ‘I’ and
achieves identity and maturity only as a person in community.5  In short, there
is and can be no ‘I’, except in relationship and in contrast with others. The very
idea of individuality is nonsense in the absence of comparison.6  Furthermore,
it is now clear that the evolutionary emergence of Homo sapiens is inseparable
from the emergence of society. As sociologist Werner Stark (1909–85) argues,
‘Here we are challenged to realise that the self and society are also coequal and
coeval; that they are…twin-born.’7  And again, ‘Think society away, and Homo
sapiens disappear; what is left is a speechless, mindless beast.’8
What this means is that there is no pre-social, fixed human nature on which to
base discourse about human behaviour. Social life is not an optional extra;9  it
lies at the core of what it is to be human. Consequently, it is not possible to strip
culture away in order to get to a more essential human nature in the way that
many reductionist theories since the Enlightenment have tried to do.10 This is
an insight that renders the idea of the autonomous individual—so beloved of
economics and much recent political philosophy—a dangerous falsehood.
Even the contemporary Western concept of the self, which seems so natural and
self-evident to contemporary Western thinkers, is an artefact of a long social
discourse.11 This Western liberal notion of the human person as a free,
independent, inquiring, rational and maximising individual is a masculine,
Enlightenment view,12  derived from a long Western Christian tradition, as
mediated by John Calvin (1509–64) and René Descartes (1596–1650). To
Buddhists, this view is a delusion and the source of human unhappiness. Indeed,
other societies have held very different ideas of who we are, connected closely
also to their particular forms of social organisation. For example, Homeric culture
barely conceived of a self outside of social roles. Similarly, Geertz (1926–2006)
writes of Balinese culture:
[There is] a persistent and systematic attempt to stylise all aspects of
personal expression to the point where anything idiosyncratic, anything
characteristic of the individual…is muted in favour of his assigned place
in the continuing, and so it is thought, never-changing pageant of
Balinese life. It is dramatis personae, not actors, that endure; indeed it is
dramatis personae, not actors, that in the proper sense really exist.
Physically men come and go—mere incidents in a happenstance history
of no genuine importance, even to themselves. But the masks they wear,
the stage they occupy, the parts they play, and most important, the
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spectacle they mount, remain and constitute not the façade but the
substance of things, not least the self.13
Geertz therefore concludes:
[T]he Western conception of a person as a bounded, unique, more or less
integrated motivational and cognitive universe, a dynamic centre of
awareness, emotion, judgment, and action organised into a distinctive
whole and set contrastively both against other such wholes and against
a social and natural background is, however incorrigible it may seem to
us, a rather peculiar idea within the context of the world’s cultures.14
Importantly, these different views of the self are not just different they are
incommensurable. This means that it is not possible to synthesise these
understandings to obtain a genetic concept of the self.15 This insight poses a
fundamental challenge to the positivist view of the social sciences, on which
economic fundamentalism is based. That discredited positivist view presupposes
that there are ‘sheer facts’ to be discovered about human interactions and about
the world more generally. Consequently, it ignores the social process through
which these ‘sheer facts’—and the conceptual frameworks on which they are
based—are established. Now these are not new ideas, however much they have
been ignored in positivist discourse. Even Sir Francis Bacon (1561–1626), one
of the fathers of empiricism and the scientific method, described four kinds of
barriers—‘Idols of the Tribe, Cave, Market Place, and Theatre’—that act against
the achievement of objective knowledge and shape perception and thought.
These were the limitations of human nature in general, the preconceptions of
individuals, the fashions of day-to-day discourse and the dogmas of philosophies
and science. Of course, Bacon hoped that the empirical method would provide
a way out of these problems. Now, however, we can be far less sure that this is
possible.
It is now clear that our taken-for-granted ‘reality’, our everyday understanding
of the world, of our scientific knowledge and of ourselves is socially constructed.
Importantly, language is now seen as the social medium into which we are born
and within which we live, rather than simply being a tool we use to describe a
pre-existing reality.16  Consequently, the extent of our ability to get beyond
language is problematic. The only reality we can know anything about is the
reality we encounter through our language17  and our stories. As Peter Berger
and Thomas Luckmann tell us:
I apprehend the reality of everyday life as an ordered reality. Its
phenomena are prearranged in patterns that seem independent of my
apprehension of them and that impose themselves upon the latter…The
language used in everyday life continuously provides me with the
necessary objectifications and posits the order within which these make
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sense and within which everyday life has meaning for me…In this
manner language marks the coordinates of my life in society and fills
that life with meaningful objects.
And again: ‘Everyday life is, above all, life with and by means of the language
I share with my fellow men. An understanding of language is thus essential for
any understanding of the reality of everyday life.’18
Consequently, for bacteriologist and philosopher of science Ludwik Fleck
(1896–1961), ‘Cognition is the most socially conditioned activity of man, and
knowledge is the paramount social creation. The very structure of language
presents a compelling philosophy characteristic of that community, and even a
single word can represent a complex theory.’19
The idea that language, as a sign of something else, was always removed from
reality was a cornerstone of the ancient rhetorical tradition that held sway over
Western societies for many centuries.20 This does not mean, however, that the
natural and social worlds do not play a role in constraining our conceptual
system, or that there is no order in those worlds. Rather, it can play this role
only through our experience of it, and that experience is constructed socially
through language and stories. Consequently, American philosopher Nelson
Goodman (1906–98) goes so far as to argue that it is not meaningful to talk about
the way the world is.21  In this vein, Wittgenstein has pointed out that concepts
must necessarily presuppose the existence of—and operate according to—the
public rules of a social milieu, and presuppose a shared public domain of
discourse.22 The very language of that discourse is itself a product of a language
community, a culture.
American linguist Benjamin Whorf (1897–1941) put it this way:
Thinking also follows a network of tracks laid down in a given language,
an organisation which may concentrate systematically upon certain
phrases of reality, certain aspects of intelligence, and may systematically
discard others featured in other languages. The individual is utterly
unaware of this organisation and is constrained completely within its
unbreakable bonds.23
Furthermore, Whorf tells us, on the basis of his studies of other cultures and
languages, the ‘various grand generalisations of the Western world, such as
time, velocity, and matter, are not essential to the construction of a consistent
picture of the universe’.24
Wittgenstein goes further:
Language disguises thought. So much so, that from the outward form of
the clothing it is impossible to infer the form of the thought beneath it,
because the outward form of the clothing is not designed to reveal the
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form of the body, but for entirely different purposes. The tacit
conventions on which the understanding of everyday language depends
are enormously complicated.25
In this same spirit, contemporary linguists Lakoff and Johnson have drawn
attention to the pervasiveness of metaphor in everyday life, and, in the process,
spelt out in part the mechanism by which language structures reality. The terms
in which we think and act—our conceptual system—are fundamentally
metaphorical in nature, reflecting the dominant historical and social order.26
Similarly, many other theorists have argued that the way in which social
phenomena are labelled serves as a device for social control. Accordingly, the
leading sociologist of science, Karl Mannheim (1893–1947), claimed that almost
no human thought was immune to the ideologising influences of its social context;
that knowledge must always be knowledge from a certain position.27 This view
applies with particular force to knowledge of society itself. Consequently, the
extent to which our accounts of social phenomena are a product of those
phenomena—or of the process by which they are derived—is always problematic.
John Shotter bluntly sums all of this up:
[O]ur understanding and our experience of reality is constituted for us,
very largely, by the ways in which we must talk in our attempt…to
account for it…In accounting for ourselves we must always meet the
demands placed upon us by our status as responsible members of our
society, that is, we must talk in ways that are both intelligible and
legitimate to others, in ways that make sense to them and relate to
interests in which they can share.28
As we saw earlier, there is an important circularity here. We tend to become
what we say we are.
Culture is something we learn as children growing up in a society and discovering
how our parents and those around us interpret the world.29 This process of
enculturation is a process of sharing knowledge30  —the knowledge by which
people design their own actions and interpret the behaviour of others. This
knowledge provides us with the standards we use for deciding what is, for
deciding what can be, for deciding how one feels about it, for deciding what to
do about it and for deciding how to go about doing it.31 The creation and
sustainment of such shared meanings is itself a social process in which moral
knowledge is incorporated into a society’s moral vocabulary and its social
discourse.
This is often described as a process of institutionalisation. The development of
language is itself considered the paradigm case of that institutionalisation, the
basis of intelligence and the mechanism by which knowledge can be transmitted
through time and space. Therefore, William Noble and Iain Davidson argue that
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‘mindedness’—that human conduct that exhibits signs of awareness,
interpretation, understanding, planning, foresight or judgement—cannot occur
independently of language. ‘Mindedness’ and language are learned through
years of socialisation through interactions with others.32  For Berger and
Luckmann:
Language now constructs immense edifices of symbolic representations
that appear to tower over the reality of everyday life like gigantic
presences from another world…In this manner, symbolism and symbolic
language become essential constituents of the reality of everyday life
and of the common-sense apprehension of this reality…Language builds
up semantic fields or zones of meaning that are linguistically
circumscribed. Vocabulary, grammar and syntax are geared to the
organisation of these semantic fields. Thus language builds up
classification schemes to differentiate objects…forms to make statements
of action as against statements of being; modes of indicating degrees of
social intimacy, and so on.33
In particular, the acquisition of language is an integral part of personality
development. In this regard, George Mead argues that the hearing of one’s own
speech—and observing the response of others—is central to the recognition of
the self as an object and agent.34  Among that reality is our understanding of
our own lives in the context of the passage of time. Consequently, Jerome Bruner
argues that because we have no way of describing lived time other than in the
form of narrative, we construct our understanding of ourselves as an
autographical narrative: ‘[I]t is only through narrative that we know ourselves
as active entities that operate through time.’35  For his part, Jean-Paul Sartre
tells us that ‘a man is always a teller of stories, he lives surrounded by his own
stories and those of other people, he sees everything that happens to him in
terms of these stories and he tries to live his life as if he were recounting it’.36
We construct our understanding of the causal relationships involved in
happenings in the natural world in the same way—as knowledge narratives.
Accordingly, it seems clear that the contemporary liberal concept of the human
person is the product of a particular tradition, a particular social discourse and
a cultural artefact. To be a person in contemporary Western society is not to be
a certain kind of being—‘a self’—but to have internalised a particular socially
transmitted and approved moral story, which is then used to structure that
Western individual’s sense of identity. Consequently, it is a story that is used
to organise one’s knowledge, experience and behaviour.37  It follows immediately
from the above insights that, at most, individuals—even Western
individuals—can be only partially sovereign and autonomous, and it is a deceit
to pretend otherwise. The formation of our values, and even of our consumer
preferences, is a social process and cannot sensibly be separated from them.
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My starting position is at odds with the starting point of the dominant school
of economics—neoclassical economics. As the basis of its discourse, that school
adopts the reductionist strategy characteristic of most science since the
Enlightenment: an extreme methodological individualism, the assumption that
human beings are essentially self-interested and an impoverished account of
human reason. This ‘presumes a deeply utilitarian understanding of social
life…severed from connections to any concrete sense of identity, purpose, or
meaning. Morality, religion, and the whole normative dimension of social life
get either pushed out of sight or explained away as resultants of more important,
or more real factors.’38
It is a starting point that makes it difficult for economists and economic
fundamentalists to understand how economic action is constrained and shaped
by the structures of social relations in which we are embedded.39  Furthermore,
its methodological individualism is not a morally neutral stance, but an ideological
conviction—one that is confined largely to the Western world. Not only does
it contain within it a view as to how societies are formed and how they function,
it contains a strong distinction between the ‘me’ and ‘you’, which brings with
it a strong distinction between ‘mine’ and ‘yours’. While economists seek to tell
us how our society should be organised, their methodological assumptions
undermine their ability to engage adequately with the values that underpin our
society.
Of course, some might argue that there is no necessary logical connection between
the acceptance, or rejection, of individualism as a methodological principle and
one’s attitude towards individualism and individual liberty as moral and political
ideals. Nevertheless, there is a close connection between these ideas historically
and they come together in the context of welfare economics, which attempts to
account for welfare improvements in terms of the subjective preferences of
individuals. Martin Hollis has, however, warned us that the atomised individuals
of neoclassical economics are entirely reactive to the environment, with no
freedom of movement.40 The consequence is that neoclassical economics denies
human agency. It is therefore inconsistent with Libertarian political philosophies
that stress human autonomy. It follows that there is a fundamental inconsistency
at the heart of economic fundamentalism. We will turn to a more detailed
discussion of those relationships in Chapter 8. In any event, contemporary
economic fundamentalists claim to hold to individualism as a fundamental value
as well as a methodological principle. It is, however, an individualism shorn of
any compassion for real people in their daily circumstances as opposed to a
claimed—and highly qualified—concern for their right to make their own
decisions. It does not, for example, extend to a genuine concern for the autonomy
of those who have no money or no job.
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This qualified adulation of individual autonomy is itself deeply flawed. It seeks
to gauge our individual worth in terms of our ability to ‘distance ourselves from
commitment to society’41  and elevates selfishness from the status of a ‘deadly
sin’—the equivalent of idolatry—to the status of the essential human
characteristic. In sharp contrast, most of our religious traditions teach us that
to be authentically human, and even to find ourselves, we have to lose ourselves
in the service of others and in the contemplation of the divine—a contemplation
that is said to extinguish the sense of self and to promote a sense of the unity of
all existence. Of course, this selfish view of humanity is also untrue as a scientific,
psychological description of real human beings. The truly autonomous human
being—Homo economicus, ‘economic man’—is autistic, incapable of entering
into normal human life with its continuous emotional engagement with
others—engagement that is essential to normal human development. Indeed,
that emotional responsiveness to others is more basic than symbolic thought,
providing the basis for the acquisition of language and the development of
symbolic thought.42
One important consequence of this adherence to methodological individualism
has been a stubborn refusal on the part of economists to examine the formation
of preferences—the basis of our choices. They do so on the grounds of what is
called the doctrine of consumer sovereignty—the idea that we are all free to
form our own preferences without having to justify them. As such, it is simply
a restatement of the economic profession’s commitment to individualism. It
privileges so-called individual preferences—as opposed to social institutions
and collective rules of behaviour—on the assumption that preferences have been
chosen individually. This view ignores the extent to which our choices are
conditioned by our positions in the social system—positions that involve
normative obligations and power relationships enforced by society. It ignores
the fact that we justify our choices to ourselves in the language of contemporary
culture and the social construction of that language and culture. It also assumes
that we know what alternatives are open to us and that we know what we want.
So it simply refuses to examine the great extent to which preferences are learned
and not chosen. It also ignores the particular influence that others have on those
preferences, the extent to which they depend on previous choices and the extent
to which they are either incomplete or inconsistent. What is more, it ignores the
highly manipulative nature of much advertising. Furthermore, the economists’
assumption that preferences are consistent has been proven to be false43  —a
finding that undercuts rational choice theory, which, in turn, underpins the
theory of demand.
In this regard, Ormorod argues that the assumption that tastes and preferences
are fixed is one of the most restrictive assumptions of orthodoxy, severely
limiting the capacity of economics to illuminate real-world problems. This is
because the alteration of tastes and preferences—particularly under the influence
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of others, including advertising—is pervasive in the real world.44 We might
note in passing that this obsession with individual preferences and individual
autonomy does not extend to our treatment of children—and no economist is
arguing that it should. It follows that they are accepting tacitly that there is a
legitimate social role in the shaping of individual preferences: consumer
sovereignty does not extend to children, or to the mentally disturbed, or to some
aboriginals—that is, that there are other values to be served that override their
autonomy. What, then, about the merely confused, or the poorly informed, or
the badly misled? To label concerns for such people as simply paternalistic is
not to mount a cogent argument but to make a questionable moral judgement.
Importantly, such preferences are said to include our internalised values and
roles, with action and role-playing seen as being always instrumental and
gratifying.45 That is, they believe that human motivations are universally
reducible to the competitive maximising of personal gain. Of course, such an
account renders the words ‘preferences’ and ‘choice’ empty of meaning.
Nevertheless, as contemporary critic and economist Michael McPherson46  tells
us, mainstream economics has been defined by the principle that the nature and
origins of tastes and preferences lie outside the proper domain of economic
inquiry. It provides the entry point into neoclassical economics—‘the essence
of all properly scientific economic thinking’47  —and consequently excludes
other forms of economic analysis. American pacifist and economist Kenneth
Boulding (1910–93) jokingly referred to the immaculate conception of the
indifference curve.48 These boundaries are essential to the deterministic,
reductionist and mechanical systems thinking that constitutes the neoclassical
method. Of course, the constructionist perspective outlined above involves a
quite fundamental challenge to this impoverished theorising, because it directs
attention towards the social processes through which our choices are legitimised
to us and to each other and away from what are wrongly assumed to be individual
psychological processes.
Importantly, this refusal to examine seriously the formation of preferences is an
ideological stance and an ad hoc strategy designed to protect the structure and
methodology of economic thought from a fatally destructive criticism. If the
consumer is not entirely sovereign, the ideological use of the concept of
Pareto-optimality in welfare economics collapses. This untenable stance flows
directly from economic theory’s commitment to Cartesianism—the philosophical
movement at the heart of the Enlightenment—and to a Newtonian cosmology.
We will explore the consequences of those commitments in some detail in
subsequent chapters. For the moment, it is sufficient to note that economics does
not want to explore the complex of motives or feelings that lies behind real
human choices. Rather, it renames people as economic actors and sets out to
explore the so-called ‘rational choices’ of these ‘idealised’ actors. In this unreal,
48
The Cult of the Market
idealised, rationalist, but impoverished world, instrumental calculation is
enthroned as the distinctive quality of human reason while the emotions are
repudiated.49 This is a debased, impoverished rationalism that is remote from
the original Greek conception of reason as humankind’s highest faculty—a
sharing in the divine nature conceived of as pure mind50  —and from the more
modest concept that arose with humanism and is again being explored in
contemporary thought.
A further fundamental objection can be raised to this focus on preferences and
the optimisation of choices. It privileges the role of consumption in human affairs
compared with the role of production. Homo economicus is a consumer, rather
than a producer. It is quite clear, however, that for most people, their roles in
the workforce are a crucial part of their sense of identity.
Social Order is an Evolved Complex Moral Order
Philosophers and theologians in the Western tradition have tended to draw a
strong distinction between humankind and other animals, believing—at least
in earlier times—that humankind alone shared in the divine nature and that this
set us apart radically from other animals. It is now quite clear, however, that
we are descended from other social animals. Even our earliest hominoid ancestors
lived as members of structured social groups. Our closest contemporary
relatives—the other primate species—also live in social groups that exhibit
cooperative behaviour involving parental care, cooperative foraging, mutual
protection, self-denial and reciprocal kindness.51 This social behaviour among
primates appears to extend back millions of years. Therefore, it seems fair to
assume that human cooperation is partly a legacy of our primate origins.52
Indeed, contemporary research is attributing a central role to collaboration and
trust in human evolution and, in particular, to the evolution of language. It is,
therefore, simply not true that we are born entirely selfish.
Humans have an unusually long period of infantile and juvenile dependency on
adults and this fact alone should put paid to any excessive adulation of
individualism. The basic ability to intensively attend to and respond to others
is present at birth.53  New-born human babies imitate the expressions of others
and enter into an exchange of feelings. By twelve months, they show a specific
need to share purposes and meanings and to learn how to denote common ideas
by means of symbolic expression. It is also clear that the life chances of a
person—and the lifelong sense of his or her own worth—is heavily dependent
on the experience of being loved as a child.
Human nurture and cooperation more generally are not simply a result of
biological inheritance. Even among other primates, behaviour is not determined
purely genetically; social learning is also important. Primate behaviour is a
consequence of a complex mix of genetic, cultural and environmental factors
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with some recent research tending to emphasise the significance of the cultural
element. Cultural learning is even more important to humans because human
cooperation involves a much more complex range of behaviours and far wider
networks than does cooperation among other primates. It is our ability to fashion
more complex and more varied forms of social life that distinguishes us from
them—an ability that depends on language and story-telling.
It is, therefore, now generally considered that humans are distinguished uniquely
from other animals by our capacity for—and possession of—complex cultures
and language. The possession of culture played an active role in shaping the
final stages of human development.54 The evolution of the human race—and
particularly the emergence of intelligence and symbolic capacity—entailed a
complex in which the organised hunting of large animals, life in organised social
groups and the making and the use of tools were interconnected.55  As
contemporary anthropologist Roger Keesing (b. 1935) puts it: ‘[T]he whole pattern
evolves together; changes in physical structures and changes in behaviour, both
genetically and socially transmitted, are tied together.’56  Michael Carrithers
emphasises the evolution of social intelligence as playing the key role in this
development57  —a position consistent with the social function of intellectual
hypothesis advanced by British psychologist Nicholas K. Humphrey.58  Similarly,
Philip Lieberman believes that our ability to talk is one of the keys to
understanding the evolutionary process that made us human.59
It also appears that there is no necessary opposition between the influence of
instinct and of learning in this evolutionary process. Among recent commentators,
anthropologist Peter Reynolds60  rejects explicitly the proposition that human
evolution has been characterised by the replacement of instinct by culture.
Rather, human behaviour and animal behaviour more generally appear to involve
a complex interaction between instinct and experience. He argues that there is
a great deal of behavioural continuity and that the instinctive systems that
function in animals have parallels among humans. There appears to be a
‘progressive’ development of social behaviour, particularly among primates. We
also appear to share much of the same emotional equipment. Reynolds concludes
that a theory of human evolution that presupposes the development of reason
at the expense of emotion, or of learning at the expense of instinct, conflicts
with the evidence. Importantly, he argues that the relationship between reason
and emotion is not one of hierarchy, but of specialisation by function—the brain
integrating different kinds of information into a unified course of action.
Consequently, the progressive evolution of primate cognition did not depend
on the replacement of innate behaviour by learned behaviour, but on the selection
and control of innate behaviour by conceptually stored information. The
comparative evidence also supports progressive changes in the capacity for
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conceptualisation, in instrumental skills and in the volitional control of behaviour
during the course of human evolution.
Keesing argues that our behavioural potential appears to be many-sided, complex,
culturally shaped and socially expressed:
[T]he human behavioural repertoire entails countervailing tendencies.
Humans probably do have behavioural tendencies to dominate, to
compete, to be aggressive (though probably not to be territorial in a
strict sense). But they also have tendencies to share, to cooperate, to be
altruistic. Institutions and customs may intensify competition, reinforce
dominance, or express aggression in warfare and combat; but they may
reinforce our propensities to share, cooperate, be egalitarian and
peaceful.61
Similarly, Mary Midgley argues that there is no need to choose between
explanations based exclusively on social or innate human tendencies, because
she believes that such causes do not compete; they supplement each other.62
For example, she suggests that such innate tendencies as fear and anger are
necessary motives and elements in a good life. Further, she points to the
complexity of human motives and of the states labelled as aggression, spite,
resentment, envy, avarice, cruelty, meanness and hatred and the complex
activities they produce. Importantly, she argues that we are capable of these
vices because we are capable of their opposites—the virtues. The capacity to
form long-term relationships necessarily involves the possibility of rejecting or
abusing that relationship. Aggression is only one among many motives that can
lead to wickedness. Nor is it true that all aggressive behaviour is evil. She argues
that we need to think of wickedness not primarily as a positive, definite tendency
such as aggression—which needs special explanation—but rather as a negative,
as a general kind of failure to live as we are capable of living. This, she suggests,
involves recognising a whole range of natural motives associated with power:
aggression, territoriality, possessiveness and competitiveness. The positive
motives that move people to evil conduct are often quite decent ones such as
prudence, loyalty, self-fulfilment and professional conscientiousness. The
appalling element for Midgley lies in the lack of other motives, which ought to
balance these—in particular, a proper regard for other people and a proper
priority system that would enforce it.
It should be quite clear from the above that it would be a mistake to devalue
the critical influence of cultural evolution in trying to correct the excessive
distinction made between nature and nurture in earlier accounts of human
evolution. It is also important to note that an evolutionary account of human
development does not involve any necessary acceptance of the biological
determinism connected with such contemporary theorists as Edward O. Wilson
(Sociobiology: The New Synthesis) and Richard Dawkins (The Selfish Gene). The
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more extreme pronouncements of these theorists are simply wrong. Their story
is simply another attempt—in a long line of attempts in the Enlightenment
tradition—to find a deterministic, mechanical explanation of human behaviour.
Their selfish-gene metaphor is simply not helpful. Genes are not selfish; they
lack the agency that would enable them to be described appropriately in that
way. Nor are living organisms reducible to their genes, as recent research into
the human genome has shown.
Contemporary biologist Brian Goodwin says it quite bluntly: organisms cannot
be reduced to the properties of their genes and have to be understood as dynamic
systems with distinctive properties. He argues that a more dynamic
comprehensive theory of life focused on the dynamics of emergent processes
would reinstate organisms as the fundamental units of life. In this view, organisms
are not simply survival machines for genes. Organisms assume intrinsic value,
having worth in and of themselves.63  For Goodwin, such a realisation arises
from an understanding of organisms as centres of autonomous action and
creativity, connected with a causal agency that cannot be described as
mechanical. It is the relational order that matters. Of course, this applies with
particular strength to humans, and Goodwin extends this conclusion to social
structures where relationships, creativity and values are of primary significance.
As should be clear from the above, this social order is acknowledged to be a
moral order; it determines how we should act. As pioneering French sociologist
Emile Durkheim (1858–1917) pointed out:
[W]e are involved in a complex of obligations from which we have no
right to free ourselves…Thus, altruism is not destined to become, as
Spencer desires, a sort of agreeable ornament to social life, but it will
forever be its fundamental basis. How can we ever really dispense with
it? Men cannot live together without acknowledging, and, consequently,
making mutual sacrifices, without tying themselves to one another with
strong, durable bonds. Every society is a moral society.64
The study of social life is therefore a study of social norms, the institutions in
which they are embodied and the stories we tell about them. It involves not
simply regularities in conduct, but regulated conduct.65  It is the shared values
embedded in those stories that act as the mortar that binds together the structure
of each human community, with rewards and punishments based on those
commonly held values. It is also the pervasiveness of these values and rules that
gives each person a sense of belonging, a sense of community.66  Our very
survival depends on such conformity. For the most part, conformity is a result
of the internalisation of values and conceptions of what is desirable. These
provide security and contribute to personal and social identity. Such cultural
knowledge is, however, often tacit; it is so regular and routine that it lies below
a conscious level. Michael Polanyi tells us that paying express attention to such
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knowledge can impede the skilful application of it in much the same way as
giving express attention to a motor skill can impede the application of that
skill.67  Such skills are not exercised by following the rules explicitly. The aim
of training is to free us from the need to follow such rules consciously.68
Sociability, then, is not simply a natural trait. Rather, social phenomena are due
to nature and nurture. What is distinctive about human beings is our capacity
to control our behaviour—what Stark calls our ‘animality’—a capacity that
other species on the whole lack.69 The process of nurture, the process of
socialisation, is a process of moralisation.70 The survival of sociality requires a
system of discipline that sets limits to, and works against, the drives that we
have inherited. It is this control that makes human civilisation possible and it
is only then that higher values can influence human conduct. American cultural
anthropologist Marshall Sahlins (b. 1930) puts it this way:
It is an extraordinary fact that primate urges often become, not the secure
foundation of human social life, but a source of weakness in it…In
selective adaptation to the perils of the Stone Age, human society
overcame or subordinated such primate propensities as selfishness,
indiscriminate sexuality, dominance and brutal competition. It substituted
kinship and cooperation for conflict, placed solidarity over sex [and]
morality over might.71
Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711–76) made a similar argument: ‘It is
certain that self-love, when it acts at its liberty, instead of engaging us to honest
action, is the source of all injustice and violence…We must allow that the sense
of justice and injustice is not derived from nature, but arises artificially, though
necessarily, from education and human conventions.’72
For Stark, it is the control of greed exercised by the social norms that, in
particular, constitutes a crucial victory of culture over animality.73  He sees what
he calls society’s primary laws as emerging out of these social norms. These
norms—a society’s ethos—are not only taught to us by our parents, as indicated
above, we learn them from our stories, our popular music, our fairy-tales, fables,
sagas and legends, symbolism and ceremony, and from popular, artistic and
educational literature. In the contemporary world, radio, television, film and
the Internet provide much of the medium for this learning. These norms always
operate in conjunction with ethical and religious teachings.
Importantly, for Stark, religion lies behind the other ethos-building institutions,
filling the gaps left by custom and law—a view consistent with that of Geertz
cited in Chapter 1. Because only crude offenders are detected, the pressures
encouraging obedience to the law cannot be fully effective. They leave inner
dispositions largely unaltered and cannot enforce the performance of good deeds.
In these circumstances, the belief that our moral conduct will ultimately be
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rewarded or punished by some transcendent judge provides a powerful incentive
for moral conformity. Stark, drawing on the work of French philosopher Henri
Bergson (1858–1941), doubts whether society and culture could survive without
a metaphysical prop of some kind. As indicated in the previous chapter, even
in our partly secularised society, religious conceptions have not been eliminated.
Not only do traditional religious views survive in a significant proportion of the
population, powerful religion substitutes such as the deification of nature and
of history have a similar influence.
The evolution of social norms and institutions has involved a long process of
moral search and experimentation. Stark, drawing on the work of American
social evolutionist William Sumner (1840–1910), describes it as follows:
What Sumner saw at work, in the lap of society, was a process of selection
separating by way of trial and error, useful and disappointing expedients,
and leading to the adoption of the former and the discarding of the latter.
The guide in this never resting and never ending stream of
experimentation is not pure but practical reason, not ratiocination, but,
rather, common sense. General principles of action may and do in the
end emerge, but they are merely abstract formulations, summings up,
of concrete experiences.74
The conviction that humans have themselves created the social system within
which they have their being is central to this point of view. For Stark, the
self-creation of society is the greatest of all social phenomena. What have been
selected in this historical process of evolution are ways of behaving that mitigate
the war of all against all. Hayek, the darling of economic rationalists, also
described a historical, evolutionary process of trial and error for the development
of social rules.75  Successful action results in the rule being selected, whereas
unsuccessful action results in the rule being discarded.
Importantly, if humankind has made society in the process of its own evolution,
it is not the pure product of ‘nature’. In the words of Berger and Luckmann,
‘[s]ocial order is not part of the “nature of things” and it cannot be derived from
the “laws of nature”. Social order exists only as a product of human activity.’76
Equally, if humankind has made society, it has also made the economic system.
These insights have considerable significance for the study of human behaviour
itself. The social and economic systems and their constituents are not natural
types or entities such as sodium chloride—exhibiting natural regularities to be
described by the natural sciences—they are social artefacts. It is also clear from
the above that culture is not a once-for-all influence; it is a continuing process
constructed and reconstructed during human interaction.77  Consequently,
contemporary anthropologist Bruce Knauft tells us: ‘Culture is now best seen
not as an entity, tied to a fixed group of people, but as a shifting and contested
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process of constructing collective identity…This is as true in New Guinea as it
is in New York.’78 The entire cultural and institutional environment within
which the institutions of governance are embedded is the product of history
and is subject to a path of dependency to at least some extent.79  Consequently,
history matters.
In their account, Berger and Luckmann explain that institutionalisation arises
out of the habitualisation of actions that tend to be repeated frequently and their
associated typifications.80 These actions can then be reproduced with an
economy of effort, making it unnecessary for each situation to be defined anew.
Institutions control conduct by setting up predefined patterns of conduct, and
are experienced as possessing a reality of their own that confronts members of
the group as an external and coercive fact. The objectivity of this created world
of meaning hardens as those patterns are passed on to children, and are
experienced by them as an objective reality and an authoritative claim. Among
groups, it ensures predicability of behaviour, stabilising actions, interactions
and routines, which are then taken for granted. As such, they make possible a
division of roles and labour in the widest sense.
Such an institutional world, and its associated roles, requires ways in which it
can be explained and justified—that is, it requires legitimisation, giving rise to
legitimising formulae. These legitimisations, these stories, are also learned during
socialisation. In the evolution of human society, a widening canopy of
legitimisations has been created, backed by the mechanisms of social control.
For Berger and Luckmann, this edifice of legitimisation uses language as its
principal instrument, with the fundamental legitimising explanations being built
into the vocabulary. Importantly, society, identity and reality are each
crystallised in the human subject in the process of internalising the language,
which provides the means and the content of socialisation.
Language also provides the means for objectifying new experiences, allowing
their incorporation into the existing stock of knowledge and the means by which
these sedimentations are transmitted in the tradition of a collective. In this way,
legitimisations can be adapted so as to reinterpret experience without necessarily
upsetting the institutional order. Berger and Luckmann stress that this process
of legitimisation does not primarily involve a preoccupation with complex
theoretical systems because ‘the primary knowledge about the institutional order
is the sum total of “what everybody knows” about the social world, an
assemblage of maxims, morals, proverbial nuggets of wisdom, values and beliefs,
myths [and] so forth’.81 With the evolving complexity of a society, however,
there similarly arose specialised bodies of ‘theoretical’ knowledge providing a
stable canopy of meaning for the society and ultimately creating symbolic
universes in which all sectors of the institutional order were integrated in an
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all-embracing frame of reference. In the process, they attained a measure of
autonomy capable of modifying, as well as reflecting, institutional processes.
As more complex forms of knowledge arose—and as an economic surplus
developed—there also arose specialist legitimisers, who devoted themselves
full-time to integrating the meanings attached to disparate institutional processes.
In the process, they became increasingly removed from the necessities of
everyday life, claimed a novel status and claimed knowledge of the ultimate
status of what everyone did. These legitimisers, these story-tellers, these ‘priests’,
form part of the system of social control, justifying the institutional order and
giving normative dignity to its practices. The symbolic universe provides order
for the subjective understanding of biographical experience and the history of
society more generally—our sense of who we are.
The entire society now makes sense. Particular institutions and roles are
legitimised by locating them in a comprehensively meaningful world.
For example, the political order is legitimated by reference to a cosmicThe
entire so order of power and justice, and political roles are legitimated
as representatives of these cosmic principles.82
This human projection of meanings onto reality creates the world in which we
live, but these symbolic universes are social products with a history. Of course,
no symbolic universe is entirely taken for granted, with variation in the way in
which the universe is conceived, with competition between rival groups of
experts, the repression of dissent and the evolution of the tradition to ward off
heretical groups. Importantly, an ideology develops when a particular definition
of reality comes to be attached to a concrete power interest. So it has been with
our society and with our market system. Of course, in modern pluralist societies,
there tends to be a taken-for-granted shared universe and different partial
universes existing in mutual accommodation and tension.
Berger and Luckmann go on to give an account of what they call the conceptual
machineries of universe maintenance, pointing to the role of mythology, theology,
philosophy and science in creating and maintaining the symbolic universe. For
them:
Modern science is an extreme step in this development, and in the
secularisation and sophistication of universe-maintenance. Science not
only completes the removal of the sacred from the world of everyday
life, but removes universe-maintaining knowledge as such from that
world. Everyday life becomes bereft of both sacred legitimation and the
sort of theoretical intelligibility that would link it with the symbolic
universe in its intended totality. Put more simply, the ‘lay’ member of
society no longer knows how his universe is to be conceptually
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maintained, although, of course, he still knows who the specialists of
universe-maintenance are presumed to be.83
In summary, social life is made possible only through the disciplining of what
Stark calls our animal nature or our animality.84  Not only have our instincts
been tamed, they have been transformed into factors making for social cohesion.
Nevertheless, underneath human culture, animal nature is still present and needs
permanent discipline. At best, the average socialised person is only
semi-moralised up to a moderate standard of law-abidingness. We adjust to social
life by internalising and operating its norms and by internalising and
manipulating them. We learn how to seem social as well as how to be social—not
only how to serve, but how to hold our own, to manipulate and how to exploit.
Of course, we often also lie to ourselves about our own motives. Consequently,
there is often a deep discrepancy between human ideals and real conduct. Every
society must therefore guard against antisocial conduct; it must have and apply
sanctions, to deter as far as possible criminal behaviour in the widest sense of
the word.
It is important to note before we move on that the above evolutionary account
of the development of human society and of culture does not involve any
acceptance of the social Darwinism that is identified with Spencer or Sumner in
the late nineteenth century, and which attempted to justify the dominant social
hierarchies of Victorian society.
The Maintenance of Social Order Also Involves the Creation
of Moral Institutions
Clearly, punishment—or the threat of punishment—is necessary for a general
climate of obedience to social norms. What is more, there is an element of force
in all forms of property, marriage and religion. In smaller and simpler
communities, unorganised social pressure could have been sufficient to maintain
the social control necessary to guard against a war of all against all,85  though
some genetically based sense of hierarchy could also have been important. What
is perhaps more certain is that, in its early days, law was barely differentiated
from other forms of social pressure.86 The evolution of larger, more complex
and more anonymous societies involved splitting the social code into two
parts—custom and law—with organised law enforcement by people forming
part of a governmental apparatus.
This perspective sees the State as having grown out of a basic social need for a
coordinating mechanism especially to ensure safety and order, with the State as
the guardian and enforcer of the key norms.87  Plato (427–347 BC), Aristotle
(384–22 BC), the Stoics88  and the Epicureans89  all thought of the State as
coterminous with society itself. Much more recently, Stark argued that society
solved one of its most difficult problems by placing a monopoly of the means of
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compulsion in the hands of the State.90  For his part, Norbert Elias91  also sees
the advancing division of functions involved in the civilising process—including
the division of labour—as going hand in hand with the monopolisation of
physical force and the growing stability of the central organs of society. It is the
monopolisation of force—this narrowing of free competition—in conjunction
with increasing pressures for self-constraint that create the pacified social spaces
in which the functional dependencies between people can grow, the social fabric
can become more intricate and economic activity can flourish.
In his account of the origins of the State and civilisation, based on the study of
the six original civilisations of which we have knowledge, Elman Service
specifically denies the class-conflict theory of the origin of either the State or of
civilisation. He agrees that the creation of culture was the human achievement,
the means by which societies tamed and governed their members and created
and maintained complex social organisations. This depends on the ability of the
political aspects of a culture to integrate and protect the society. Some societies,
however, have done more than perpetuate themselves, having found
political–cultural solutions that enable them to grow to ever-greater size and
complexity. Service argued that the origins of government lay essentially in the
institutionalisation of centralised leadership, which in developing its further
administrative functions grew into a hereditary aristocracy.92  Primal government
worked to protect and legitimise itself in its role of maintaining the whole society.
In this view, political power organised the economy rather than the reverse.
Despite all claims and appearances to the contrary, the law is really a liberator
not an oppressor, and so is the State as the ultimate enforcer of the law. These
moral functions can, however, easily be subverted so that the State becomes an
oppressor. This experience provides the motivation for much political philosophy,
and for political programs aimed at regulating the role of the State itself.
Unorganised social pressure in support of key norms and the organised
enforcement of law is not enough to ensure social order. We cannot do without
a sense of guilt—the guilt flowing from the breach of internalised norms.93 The
survival of a community depends on its moral cohesion and the coercive force
of the law cannot maintain that moral cohesion alone: secular restraints are not
enough to deter evil, antisocial or merely illegal acts. The healthier the society,
the less it relies directly on legal sanctions. Ideally, life in society should be lived
above the law, not by it. Australian theologian Bruce Kaye, in particular,
emphasises that social interaction degenerates when it is construed narrowly in
terms of legal obligations.94 The law is a framework and a guide as to the
character of the civic system, but is not an adequate dynamic for the civil
community. Similarly, within organisations, an effective dynamic goes beyond
narrow legal definitions. The ethos or culture of such organisations is a vital
motivating and shaping factor in the civil community that the organisation exists
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to create and serve. Kaye argues that, if a company interprets its place in the
civil and market systems in narrow legalistic terms, it will not create the civil
community within its own life, or in its relationships with the host society,
which will enable it to fulfil its basic purposes. More prosaically, much
contemporary management literature points to the role that goals, values and
missions perform in maintaining organisational efficiency.95
Voluntary efforts to behave morally and to uphold the law are necessary for
complex social organisations; otherwise law enforcement would become
impossible as well as tyrannical. These inward voluntary limitations—so
necessary for corporate life—are the product of conscience, conviction and
inward persuasion and belief, and cannot be imposed directly from outside.
Convention is therefore society’s strongest defence against anarchy and the
tyranny of an all-pervading disciplinary and coercive law. G. R. Dunstan’s
account emphasises the role of institutions as the means by which moral insights
are given stability and permanence.96 Without such institutions, moral insights
would be lost in times of need. This emphasis on conventions places a primary
emphasis on morality as a common possession rather than as a matter of individual
choice or decision.
For Dunstan, such conventions incorporate expectations as well as imposing
limitations. We take the predictability necessary for social life for granted because
we assume that we know what to expect of one another in roughly comparable
situations. We can do so because a large part of our socialisation—our elementary
social and moral education—involves training in the meeting of such mutual
expectations. Such expectations involve a prescriptive element because social
situations are understood as relationships in which certain conduct is expected
as appropriate to the roles of the people involved.97  Fidelity, in this context,
means meeting the expectations appropriate to one’s role. Simply following the
moral rules—including obeying the law—is not enough. Personal integrity
requires one to be on guard against formalism and to be conscious of the live,
human, ethical reality behind such obligations. In times of rapid social change,
such expectations can be fluid or imperfectly understood, but there is a
recognisable continuity and cohesion in them. Frequently, there are conflicts
between these roles and their accompanying obligations and consequently the
need for moral judgement cannot be avoided.98  Such role behaviour—and the
mutual support of people in their groups—is a significant part of everyday life,
bound up with our awareness of ourselves as agents. Consequently, Mead
believed that a person was built up of internalised roles, so that the expectations
of others became the self-expectations of a self-steering person.99
These conventions are very demanding because they flow from what the
community believes to be of worth. They include specific beliefs about the worth
of people regardless of their specific characteristics. These include beliefs about
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the value of human relationships and the common interest in the truths on which
they stand. Such beliefs have a history and, in the case of Western societies, can
be traced in the twin roots of our culture: Greek culture and Judaeo-Christian
religion. A mature religious ethic, such as the Judaeo-Christian tradition, makes
demands well beyond mere utilitarian considerations to the supreme worth of
sacrifice, in the transcendence of self in subordination and service to the other.
These learned moral traditions are complex and usually tacit. Such moral
judgements are neither simple deductions from principles nor simply calculation
of consequences; but, as I pointed out earlier, they have been built into our
vocabulary and our stories. Such moral judgements involve a skilled
performance.100  Even the moral abstractions of our legitimisers express general
aims, which cannot be made operational in a straightforward way through
clear-cut ‘means-to-ends’ calculation, though such abstractions supply a general
orientation for living. Also, as we have already seen, there are conflicts in the
roles we perform and there also conflicts between the abstractions we use. What
this means for American philosopher Hubert Dreyfus is that skilled social
behaviour transcends the analytical application of universal rules in a way of
thinking that is rapid, intuitive, holistic, interpretative, experientially based
and context dependent.101  Importantly, for Cambridge economist Tony Lawson,
the social system is an inherently dynamic process, which emerges from and
depends on human practice, but which is not reducible to individual human
agency. In short, it is an emergent evolutionary system.102
Consistent with the account given earlier, British moral philosopher Robert
Downie emphasises the emotional element in social morality: the ties generated
by kinship, common religion, custom, language, traditional ways of earning a
living, traditional loyalties of all kinds and, more generally, shared broad cultural
traditions.103  Nevertheless, there are limits to the degree of variability in social
rules. Social moralities must have certain structural features in common. Downie
lists a number of obvious truths as limiting the scope for variety: our lack of
self-sufficiency, our limited benevolence, our approximately equal power, our
limited understanding and skills and limitations imposed by the environment
and scarcity.104  Consequently, we require means of limiting violence,
exploitation and competition and means for encouraging cooperation. All of this
implies that there is necessarily a strong element of consequentialism in social
morality. This does not mean that social morality is, or must be, limited to an
examination of the consequences of action. The beliefs on which we act extend
our moral values well beyond such consequentialism.
Not only are there social rules and expectations, there are said to be social rules
about social rules. Downie describes second-order rules of recognition, of change
and of empowerment and procedure. For their part, Australian public-choice
philosopher Geoffrey Brennan and American Nobel Prize-winning economist
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James Buchanan105  emphasise the importance of rules at the constitutional level.
They argue optimistically that the natural tendency for conflict in the interests
of individuals is moderated substantially in the choice of rules. In their view, it
is these second-order rules and moral principles that help us determine the moral
legitimacy of government action. This view presupposes the existence of
sufficient social capital and freedom from violence to enable discourse about
such rules. It also ignores the extent to which there are real conflicts of interest
involved in those constitutional rules. Additionally, there is no reason to believe
that these add up to a coherent, consistent system. Nor, as Brennan and Buchanan
point out, is there any reason to believe that the forces of social evolution will
always ensure the selection of the best rules.
In summary, while there is wide range of views about the basis of our moral and
legal principles, there is strong support for the proposition that the moral and
legal principles, along with a sense of community, provide crucial elements in
the governance structures of our societies.
The Maintenance of Social Order Involves Moral Choice
and Struggle
The maintenance of social order involves a struggle within the individual, a
struggle to control our behavioural tendencies to dominate, to compete, to be
aggressive—those behavioural tendencies that Stark reduces to greed and lust.
That this is consistent with our daily experience is acknowledged widely, but
this is not a new intuition. Various religious traditions have been talking about
such issues for as long as we have written records. For example, for the Hebrew
prophets, the existence of evil in the world was a consequence of humankind’s
overreaching pride, of human freedom reaching beyond its limits, leading to
alienation from God. For Zarathustra of Balkh (c. 626–551 BC), the potential for
good and evil was born in all of us—a consequence of what he saw as a cosmic
battle between good and evil, the battle between the supreme god, Ahura Mazda,
and the evil god, Ahriman. This teaching points to the prevalence and strength
of evil in the world, and of the resulting conflicts within us.106
The Bhagavadadgita (Song of the Lord), a popular Indian religious poem forming
part of the Mahabharata (The Great Epic of the Bharata Dynasty), dating from
the fifth century BC, teaches that human beings are distinguished from animals
by the knowledge of right and wrong. The world is the field of righteousness
and the battleground for mortal struggle between the good and evil in each of
us. Drawing on this Indian tradition, Sidharta Gautama (the Buddha, 563–483
BC) taught that all life was suffering and that human suffering could be
transcended only by seeing through the illusions of worldly reality and the
individual self—and by cultivating a personality that was free from the deluded
desires and passions that caused suffering.107  In this view, suffering arises out
of selfish cravings and such cravings can be overcome by following the eightfold
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path of Buddhism. About the same time, in China, Confucius (Kong Fuzi, 551–479
BC), drawing on the idea of the interdependence of all things, was concerned to
define and help cultivate the way to a harmonious society. His teachings were
concerned with the avoidance of vice and the cultivation of personal virtue,
proper government, the values of family and community.
The ancient Greek conception of hubris—the human bent towards
self-aggrandisement, pride and all associated forms of egotism—has similarities
with the Judaeo-Christian conception of the Fall.108  In this view, a shadow lies
over every human being because we do not have the ethical stamina we need.
This Greek concept emphasised the tragic dimension of this darker side of human
beings. Hubris, in this sense, is not pride but the self-elevation of the great
beyond the limits of its finitude.109  In this tradition, Socrates (c. 470–399 BC)
was concerned to explore the concepts of the good life and of virtue. While there
is some difference of emphasis, the moral metaphysics of ancient Athens is similar
to the fundamental moral stance of the Christian Church.
For the Christian Church also, moral evil is omnipresent. As Saint Paul (10–67),
some time in the middle of the first century AD, said:
I have been sold as a slave to sin. I cannot understand my own behaviour.
I fail to carry out the things I want to do, and I find myself doing the
very things I hate…for though the will to do what is good is in me, the
performance is not, with the result that instead of doing the good things
I want to do, I carry out the sinful things I do not want.110
Again, contemporary Christian theology talks about humankind’s ‘torn’ or
‘broken’ condition111  in alluding to what has more traditionally been called
original sin. The Fall involves strong claims about how the human world is,
rather than simply a mythological story of how it came to be that way. As
contemporary Anglican theologian David Tracey would have it: ‘The one piece
of Christian doctrine that is empirically demonstrable is that there is something
awry with the world.’112 The Christian tradition goes on to suggest that an
effective social order is possible only through a covenant relationship with
God—a relationship that is corporate and individual.113  Importantly, mainstream
contemporary Christian theologians see the myth of the Fall as incorporating a
profound insight into the human condition—a fall to moral responsibility—and
not as a historical account of the origin of evil. Balancing this negative view of
the human condition, the somewhat dualistic Christian tradition also sees
humankind as having being made in the likeness of God, and as having been
saved by Christ, who initiated the Kingdom of God, within which we can
experience our true calling as children of God, open to love and the possibility
of radical goodness.
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It is largely the doctrine of original sin as developed by Saint Augustine of Hippo
(354–430) and transmitted through the Protestant reformers that found
philosophical expression in English philosopher Thomas Hobbes’ (1588–1679)
‘war of all on all’.114  Hobbes believed that we were all motivated by a restless
desire for power, which we required to assure us of the means to live well. In
Hobbes’ view, in a ‘state of nature’,
there is no place for industry; because the fruits thereof is [sic] uncertain:
and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of
commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious buildings;
no instruments of moving and removing such things as require much
force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no Arts;
no Letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continuous fear, and
danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish
and short.115
This is simply a secularised version of Calvin’s natural man.116  For Hobbes, it
was only as a consequence of the discipline enforced by government that a
civilised life was possible.
The more optimistic Enlightenment view that humankind and human structures
are perfectible is found in the works of Swiss philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau
(1712–78). This optimism—that humankind was basically good—was condemned
by a number of councils of the Christian Church as the Pelagian heresy in the
fifth century, by the Catholic Council of Trent in the sixteenth century and by
a number of Protestant councils about the same time. Rousseau thought that
human beings were endowed by nature with compassion for their fellow
humans—a view he derived from Smith and Hume. He also believed, however,
that human life in a ‘state of nature’ was one of solitude: ‘Having no fixed
habitation and no need of one another’s assistance, the same persons hardly meet
twice in their lives, and perhaps then without knowing one another or speaking
together…They maintained no kind of intercourse with one another, and were
consequently strangers to vanity, deference, esteem and contempt.’117
It is now clear that this individualistic anthropology is nonsense. Our primate
ancestors lived in social groups and we evolved as social animals. Nevertheless,
while generally holding that humankind in this mythical ‘state of nature’ was
inherently good, Rousseau conceded that the weight of human experience
demonstrated that human beings were wicked. He claimed that it was human
society that induced people to hate each other and to inflict every imaginable
evil on one another. He also disputed that private interests were linked to the
public interest; rather, they excluded each other. The laws of society were a
yoke that everybody wished to impose on others, but not themselves.118
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The point of this account for current purposes is not theological but empirical.
It is not intended to promote particular religious beliefs or a particular or
masculine image of God, or to encourage an orgy of guilt feelings.119  Rather,
this account is intended to encourage a more realistic understanding of the
human condition. These traditional theological concerns about human sinfulness
have been absorbed into secular discourse and then—under the influence of
Enlightenment optimism—forgotten. Worse, economic orthodoxy has been
dominated by the claim that self-interest provides an adequate basis for modelling
human behaviour and, in the process, is legitimising selfishness.
Human moral finitude is, however, alive and active in the world. These traditional
religious concerns incorporate a profound insight into the human condition, an
insight pointing to the fragility of our social order and an insight that we ignore
to our peril. Certainly, in our daily life we do not, and cannot, ignore the fact
that to be human is inter alia to be proud, to be vain, to want to dominate others,
to become angry, to be vindictive, violent, vengeful, greedy, dishonest,
untruthful, weak-willed, easily lead, self-destructive, frightened, confused and
to become discouraged.
Of course, we find it easy to see these faults and failings in others. What is
frequently overlooked is the insidious and ever-present influence of these
tendencies on our own actions and values and on social values more generally.
We need to protect ourselves from our own dark side and we should not ignore
this particular reality in our institutional arrangements. One consequence is that
even our moral vocabulary—and our moral, religious, political and legal
institutions—can be subverted into instruments of immoral conduct.
The whole Enlightenment project has been based on a much more optimistic
view of the human condition through a secular appropriation of the Christian
eschatological hope. It involves a strong belief in the power of rationality to lead
to moral and technological progress and greater human happiness. This is despite
a human history that includes countless wars, massacres, tortures, cruelty,
exploitation and abuses of every kind. Surely the history of the twentieth century
demonstrates conclusively that such optimism is misplaced and that we live
always on the edge of chaos. Rather than being assured, a peaceful, just social
order is something that has to be striven for constantly. The twentieth century
saw human viciousness and barbarism on a scale that is hard to imagine. For
example, William Eckhardt estimates that in the period 1900–89, 86 million
people were killed in war.120 The Soviet regime alone killed about 62 million
people in the 70 years after 1917, with 9.5 million of those killed in the 1930s.121
These are only some of the grosser statistics. There are other incidents of inhuman
treatment of our fellows without number. In Sigmund Freud’s (1856–1939)
judgement: ‘[T]he tendency to aggression is an innate, independent, instinctual
disposition in man…constituting the most powerful obstacle to culture…there
64
The Cult of the Market
is no likelihood of our being able to suppress humanity’s aggressive
tendencies.’122
One response to this catalogue of violence might be to argue that it reinforces
suspicion of government. This is not, however, an adequate response. While
governments—even nominally democratic governments—can behave very
badly, not everything they do is bad. Also, in the above cases, government
leaders found ready accomplices for their crimes among ordinary citizens.
Similarly, while business does great good, it also does much evil—including
such things as the design and manufacture of gas chambers, the manufacture
and distribution of weapons, assisting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the
corruption of governments, the sale of addictive substances known to cause vast
numbers of premature deaths, the sale of unsafe and shoddy products more
generally, the pollution of the environment, the evasion of taxation, the
exploitation of workers and the systematic deception of customers and
shareholders.
Taking cigarettes as an example, Simon Chapman, Professor of Public Health at
the University of Sydney, has estimated that 4.9 million people world-wide are
killed by smoking every year—19,000 of them in Australia. This is a rate of
death rivalling the worst examples of twentieth-century tyranny. The number
of Australian smoking deaths is larger than the deaths caused by breast, cervical
and skin cancer, AIDS, suicide, alcohol and road crashes combined.123 There
is well-confirmed scientific evidence for these estimates and the cigarette
companies have known about the adverse effects and the addictive properties
of their products for many years. Indeed, they have manipulated these addictive
properties. Consequently, there is no way that cigarette producers and their
distributors—including the local supermarket and corner store—can avoid some
moral responsibility for these horrible premature deaths. While we have a war
on terrorism, however, we do not have a war on cigarette production and
distribution—presumably because this mass killing occurs as a part of everyday
economic transactions, because of the superficial acquiescence of the victims
and the political power of the perpetrators.
Worse still, we do not have a real war on poverty, hunger or disease. Our
tolerance of these particular continuing evils involves the premature deaths of
vast numbers of people in Third-World countries.
If these historical insights are not enough evidence to convince the reader of the
capacity of human beings—just like us—to engage in the grossest evil in the
pursuit of power and economic gain, let us now turn briefly to slavery—one of
the cruellest institutions in human history. Slavery apparently first appeared in
subsistence pastoral economies, but the transition to a semi-market economy
brought a significant expansion in the number of slaves and much harsher
treatment of them.124  Slavery played a dominant role in production in early
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semi-market economies. For example, plantation slavery was common in ancient
Greece and in the Roman Empire, while slaves were also used in mining, industry,
commerce, domestic service and brothels and in harems. As a consequence,
slavery was accepted as normal for a significant proportion of the population.
In ancient Athens—the exemplar of the democratic polis—slaves made up about
one-third of the population. Warfare, slave raiding, kidnapping, punishment,
debt, the sale of children and birth to a slave mother provided the supply.
Aristotle even argued that some people lacked the higher qualities of the soul
necessary for freedom and were born to be slaves. To its shame, the Christian
Church for most of its history did not condemn this base institution, even if it
advised slave owners to be kind to their slaves. Islam took a similar view.
In relatively recent times, the European colonisation of the Americas exploited
a pre-existing African slave trade to provide slaves to exploit the lands stolen
from the indigenous populations to produce goods for export to Europe. This
obscene trade to the West Indies and South America began in 1517, growing
rapidly by the end of the seventeenth century. In British North America, the
trade started in 1619 and developed slowly until new arrivals totalled about
260,000 in 1754. Overall, it is estimated that more than 15 million African slaves
were transported to the Western Hemisphere before the suppression of the trade.
It is thought that approximately one-third of the African slaves shipped—usually
in appalling conditions—died as a consequence of their treatment on the voyage
and in the ‘hardening’ process of their exposure to European diseases. While
slaves in the Americas and throughout the Western world were emancipated in
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the institution lingers on in some
underdeveloped states and in some hidden ways.
It has been estimated recently that there are currently as many as 20 million sex
slaves throughout the world, including some in Australia. This tendency towards
the exploitation of others—which allowed this evil institution to persist for so
long—is still with us. Furthermore, the International Labour Organisation (ILO)
estimates that 8.4 million children work as slave labourers, prostitutes or soldiers
world-wide. Of these, 1.2 million are kidnapped, sold or smuggled each year.125
The United Nations Children’s Fund, UNICEF, describes the trafficking of
children into prostitution and slavery as a billion-dollar business. Importantly
also, the descendants of emancipated slaves have struggled throughout the
Americas to free themselves from the low socio-economic status to which they
were condemned by the ruthless exploitation of their ancestors.
The conclusion is obvious. We are all capable of unspeakable acts and an
extraordinary indifference to the suffering of others. Before we get carried away,
therefore, about the perfectibility of modern humans, or even about
labour-market deregulation, it would be wise to remember that within every
person there exists the capacity to be a slave driver, a slave owner, a death-camp
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guard, a camp commandant, a torturer and a tyrant—writ large or in the minutia
of everyday life.
This is the reason why people have long sought to put in place structures to
inhibit the accumulation of excessive power and its abuse. It has been one of
the primary justifications advanced for liberalism and the market system in the
past two centuries. There has also, however, been a recent strong tendency to
overlook the exploitation and the abuse of power that occurs within the market
system itself. It is not simply governments that are capable of tyranny. With
the passing of the Soviet Union, we might have been better served if we had
looked more closely at the warts within our own system, rather than giving
ourselves over to triumphal gloating at the collapse of the utopian socialist dream.
Summary
This chapter started off by pointing to the influence of the economics profession
and economic fundamentalism on public policy and expressing concern at that
influence. I suggested that economic fundamentalism assumed that social
relationships were reducible to transactions between self-interested
individuals—that is, that economic relationships were the fundamental social
relationships. It has been argued that as a consequence, the vocabulary of
economics with all its entailments now provides the dominant vocabulary for
the evaluation of public policy choices.
My more detailed analysis began with an examination of the basis of the social
order, starting from a position that saw the individual as embedded in society.
I pointed out that there is no such thing as a pre-social human nature and that
the formation of our values—and even of our consumer preferences—is a
thoroughly social process. In support, I pointed to our earliest hominoid ancestors
as having lived as members of social groups. Our evolution involved a complex
in which the organised hunting of large animals, life in organised social groups
and the making and use of tools were interconnected. That evolution is
inseparable from the evolution of human culture. That culture is something we
learn as children—discovering how our parents and those around us interpret
the world. This evolved social order is acknowledged widely to be a moral
order—an order that determines how we should act. The study of social life is,
therefore, the study of social norms, institutions and the stories in which they
are embodied—not simply regularities in conduct, but regulated conduct. These
regulations set limits to, work against and channel the drives we have inherited.
It is the control of greed, broadly defined, which constitutes a crucial victory
of culture against animality—a victory that permitted complex organisations to
emerge. Central to this view is the idea that human beings as they have evolved
created the social system in which they have their being. This evolution of
human culture is not a once-and-for-all process; it is a continuing process.
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The maintenance of any social order involves, then, a moral struggle within and
between individuals—a struggle to control our behavioural tendencies to
dominate, to compete and to be aggressive. There are severe limits to our
successful control of these tendencies. This fact has been acknowledged widely
throughout human history and in different cultures, particularly in the context
of religious teachings. In particular, it is reflected in the Christian doctrine of
original sin—a doctrine secularised by Hobbes in his war of all on all—and then
largely forgotten. It is a doctrine that incorporates a profound insight into the
human condition—an insight that we ignore to our peril, particularly in the
design of our institutional and organisational arrangements. It is unorganised
social pressure, organised enforcement of law and our own sense of guilt flowing
from any breach of internalised norms that provide the moral coercion that
permits the social system to survive.
It is also clear that no society can survive without stable moral traditions backed
up by effective means of coercion. Leading moral philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre
tells us, however, that our day-to-day moral vocabulary derives from several
different and incompatible moral traditions.126  Consequently, the moral
foundations of modern society are incoherent and fragmented. This would seem
to pose a significant threat to that social system and some commentators have
sensed deterioration in the social, intellectual and philosophical capital of the
Western civil order.
Having concluded that human civilisation is always under threat from what
used to be called human sinfulness—including human greed—in the next
chapter, we will go on to examine the relationship between the economic system
and the social order. It will suggest that the economic system, like society itself,
is a social artefact and, far from being autonomous, is dependent on the systems
of social control discussed above.
68
The Cult of the Market
ENDNOTES
1  Smith 1757, Part VI, Section III, Ch. 1.
2  Shotter 1985.
3  In his mature work, he added the qualification ‘always’. Pareto 1896, cited in Guala 1998.
4  Secord 1986.
5  von Bruck 1986.
6  Saul 2001.
7  Stark 1978, p. 66.
8  Stark 1983, p. 191.
9  Simons 1995.
10  Rabinow 1983.
11  Carrithers et al. 1985.
12  Midgley 1984.
13  Geertz 1975, p. 50.
14  Geertz 1979, p. 229.
15  Bernstein 1983.
16  Ibid. and Crotty 1998.
17  Brown 1988.
18  Berger and Luckmann 1971, pp. 36, 51–2.
19  Fleck 1979, p. 42.
20  Carruthers 1990.
21  Goodman 1968.
22 Wittgenstein 1951.
23 Whorf 1967, p. 256.
24  Ibid., p. 216.
25 Wittgenstein 1978.
26  Lakoff and Johnson 1980.
27  Mannheim 1936. Mannheim also believed that while idealogising influences could not be eradicated
entirely, they could be mitigated by the systematic analysis of as many of the varying socially grounded
positions as possible. It is a view that should encourage us to resist strongly the imperialist pretensions
of economics.
28  Shotter 1985, p. 168.
29  Fortes 1983.
30  Spradley and McCurdy 1994.
31  Ibid., p. 69.
32  Noble and Davidson 1996.
33  Berger and Luckmann 1971, p. 55.
34  Cited in Goody 1995.
35  Abbott 2002.
36  Sartre 1964, cited in Bruner 1987, p. 5.
37  Harre 1985.
38  Madsen et al. 2002.
39  Granovetter 1991.
40  Hollis 1977.
41  Saul 2001, p. 23.
42  Hobson 2002.
43  Cherniak 1986.
44  Ormerod 2001.
45  Hollis 1985.
46  McPherson 1983.
69
The Creation of Social Order is Irreducibly a Moral Project
47  Amariglio et al. 1990, p. 126.
48  Boulding 1970.
49 Toulmin 1990.
50 Tarnas 1991.
51  Midgley 1994.
52  Key and Aiello 1999.
53  Carrithers 1992.
54  Fortes 1983.
55  Keesing 1981.
56  Ibid., p. 16.
57  Carrithers 1992.
58  Humphrey 1976.
59  Lieberman 1998.
60  Reynolds 1981.
61  Keesing 1981, p. 21.
62  Midgley 1984.
63  Goodwin 1997.
64  Durkheim 1993, pp. 227–8.
65  Emmet 1966.
66  Spradley and McCurdy 1994.
67  Polanyi 1958.
68  Brown 1988.
69  Stark 1976.
70  Stark 1983.
71  Sahlins 1960.
72  Hume 1966, pp. 187–205.
73  Stark 1983.
74  Stark 1978, p. 198.
75  Frowen 1997.
76  Berger and Luckmann 1971, p. 70.
77 Williamson 1994.
78  Knauft 1996, p. 44.
79 Williamson 1994.
80  Berger and Luckmann 1971.
81  Ibid., p. 82.
82  Ibid., p. 121.
83  Ibid., p. 130.
84  Stark 1976.
85  Stark 1978, p. 124.
86  Llewellyn 1931–32.
87  Stark 1978, p. 201.
88  Stoicism was a school of Hellenistic philosophy, founded by Zeno of Citium (333–264 BC) in Athens,
which became popular throughout Greece and the Roman Empire.
89  Epicureanism was a system of philosophy based on the teachings of Epicurus (340–270 BC), founded
about 307 BC. Epicurus was an atomic materialist.
90  Stark and Sumner believe that class dividedness and even class warfare can be accommodated fully
within the framework of their analysis. Stark agrees that each class or group in society has its own
mores and that the upper strata tend to force their own customs on the lower strata. Indeed, he
acknowledges that chiefs, kings, priests, warriors, statesmen and other functionaries have often used
their authority to promote their own interests. In any event, there is no need for us to deny the possibility
that dominance played a role in the historical processes that created societies and states. Of course, it
70
The Cult of the Market
would also be entirely consistent with Stark—and with the liberal tradition—to argue that our desire
to acquire such dominance requires control. Indeed, the coercive nature of social control necessarily
raises the question of the legitimate limits of such cohesion—a question of central concern for this
analysis.
91  Elias 1994.
92  Service 1975.
93  Dunstan 1974.
94  Kaye 1994.
95  See, for example, Senge 1992b.
96  Dunstan 1974.
97  Ibid.
98  Emmet 1966.
99  Cited in Gerth and Mills 1954.
100  See Dunstan 1974; Emmet 1966.
101  Cited in Flyvbjerg 2001.
102  Lawson 2003.
103  Downie 1972.
104  Ibid.
105  Brennan and Buchanan 1985.
106  Midgley 1984.
107  Solomon and Higgins 1996.
108  Of course, mainstream contemporary Christianity would interpret the story of the Fall as myth
rather than as history. The story of the Fall in ‘Genesis’ is not a historical account of the origin of human
sinfulness; rather, it is an expression of the insight that sin originates in human pride and self-will.
109 Tillich 1963, p. 93.
110  Romans 7:14–20.
111  von Bruck 1986.
112 Tracey 1976, as reported by Edwin Byford, personal communication.
113  Of course, the traditional Christian view sees this human brokenness not simply in terms of one’s
alienation from one’s fellows, but, more importantly, in terms of humankind’s alienation from God and
consequently from the rest of creation. In this view, evil is the result of a human turning from God.
Receptivity to the presence of God is replaced by ego projections. Consequently, every human is apt
to fail when put to the test. This tragic flaw is seen as the cause of humankind’s inability to build a
truly satisfactory society and a truly integrated social whole. As Pope John Paul II said in Centesimus
Annus:
A man is alienated if he refuses to transcend himself and to live the experience of self-giving
and of the formation of an authentic human community…A society is alienated if its forms
of social organization, production and consumption make it more difficult to offer this gift of
self and to establish this solidarity between people.
114  Simons 1995.
115  Hobbes 1651, p. 186.
116  Loy 2002.
117  Rousseau 1935, p. 188.
118  Ibid.
119  In particular, I do not intend to be interpreted as endorsing Christianity’s traditional ambivalence
towards human sexuality. That ambivalence places an undue emphasis on only one aspect of human
behaviour, it reflects an individualistic bias and down plays the corporate, structural nature of much
evil in the world. Neither is the above account intended to support fundamentalist interpretations of
religious doctrines, creationism or the political program of the so-called religious right. Neither is it
intended to condone the innumerable evils—large and small—done in the name of organised religion
throughout history—from human sacrifices and religious wars to mass killings, the burning of witches,
the torture and murder of ‘heretics’, the exploitation of guilt as a source of institutional and personal
power, the abusive indoctrination of young children in the service of long-term dependency and the
71
The Creation of Social Order is Irreducibly a Moral Project
toleration of the physical and sexual abuse of children by the clergy. Our spiritual yearnings are open
to the grossest of abuses by leaders claiming to speak on behalf of God. Furthermore, history has
demonstrated that spiritual pride is among the worst of human failings. If God is truly the Abba of the
New Testament, there is no place for fear in any relationship with such an intimate, loving parent.
120  Eckhardt 1989.
121  Glover 1999.
122  Freud 1932, cited in Webb 1995, p. 15.
123  Chapman 2004.
124  Encyclopaedia Britannica 1981.
125  Bita 2002, p. 9.
126  MacIntyre 1966.
72
The Cult of the Market
Chapter 3: The Relationship Between
the Economic System and the Social
Order
Is society mainly a market place, in which self-serving individuals
compete with one another—at work, in politics, and in
courtship—enhancing the general welfare in the process? Or do we
typically seek to do both what is right and what is pleasurable, and find
ourselves frequently in conflict when moral values and happiness are
incompatible? Are we, first of all, ‘normative-effective’ beings, whose
deliberations and decisions are deeply affected by our values and
emotions?
— Amitai Etzioni1
In brief, the principle of self-interest is incomplete as a social organising
principle. It operates effectively only in tandem with some supporting
social principle. This fundamental characteristic of economic liberalism,
which was largely taken for granted by Adam Smith and John Stuart
Mill in their different ways, has been lost sight of by its modern
protagonists…The attempt has been made to erect an increasingly explicit
social organisation without a supporting social morality…In this way,
the foundations of the market system have been weakened.
— Fred Hirsch2
Introduction
The previous chapter began an examination of two key, but buried assumptions,
which have underpinned much recent public policy formulation: the ideas that
the economic system is autonomous and that the economic system has priority
over the social system. These two assumptions have allowed economics to become
the dominant methodology and vocabulary for the evaluation of public policy
choices in our society. As a consequence, ‘economic efficiency’—defined in
neoclassical terms—has become the dominant value to be served by government
policy.
The discussion so far has centred on the question of how social order originates.
It has been shown that there is broad consensus that the social order is a moral
order that developed with the social evolution of the human race. It was
concluded that there was no pre-social human nature, and consequently the
study of social life involved the study of regulated conduct, not simply the study
of regularities. It is our shared values that act as the mortar that binds our
communities together and these are backed by formal and informal means of
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coercion and our own sense of guilt. Importantly, it is the control of our greed
that constitutes one of the prime victories of culture over our ‘animality’. That
victory is, however, incomplete and the maintenance of a peaceful society
involves constant struggle. I concluded that, in an effective civil society, the
pursuit of individual and organisational choice and ‘self-interest’ were heavily
constrained by internalised moral codes and by externally imposed social
sanctions. The resulting order was constantly under threat from what used to
be called human sinfulness, particularly human greed.
This chapter will give an account of the various contemporary theories that are
used to account for that social order before focusing on the relationship of
dependence between the economic and social systems, pointing to the neglect
of this relationship by economic fundamentalists. In addition, the chapter will
provide a brief historical overview of this debate as it arose after the breakdown
of the medieval hierarchical world-view, particularly under the influence of the
Reformation.
Current Theories Explaining the Existence of Social Order
Chapter 2 provided an evolutionary account of the development of social order
supplemented by a discussion of some of the elements that make up that social
order. Among many theorists, however, my evolutionary account will not seem
satisfactory as an explanation of our social order, however much the theorist
agrees that something like that described really took place. What will often be
sought is a satisfying ‘theoretical’ story providing a causal explanation that is
necessarily ahistorical, which attempts to tease out what is ‘really’ going on in
society and what are the ‘laws’ that determine the way things are. This involves
making a distinction between occurrences that are not necessarily
associated—that is, contingent—and occurrences that occur closely together,
and which are taken to involve some causal relationship. Consequently, such
an attempt at causal explanation involves a belief in the existence of some
underlying influence or structure or law that creates an objective order, which
our culture obliges us to observe and which can be abstracted from historical
reality with all its contingent elements in a way analogous to theoretical accounts
in the physical sciences. As we will see later, the extent to which there are such
underlying structures that are accessible to us is problematic given that this
level of abstraction cannot be subject to empirical falsification, as in the physical
sciences. The value of such theoretical stories as a means of explanation is,
therefore, problematic. The danger is that dialectic is simply substituted for
‘proof’.
Such theorising is often distinguished from theoretical accounts that provide a
justification for what exists or what is thought to be desirable. The latter does
not usually involve an examination of the moral judgements we really make and
the values that underlie them, but rather an appeal to some single, plausible
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fundamental principle in an attempt to legislate what those moral judgements
should be. Often these genuine attempts at explanation and judgement are
associated with the theorist’s desire to legislate particular judgements about
fundamental political and social institutions. The progression of such ideas often
involves the attempt by particular theorists to differentiate their stories from
those of others. As a consequence, these stories appear to exhibit a developmental
trajectory similar to those found in the natural sciences and in industrial
development. To me, this Enlightenment project—important though it is claimed
to be in providing a justification for our social arrangements—is tainted by an
unrealistic apriorism, uni-causal explanations and tenuous and tedious
distinctions.
No single dominant story has emerged from these efforts to explain the existence
of social order and of our political and moral institutions. Phillips tells us that
there are, however, four primary theoretical approaches to the problem:
• the private-interest doctrine
• situational analysis
• the consensus doctrine
• the conflict approach.3
The private-interest story assumes that individuals are guided entirely by
considerations of self-interest—a view held by economic fundamentalists.
Spencer, the most prominent of the laissez-faire advocates, is usually cited as a
holder of an extreme version of this approach, believing that the pursuit of
self-interest formed a self-regulating mechanism in society. Hobbes and Weber
are also self-interest theorists who emphasise the inevitability of conflict. In
contrast with Hobbes, for Weber, competitive struggles often generate social
regularities. George Homans, a well-known contemporary exponent of a
private-interest approach, works explicitly with an exchange model based on
free-market principles. According to Homans, social interaction is social exchange
involving such rewards as esteem, admiration and respect and such costs as
boredom, embarrassment and expenditure of time. It is the informal rules
governing these exchanges that provide for social order. The problem with such
private-interest stories is that they are unable to explain how there could be
sufficient similarities among individuals and enough continuity through time
to have created organised societies. Nor, as is argued shortly, is it possible to
explain all obedience to rules and laws by the calculation of benefits derived
from them, or from fear of punishment. The existence of shared social norms is
ignored. Such theories have no room for moral notions such as right and wrong.
Consequently, they omit the moral dimension in human relations and moral
discourse is not even possible.
Erving Goffman, a situational analyst, also sees people as narrowly self-interested,
acting out their roles as public means to private ends. For Goffman, society is a
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pseudo-moral system in which everyone is engaged busily in the exchange of
impressions. Situational morality more generally stresses the importance of the
properties and structures of situations in influencing social conduct. Goffman,
however, lacks an adequate account of what it is to be human and of human
beings possessing a sense of personal identity. Also missing is any commitment
to moral standards other than those found in social situations. Nor can he account
for moral rules opposed to any derived from those social situations.
The majority of sociologists, including Durkheim and Talcott Parsons, are
described as consensus theorists. For these theorists, social order is made possible
by a consensus about shared values and meanings. For Parsons, ‘institutions or
institutional patterns’ are defined as ‘[n]ormative patterns, which define what
are felt to be, in the given society, proper, legitimate, or expected modes of
action or of social relationship…They are patterns supported by common moral
sentiments.’4
People are motivated to observe these normative standards through socialisation
and social control and through the feelings of self-respect, guilt and shame.
Phillips argues that such models are unable to account for social conflict, making
too much of control mechanisms and too little of human spontaneity and inner
conflict. It is also criticised as a tacit commitment to the status quo. More
importantly, it is argued that such theorists are not committed to morality as
such, only to a moral system that yields order. Such theories can say nothing,
therefore, about the moral status of a particular society. Consequently, fears
about moral relativism are raised to dispute this tradition. Despite theses
criticisms, there is much in the consensus approach that is useful. In particular,
Phillips agrees with Durkheim, Parsons and most other sociologists that
individuals are motivated to act in accordance with normative standards. As
argued in Chapter 2, the internalisation of these standards helps provide much
of the restraining control necessary for social order. Social order is made possible
by consensus within a social system about normative standards; and motivation
to observe these standards can best be assured by the mechanisms of socialisation
and social control. Phillips, however, is concerned that consensus theorists never
consider the possibility of justifying rationally these dominant moral standards.
I will argue later that this Enlightenment aspiration for a ‘rational’ justification
of our moral values is unattainable.
Conflict theorists such as Louis Coser and Randall Collins place a strong emphasis
on power relationships, coercion, competition and the mechanisms of political
allocation. They point to constraint and conflict about values and coercion. For
Coser, such conflicts are functional in that they help to structure the larger social
environment by assigning positions to the various subgroups within the system
and by helping to define the power relations between them. For Collins, however,
social life is mainly a fight over the control of resources. What ought to concern
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us, according to Collins, is how various factors of power, coercion, control of
resources and the like produce particular moral values and beliefs in the first
place. For Collins, ethics are ultimately arbitrary—simply a device for dominating
others. In the process, Collins assumes that moral principles have only
instrumental value. His doctrine makes it impossible to treat one another as
moral beings. Phillips goes on to give an account of Alvin Goulder’s critique of
the functionalist concern with social order. Phillips reduces this to a criticism
of the functionalist concern for quiet values such as temperance, wisdom,
knowledge, goodness, cooperation or trust and faith in the goodness of God.
Nowhere does Goulder formulate and defend his own values.
Similarly, Alan Gewirth attempts to provide a rational justification for moral
principles and institutions, avoiding some of the weaknesses of earlier theories,
including hypothetical people, hypothetical situations and states of nature. His
approach involves trying to deduce these principles from the nature of human
action and the web of social relations in which we are embedded. He sees the
control of actions for worthwhile ends as inherently social and inter-subjective.
He conceives of voluntariness and purposiveness as the most general features
of all actions encompassing the effectual, traditional, value-rational and
means–ends actions considered by Max Weber. He considers that all actions
have a normative structure involving evaluative judgements of the goodness of
their purposes, that every agent implicitly makes claims to freedom and
well-being as being intrinsically good and accepts logically that all agents have
the same prudential generic rights. It follows for Gewirth that every agent must
acknowledge certain generic obligations and this leads to his supreme moral
principle to act in accordance with the generic rights of your recipients as well
as yourself, not just restraining from action damaging to others but contributing
positively to their well-being. This obligation extends to social rules and
institutions. As Phillips tells us, however, the most influential of contemporary
sociological theories of action is that advanced by Parsons. Importantly, however,
Parsons does not set out to provide a rational justification for any particular set
of moral values—believing that to be impossible. He starts from the concept of
an actor whose actions are goal oriented, are involved in situations, are regulated
normatively and involve motivation. Because any such actor is involved in
interactions with other actors, the outcome of any action is contingent on the
response of others. Because the possibility of instability in this situation exceeds
the possibility of stability, such actions must be integrated by a shared
institutionalised normative order. Of course, this is what was argued in Chapter
2. Without such a normative order, we would be left with the war of all on all.
Summarising the above, there seems to be broad agreement that normative values
are significant to human society, though there is less agreement on the positive
role they play. Some theories, in stressing their capacity for manipulation in
favour of the powerful, invoke effectively a dark account of the human condition
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and the doctrine of original sin unmediated by any recognition of the positive
contribution of such values to human emancipation—a major theme of Jurgen
Habermas’s theory of justice, to which we will turn in Chapter 7. My sympathy,
along with Phillips’, lies with the consensus theories represented by the
sociological tradition, and particularly the account given by Parsons. There is,
however, no need to reject in their entirety the other perspectives outlined.
Clearly, there is some truth in the transactions view of human society; it simply
fails to provide anything like a complete account. Indeed, from the perspective
developed earlier, it leaves out the bits that are most important. Similarly, there
is clearly much conflict in social life and no account should ignore that conflict.
Power relationships and coercion are ever-present features of social life and this
is one of the main reasons why one should fear an unrestrained market
system—as we should fear unrestrained government power. The Christian
tradition, with its emphasis on original sin, points to the possibility of abuse of
power relations and of moral rules themselves. In summary, there is no need to
adopt a uni-causal theory. What does concern me, however, is the attempt by
some of these theorists to reconstruct rationally our moral values in accordance
with their pet theories and, as a result, to legislate how we should all behave.
The evolved social world is much too complex for such reductionism. This was
the reason why Aristotle warned us that the good had no universal form and
consequently was not reducible to any single principle. So it is much more
realistic to acknowledge that the emergence of social order and its maintenance
involves a complex of influences over a long period of time.
One important theorist not quite fitting the above is the rational-choice theorist
Jon Elster.5  He does not believe that social norms can be reduced to any single
principle—a view given empirical support by the historical account of MacIntyre.
In particular, Elster insists that social norms cannot be reduced to rationality or
to any other form of optimising mechanism. He argues that such a view cannot
deal with the problem of free riding and the voluntary provision of public goods.
The rational self-interest of individuals can lead them to behave in ways that
are collectively disastrous. He even suggests that a form of irrationality—what
he calls magical thinking—plays an important role in many decisions to
cooperate. Consequently, Elster entertains briefly the idea that civilisation owes
its existence to a fortunate coincidence. He goes on to argue that altruism, envy,
social norms and self-interest all contribute in complex, interacting ways to
order, stability and cooperation, and provide the cement of society: ‘Every
society and each community will be glued together, for better and for worse,
by a particular, idiosyncratic mix of these motives.’6
As already noted, the trouble with nearly all such stories is that—remote from
the possibility of empirical falsification—they remain, at the end of the day,
speculation. While ideas might be refined and inconsistencies in particular
arguments eliminated, conflicting ideas cannot finally be resolved. In addition,
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we slip so easily and unconsciously between causal explanations and justification.
Explanations advanced as causal rapidly take on normative power. Clearly, it is
important to have a vision of who we are to provide some grounding for our
decisions, but there is a danger that we can become trapped in a fundamentalist
implementation of a particular vision—to the exclusion of other perspectives.
Karl Marx is instructive in this regard:
Hitherto men have constantly made up for themselves a false conception
about themselves, about what they are and what they ought to be. They
have arranged their relationships according to their ideas of God, or
normal man, etc. The phantoms of their brains have gained the mastery
over them. They, the creators, have bowed down before their creatures.
Let us liberate them from the chimeras, the ideas, dogmas, imaginary
beings under the yoke of which they are pining away.7
Such images are unavoidable if we are to have any discourse at all; and Marx’s
criticism can be applied with particular potency to his own thinking. The lesson
is not to abandon all such visions—an untenable position—but to hold them
lightly with some humility, open to other forms of explanation, while
acknowledging that the complexity of human society rules out any simple
explanatory scheme.
Another approach to explaining the existence of social order seeks an empirical
grounding and involves an examination of the development of moral values in
growing children. In particular, French developmental psychologist Jean Piaget
(1896–1980) conceived of morality as a system of rules for social behaviour, and
the essence of morality as the respect that individuals acquired for those rules.
Piaget’s account of moral development in children up to the age of twelve focuses
primarily on its cognitive aspects, though it is not purely a cognitive process.
Rather, it is an interactive process during which children’s understanding of
rules changes. Piaget’s account involves a three-stage progression in a child’s
moral understanding: constraint, followed by cooperation, giving rise to
generosity. Piaget sees generosity as a refinement of justice manifest in the
concept of equity, which he considers a fusion of justice and love. Piaget noted
that altruism, empathy and sharing were all evident in the behaviour of very
young children, but he also noted that the legal sense was far less developed in
young girls than in boys. In contrast, girls showed a greater capacity for tolerance
and innovation in their play. Indeed, Carol Gilligan, a contemporary
developmental psychologist, suggests that girls avoid conflict rather than develop
rules for limiting its extent, and that Piaget was influenced unduly by his study
of boys.8 There is also good reason to believe that Piaget’s account is culturally
specific. According to Piaget, five- to six-year-old Swiss children conjecture that
nature is just, and he goes on to say that belief in immanent justice wanes with
age and experience. Such a development is not, however, true of many in
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South-East Asia for whom the natural order is a moral order in which events
happen for a moral purpose. Piaget’s developmental hypothesis does not hold
for Indian children—even if it does hold for Swiss children, something that has
also been questioned. Belief in immanent justice does not wane with age among
such people.9
Lawrence Kohlberg extended Piaget’s study of moral development in children
into adolescence, modifying Piaget’s theory in the process. His is also an
interactive theory with three levels of development:
• the pre-conventional, where rules and social expectations are external to the
self
• the conventional, where the self has internalised the expectations of others
• the post-conventional, where the self is differentiated from the rules and
expectations of others, and values are defined in terms of self-chosen
principles. These are further subdivided into two stages. Importantly, he
sees the post-conventional level as involving, firstly, a contractual-legalistic
orientation and, then, a universal-ethical principle orientation. He suggests
that very few people develop to such a stage.
His is a unitary conception of morality as justice, by which he means equality
in a democratic society. His account emphasises the role of social institutions in
which the basic values of a society are embodied, downplaying the influence of
direct teaching. This could be seen as running counter to Freud and the
sociological tradition with their emphasis on the internalisation of social values,
but there is no necessary opposition between these accounts: they involve a
difference of emphasis towards the role of conscious moral reasoning and away
from the unconscious—and from tacit moral knowledge. In commenting on
Kohlberg’s theory, Phillips concludes that cognitive moral development at every
stage of moral reasoning is influenced inescapably by unconscious mechanisms,
by moral precepts that are acquired earlier and are available consciously and by
the moral values and norms of the group and of the wider society.10 This is
demonstrated clearly by the example of Indian children given above.
This difference in emphasis reflects Kohlberg’s own commitment to a particular
cultural tradition involving a particular type of moral story, which we have
already questioned: a rational, unitary account of a morality, based on the
concepts of justice and rights in which the rational individual standing alone is
the ideal moral agent, entering with rights into fair contracts with others. His
interview methodology, however, required his subjects to talk like moral
philosophers. This realisation undermines the force of his argument.
Furthermore, rights are only one way of talking about morality. There are other
types of moral stories involving fundamentally different starting points in the
conception of the self, society and nature, and these do not necessarily take the
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form of formal arguments. The latter are very much in the minority.11  For
example, in the Christian tradition, the story of the Good Samaritan carries a
particular, powerful moral message, but it is not couched as a formal argument.
The similar duty-based theories, however, are another formal way of talking
about morality and are concerned with the conformity of individual action to a
code of conduct. In the case of India, a duty-based ethical code is combined with
a role-based conception of society. Moreover, Kohlberg fails to present any
persuasive evidence linking moral reasoning to real behaviour. There is no reason
to assume that a capacity to engage in higher levels of moral reasoning leads to
moral conduct. If this were so, we would expect there to be a disproportionate
percentage of academic moral philosophers among those who engage in heroic
good works and who we canonise.
Gilligan argues that Kohlberg’s perspective reflects the concern of adolescents
justifying by reason their separation from those to whom they were formerly
bound. Its limitation lies in its failure to see a world of relationship, compassion
and care. Whereas justice emphasises the autonomy of the person, care underlines
the primacy of relationship. Kohlberg’s theory involves a general neglect of the
emotional and behavioural aspects of moral development. In opposition to
Kohlberg, Gilligan suggests that moral development proceeds along two different
but intersecting paths that run through different modes of experience and give
rise to different forms of thought: ‘Whereas the analytic logic of justice is
consonant with rational social and ethical theories and can be traced through
the resolution of hypothetical dilemmas, the ethic of care depends on the
contextual understanding of relationship.’12
This ethic of care develops through relationships that give rise to an
understanding of interdependence and is sustained by the ability to discern
connection. The fundamental tension in human psychology between the
experience of separation and the experience of connection is reflected in the
age-old dialogue between justice and love, reason and compassion, fairness and
forgiveness. This tension underlies the conflicting conceptions of the human
with which I began this chapter. Gilligan argues that these discrete experiences
give rise to two different moral languages: a language of rights that justifies
separation, and a language of responsibility that sustains relationships. A focus
on the first language at the cost of the second opens the way to manipulation,
exploitation and the rationalisation of hurt.
Gilligan’s account provides a timely reminder of the dual nature of our Christian
inheritance, especially since the Reformation. In Christian language, the life of
faith is both corporate and individual. The Christian life is to be lived in
community, but it is a life to which individuals as well as communities are called
and in which individual conscience is respected. Clearly, there is a tension
between these two pillars. The individualistic aspect of Christian
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belief—including belief in an individual soul—has been translated into our
current secular emphasis on individualism, as an explanatory mechanism and
as a normative ideal, through the Enlightenment and its liberal discourse. In
Anglo-Saxon countries, however, in contrast with Continental countries, we
have lost sight of the communal aspects of the tradition.
Importantly, current work in developmental psychology influenced by Russian
developmental psychologist Lev Semenovich Vygotsky (1896–1934) and Russian
neuropsychologist Alexander Luria (1902–77) on the social origin of higher
mental processes and in particular on the role of spoken language in the shaping
of a child’s capacity to think and act, also undermines Kohlberg’s Platonist
aspirations.13  Instead of children’s mental equipment being part of a permanent
‘human nature’ with which all humans alike confront experience, the
internalisation of speech is now seen as the means by which children acquire
their native culture, their moral values and even their capacity to think. This is
consistent with the comparative research on the acquisition of cultural
conceptions of the person conducted by social psychologist Joan Miller14  and,
this is consistent with the constructionist view outlined earlier. We have,
therefore, come full circle. Our moral values are embedded in the language we
are taught as a child and that language is itself a social construct and a social
tradition.
I reject Kohlberg’s account, but his emphasis on the role of moral reasoning
serves to remind us that social norms are subject to reflection, criticism and
revision. Moral philosophers play a role in that reflection, criticism and revision,
but their speculations are based also on the ideas and circumstances of their
societies. Moral philosophers—economists included—are not the only
participants in such moral discourse; it can be seen, heard or read in the media
every hour of every day. Nonetheless, moral philosophers help crystallise those
ideas.15
Despite these long debates—particularly in the sociological
discipline—neoclassical economists have neglected to discuss the relationship
between the economic system and the broader social system. As contemporary
economists Brennan and Buchanan tell us, ‘These economists have tended to
neglect the importance of rules under the sometimes naïve presumption that the
“market will out”, regardless of institutional constraints.’16
In effect, neoclassical economists have endorsed tacitly Margaret Thatcher’s
claim that there is no such thing as society and along with it a particularly
contentious moral theory. In the process, they are effectively imposing that
particular tenuous moral theory on the rest of us, without any moral authority
to do so. This conduct reflects the imperialist pretentiousness of neoclassical
economics in seeking to explain all social phenomena in defiance of the rest of
the social disciplines and the humanities.
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Any complex exchange economy needs, and presupposes, an already existing
state of general pacification in order to function. Such an economy and its
associated institutions are not natural phenomena and they do not arise
spontaneously.17 They are social, historical artefacts. Indeed, the dichotomy
between the social system and the economic system is itself a social artefact and
is a product largely of the Scottish Enlightenment.
These imperialist tendencies appear even among economists well disposed
towards the importance of social norms. For example, contemporary economists
Avner Ben-Ner and Louis Putterman18  label religious prophets as ‘moral
entrepreneurs’, presumably on the basis that the language of economic
explanation is more ‘scientific’ and more privileged than the traditional religious
description. Similarly, these tendencies can be seen in the recent attempts of
economists to include our moral concerns within the framework of preferences
and consequently within the framework of instrumental and maximising
calculation. As argued earlier, however, an economic approach to our moral
values—based on the traditional self-interest model—is simplistic and misleading
not simply because of the neglect of altruistic behaviour. Among economists,
Albert Hirschman (b. 1915) argues against the use of such a simplistic model of
human behaviour: ‘What is needed is for economists to incorporate into their
analyses, wherever that is pertinent, such basic traits and emotions as the desire
for power and for sacrifice, the fear of boredom, pleasure in both commitment
and unpredictability, the search for meaning and community, and so on.’19
Certainly, minor revisions to the neoclassical model such as allowing bounded
rationality or allowing individuals to have altruistic preferences will not be
enough to correct this form of modelling.20 This is because it is simply not true
that society consists of a set of independent individuals, each of whom acts to
achieve goals that are arrived at independently, and that the functioning of the
social system consists of the combination of these independent actions of
independent individuals.21 This billiard-ball view is derived crudely from a
number of interrelated influences. Firstly, the only perceptible actors in society
are individuals.22  Secondly, as we will see in subsequent chapters, the political
and moral philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries—influenced
by a mechanical cosmology—built such a view from the Reformation’s emphasis
on individual conscience. Thirdly—and largely as a consequence of the first
two—individuals are more isolated in modern society than they were in the
past. Nevertheless, in modern societies, individuals still do not act independently
or set their goals independently; and their interests are still not wholly selfish.
The contemporary account of the individual used in much moral and political
philosophy and in economics simply does not give us a rich enough account.
The standard response to this critique is the claim that moral values are
incorporated into individual preferences; however, this effectively denies the
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pervasive, conflicting and regulatory influences of culture. It does so in an
attempt to preserve the methodological individualism essential to neoclassical
modelling and the primacy of voluntariness essential to its normative use. As I
have argued already in Chapter 2, morals are a community construct. It is the
assumed conventional dichotomy between the individual and the group that is
misleading. It eliminates the tacit, interactive, dynamic relationship between
individuals and between those individuals and the cultures within which they
are embedded. Treating values as a kind of preference is simply an ad hoc strategy
to insulate that theory from falsification by eliminating its predictive power and
rendering it empty. It also eliminates the distinction embedded in our languages
between selfish and unselfish behaviour.23 The neglect of these considerations
is, however, central to the whole neoclassical research program. That program
is committed strongly to explanation in terms of methodological individualism,
reductionism, instrumental rationality, the Newtonian metaphor and its associated
mathematic modelling and self-interest as the fundamental social force. Indeed,
the Newtonian metaphor, which is associated with a natural-law outlook, is the
dominant metaphor and the master narrative in contemporary economics. These
constitute the neoclassical image of what it is to be properly ‘scientific’. These
commitments are fundamentally normative and misleading rather than positively
scientific. Inherent in that commitment is a view of society as a social contract.
This is not simply a result of the positivist movement in economics and
philosophy for the best part of the twentieth century; it has deeper roots in the
whole Enlightenment program, about which more will be said in the next chapter.
It provides a particularly good example of how a particular intellectual paradigm
or tradition locks us into a particular way of looking and discussing.
While contemporary neoclassical economists have largely neglected the
relationship between the economic and social systems, this is not true more
generally. It is to the discussion of that relationship by prominent theorists to
which we now turn.
The neglect noted above is surprising given the extent of the discussion of the
relationship between the social and economic systems since the time of Smith
(1723–90). Smith was well aware of the dependency of the economic system on
legal rules and institutions; it is a common misrepresentation to regard Smith as
the prophet of economic fundamentalism. Sen puts it this way:
While many admirers of Smith do not seem to have gone beyond this
bit about the butcher and the brewer, a reading of even this passage
would indicate what Smith is doing here is to specify why and how
normal transactions in the market are carried out, and why and how
division of labour works, which is the subject of the chapter in which
the quoted passage occurs. But the fact that Smith noted that mutually
advantageous trades are very common does not indicate that he thought
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that self-love…could be adequate for a good society. Indeed, he
maintained precisely the opposite.24
Furthermore, in his best-known work, The Wealth of Nations, Smith echoes
Hobbes when he says it is ‘only under the shelter of the civil magistrate that the
owner of that valuable property which is acquired by the labour of many years
or perhaps of many successive generations, can sleep a single night in security’.25
Earlier, in the Theory of Moral Sentiments, he wrote that
in the race for wealth and honours and preferments…[the individual]
may run as hard as he can, and strain every nerve and muscle, in order
to outstrip his competitors. But if he should jostle or throw down any
of them, the indulgence of the spectators is entirely at an end. It is a
violation of fair-play, which they cannot admit of.26
Importantly, Smith recognised that justice was more a precondition for human
interaction, interchange and cooperation than a product of that interaction.
What is more, in the Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith argues that economic
activity is rooted in the non-economic need for sympathy and appreciation.27
Economist Lionel Robbins, in talking about Smith’s views, suggested that the
‘invisible hand’ was ‘the hand of the law-giver, the hand which withdraws from
the sphere of the pursuit of self-interest those possibilities which do not
harmonise with the public good’.28  It is quite clear that for Smith the ‘invisible
hand’ is the hand of God:
[T]he ancient Stoics were of the opinion, that as the world was governed
by the all-ruling providence of a wise, powerful, and good God, every
single event ought to be regarded as making a necessary part of the plan
of the universe, and as tending to promote the general order and
happiness of the whole: that the vices and follies of mankind, therefore,
made as necessary a part of this plan as their wisdom or their virtue; and
by that eternal art which educes good from ill, were made to tend equally
to the prosperity and perfection of the great system of nature.29
As the above makes clear, Smith was also a Newtonian, seeing the economic
system and the social order as a mechanical, equilibrium system involving two
fundamental balancing social forces—self-interest and sympathy—and that that
balancing was the product of divine providence. Smith, therefore, under the
influence of his friend Hume, could be seen as the father of the application of
the Newtonian metaphor to economic analysis, just as earlier Hobbes was the
father of the application of the Newtonian metaphor to political theory.
This issue of the relationship between society and the economy was central to
the work of Karl Marx. He claimed that all distinctively human activity had a
social dimension and was made possible only as a result of membership in society.
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Cooperation and compassion were more human attitudes than selfish indifference
or hostility. He also pointed out that commodities did not go to the market and
make exchanges on their own account. Value was not inherent in a commodity;
rather, it was a relationship between people expressed as a relationship between
things. Consequently, Marx emphasised that the market consisted of social
relationships; however, he also told us in his preface to Contribution to the Critique
of Political Economy:
The totality of these relations constitute[s] the economic structure of
society—the real foundation, on which legal and political superstructures
arise and to which definite forms of social consciousness correspond.
The mode of production of material life determines the general character
of the social, political, and spiritual processes of life. It is not the
consciousness of men that determines their being, but on the contrary,
their social being determines their consciousness.30
This is interpreted usually as meaning that the economy constitutes the ‘real
foundation’ of society, and on this foundation ‘the legal and political
superstructure’ is based.31  In other words, the moral superstructure of a society
is adapted to its socio-technical or economic substructure. This should not,
however, be interpreted as meaning that Marx thought that the superstructure
was unimportant.32  Indeed, Berger and Luckmann tell us that the mechanical
determinism inherent in the above interpretation misrepresents the dialectical
character of Marx’s thought and his real understanding.33  For Marx, realities
were never isolated entities standing in a linear relationship. Rather, reality
could be understood only as multifaceted interaction.34  Nevertheless, he was
concerned that human thought was founded in human activity—labour in the
widest sense—and in the social relations brought about by this activity.
Consequently, Berger and Luckmann suggest that substructure and
superstructure should be understood as human activity and the world produced
by that activity respectively. Inherent in these views is the belief that there is
no such thing as an immutable human nature and that peoples’ wants are largely
a function of how society is organised. One consequence is that the various
societal forms found in human history are reflected in human
self-understanding—a view not inconsistent with the constructionist ideas
outlined in Chapter 2. A further consequence for Marx was that the economic
elite shaped the perceptions and ideas of the working population, permeating
their entire existence: ‘The ideas of the ruling class are, in every age, the ruling
ideas: ie, the class which is the dominant material force in society is at the same
time its dominant intellectual force.’35 This is a form of oppression, the source
of a false consciousness and of alienation. Of course, these ideas strike at the
heart of the idea of individual autonomy and of consumer sovereignty.
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In Capital, Marx claimed to disclose the ‘natural laws’ of capitalist production
and was perhaps guilty of the same error as the bourgeois economists he
criticised: the reification of economic categories and their elevation into universal
laws. It was on the basis of these so-called universal laws that he claimed that
socialism was a vastly superior form of social organisation to capitalism and that
socialism was destined to replace capitalism.36  Central to these claims was the
belief that capitalism debases human beings, reducing them to a state of
alienation—an appendage of a machine. Capitalism was a form of society in
which the social bond was mutual self-interest, dissolving the social world into
atomised individuals confronting each other. It was a system based on the
exploitation of the majority—who earned their living by the sale of their
labour—by a small minority, who owned the means of production. It was this
exploitation that produced class warfare. Nothing less than communism—true
democracy—would do away with class antagonisms and enable human beings
to live fully human lives. The selfishness and egoism inherent in capitalism were
morally reprehensible—the very antithesis of true humanity—and the State and
private property were impoverishing human creations, defending the interests
of the rich. In particular, the only rights protected in liberal states were those
of the egotistical man. Marx believed further that capitalism was incapable of
maintaining the full use of the resources of advanced societies, while communism
would do so. In addition, communism would produce members of society with
better wants and superior accomplishments.
Of course, history has now moved past the Soviet experiment with its problematic
connection to Marx’s thought and its massive casualty list. Nevertheless, it is
no longer possible to maintain a utopian confidence in a socialist alternative to
the capitalist system, however much we might decry the failings of the latter.
Importantly, that experience has also discredited Marxist thought. In the process,
the shared roots in the Enlightenment of Marx’s utopianism and that of capitalism
are rarely noticed.
The economic sociology tradition dating from Weber regards the economic
process as an organic part of society, constantly interacting with other forces.37
Weber saw economic action as social and emphasised the autonomy of the social
orders, law, politics and religion vis-a-vis the economy. In opposition to Marx,
he argued that it was not the underlying economic forces that created cultural
products such as religion and ideology; rather it was culture that produced
certain forms of economic behaviour.38 This emphasis on culture as distinct
from economics is said to have been characteristic of Western Marxism and of
the Frankfurt school in particular. For example, Habermas argues that people
constitute their reality and organise their experience in terms of
knowledge-guiding interests, and that Marx’s focus on production provides an
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inadequate base on which to ground a socially and historically developing
rationality.39
In The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism,40 Weber argued that the
early Puritans, in seeking to glorify God alone and in renouncing the acquisition
of material goods as an end in itself, developed certain virtues such as honesty
and thrift that were extremely helpful to the accumulation of capital. Weber
went on to argue that the reinforcement of social virtues such as honesty,
reliability, cooperativeness and a sense of duty to others had the effect of
heightening the capacity of adherents to cohere in new communities.41 This
was helpful to economic development because small sectarian communities
created natural networks through which businessmen could hire employees,
find customers, open lines of credit and the like. Nevertheless, Weber saw market
exchange as exceptional in that it represented the most instrumental and
calculating type of social action that was possible between human beings. For
Dorothy Emmet,42  the fruitful way of interpreting Weber’s views is in terms
of the mutual conditioning of one by the other, and this is consistent with the
organic outlook of contemporary economic sociology.
For Durkheim, the division of labour serves a much broader function than the
creation of wealth and efficiency.43  For him, it is the principal vehicle for
creating cohesion and solidarity in modern society. As the division of labour
advances, people cease to bond together on the basis of their similarities (what
he called mechanical solidarity) but on the basis of the duties and rights arising
out of the interdependency produced by the division of labour (organic
solidarity). It is these duties and rights that hold society together. Consequently,
morality was central to the whole cohesion of society. Durkheim went on to
argue that a whole structure of norms and regulations surrounded economic
exchanges and made them possible. In particular, without some generally shared
feelings about honest dealings, contracts would be unenforceable.
Durkheim insisted that even a well-functioning exchange economy was in
constant danger of being hollowed out by fraud and force. Indeed, Durkheim,
in his preface to the second edition of The Division of Labor in Society, published
in 1902, was concerned about the state of juridical and moral anomie—lawlessness
or disconnectedness—which attended economic life in his day:
The most blameworthy acts are so often absolved by success that the
boundary between what is permitted and what is prohibited, what is
just and what is unjust, has nothing fixed about it, but seems susceptible
to almost arbitrary change by individuals. An ethic so unprecise and
inconsistent cannot constitute a discipline…
That such anarchy is an unhealthy phenomenon is quite evident, since
it runs counter to the aim of society, which is to suppress, or at least to
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moderate, war among men, subordinating the law of the strongest to a
higher law. To justify this chaotic state, we vainly praise its
encouragement of individual liberty. Nothing is falser than this
antagonism too often presented between legal authority and individual
liberty. Quite on the contrary, liberty (we mean genuine liberty, which
it is society’s duty to have respected) is itself the product of regulation.
I can be free only to the extent that others are forbidden to profit from
their physical, economic, or other superiority to the detriment of my
liberty. But only social rules can prevent abuses of power. It is now
known what complicated regulation is needed to assure individuals the
economic independence without which liberty is only nominal.
If in the task that occupies almost all our time we follow no other rule
than that of our well-understood interest, how can we learn to depend
upon disinterestedness, on self-forgetfulness, on sacrifice? In this way,
the absence of all economic discipline cannot fail to extend its effects
beyond the economic world, and consequently weaken public morality.44
Karl Polanyi takes up much the same theme. For him, the human economy was
embedded and enmeshed in institutions—economic and non-economic. The
latter were vital.45  Consequently, Polanyi objected to what he called the
economistic fallacy of equating the whole of the economy with the market. By
doing so, the true nature of the economy was distorted. In The Great
Transformation,46  Polanyi disputed Smith’s claim that humans had a natural
propensity to truck and barter. In The Economy as an Instituted Process,47  he
argued that historically there were several different ways of organising an
economy: through reciprocity, redistribution and exchange or a combination of
all three. Even within markets, prices that fluctuate frequently—due to
competition—represent a fairly late stage of development
The market economy as an institutional structure was insignificant until relatively
recent times. Nevertheless, the division of labour was a phenomenon as old as
society and sprang from differences inherent in the facts of sex, geography and
individual endowment. Polanyi believed that historical and anthropological
research justified the view that the economy was, as a rule, submerged in social
relationships. Economic actors do not act to safeguard their individual interests
in the possession of material goods but to safeguard their social standing, claims
and assets. Material goods are valued only in so far as they serve this end. In
tribal society, an individual’s economic interest is rarely paramount as the
community keeps its members from starving. It is the maintenance of social ties,
on the other hand, that is crucial. Disregarding the accepted code of behaviour
would involve cutting oneself off from one’s community. In any event, in the
long run, all social obligations are reciprocal and serve the individual’s long-term
interests. In a society characterised by reciprocity, the idea of profit is barred
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and haggling is decried, while giving freely is acclaimed as a virtue. As Polanyi
said:
Broadly, the proposition holds that all economic systems known to us
up to the end of feudalism in Western Europe were organised either on
the principles of reciprocity or redistribution, or householding, or some
combination of the three. These principles were institutionalised with
the help of a social organisation which, inter alia, made use of the patterns
of symmetry, centricity, and autarchy. In this framework, the orderly
production and distribution of goods was secured through a great variety
of individual motives disciplined by general principles of behaviour.
Among these motives gain was not prominent. Custom and law, magic
and religion co-operated in inducing the individual to comply with rules
of behaviour which, eventually, ensured his functioning in the economic
system.48
Consequently, Polanyi believed that what economists saw as the typical market
was just one of many possible forms of organised exchange. To Polanyi, two
watershed events in European history were responsible for the emergence of
the modern market economy: the creation by the mercantilist state of ‘internal
markets’ and the radical elimination of all market regulation beginning in the
early nineteenth century in England. To him, the result was unspeakable misery
for the common people until actions were finally taken to protect society from
‘the self-regulating market’. Consequently, he traces many of the key tragic
political events of the twentieth century to the radically utopian attempt in
mid-nineteenth century England to transform all of society into one giant market.
For Polanyi, the control of the economic system by the market has overwhelming
consequences for the organisation of society: it means no less than the running
of society as an adjunct to the market. Instead of the economy being embedded
in social relations, social relations are embedded in the social system. A
self-regulating market demands nothing less than the institutional separation of
society into an economic and a political sphere. To include human beings (labour)
and their natural surroundings in the market system is to subordinate the
substance of society itself to the market. Consequently for Polanyi, a market
economy can exist only in a market society. The very idea of a self-adjusting
market implied a stark utopia. He believed that such an institution could not
exist for any length of time without annihilating the human and natural substance
of society.49
The dominant school of economics in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries was institutional economics and was associated with such figures as
Thorstein Veblen, Wesley Mitchell and John Commons. It was devoted to the
investigation of the institutions that underpinned the market economy. It rejected
the reductionism of the marginalist school while emphasising the importance of
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the legal foundations of an economy and the evolutionary, habituated and
volitional processes by which institutions were created and changed.50 This
perspective was not open to mathematical formalism and was eclipsed by
neoclassical economics.
Interestingly, Hayek, a strong supporter of market processes and a minimalist
state in his later writings, made it clear that what he had called the ‘spontaneous’
order of the market was dependent on the system of abstract rules, deep-rooted
convictions and moral rules, which was the product of civilisation and which
represented the institutional infrastructure of the economic system.51  For Hayek,
informal rules such as custom and conventions are probably even more important
in daily economic life than the formal ones. Hayek was conscious of the
complexity of that social system, arguing that no ‘single human intelligence is
capable of inventing the most appropriate abstract rules because those rules
which have evolved in the process of growth of society embody the experience
of many more trials and errors than any individual mind could acquire’.52
Another more recent theorist to write on the issue is sociologist Mark
Granovetter. He also argues that economic institutions—like all institutions—do
not arise automatically in some form made inevitable by external circumstances;
they are constructed socially.53 They are constructed by individuals whose
action is facilitated by and constrained by the structure and resources available
in the social networks in which they are embedded. Just as for firms and
economic groups, how industries are organised is a social construction that often
might have been otherwise. He also reminds us that economic action—like all
action—is socially situated and cannot be explained by individual motives alone;
it is embedded in continuing networks of personal relations rather than carried
out by atomised actors. Like Polanyi, he points out that the pursuit of economic
goals is accompanied by such non-economic goals as sociability, approval, status
and power.
While some economic literature focuses attention on the role of our moral codes
in permitting the exchanges involved in any complex division of labour, we
would do well to remind ourselves that most economic activity occurs in groups
and, without an effective social order, no large-scale group activity would be
possible. Indeed, collectives are the important decision-making units in
contemporary society. Consequently, Herbert A. Simon (1916–2001) found it
puzzling that neoclassical economics placed markets at the centre of the stage
with all economic phenomena and all social phenomena to be explained by
translating them into, or deriving them from, market transactions based on
negotiated contracts.54  In criticising this approach, Simon pointed to the absence
of adequate empirical testing and an absence of an adequate consideration of
the literature on organisations and decision making. Because organisations are
the dominant feature of the economic landscape, Simon suggests that the term
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‘organisational economy’ might be a more appropriate description than ‘market
economy’.55  He also points out that the boundary between markets and
organisations varies greatly from one society to another and from one time to
another, and argues that these variations need to be explained. Further, he argues
that we should begin with empirically valid postulates about what motivates
real people in real organisations, and points to four well-documented
organisational phenomena: authority, rewards, identification and coordination.
Consequently, for Simon, prices are only one of the mechanisms for the
coordination of behaviour, either between organisations or within them.
Douglass North (b. 1920) approaches this issue from the perspective of an
economic historian interested in explaining economic growth and the differential
performances of economies. In Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic
Performance,56  he argues that a proper understanding of the nature of human
coordination and cooperation has been missing from economic analysis. While
many economic historians emphasise the role of technological innovation in the
development of human society and in economic growth, North places his
emphasis on the development of institutions. He defines those institutions as
the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction and this brings
us back into the sociological stream discussed earlier. North sees human
cooperation as a fundamental theoretical problem that needs to be explained
because complex, impersonal exchange is the antithesis of the condition under
which cooperation arises from rational self-interest in game theory. In particular,
he sees a vast gap between the relatively clean, precise and simple world of game
theory and the complex, imprecise and fumbling way by which human beings
have gone about structuring human interaction. He also disputes that
evolutionary pressures will lead to institutions that are ‘efficient’ in the
neoclassical sense. He also points out that historically the growth of economies
has occurred within the institutional framework of well-developed coercive
polities because it is difficult to sustain complex exchange without a third party
to enforce agreements.
The difficulty in enforcing agreements has always been the critical obstacle to
increasing specialisation and the division of labour. Enforcement poses no
problem when it is in the interests of parties to live up to an agreement. Without
institutional constraints, however, self-interested behaviour will foreclose
complex impersonal exchange because of the uncertainty that either party will
find it in their interest to live up to an agreement. Transaction costs will reflect
this uncertainty by including a risk premium, the magnitude of which will turn
on the likelihood of defection. North argued that throughout history the size of
this premium had been too large to allow complex impersonal exchange and
therefore limited the possibilities for economic growth.
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For North, it has been the evolution of institutions that has limited these costs
and in the process created a hospitable environment for the complex exchange
necessary for economic growth. Uncertainties surround such complex exchange.
They arise as a consequence of the complexity of the problems to be solved and
our limited problem-solving abilities. In all societies—from the most primitive
to the most advanced—people impose constraints on themselves to give a
structure to their relations with others. In these circumstances, history matters
because the past, the present and the future are connected to the past by the
continuity of a society’s institutions. Consequently, today’s and tomorrow’s
choices are shaped by the past.
Such institutions include formal rules and informal constraints such as convention
and codes of behaviour. Institutional constraints include what individuals are
prohibited from doing and under what conditions some individuals are permitted
to undertake certain activities. The rules and informal codes are sometimes
violated and punishment is enacted. Therefore, an essential part of the
functioning of institutions is the costliness of detecting violations and the severity
of punishment. Taken together, the formal and informal rules and the type and
effectiveness of enforcement shape the whole character of the social and economic
system. Institutions affect the performance of the economy by their effect on
the costs of exchange and production. Together with the technology employed,
they determine the transaction and transformation costs that make up total costs.
In the course of his analysis, North makes a crucial distinction between
institutions and organisations. While organisations—like institutions—provide
a structure to human interactions, he differentiates the rules from the players.
The institutional framework influences fundamentally what organisations come
into existence and how they evolve. In turn, they influence how the institutional
framework evolves. Such institutions—from conventions, codes of conduct and
norms of behaviour to statute and common law and contracts between
individuals—are evolving and are continually altering the choices available to
us. Such evolution is a complicated process usually involving incremental change.
Even discontinuous changes—such as revolution and conquest—are never
completely discontinuous because of the embeddedness of informal constraints
in societies. Although formal rules can change overnight as the result of political
or judicial decisions, informal constraints embodied in customs, traditions and
codes of conduct are much more impervious to deliberate policies. These cultural
constraints connect the past with the present and the future and provide a key
to explaining the path of historical change.
The institutions necessary to accomplish economic exchange vary in their
complexity, from those that solve simple exchange problems to ones that extend
across space and time and numerous individuals. The greater the specialisation
and the number and variability of valuable attributes associated with a good or
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service, the more weight must be put on reliable institutions that allow
individuals to engage in complex contracting with a minimum of uncertainty.
Exchange in modern economies consisting of many variable attributes extending
over long periods of time necessitates institutional reliability, which has emerged
only gradually in Western economies. North believes that formal rules make up
only a small, although very important, part of the constraints that shape choices
in these economies. In our daily interaction with others, whether within the
family, in external social relations or in business activities, the governing
structure is defined overwhelmingly by codes of conduct, norms of behaviour
and conventions. Underlying these informal constraints are formal rules, but
these are seldom the obvious and immediate source of choice in daily interactions.
It is clear that exchange is not simple in tribal societies. In the absence of the
State and formal rules, a dense social network leads to the development of
informal structures with substantial stability. Informal constraints are pervasive
features of modern economies as well. These informal constraints involve
extensions, elaborations and modifications of formal rules, socially sanctioned
norms of behaviour and internally enforced standards of conduct. Cooperative
frameworks of economic and political impersonal exchange are at the heart of
social, political and economic performance. While formal rules can help, it is the
informal constraints embodied in norms and internally imposed codes of conduct
that are critical. In short, North57  does not believe that the rational choice
paradigm can explain the historical and contemporary record of economic growth.
In a complementary account, Francis Fukuyama58  also sees what he calls
spontaneous sociability as critical to economic life. His view of the role of moral
values in promoting organisational innovation and economic development owes
much to the earlier work of Weber and Polanyi. Communities of shared values,
whose members are willing to subordinate their private interests for the sake of
the larger goals of the community, can alone generate the kind of social trust
that is critical to organisational efficiency. Consequently, the ability to create
large, private business organisations in such societies as Germany, Japan and
the United States is related to the fact that they are high-trust societies with
abundant social capital.
Echoing North’s59  and Williamson’s60  focus on transaction costs, Fukuyama
argues that widespread distrust imposes a kind of tax on all forms of economic
activity—a tax that high-trust societies do not have to pay. Justified expectations
of honest conduct in transactions reduce costs incurred finding a buyer or seller,
negotiating a contract, complying with government regulations and enforcing
that contract in the event of dispute or fraud. There is less need to spell things
out in lengthy contracts, less need to hedge against unexpected contingencies,
fewer disputes and less need to litigate if disputes arise. In some high-trust
relationships, parties do not even have to worry about maximising profits in
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the short run, because they know that the other party will make a deficit in one
period good later. Importantly, a high-trust society can organise its workplace
on a more flexible and group-oriented basis, with more responsibility delegated
to lower levels of the organisation. Such a society will be better able to engage
in organisational innovation, since the high degree of trust will permit a wide
variety of social relationships to emerge. Workers usually find their workplaces
more satisfying if they are treated like adults who can be trusted to contribute
to their community rather than like small cogs in a large industrial machine
designed by someone else. On the other hand, low-trust societies must fence in
and isolate their workers with a series of bureaucratic rules. Consequently, the
ability of companies to move from large hierarchies to flexible networks of
smaller firms will depend on the degree of trust and social capital present in the
broader society. This is important in contemporary discussions of the
development of electronic commerce and the associated possibility of creating
virtual organisations using new communications technology. A low-trust society
might never be able to take full advantage of the efficiencies that these
developments offer.
Fukuyama argues that the most effective organisations are based on communities
of shared ethical values.61  Such communities do not require extensive contracts
and legal regulation of their relations because prior moral consensus gives
members of the group a basis for mutual trust. In this regard, Williamson warns
us against seeing trust in purely calculative terms, as to do so can have corrosive
effects on the relationships involved.62  Groups can enter into a downward spiral
of distrust when trust is repaid with what is perceived as betrayal or exploitation.
Fukuyama, like Stark and Weber, points out that traditional religions—or ethical
systems such as Confucianism—constitute the major institutionalised sources
of such culturally determined behaviour because their shared moral languages
give their members a common moral life. To some extent, any moral community,
regardless of the specific ethical rules involved, will create a degree of trust
among its members. Certain ethical codes tend to promote a wider radius of trust
than others do by emphasising the imperatives of honesty, charity and
benevolence towards the community at large.
Fukuyama continues his discussion in terms of social capital, which he defines
as a capability that arises from the prevalence of trust in a society or in certain
parts of it. Social capital differs from other forms of human capital in so far as it
is usually created and transmitted through cultural mechanisms such as religion,
tradition or historical habit. The social capital needed to create this kind of moral
community cannot be acquired—as in the case of other forms of human
capital—through a rational investment decision. Rather, it requires habituation
to the moral norms of a community and the acquisition of virtues such as loyalty,
honesty and dependability. The group, moreover, has to adopt common norms
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as a whole before trust can become generalised among its members. In other
words, individuals simply acting on their own cannot acquire social capital.
Social capital is based on the prevalence of social rather than individual virtues.
Fukuyama also argues that those societies with a high degree of communal
solidarity and shared moral values should be more economically efficient than
more individualistic ones. The larger organisations become, the greater the
tendency is for individual members to become free riders. The stronger the social
solidarity, the more likely it is that members will identify their own well-being
with that of the group and the more likely it is that they will put the group’s
interests ahead of their own. In the words of eminent American Nobel
Prize-winning economist Kenneth Arrow:
Now trust has a very important pragmatic value, if nothing else. Trust
is an important lubricant of a social system. It is extremely efficient; it
saves a lot of trouble to have a fair degree of reliance on other people’s
word. Unfortunately this is not a commodity that can be bought very
easily. If you have to buy it, you already have some doubts about what
you’ve bought. Trust and similar values, loyalty or truth-telling, are
examples of what the economist would call ‘externalities’. They are
goods, they are commodities; they have real, practical, economic value;
they increase the efficiency of the system, enable you to produce more
goods or more of whatever values you hold in high esteem. But they are
not commodities for which trade on the open market is technically
possible or even meaningful.63
Arrow went on to argue that the whole economic system would break down if
it were not for reinforcement agents and incentives based on morality. Elster,
however, specifically rejects this as an adequate account of all social norms on
the grounds that not all norms are Pareto improvements,64  some norms that
would make everybody better off are missing and the fact that a norm does make
everybody better off does not explain why it exists.65 The last of these would
require the demonstration of a feedback mechanism in which the benefits of the
norm contribute to its maintenance. In this regard, Elster suggests that a form
of social—as opposed to individual—selection could provide an adequate
feedback mechanism. Similarly, American sociologist James Coleman66  (1926–95)
concluded that rational-choice theory could not explain the process by which
norms were internalised. Furthermore, social psychologist Daniel Batson67
conducted a series of experiments that went a long way towards disproving that
all altruistic behaviour could be explained by the desire to avoid unpleasant
feelings or self-punishment or to gain social approval, a sense of efficacy or
shared pleasure—a conclusion supported by field research.
In the light of the above, I would argue that our moral, as well as our legal,
institutions provide essential infrastructure for the social system in general and
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the economic system in particular. Although it has long been recognised that
infrastructure is an essential part of the economic system, discussion of that
infrastructure is limited mostly to physical infrastructure—a limitation associated
with a very poor understanding of the concept of capital. Coleman68  points to
the properties of social capital that distinguish it from the private, divisible,
alienable goods treated by neoclassical economic theory. Importantly, while it
is a resource that has value in use, it cannot be exchanged easily. Social capital
is not the private property of any of the people who benefit from it; it is an
attribute of the social structure in which a person is embedded. Social capital
does not benefit primarily those whose efforts bring it into existence, but those
who are part of the particular structure. The result is that most social capital is
created or destroyed as a by-product of other activities. It also means that the
importance of social capital is frequently unrecognised.
Of course, the comprehensive legal framework for economic
organisation—including property rights and contracts—developed by complex
societies also forms an essential part of that apparatus of social control and as
such is an essential precondition to any complex division of labour; no one would
argue that trust or moral obligation alone could take its place. These institutions
are an essential part of any complex market system, but they rest on a bedrock
of ethical habits. As Durkheim argues, contracts—which appear to be voluntary,
calculated deals among uncommitted individuals—draw effectively on prior
shared bonds that are not subject to negotiation, and of which the parties are
often unaware.69
Conclusion
Earlier it was argued that two key assumptions had been introduced into
contemporary public policy debates by economic fundamentalists. These were
the autonomy of the market and the primacy of the market over the social. It
has been argued that the complex exchange necessary to a highly specialised
division of labour requires a pre-existing state of social peace. That state of peace
is dependent on our evolved cultural systems with their informal norms and
formal rules backed by formal and informal means of coercion and by our own
sense of guilt at the breach of internalised norms. Consequently, the market is
a sub-system nestled within a more encompassing societal context. Of course,
these systems are not independent of each other: they interact and condition
each other. Indeed, social and economic institutions cannot be distinguished
clearly.70  Nevertheless, the process of economic competition is not
self-sustaining; its very existence, as well as the scope of transactions organised
by it, is dependent to a significant extent on the societal ‘capsule’ within which
that competition takes place.71
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It has been noted in passing that an evolutionary account of the existence of the
social order will not seem to be a satisfactory account to some theorists, who
will be looking for an ahistorical account analogous to the theoretical accounts
given in the physical sciences. While doubts are entertained about the value of
such accounts, and no dominant theory has emerged, a brief overview has been
given of the types of theories being advanced in contemporary discourse. It is
concluded, however, that there is no need to adopt a uni-causal approach and
that all of the accounts discussed provide some insight into the human condition.
Of particular importance is the account given by Elster, who concluded that
social norms could not be reduced to any single principle and, in particular,
could not be reduced to rationality or any other form of optimising mechanism.
This brief survey of competing theories ends with an account of the approaches
of prominent development psychologists, who have attempted a more empirical
approach based on the moral development of children. In particular, Kohlberg’s
unitary, rationalist conception of morality as justice is discussed and discounted
as not providing a convincing account. Gilligan’s alternative account of the
moral development of children suggests that moral development proceeds along
two different but intersecting paths that run through different modes of
experience and give rise to different forms of thought: an analytical logic of
justice and an ethic of care.
The advocates of social-contract theory, however, work with a model of society
that is a replica of the market. Their attempt to model society’s moral
infrastructure as a social contract is an attempt to reduce all social phenomena
to what is itself a particular social phenomenon. It is a contract that takes the
simplest of transactions as its paradigmatic example,72  but a simple exchange
transaction provides only a poor model for complex long-term contracts. By
trying to generate the rules of economic life internally and by viewing them as
having emerged from rational, self-maximising individuals, such theorists have
effectively assumed what they set out to explain.
Such a view argues that our long-term interests require the capacity to discipline
our appetites—the suppression of our animality—but this argument does no
more than incorporate some of our moral values within the concept of
self-interest. While it highlights the frequent presence of considerable tension
between our immediate desires and our long-term interests, these long-term
interests incorporate only some of our moral values. In any event, this concept
of self-interest is not descriptive of the real behaviour of real individuals,
amounting to no more than idealisations of individuals and of their
self-interest—idealisations that fly in the face of daily experience. In any event,
as argued earlier, there is no historical basis for the view that fully formed
individuals preceded communities and their shared rules, roles and beliefs.
Indeed, contemporary society could not exist without the complex of social and
religious norms that sustain it. The development of that society—indeed, the
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formation of complex communities generally, along with their associated norms
and institutions—has been a long process of social evolution along with the
development of supporting religious and philosophical beliefs. Of course, it
could be said that this process of social evolution produced what amounts to a
tacit social contact, but such an assertion would be mere sophistry, devoid of
content.
The competition process itself is constrained and sustained by social and legal
rules. The complex division of labour in modern societies involves a complex
of relationships and institutions, which cannot be reduced to transactions. Rather
state, ‘law and society are entwined in mutually reinforcing virtuous connection;
rather than mutually reinforcing vicious competition. Or so it is when we are
in luck.’73
The next chapter will focus first on the history of the concept of the social
contract and the associated doctrine of freedom of contract as the central
paradigms in economic fundamentalism. It will also point to the growing
difficulty encountered in trying to justify these theoretical ideas as the original
divine basis of natural law was secularised and attempts were made to naturalise
it. This leads readily into the question of how economists perceive their own
enterprise and how that enterprise fits in with the Enlightenment project.
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Chapter 4: A Brief Account of the
Historical Origins of Economic
Fundamentalism
How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some
principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and
render their happiness to him, though he derives nothing from it except
the pleasure of seeing it.
— Adam Smith1
Introduction
At the conclusion of Chapter 3, it was argued that the proposition that
self-interest was the fundamental ordering principle operating in society could
not be sustained. This conclusion is inconsistent with the beliefs of many
economists, who claim that the existence of social groups and of social order can
be explained by voluntary contracts between individuals who have made the
rational calculation that cooperation is in their long-term self-interest. This view
begs the question of whether real individuals are capable of determining what
is in their long-term self-interest—a question that, in practice, has often been
settled in the negative. In contrast, I argue that civilisation requires the
suppression of self-interest through social norms and that, in practice, our
decisions are deeply affected by socially inculcated values and by our emotions.
Consequently, the complex of relationships and institutions that make the
division of labour possible cannot be reduced to voluntary transactions between
individuals.
I also argued in Chapter 3 that our moral codes and our legal system provide the
infrastructure and the institutional basis essential for the social system in general
and the economic system in particular. While it has long been recognised that
infrastructure is essential to the functioning of the economic system, economists
generally have taken that social infrastructure for granted, limiting their
consideration to physical things. This limitation involves even a very narrow
understanding of the economic concept of ‘capital’—a limited understanding
that is breaking down. This has led to recognition among some economists of
the importance of ‘human capital’ to the functioning of the economic system.
That concept is, however, confined too frequently to embodied marketable
knowledge and skills. This is far too narrow a view of the abilities and attributes
required for successful human interaction—economic and social. The
development of that human capital involves the process of socialisation and
moral education, but the content of that socialisation has been invented in the
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process of social evolution and involves some vision—or visions—of the ‘good
society’.
It is clear that religious and intellectual speculation has played an important part
in the development of such visions. This intellectual speculation involves the
attempt to see beyond the historical to what—in the rationalist, classical scientific
tradition—are conceived of as more radically fundamental, underlying forces,
which are seen as fixed natural laws. As such, it incorporates a conception of
natural laws as mathematical, eternal and absolute—a reflection of some perfect
mathematical form—derived from ancient Greek philosophers Pythagoras
(569–500 BC) and Plato, and reinvigorated by the Enlightenment. Such a
vision—and its associated speculative reasoning—attempts also to lay down the
form that moral justification should take. I will critique this tradition in more
detail in the next chapter.
As indicated in Chapter 2, these are not new questions. Rather, they are as old
as philosophy and its fascination with deductive political and moral stories.
Even the idea of the ‘invisible hand’—beloved of economists—was old in 1759
when Smith first used the phrase.2  Just how old could come as something of a
surprise, even though Smith tells us. In his Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith
says:
[T]hat the ancient Stoics were of [the] opinion, that as the world was
governed by the all-ruling providence of a wise, powerful, and good
God, every single event ought to be regarded, as making a necessary
part of the plan of the universe, and as tending to promote the general
order and happiness of the whole: that the vices and follies of mankind,
therefore, made as necessary a part of this plan as their wisdom or their
virtue; and by that eternal art which educes good from ill, were made
to tend equally to the prosperity and perfection of the great system of
nature.3
The idea could have originated with Hesiod, one of the earliest Greek epic poets,
in the seventh century BC—though he might have just been reporting an idea
with wide currency within his culture.4
In Chapters 2 and 3, I provided an evolutionary account of the emergence of
social order along with a brief summary of the various ahistorical theories that
have been used to account for social order. These ahistorical approaches have
not led to—nor are they likely to lead to—any consensus. Rather, the history
of the social sciences has been dominated by three competing opinions:
• society is merely a collection of individuals
• society is an integrated whole; the term ‘society’ stands for a reality
• society is neither a fiction nor a fact; it is an entity ever in the making, a
process.5
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The first view is based on a mechanical, atomistic metaphor. In this view, atoms
are conceived of as the solid fundamental particles in nature interacting in a
mechanical fashion like billiard balls. Consequently, this view leads to the use
of mechanical analogies and to social theories in which supra-individual forces
must be explained in terms of individual behaviour. It also sees the social system
as an equilibrium system modelled on the equilibrium system of classical
mechanics and of Newtonian cosmology. As we will see in the next chapter, this
is the fundamental idea—the paradigm, the cosmology—that underpins the
Enlightenment. It is this view that underpins neoclassical economics, which
models human beings and their interactions as if they were mechanical,
equilibrium systems. This perspective, however, in denying the existence of a
super-individual entity, still has to account for our understanding of the existence
of such entities. To suggest simply that such understandings are mistaken—as
Margaret Thatcher did—is inconsistent with that perspective’s own
methodological individualism. This is because it denies the primacy of the
meanings and intentions of individuals when they use the word ‘society’ to
describe a collective entity with a pervasive influence on our lives.6 The second
view, which is based on an organic metaphor, is the way ancient Greek and
medieval philosophers viewed society—the view that was overthrown by the
Enlightenment. In this view, society is conceived of as an organism similar to
the human body—a view lending itself to biological analogies. Important
historically is the view of God as the head and society as the body.
Both of these views exclude essential elements of the social order and cannot,
therefore, provide an adequate account. There is a tension between these views
and an associated tension between the public and private spheres. These
tensions—which remain unresolved to this day—have been central to Western
political speculation. The boundaries to be placed between the public and private
spheres and the limits on individual liberties are the stuff of day-to-day politics
and the defining themes to which I drew attention in the opening paragraphs
of Chapter 1. The third view of nature as process—or as evolution—arises
primarily out of the relatively recent experience of change in social and economic
life within the lifetime of reflective commentators. As a result, change came to
be seen as a fundamental factor that had to be explained. This process view
better accounts for the integration of the social order and the independence of
the individuals that comprise it.7
What is clear, however, is that we are heirs to a dominant tradition of moral and
social argument, arising out of the Enlightenment and based on atomism and a
mechanical, Newtonian metaphor that continues to influence our policy
development processes. The broad philosophical and scientific foundations of
this tradition in the Enlightenment will be discussed in Chapter 5. For the
moment, we will focus on a more detailed account of the origins of the various
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social doctrines that flow from this tradition—doctrines that influence
contemporary economic and policy thought, including social contract theory.
A Brief History
The city-state—the polis—began to emerge as a new form of social and political
organisation in Greece in the eighth century BC out of that culture’s religious,
military and economic history. The polis was a complex hierarchical society built
on an organic metaphor around the notion of citizenship. The polis provided
ancient Greece with an intellectual model of how society was constituted.8  Only
in the polis was real human existence conceived of as being possible. Plato and
Aristotle agreed that to be a member of a polis involved a life of collective
involvement, transcending private interests. Plato argued that political power
existed to serve the welfare of the polis and its citizens and that this required
greed and ambition to be constrained by philosopher-kings guided by the power
of reason. For Aristotle, politics was the moral consummation of all other levels
of human activity and the State expressed the common moral life of the
community.9
In medieval times, Thomas Aquinas provided the dominant Christianised
Aristotelian version of this organic model: a hierarchical cosmos created and
maintained by God, in which everything had its ordained place and humans
served God’s ends.10 This organic model did not postulate—nor would it have
allowed—the strong separation between the public and private spheres that
characterises some modern societies. Of course, this account is not intended to
endorse the rigid and authoritarian nature of this model. Nor is it intended to
excuse the often-exploitative relationships it permitted in practice. Nevertheless,
in this model, a set of fundamental principles of justice, based in the cosmic
order itself, was seen as the foundation of the social order and of all enacted law.
In this view, one should cultivate moral virtues rather than merely keep the
moral law. In consequence, people were seen as owing a wide range of duties
to God, to the Church, to their feudal lord and to other people. It involved an
appreciation of the interdependency of society and of the debt owed to the lower
classes. It also involved the consolation of the promise of immortal life to those
at the bottom of the hierarchy.11  In addition, the possession of property by the
elite involved temporary custodianship, not ownership. Such custodianship
carried duties as well as rights. Among other things, it was the duty of those in
authority to stamp out usury and to ensure that prices and wages were just.
This hierarchical view played a crucial role in a developing natural-law tradition
from John of Salisbury in the twelfth century, St Thomas Aquinas in the
thirteenth, Nicholas of Cusa in the fifteenth, the Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos
(attributed to Philippe Duplessis-Mornay and Hubert Languet) in the sixteenth
and Hugo Grotius in the seventeenth.12
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Calvin provided a later ethical vision of the social world as a holy community
of saints participating voluntarily in an unmediated relationship with Christ—the
source of transcendent power and authority. This vision drew on the Pauline
and Augustinian theological tradition, Calvin’s particular theology and a literal
reading of the Old and New Testaments. In stressing the sovereignty of God,
Calvin and Calvinists sought to remake society in the image of a religious
community. In this vision, leadership in church and state fell to men pre-ordained
for salvation by God. Importantly, the individual was imbued with a new
autonomy while the nature of the social ties between these individuals was
redefined. The Reformation had more broadly articulated a new idea of authority
within the Church and within society. In particular, it brought with it a new
conception of ministry based on consent, collective agreement and the
fundamental equality of believers and ministers before God. Furthermore, it
sanctified secular life, giving religious legitimisation to secular callings. This
Calvinist vision was attractive to the prosperous mercantile classes of the
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries for whom material wealth and business
success were signs of God’s grace and their membership among the elect. In this
way, Calvinism helped create a climate favourable to capitalism. In the US colonies
in particular, Puritan settlers attempted to start afresh and organise a Christian
commonwealth that would serve as a model for the rest of the world. As a result,
the US culture remains Calvinist in some form or other to this day.
All of these theories involved an account of social existence in terms of a vision
of an ultimate good or divine purpose. What is particularly important for my
account is the fact that the medieval concept of ‘man’ as a political and social
being—necessarily involved in a network of social relations—which was derived
from Aristotle—gradually waned. This decline brought with it a need for a new
explanation. This waning was associated also with the decline of the moral and
secular authority of the Western Christian Church, partly as a result of the
struggle for power between religious and secular authorities in medieval Europe,
and partly as a result of the Reformation and the religious and political strife
that followed.
Progressively, the intellectual climate came to be defined by deism and an
associated distancing of God from human affairs.13  Under this deist view, while
God had actively created the Universe and was the final cause of the physical
and social order, He had then turned His back, leaving it to operate automatically
by laws built in at the outset. This involved a vision of God different from that
of the Judaeo-Christian revelation, that of the Stoics: a God fitting the
Enlightenment ’s new cosmology and the Newtonian mechanical world-view, a
clock-maker God who started the cosmic clock and who filled in the gaps between
the rapidly expanding natural forms of explanation and social and physical
reality. Over time, the Enlightenment rejected Christianity’s claim of a historical
revelation that was the source of truth and value.14  It thus progressively brought
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into question the idea that the source of social order was to be found outside
society. It also progressively disengaged moral discourse from direct theological
discourse and in the process strengthened the distinction between the public
and private realms. In this disengagement, the magisterium of the Church—its
claimed authority to teach on faith and morals on the basis of a commission from
God—passed imperceptibly from ecclesiastical authorities and their theologian
advisers to natural and moral philosophers, who claimed an authority to teach
on social and political arrangements because of their special knowledge of the
truth and of natural laws. What remained in deism, as a remnant of God’s
presence in the world, were the facility of reason and the holiness of rationality.15
We hear this echo still in our own day in the continued adulation of human
rationality. Of course, the growing strength of capitalist market relations—with
its distinction between public and private—reinforced this need for a new
conception of the social order.
This deist view was still a vision of a benevolent God in which natural laws were
seen as having been created to ensure human happiness. Consequently, the
discovery of and obedience to such laws was essential to human happiness. It
also imputes a purpose to social phenomena. This trend was also directly
associated with the development of science and a desire to find a scientific and
increasingly more natural explanation of the social order. This established the
intellectual climate that determined what was accepted as a valid explanation.
In this climate, the transcendent grounding of the social order was no longer
seen as providing an adequate explanation. While not yet totally abandoning
belief in and a reliance on the benevolence of God, human attributes or ‘human
nature’ were seen increasingly as the ultimate determinants of the regularities
and uniformities in social life and the vision of the social good. It was a process
that progressively divinised nature and human reason, providing a secular source
of meaning and justification as comprehensive and as dogmatic as that provided
by the religion it replaced. Clark calls this Enlightenment project ‘the Natural
Law Outlook’. It was a project with three essential elements: a belief in social
physics, naturalism and the derivation of a natural universal moral theory.16
For example, Hobbes, the first of the major contract theorists, had a strong
interest in the new philosophy and in the science of the seventeenth century,
having been Francis Bacon’s secretary.17  His was a materialistic, reductionist
and mechanistic theory and he used the Newtonian metaphor in his theorising
even before Sir Isaac Newton (1643–1727) had put the finishing touches to that
paradigm. He aimed to develop a science of politics comprising universal
propositions proven conclusively as the propositions of Euclid. This new type
of political theorising, which became typical of modernity, incorporated a new
and distinctive view of the way in which people should relate to the world. The
individual is conceived of as an isolated mind and will with a vocation to bring
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the world under the control of reason—a way of thinking that privileges the
rational, wilful subject.18
Hobbes’ theory involved a mechanics of the mind and a mechanics of society in
which strivings within our bodies determined our actions in our relationships
with each other. For Hobbes, the unceasing pursuit of power and pleasure was
the sociological counterpart to the concept of gravity. This theme reappeared
later in Bentham’s utilitarian account of morality. As indicated above, this
tradition breaks with Aristotle and Aquinas and their view of humans as
inherently social and political animals. Rather, this tradition postulates theories
that are highly individualistic and pre-social, and that are voluntaristic,
consensual and rationalist.19  Nevertheless, they are theories with roots in earlier
political theorising in which the idea of contract was used to undermine the
quasi-divine pretensions of kings and emperors.20
This use of the idea of contract can be traced to the Old Testament, to Roman
law and the political practice of medieval Europe, where kings were often elected
and ruled in accordance with pre-existing laws and customs.21  In particular,
among the Germanic peoples, the idea of a pactum governing their monarchy
was derived from the idea of a covenant, which in turn was derived from the
social and religious history of the ancient Middle East as recorded in the Old
Testament. In such a covenant, divine authority was invoked as a witness to
morally binding agreements. These agreements were often in the form of a
suzerain treaty between a stronger political leader and a weaker one, but they
also covered mutual pledges between more equal partners. The Old Testament
relates how this ‘basic, “mutual”, oath-bound creation of responsible
relationships’ is recognised to be a close analogy of the way in which God relates
to humanity and a model of how we should relate to each other under God.22
It involves also a revelation of the nature of a just, merciful God who engages
directly in the creation and sustaining of righteous living in community.
This progressive secularisation of covenant, through the development of social
contract theories, was also associated closely with the religious, social and political
developments in the surrounding societies. In particular, contract ideas provided
radical Protestants with a means of justifying their political dissent. It also suited
the new merchant classes and their allies in challenging the monopoly on political
power of the established oligarchies.23  In particular, these ideas were congenial
to Calvinists engaged in struggle against ruling state authorities opposed to their
religious beliefs. For example, the Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos, which appeared
in 1579, attributed the obligations of a ruler to his vocation or divine calling.
Consequently, the covenant between ruler and people was not simply between
ruler and people, it was between ruler, subjects and God, and expressed the will
of God.24  It was the influence of Calvinism, with its propensity to think of
obligations in terms of covenants, combined with the importance of Calvinism
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in the political conflicts in sixteenth and seventeenth-century Europe, which
first raised contract theory to a central position in Western political theory.25
In particular, the popularity of the contractual ideas in seventeenth-century
Britain is attributable directly to the influence of Puritanism—the English brand
of Calvinism. Contractual ideas were used by politicians and propagandists to
justify rebellion during the English Civil War (1642–51)—a war that was
provoked by the religious policies of Charles I and by his claims to absolute
political power founded on divine will. This Puritan contractualism is reflected
also in The Agreement of the People, a proposed contract drawn up between 1648
and 1649 by the Levellers, the radical democratic party in the English Civil War,
and in their demands for a popular franchise.26
Covenant and social contract ideas—particularly those developed by John
Locke—were used to justify the second expulsion of the restored Stuarts in
1688, and became part of the prevailing ideology. Changing ideas about the
nature of property rights came to a head at the same time, with the ownership
of property tending to become more ‘absolute’. In these struggles, the Whigs
also wrested from the Crown a new freedom of property.27 While in medieval
times the relationship between the Crown and its tenants combined rent and
taxes, the ideas of rent and taxes had gradually become separated. The abolition
of feudal tenures in 1660 and the creation of new excise taxes marked this
fundamental shift in ideas about land as private property. The great lords ceased
to be tenants of the Crown and became owners, while freeholders also began to
see themselves as owners. In the process, the rural poor were progressively
dispossessed of their customary land rights. As we saw earlier, the England of
the period has been described as a property owners’ association with the landless
classes excluded from the political process. It was against the landless classes
that the property owners sought government protection.28 These changing
ideas and the associated theories of Hobbes and Locke were related also to the
emerging market society.29 The consequence was that the logic of capitalism,
rationalisation and the Enlightenment’s faith in material and moral progress
became intertwined.30
Consequently, the propertied elite found it easy to conceive of civil society as
based on a social contract, not on socially defined moral obligations backed by
divine law.31  As a result, the concept of contract gradually replaced custom as
the source of law and social obligations, including the obligations associated
with commercial contracts. There was an ambiguity in this theorising.32  It is
not entirely clear whether Hobbes and Locke were discussing the origins of
political society or criteria for judging it. It does seem that both believed that
theirs was a historical account. It is now clear that their accounts were not.
Subsequent contract theorising—such as that of Immanuel Kant (1724–1804)
and John Rawls (1921–2002)—is defended as an analogy in which contract is
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used to try to deduce the ideal form of political organisation.33  As such, they
are clearly normative theories. We might note in passing that the standard
criticism of such theories is that they presuppose a universal human nature that
determines the distinguishing characteristics of the ‘state of nature’ that lead to
a need for a universal contract. Social-contract theorists have not relied on an
account of human nature based on empirical evidence, but on an arbitrary,
idealised model that assumes that human beings are motivated by self-interest
and that they are rational in their pursuit of that self-interest. As we have already
seen, these are the assumptions under which neoclassical economics operates;
however, the account I gave earlier of the social construction of reality—and of
the wide differences in values and practices that have been observed in
practice—undermines belief in such a universal human nature.
What was new in this theorising was the idea that contractual relationships were
created by the free choice of the individuals involved, not the idea that such
relationships involved mutual rights and duties. It followed that for Hobbes ,
and many later theorists, a price agreed by the parties was a just price merely
by virtue of the agreement. Importantly for our account, for Hobbes, the
obligation to abide by one’s promises—a cornerstone of all social contract
theory—is an obligation of natural law corresponding with the self-interest and
common interest of all men.34  For Hobbes, men acting freely created civil society,
even when it was imposed on them by conquest. The overriding requirement
for law meant that rational men would and did assent to surrender their ‘natural
liberty’ even to a conqueror. This aspect of Hobbes’ doctrine appears to reflect
his commitment to peace—a commitment reflected in his submission to Cromwell
in 1651 after the defeat of the Royalists. This aspect of Hobbes’ doctrine was,
however, unattractive to his English contemporaries as it brought into question
the legitimacy of the execution of King Charles I.
Locke’s ideas were much more acceptable, as he modified Hobbes’ account to
provide a justification for resistance to tyrants in the name of individual rights,
liberty and property. Locke was associated closely with the Whig cause, being
the philosophical spokesman of the great Whig landowners, the landowning
classes and the rising bourgeoisie. Locke owed his influence to his defence of
their property rights.35  In Locke’s state of nature, people are naturally free and
equal and are not in a constant state of war. Rather, they are acquiring property.
They own their own person and their labour. It was through this labour that
the common property of mankind was appropriated to individual use; and it
was the hard-working who, Locke claimed, acquired the most property. While
in the state of nature there were severe limits to the unequal division of property,
the invention of money made it possible for great inequalities of wealth to
develop. In using money, people agreed tacitly to such an unequal distribution.
In establishing civil society, individuals agreed to surrender some of their right
to protect that property. Consequently, for Locke, the principal role of
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government was to protect property rights—rights that he claimed predated
government itself. Since it is transparently obvious that no one had, in fact,
assented to such a contract, Locke relies on the notion of tacit consent to support
his contractual views.
This theory drew heavily on the concept of natural law—a law deriving from
divine law—to explain, in particular, the limits on the powers of government
and the obligation to keep promises and agreements. Locke drew specifically on
the work of Anglican theologian Richard Hooker (1554–1600), the creator of the
distinctive Anglican theology the via media. For Hooker, society did not occur
spontaneously but resulted from the deliberate seeking of communion and
fellowship in political societies. Government and laws were also the result of
agreement.36  For Hooker, the universe was ruled by natural laws appointed by
God , governing the physical universe and moral questions. They were discovered
by reason and were not to be found solely in scriptures or in church teaching.
It is a vision that draws also on the Calvinist vision of a community of individuals
under God’s dominion in which man is God’s workmanship and His property.
This provided the necessary transcendental underpinnings for Locke’s theory
of civil society. This vaguely religious justification of property also helped to
make Locke’s ideas more attractive to the English governing classes.37
Nevertheless, in time, this concept of natural law came to be stripped of its
associations with divine laws and nature ultimately came to denote human
appetites.
Locke and Newton were strong influences on the Scottish Enlightenment and
on Smith (1723–90), one of its leading figures. Newton, the seminal figure in the
science of the seventeenth century, gave this natural-law outlook widespread
scientific credibility. Newton emphasised the independence of scientific
discoveries from theology and metaphysics, even though the belief in a divine
order was central to his beliefs.38  He believed that the rational and the natural
were synonymous. Consequently, the structure of nature—God’s design—could
be discovered by reasoning, particularly mathematical reasoning, applied to
observation and experimentation. He also believed that this method was
important for moral philosophy and for salvation for that also was part of God’s
design.
Important to this account is the influence of the dominant Protestant natural-law
philosophers, Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) and Samuel Pufendorf (1632–94). It
was through these influences that the natural-law outlook was transmitted to
Smith. As indicated above, their philosophy involved a continuation and an
extension of certain strains in scholasticism and, in particular, the distinction
between positive law and natural law. Natural law was seen as the earthly
manifestation of divine law, revealed through nature and reason, while humans
created positive law.39  Grotius and Pufendorf were also leading contract theorists
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in their own right. With Grotius—who was seen as the founder of modern
natural-law theory—natural law was founded on reason and rational axioms
similar to mathematical axioms that could be intuited by everyone. This marks
a major break in the natural-law tradition. Grotius saw that instead of natural
law relying on revelation, it was seen as working through a social instinct
implanted in humans by God. It was a theme picked up by Smith. Indeed, the
tradition of moral philosophy associated with the Scottish Enlightenment and
out of which the modern ideas of civil society emerged was steeped in natural-law
speculation.40
Another influence was Bernard Mandeville’s (1670–1733) Fable of the Bees, first
published in 1714, which argued, amid much scandal, that the pursuit of
self-interest—when managed properly within an appropriate institutional
framework and under the direction of wise statesmen—could be transformed
into public benefits with good consequences. Hume and Smith, leading lights
in the Scottish Enlightenment, picked Mandeville’s view that vanity motivated
people to conform to social norms.41 The Scottish Enlightenment’s idea of civil
society was an attempt to develop an individualistic theory of society that could
cope with the disparate and contradictory human motivations—which were
described usually as altruism and egoism—and with the weaknesses of Locke’s
account.42 What was new in this vision of civil society was its understanding
of human interaction as a moral sphere in which moral attributes were derived
by reason from the nature of humans themselves, and not from a transcendent
reality. The concept of moral affections and natural sympathy now provided
the grounding that had previously been provided by God.
As argued above, this interweaving of natural law and Calvinist principles was
particularly influential in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in the Puritan
communities of North America, which saw themselves as a new chosen people,
and where there was a conscious effort to establish a new social and political
order—a holy commonwealth—based on these principles. Of course, this
utopianism had ultimately to accommodate the failure of some members of the
new settlements to join the Church and the breakdown of community solidarity
as the settlements expanded. This provoked a major crisis in American
Puritanism, leading to a redefinition of the normative order. That order, which
had been identified with the Church, came to be seen as residing within each
individual conscience. As Adam Seligman tells us, the result is that the moral
order is seen as resting not on grace but on the personal moral behaviour of the
individual.43 The evolution of the American polity involved a confluence of
influences connecting the integration of an increasingly secularised Puritan
tradition with Lockean political philosophy, a rationalised natural-law tradition
and the Enlightenment’s belief in the perfectibility of ‘mankind’. It was these
principles—this civil religion44  —that the American revolutionaries invoked
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in their quest for political independence and they remain central to the unique
American understanding of themselves. In Britain and Europe, different traditions
militated against the very strong emphasis on individualism, natural rights and
anti-statism that characterises America.
In his Treatise on Human Nature and again in an essay Of the Original Contract,
Hume attacked Locke’s social-contract ideas.45  Nevertheless, he believed in a
constant human nature, which history could illuminate and which could provide
the basis of a scientific moral philosophy. Hume agreed that, at first, government
was founded on contract because men were so equal in physical ability that they
could be subject to authority only by their own agreement. Hume, however,
rejected the social contract account of legitimate political authority. There was
no state of nature. It was a mere philosophical fiction. Nor was society formed
by a social contract constituted by promises. Rather, societies evolved and formed
gradually. Even if there had been some initial agreement, the subsequent
obligations of its citizens were not and could not be derived from any original
agreement to which they were not parties, or from any renewed agreement of
their own. Similarly, he rejected the notion of tacit consent.
For Hume, the duty of allegiance owed to a state and the obligation to perform
contracts were based on self-interest and neither was derived from the other.
Similarly, Hume rejected the idea that society was founded to protect property
rights. The concept of a property right is itself an artificial concept depending
on morality and justice and these are notions created and recognised by society.
Property rights cannot pre-date society . For Hume, the whole contractual edifice
of political theory was unnecessary. Justice in general, rights of property in
particular and the obligation to perform a promise derive from convention in
the same way that the use of money or language is derived. Nevertheless, for
Hume, the stability of possessions, their transfer by consent and the performance
of promises are fundamental to the working of society. These rules are not,
however, rooted in any historical, mythical, logical or transcendental status.46
What was to stop this individualistic, self-interested society from degenerating
into a Hobbesian war of all on all?47  Hume thought it was enlightened
self-interest—not unbridled licence—that would do the trick. Hume assumed
that most of the educated population would realise that it was in their interests
not to pursue short-term advantage at the expense of longer-term interest. Those
who did not would be dealt with by the law and would adjust their behaviour.
Obligations that originated from self-interest came to be generalised until they
were seen as general moral obligation, independent of particular cases.
A second answer is associated with Smith and his attempt to create a science of
morals and society. Contrary to popular belief, Smith was no admirer of mere
selfishness:
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The wise and virtuous man is at all times willing that his own private
interests should be sacrificed to the public interest of his own particular
order or society. He is at all times willing too, that the interest of this
order or society should be sacrificed to the greater interest of the state
or sovereignty, of which it is only a subordinate part. He should,
therefore, be equally willing that all those inferior interests should be
sacrificed to the greater interest of the universe, to the interest of that
great society of all sensible and intelligent beings, of which God Himself
is the immediate administrator and director.48
Consequently, it is clear that Smith did not believe that society was based simply
on selfishness and greed . On the contrary, in The Theory of Moral Sentiments,
Smith discussed the basis of moral feelings or sentiments and their relationship
with justice. Smith argues that though men have natural sympathy for each
other—and are led by that sympathy to act with benevolence—these motives
are insufficient to curb men’s natural propensity to act in their own interests.
Thus, for Smith, justice is the supreme virtue as it counteracts human selfishness.
Importantly, for Smith, the ‘invisible hand’ was a consequence of divine design,
of a benevolent providence that had so arranged human nature as to produce
this outcome.
Smith further elaborated his views on economic affairs in The Wealth of Nations.
In the process, he also drew on the natural-law outlook described above to
provide what he thought were constant universal natural laws. For Smith, moral
sentiment balanced any attempt to describe rational self-interest in terms of
reason disengaged from the ‘passions’ or from the self freed from the eyes of
others. In particular, for Smith, the motivating force of economic activity was
the desire for recognition by others. Therefore, the individual self could never
be totally disengaged from society, nor could reasoned self-interest be abstracted
from those passions, which, through the moral sentiment, rooted man in society.49
Consequently, Smith recognised the interdependence of individuals and the
social embedding of individual existence. Furthermore, this civil-society tradition
was inconsistent with any restriction of reason to what we would now call
instrumental rationality .
Despite his popular identification with laissez-faire ideas, Smith took no crude
minimal view of the functions of government. In his view, the State had three
principal purposes: to protect citizens from external enemies; to protect citizens
from force and fraud; and to erect public works and institutions that were in
the public interest but were too costly to be carried out by individuals.
Importantly for this account, Smith also rejected any dogmatic prohibition on
state interference with contracts:
Such regulations may, no doubt, be considered as in some respect a
violation of natural liberty. But those exertions of the natural liberty of
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a few individuals, which might endanger the security of the whole, are,
and ought to be restrained by the laws of all governments…The
obligation of building party walls, in order to prevent the communication
of fire, is a violation of natural liberty, exactly of the same kind with the
regulations of the banking trade here proposed.50
As Seligman points out, Hume’s undermining of the unity of reason and moral
sentiments ultimately subverted the Scottish Enlightenment’s civil society ideas
and encouraged still further the growth of liberal individualism while further
undermining the concept of a common good. Kant tried to rebuild that link,
claiming the existence of universal natural laws of human action and a determined
plan of nature.51  In doing so, he reasserted the Enlightenment ambition drawing
on the idea of moral personhood, the tradition of ascetic Protestantism and the
transcendental qualities of universal reason, which he saw as creating a secular
version of the autonomous individual conscience. Thus, in Kant, reason replaced
God as the source of universal values and moral injunctions. With Kant, however,
the State is no longer viewed as coterminous with civil society, and morality is
now separated from legality and privatised so as to reside within the conscience
only of the morally and economically autonomous individual. This individualistic
moral and political theorising involved a further erosion of the idea of citizenship
and the communal nature of political life, undermining still further the status
of the public sphere and the idea of a common good.
In the early nineteenth century, the desire to create a science of morals and
politics became centred on utilitarianism—a development of elements of Hume’s
thought.52  By attributing to human beings certain universal, constant,
fundamental and opposed natural inclinations, the search for pleasure and the
avoidance of pain, utilitarians claimed to have given morals and politics an
empirical scientific foundation. These tendencies provided a substitute for the
fictional natural rights on which Locke and some earlier theorists had relied. In
the process, utilitarians claim to provide an ahistorical, universal and allegedly
scientific account of moral and political theory based on a form of social physics
and a mechanical Newtonian model in a somewhat similar way to Locke.
Importantly, Bentham aspired to be the Newton of the moral world and thought
he had found in the above the single unifying principle akin to gravity that
regulates the social world.53  Bentham starts from his particular view of human
nature and deduces all institutions and legal arrangements from these properties.
While Bentham made random use of historical examples to bolster his claims, it
was doubtful that utilitarian theorists provided an account of the process by
which society was formed.54 This utilitarianism was attached pragmatically to
classical political economy and subsequently formed the basis for neoclassical
economics and its particular failed attempt at Newtonian scientific theorising
about human beings and their economic activities.
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Bentham provided an alternative legal philosophy to social contractualism,
though he did not extricate himself from the natural-law outlook. In particular,
he used the idea of a state of nature in a similar way to Locke and retained his
individualism. There was, however, a change of emphasis because, for Bentham,
it was the role of the lawmaker to create and adjust laws to create an artificial
harmony of interests between individual action and the public good. Of course,
there was great dissatisfaction with the initial utilitarian account. In particular,
support for utilitarianism was undermined by a refusal to accept that pleasure
and pain were the only sources of human action—a belief that contradicted
everyday experience. Nor can it explain why people find pleasure in different
things.55  Nevertheless, Mill was a utilitarian continuing the Enlightenment’s
search for a science of society.
While he tried to broaden Bentham’s understanding of happiness in terms of
pleasure and pain, Mill never shook off his utilitarian beliefs. In Utilitarianism,
Mill argues that there is no natural harmony of interests between individuals
and that it is the lawmaker’s role to create such harmony.56  For Mill, the
principles of justice are principles of long-term expediency. This view was
mirrored in the growth of legal positivism whereby law was not the result of a
social contract but of a hierarchical power relationship. The source of authority
was customary obedience. It reflected also a growing scepticism with universal
principles of human nature—a scepticism many contemporary economists seem
to have overlooked. Mill had an exceptionally strong belief in freedom combined
with the possibility of progress, particularly in terms of his positive conception
of freedom.57
Mill thought that progress was to do with self-realisation or
self-improvement—living in accordance with an ideal chosen by the individual,
with virtue—rather than the growth of happiness, as with Bentham. Like Locke
and Bentham, Mill was an individualist in that all ends were individual ends
and the function of government was to facilitate the attainment of those ends.
For Mill, however, civilised society helped those individuals to form those ends.
Consequently, he believed in education and voluntary cooperation in
self-government as a means of moral improvement. Despite his basic utilitarian
beliefs, Mill nevertheless saw morality as a product of social life composed of
such things as love, fear, self-esteem and religious emotions. As John Plamenatz
tells us, Mill believed that we could not live for ourselves alone.58  Somewhat
inconsistently, he also held that virtue became a good in itself.
Mill went on to support representative government because it improved the
quality of life of those who enjoyed it, rather than because it created a harmony
of selfish interests. Nevertheless, he did not believe that it was suited to all
people all of the time because people were made fit for such freedom only by
social discipline. While a strong supporter of the market economy, Mill was
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unhappy with the practical consequences of that system for the poor of his day
and he sought moral and political limits to its operation.59  He saw that the poor
had no opportunity to enjoy freedom as he conceived it and he saw excessive
wealth as inimical to that liberty. Consequently, he supported such things as
inheritance tax, guaranteed minimum incomes and industrial democracy .
At this point, we reach a major cleavage in this tradition, between political
economy increasingly conceived of as a positive, deductive science and political
and moral philosophy, which continues with its rationalist speculation about
political and moral principles but which gradually shed its claims to be a scientific
enterprise. We will resume our examination of the scientific claims of economics
in subsequent chapters, concentrating for the moment on the continued
development of political speculation.
Peter Self (1919–99) describes a further major cleavage opening up within the
liberal tradition between positive and negative liberals after Mill—a cleavage
remaining to this day—with economic fundamentalists and most libertarians
members of the negative school. In contrast, the positive liberals such as Thomas
Green, John Hobson and Leonard Hobhouse were strong supporters of social
reform to improve the lot of the poor and, along with the socialists, they were
highly influential in the growth of social legislation in the late nineteenth century.
Their successors in Australia are the small ‘l’ liberals and many on the left of
politics.
The negative ‘liberals’ were opposed to the growth of social legislation, holding
that freedom meant merely the absence of government coercion. Of course, in
conceiving of government action solely in terms of coercion—rather than in
terms of communal decision making and coordination—the negative liberals
take a very narrow view of the nature of governmental action and its contribution
to welfare. Within the negative school, the social evolutionists sought to provide
an alternative account that was scientific and historical while remaining staunchly
individualistic. In the process, they abandoned the psychological reductionism
that had characterised Hobbes and Locke and many subsequent theorists. For
Spencer , the leading social evolutionist,60  the principle of utility was no rule
but the articulation of the problem to be solved.61 The theory of evolution
undermined the notion of a universal human nature on which deductive
utilitarianism depended. Spencer drew on the increasingly secularised natural-law
tradition—a secularisation that reflected the increasing rejection of earlier
religious certainties. For Spencer, therefore, the universality of natural causation
provided a substitute for the Puritanism of his childhood, with progress a
substitute for the eschatological promises of Christianity. In fact, in much
nineteenth-century thought, the uniformity of nature had acquired a logical
status and a numinous aura that made it a substitute for the idea of God. In the
process, moral qualities were bestowed on the universe.
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Spencer saw the idea of evolution from the simple to the complex as a process
deriving from the fundamental laws of matter and motion, to manifestations of
force. Only classical mechanics—the Newtonian metaphor—provided an adequate
scientific understanding of reality. In this, Spencer was typical of his age—the
age immediately before the rise of relativity and quantum mechanics in physics.
He attempted to apply evolution to all phenomena in the universe, particularly
to the social world. Consequently, he was an evolutionary determinist who
believed that progress occurred through inevitable stages according to inflexible
laws: ‘Either society has laws, or it has not. If it has not, there can be no order,
no certainty, no system in its phenomena. If it has, then, are they like the other
laws of the universe—sure, inflexible, ever active, and having no exceptions?’62
He saw social life as a struggle similar to the struggle for survival in the natural
world. Consequently, he saw social competition as part of the process of
evolution. Importantly, nothing could be done in the long term to stop the
process of competition and the attempt to do so—to alleviate social
conditions—merely assured the short-term survival of the unfit. This doctrine
had much in common with Malthus ’s belief that the poor were redundant.63
The survival of the fittest was justified as if it were a natural scientific law. This
elevation of competition served to justify Spencer’s strong opposition to social
legislation—a function it continues to serve. In this view, a lack of success is
associated with a lack of virtue. There was some ambiguity, however, as to
whether the fittest meant the best, or merely an adaptation to existing
circumstances. Of course, this ambiguity goes to the heart of the difficulty with
this type of theorising: if it is the best, why? The answer to that question adds
another layer of moral theorising. If it is merely adaptation to existing
circumstances, why is that adaptation moral?
Freedom of contract was a necessary part of Spencer’s theory. It was the supreme
mechanism for maintaining social order with the absolute minimum of compulsion
and coercion. Spencer’s views can therefore be seen as an extreme version of
contractualism in which the State is nothing more than a large partnership.64
Restriction on the freedom of contract interfered with the natural order of things
and enabled the unfit to survive longer than they would otherwise. Importantly,
Spencer regarded the claims of social institutions other than economic institutions
as alien to the human personality, from which they would ultimately free
themselves. Consequently, Spencer opposed a wide range of social reforms on
the ground that it constituted an interference with the freedom of contract.
Surprisingly, Spencer saw his views as being consistent with the utilitarian
formulae of the greatest happiness of the greatest number. This pseudo-science
was not particularly influential in England. It was, however, very popular in
the United States for a long time and had a formidable influence on American
thinking and law.65  As John Murphy writes,
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Spencer’s influence on American thought in the second half of the
nineteenth century was particularly strong. He formulated his laissez-faire
philosophy in such a way that it appealed ‘at once to the traditional
individualism and the acquisitive instincts of Americans, who were able
without too great inconsistency to regard whatever they did,
individually, as in harmony with evolution and whatever government
or society did, collectively, as contrary to natural law’.66
Vestiges of this doctrine remain in some extreme justifications of the market
system and of its social inequality that are met in economic fundamentalism.
Hayek, the author of The Road to Serfdom, a polemical defence of laissez-faire,
was similarly a social evolutionist. To a large extent, the whole of Hayek’s work
was a reaction to the rise of Nazi tyranny, with its adulation of the State and the
‘will to power’. This led to his obsessive focus on ‘negative freedom’—the
avoidance of government coercion—and the neglect of other meanings of the
term ‘freedom’. It followed that he was a strong critic of Keynes and his
counter-cyclical policy prescriptions. Similarly, he was opposed to social security
legislation, which he saw as special provision for the needy, arguing that the
pursuit of social justice was a mirage.67  For Hayek, the economic system was a
self-regulating system too complex to understand fully and consequently there
were limits to what reason and economics could achieve. In particular, he was
opposed to any government interference in price signals, which he saw as a
mechanism for conveying information arising out of a spontaneous, decentralised
market process that was too complex to be understood by the social planner,
and too dangerous to interfere with. Consequently, he was also a vehement critic
of socialist central planning. Indeed, he felt that the economics profession more
broadly had made a mess of things as a result of its attempt to imitate the
procedures of the physical sciences.68  Hayek’s view ignores the imperfect nature
of price signals as an information source and the fact that the social institutions
on which the market system rests are themselves human creations built over
many centuries and subject to constant change on the basis of experience.
Hayek’s own economic work was neglected in the enthusiasm for Keynes’ work
and, from the 1950s onwards, Hayek concentrated on philosophy, politics and
psychology. It follows that while Hayek could give some comfort to the economic
fundamentalists in his opposition to government, in the cause of his
understanding of freedom he gives no comfort to the contemporary neoclassical
economist.
Summary
We saw with Hobbes and Locke the beginnings of a new type of political and
moral theorising, which sought its grounding in the natural world, individualism
and the so-called scientific perspective. While the various theories that have
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been recounted do not, of necessity, make a coherent whole, they nevertheless
reflect the same Enlightenment ambition to produce a secular, naturalist and
rational justification for our moral allegiances and social arrangements. As such,
they represent a tradition of thought sharing certain presuppositions and ways
of conceptualising, and in which the participants frame their thoughts in
relationship to earlier thinkers in the same tradition.69 This Enlightenment
ambition has failed for reasons that will be explored shortly.70
This tradition, nevertheless, constitutes the complex of ideas—the background
mood—on which market ideology and economic fundamentalism rely. With
Locke, therefore, we have a view of property rights as being prior to society—a
natural right, but one based on divine law. We also see the contract metaphor
used to explain the existence of society. With such theorists as Mandeville,
Hume and Smith , we see the gradual transformation of self-interest from being
a source of moral failure to a source of public good, albeit moderated by
competition and by a dash of sympathy for others. In the process, the divine,
deistic underpinnings were removed gradually and replaced with nature and
reason—concepts that were increasingly deified or reified. Through the alchemy
of the Newtonian metaphor, these naturalist justifications of self-interest are
turned into a formal moral theory in the form of utilitarianism. Of course, it is
this utilitarianism that underlies much economic theory. With Spencer, the
moderation—which was in Smith—was removed and instead the attempt was
made to justify naked self-interest under the rubric of the survival of the fittest.
They all share what Richard Rorty (1931–2007) calls Locke’s unfortunate desire
to privilege the language of natural science over other vocabularies.71 While
Hayek wished to avoid that privilege, in seeing the market as a self-regulating
system, he was ruling out government coordination and social risk sharing on
a priori grounds; and it was reasoning that would enslave us to the economic
system.
More recently, we have seen a major revival in contract thought as a consequence
of Rawls’ A Theory of Justice.72  Interestingly, Rawls’ idea of a reflective
equilibrium as a way of evaluating our sense of justice—and as a theory of moral
sentiments—is a deliberate echo of Smith.73  It has already been argued that the
concept of social relationships as contractual is taken for granted by economic
fundamentalists and by economists generally and this is probably one reason
why Rawls’ ideas have been so attractive. Indeed, David Gauthier claims that
such a view lies at the core of the ideology of Western capitalism.74 This
ideology—this metaphor, this claim to conceptual priority—is now part of the
deep, pre-reflective tacit structure of self-consciousness and the symbolic
universe, the way in which we conceive of ourselves as human, the way we
relate to each other, to structures and institutions and to the natural world. In
this view, society is conceived of as merely instrumental, meeting no fundamental
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human need.75  It also involves a view of ourselves as insatiable appropriators
engaged in a competitive search for power, with rationality understood as being
related instrumentally to the satisfaction of individual interests. Gauthier sums
up the historical development of this ideology in the following terms:
What is to be appropriated is first thought of as real property, land or
real estate. The distinction between land and other forms of property is
then denied, and what is to be appropriated becomes the universal
measure of property, money. Finally, in a triumph of abstraction, money
as a particular object is replaced by the purely formal notion of utility,
an object conveniently divested of all content. The rational man
is…simply the man who seeks more. Thus it follows that not only the
individualistic instrumental conception of rationality, but more precisely
the individualistic utility-maximising conception, is part of the ideology
of the social contract.76
The maximising conception of rationality entailed by contractualism and the
natural-law outlook precludes the very possibility of rational agreement, because
it undercuts the internal constraints necessary to maintain contractual
relationships. In the past, radical self-interest was usually considered a primary
threat to society, to be repressed by religion , law, morality and tradition. As
has been argued in Chapter 3, the contractual tradition, contemporary economics
and more especially economic fundamentalism have failed to understand the
extent to which the social, political and economic orders have been sustained
by motives different from those contained in the contractual conception of human
nature. The faith that is placed in this contract tradition, and this form of
theorising, cannot be sustained.
This chapter has provided a historical account of the intellectual tradition on
which economic fundamentalism rests. Along the way, it has provided some
criticism of this tradition, pointing in particular to the way in which it initially
served the interests of wealthy British landowners. In the next chapter, I will
deepen this critique by relating this tradition to the Enlightenment and criticising
the intellectual arrogance that has flowed from that project.
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Chapter 5: A Critique of the
Conceptual Foundations of Economic
Fundamentalism
‘I perceive,’ said the Countess, ‘Philosophy is now become Mechanical.’
‘So Mechanical,’ said I, ‘that I fear we shall quickly be asham’d of it;
they will have the World to be in great, what a watch is in little; which
is very regular, and depends only upon the just disposing of the several
parts of the movement. But pray tell me, Madam, had you not formerly
a more sublime Idea of the Universe?’
— Bernard le Bovier de Fontenelle1
The word Reason, and the epithets connected with it—‘Rational’ and
‘Reasonable’—have enjoyed a long history which has bequeathed to
them a legacy of ambiguity and confusion.
— Michael Oakeshott2
Introduction: The Contemporary Epochal Transformation
in the Western Mind
In the previous chapter, I provided a brief historical account of the social-contract
tradition on which economic fundamentalism rests. In the next three chapters,
I propose to extend that critique by looking at the epistemological foundations
of that tradition in the cultural and philosophical movement called ‘the
Enlightenment’. I will criticise its belief that reason and the scientific method
can provide us with certain geometric knowledge of the natural and social world,
concentrating in particular on the grossly exaggerated claims of rationalism and
its tools. In the next chapter, I will extend that critique to positivist scientific
beliefs, pointing out that science and social inquiry are only fallible human
activities always subject to revision. I will then move in Chapter 7 to a discussion
of the normative nature of social inquiry and to criticise claims to normative
expertise. The effect of these three chapters taken together is to undermine the
claims of social science and political and moral philosophy to a privileged position
in the determination of government action.
The Enlightenment was central to the breakdown of the synthesised
Ptolemaic–Aristotelian conception of the world. That particular synthesis—that
paradigm, that intellectual trajectory—had not only provided the master
narrative and the conceptual basis of the medieval world, it had informed
Western philosophical, religious and scientific understanding for about 15
centuries.3  Let me emphasise that influence again, lest its significance passes us
by. The synthesised Ptolemaic–Aristotelian conception of the world provided
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the very basis of the medieval experience of reality. Incredible though it might
seem now, that medieval Christian experience of reality was not only different
from our understanding, it was as tangible, complete and self-evident as our
modern experience of an impersonal and material objective reality, or as the
ancient Greek experience of an even more ‘mythical’ reality.4
The Enlightenment, then, involved a radical cultural change, sweeping away
what was said to be superstition and tradition and promising progress, equality,
freedom and justice. This involved the formation of a new cosmology, which
provided a new explanatory archetypal story and a different reality. This is the
reality formed by the Newtonian world-view in which the universe is viewed
as a machine—a self-sufficient mechanism involving the interaction of matter
and forces—lacking purpose and meaning. It was only with Enlightenment
thinkers such as Bacon, Descartes and Newton that the idea first emerged clearly
that there were laws governing the natural world and that it was the role of
natural philosophers or what we now call scientists to discover them. The earlier
theory of scientific explanation developed by Aristotle was essentialist and had
no room for such a concept.5  As we will see later, this mechanical world-view
still lies at the heart of contemporary economic thought, which seeks to model
human beings and their interactions as a mechanical system.
We might note in passing that the fact that such different conceptions of
fundamental realities have been held in all seriousness by people every bit as
intelligent as us, should warn us against placing excessive confidence in our
current intellectual constructs and the stories we tell about them. While we
might have better institutions for checking knowledge claims, these cannot
guarantee freedom from error.
Habermas, in his qualified defence of the Enlightenment, describes the project
of modernity as
the effort to develop objective science, universal morality and law, and
autonomous art, according to their inner logic. At the same time, this
project intended to release the cognitive potentials of each of these
domains to set them free from their esoteric forms. The Enlightenment
philosophers wanted to utilise this accumulation of specialised culture
for the enrichment of everyday life, that is to say, for the rational
organization of everyday social life.6
Habermas believes that this project has unrealised potential for increasing social
rationality, justice and morality. Contrary to Habermas—and as we will see
below—many contemporary theorists see the Enlightenment story as having
greatly diminished the apparent significance of humanity itself, its rational and
volitional freedom and the emotional, aesthetic, sensory, imaginative and
intentional qualities that had seemed most constitutive of the human experience
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until that time.7 While the Enlightenment story placed rationality on a pinnacle,
the conception of reason itself was narrowed. The classical notion of reason as
a divine gift involving a normative dimension was displaced and reason was
reduced to instrumentality and deductive logic. Indeed, human decision making
was reduced to a mechanical system. In this scheme, the life of the imagination
and the emotions was discounted along with judgement, experience and wisdom.
A substantial literature has now developed questioning many of the claims of
this Enlightenment tradition, which leading contemporary French philosopher
Jean-François Lyotard (1924–98) calls the mood of modernity, and its associated
grand narratives—the grand, large-scale theories and philosophies of the world,
science, history, progress and freedom. These narratives are the stories our
culture tells itself to legitimise its practices and beliefs, and which purport to
grasp the truth, including the truth about society and—drawing on
Wittgenstein—its language games.8  In his critique, Lyotard tells us: ‘In
contemporary society and culture—postindustrial society, postmodern
culture—the question of the legitimation of knowledge is formulated in different
terms. The grand narrative has lost its credibility, regardless of what mode of
unification it uses, regardless of whether it is a speculative narrative or a narrative
of emancipation.’9
These grand narratives are unable to contain our diversity, our incommensurable
beliefs and us. Hence, for example, Lyotard rejects totalising social theories that
are reductionist, simplistic and even ‘terroristic’.10
Similarly, American sociologist Richard Madsen and his colleagues warn us that:
There is a painful contradiction between what modernity promises and
what it delivers. It promises—indeed demands—intellectual, moral, and
political emancipation. Yet it delivers an iron cage…Morality, religion,
and the whole normative dimension of social life get either pushed away
or explained away…What goes typically unnoticed and unremarked
[on] is how this apparent straightforward approach locks its adherents
into a closed universe of diminished meaning and possibility.11
Of particular concern to this account is the extent to which the attempt by
libertarian philosophers in the Enlightenment tradition to legislate a particular
negative interpretation of individual freedom and their adulation of markets are
threatening to again enslave us all.
Importantly, one of the defining moments of recent consciousness has been the
recognition that the social and religious order is a human construction for which
we ultimately have to take responsibility. This recognition prompted leading
thinkers such as Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900), Michel Foucault (1926–84),
Jacques Derrida (1930–2004) and Pierre Bourdieu (1930–2002) to attempt to
dismantle the values defining modernity itself: reason, freedom and the
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autonomous self. Nietzsche—perhaps the first of the existentialist
philosophers—was highly critical of contemporary German culture, dogmatic
systems in philosophy including those of Plato and Kant, claims to truth and
God as a single, ultimate, judgemental authority. In this spirit of questioning,
he challenged the foundations of Christianity and traditional morality. He saw
these dogmatic systems as inventions and conventions providing repose, security
and consistency.12  Foucault challenges the ability of the human sciences to offer
universal scientific truths about human nature. He sees those claims as often
being mere expressions of ethical and political commitments of a particular
society—the outcome of contingent historical forces rather than scientifically
grounded truths.13  Foucault has, therefore, undermined the claims of the human
sciences to neutrality by showing how the drive towards freedom and autonomy
is an extension and deepening of practices of power.14  Derrida, for his part,
questioned the self-evident, logic and non-judgemental character of the
dichotomies by which we live, such as legitimate/illegitimate, rational/irrational,
fact/fiction or observation/imagination.15  He sees these dichotomies as being
defined culturally and historically and even reliant on one another, rather than
being conceptual absolutes with stable meanings. Similarly, Bourdieu attempts
to show that the things that are sacred to modern elites are social constructions
and he tries to expose the hidden means by which the powerful and wealthy
assert superiority16  and reproduce themselves.
In summary, this questioning has discredited the story that has been told about
knowledge since the Enlightenment. This is not to deny the achievements of the
past few centuries in increasing our understanding of the natural world and in
freeing us from some of the grosser superstitions that worried the medieval mind
and which provided the justification for many unspeakable crimes—particularly
at the hands of the Christian Church. Neither is it intended to diminish the
enormous contribution of liberal and socialist thinkers and activists in the
Enlightenment tradition in advancing the emancipation of ordinary citizens—a
hope Habermas continues to entertain. Nor is it intended to deny the enormous
improvement in average living standards in recent centuries. Nevertheless, and
paradoxically, the Enlightenment, in its advocacy of radical scepticism in the
cause of human emancipation, is seen increasingly as being bankrupt,17  as
having undermined its own story18  and as having created a Kafka–Beckett-like
state of absurdity and existential isolation.19  Having undermined belief in God,
society and tradition, radical scepticism has undermined belief in belief itself,
including belief in reason.
In the process, most contemporary philosophers have rejected the views of
Descartes, the father of modern philosophy, and his quest for an Archimedean
fixed and immovable point on which to ground our knowledge—a grounding
he thought he had found in his existence and his ability to think, certified by
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a non-deceiving God.20 This just wouldn’t do in the absence of a non-deceiving
God and in the face of the realisation that the language of argument presupposed
what he was trying to prove. What is more, that language is a continuing social
construct. Nor will it do to erect reason or nature as God substitutes. The moment
one admits God, again, one also admits revelation as the source of knowledge
superior to reason.
In relatively recent times, the search for absolute knowledge manifested itself
in an extreme form in logical positivism, which viewed science as the ultimate
arbiter of truth in a heroic struggle against ignorance and superstition.21  As
such, it was a utopian attempt to legislate what constituted scientific knowledge.
Such scientific truth, it was claimed, was discoverable only by the enlightened
mind cleansed of metaphysical beliefs. It could then set us free from the shackles
of tradition and its associated institutions and build a new and better world. As
we saw earlier, this optimism reflected a strong faith in progress and the
perfectibility of humankind.
French philosopher Claude Saint-Simon (1760–1825), writing in the Cartesian
tradition, had great faith in science and in industrialisation and advocated the
reorganisation of society on positive scientific lines. Nevertheless, Auguste Comte
(1798–1857), his secretary, is usually seen as the father of positivism. Comte had
a similar faith in the power of science, particularly sociology, to advance human
civilisation. He built his philosophy of positivism as a universal system around
that faith. The logical positivists centred on the Vienna Circle of the 1920s and
1930s, building on Comte’s ideas, sought, in particular, to differentiate science
from other thinking. They claimed that it was only through positivist scientific
thought that a true view of the social and physical world was possible. This is
truly a foundational project in the Enlightenment tradition.22 This story involved
four main beliefs:
• the only things that are real are the things that are observable
• all general names are only summary abbreviations for the numerous objects
in reality
• it is possible to distinguish between facts and values and consequently to
have a social science that is factual and devoid of values
• there is a unity of method between the natural and social sciences.23
These claims exercised a profound influence on philosophy and the philosophy
of science from the 1920s to the 1950s and in the associated idealisation of formal
theory. Most contemporary philosophers have, however, rejected logical
positivism. In the words of leading contemporary Australian philosopher John
Passmore, ‘Logical Positivism…is dead, or as dead as a philosophical movement
ever becomes.’24
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Philosopher of science Karl Popper (1902–94) even claimed to have done the
killing:25
[T]hroughout my life I have combated positivist epistemology, under
the name of ‘positivism’…I have fought against the aping of the natural
sciences by the social sciences, and I have fought for the doctrine that
positivist epistemological is inadequate even in its analysis of the natural
sciences which, in fact, are not ‘careful generalisations from observations’,
as it is usually believed, but are essentially speculative and daring;
moreover, I have taught, for more than thirty-eight years, that all
observations are theory-impregnated, and that their main function is to
check and refute, rather than to prove, our theories. Finally I have not
only stressed the meaningfulness of metaphysical assertions and the fact
that I am myself a metaphysical realist, but I have also analysed the
important historical role played by metaphysics in the formation of
scientific theories.26
Two other leading philosophers, Willard Quine (1908–2000) and Thomas Kuhn
(1922–96), are often also given the credit for killing positivism; and the
foundational idea that philosophy can determine on a priori grounds the
standards for scientific knowledge died with it. Indeed, the positivist ideal of a
universal and substantive ‘logic of science’ was simply misguided.27  Similarly,
positivism’s attempt to divorce science from metaphysical beliefs—beliefs that
attempt to describe the ultimate nature of reality—has failed. We will go into
this is in a little more detail shortly.
This turning away from the Enlightenment and modernity involves a rejection
of the claimed privileged status of science and of rationality, the belief in
universals—absolute truths, universal values and a common human nature—and
in progress and in the perfectibility of humankind. In particular, there can be
no final appeal from an objective viewpoint to an attainable ultimate truth.28
Importantly, respected American cultural historian Richard Tarnas believes a
great epochal transformation comparable with that of the Enlightenment is
occurring in the Western mind in reaction to the dissolution of the foundations
of the modern world-view, which has left us bereft of certainties.29
Contemporary Australian theologian Duncan Reid sums up this dissolution very
well.30  For Reid, this paradigm shift has two interrelated aspects. The first
involves a shift away from Western political, cultural and economic
predominance. The realisation that other cultures—which are also enjoying
rapid improvements in material welfare—have fundamentally different
perspectives on the human condition has led to a questioning of our fundamental
cultural assumptions. This shift is accompanied by a change within the Western
scientific world-view and a sense of disillusionment with the technology it has
given us. In particular, the Newtonian mechanistic world-view has been
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undermined because Newtonian physics has been discredited completely as an
answer to any fundamental question about the nature of the world.31 That view
is not just limited as an explanation of physical reality; it is fundamentally
flawed, however much it might continue to serve as a convenient fiction in
describing the behaviour of relatively large objects—the sorts of objects that
we perceive around us.
At a deeper level, physics has come to understand reality, not in terms of
atomism—discrete particles that can be described independently of all
others—but as a complete network, the most basic elements of which are not
entities or substances, but relationships:
All entities, even inanimate entities, constituted as they were by their
‘experiences’ of being in relationship, could now be understood as
subjects which adapt to their environment. Reality was no longer to be
‘grasped’ solely by analysis and reduction to component parts.
Understanding had to be reinterpreted in a less dominating, more
participatory way, as the perception of parts interacting in the context
of an indivisible totality.32
No longer are the properties of things seen as being fixed absolutely with respect
to some unchanging background, rather they arise from interactions and
relationships.33  As renowned mathematical physicist Roger Penrose (b. 1931)
confirms, the fundamental entities in physics are not events in space and time
but rather processes, and space and time emerge only at a secondary level.34
Thus the idea that ‘science’ can view the world from outside—as a disembodied
observer—has been discredited. Similarly, the reductionist method—in which
phenomena are simplified until they can be described by simple mathematical
equations—is undermined. Even the Platonic view of natural laws as eternal
and absolute has been questioned, along with any simple idea of causality.35
The second aspect of this paradigm shift has been a crisis of meaning in Western
epistemology:
The whole Western philosophical tradition had worked on the assumption
that knowledge…was accessible through language. But now the
word…has been unseated from its place of honour. Language, rather
than an inadequate but in principle perfectible attempt to refer to some
intelligible metaphysical reality beyond itself, has come to be seen as a
self-contained system in which reference is to the system itself.36
The common thread in these two crises is the loss of any sense of objective
certainty in the physical sciences or in political–cultural matters. As a
consequence, we have to deal with a new and profound sense of historical
relativism and the belief that there can be no overarching ‘absolute’ or unifying
principle that can reconcile all the relativities of human thought and experience.
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Additionally, we are shifting from a particular privileged explanatory
paradigm—the Newtonian world-view—to a world in which there is no
privileged perspective and no privileged archetypal story, a world full potentially
of existential uncertainty, even terror.
More optimistically, for American pragmatist Richard Bernstein, these crises are
creating a public space in which basic questions about the human condition can
be raised anew.37  Specifically, Bernstein believes that there is something wrong
with the ways in which questions in relation to rationality have been posed in
the past, and he points to a need for the conversation to move beyond objectivism
and relativism. He believes that what he calls the attacks on the tyranny of
method open the way to a new conversation on rationality and to ‘a more
historically situated, non algorithmic, flexible understanding of human
rationality, one which highlights the tacit dimension of human judgment and
imagination and is sensitive to the unsuspected contingencies and genuine
novelties encountered in particular situations’.38
Similarly, Tarnas tells us that the dissolving of old assumptions and categories
could permit the emergence of entirely new prospects for conceptual and
existential reintegration with richer interpretive vocabularies and more profound
narrative coherencies.39  He warns us, however, that in the absence of any viable,
embracing cultural vision, the old assumptions remain in force, providing an
increasingly unworkable and dangerous blueprint for human thought and
activity.
The Excessive Western Faith in Objectivism
What we have arrived at is not some minor esoteric quibble but a fundamental
attack on the foundation of our fundamental beliefs: the Enlightenment tradition
and its world-view. The belief that we have access to absolute and unconditional
truths about the world, epistēmē , has been a fundamental belief of much Western
philosophy since the ancient Greeks. This belief—this myth, this passion, this
story—could have originated with Pythagoras (569–475 BC) and Parmenides (b.
510 BC). Plato (427–347 BC) and Aristotle (384–22 BC) elaborated this belief in
different ways. It has been shared by the rationalist and empirical traditions
until recently. These traditions differ only in their account of how we arrive at
such truths.40 The rationalists—the followers of Plato—believe that only our
innate capacity to reason can give us knowledge of things as they really are,
whereas for the followers of Aristotle—the empiricists—all knowledge of the
world arises from our sensory perceptions. As we will see shortly, however,
Aristotle did not extend that idea to moral beliefs.
Nevertheless, Western art, literature and philosophy have all shared the idea
that, beyond the empirical, mundane realm lies a greater reality—some version
of Plato’s forms—independent, immovable, permanent and absolute. This
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transcendentalism—a synthesis of Greek and Christian thought—has shaped
the reality in which Westerners live. Even for Aristotle with his strong empirical
bent, human beings could apprehend infallible truth because, he believed—along
with Plato—that we shared in the divine mind. One consequence is that
institutionalised authority structures in the West are always legitimised by
invoking abstract transcendental justifications: God or, more lately, natural law,
reason, method, a generalised will of the people or human rights.41
This transcendentalism lies at the heart of the Enlightenment project and its
search for a certain, ahistorical foundation for knowledge, truth, rationality and
morality. In the Christian tradition, the transcendental absolute—the source of
certainty—was the decree of an anthropomorphised God. Through the
Enlightenment, however, God was gradually secularised,42  to be replaced with
nature, natural laws, reason and method, which continued to occupy a
transcendental level, governing the way things should be and providing us with
access to absolute truth.43  As the following account will make clear, however,
there are no Platonic forms of truth, law, reason and method or, indeed, of the
market, to which we can appeal. Nevertheless, for most contemporary
Westerners, this Enlightenment tradition continues to provide their fundamental
understanding of the world and their vocabulary of legitimation. Similarly, the
right to teach is still defined by the teacher’s special knowledge of a universal
message.44  Since the Enlightenment, however, the guardian of truth and justice
is no longer the priest, but the intellectual claiming special insight into reason
and the world—and a special right to speak for humanity. Plato and his disciples
rather than God certified this new magisterium. Tragically, Plato’s totalitarian
vision has promoted the very intellectual arrogance that his teacher, Socrates
(469–399 BC), sought to deflate at the cost of his life.
In contrast with the West, the Confucian civilisations of South-East Asia do not
conceptualise a meaningful level of human action and causation beyond the
world of experience.45 This is because Chinese cosmology lacked monotheism
and a transcendental level.46 The Chinese even lack a word for God. Instead,
there was a cosmological ordering of the world, represented by the harmonious
hierarchical interrelations of the heavens, earth and mankind—a notion of order
that excluded the Western notion of law. In the Chinese world-view, the
harmonious cooperation of all beings arose from the fact that they were all parts
in a hierarchy of wholes, forming a cosmic pattern. What they obeyed were the
internal dictates of their own natures, not the orders of a superior authority
external to themselves. In the Chinese tradition, there is no God, or God-given
laws, and no transcendental level that leaders can use to justify their claims to
power. Consequently, a different vocabulary of legitimation was developed—a
vocabulary in which justifications for power were based on the requirements
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for natural harmonies in this world. Power over another was justified in terms
of one’s obedience to one’s position in a universal relational order.
One of the leading philosophical critics of modernity, Stephen Toulmin,47  links
the origins of the Enlightenment and its obsession with foundations for objective
knowledge to the rise of the nation-state and to the general state of crisis in
seventeenth-century Europe. He explained that between the fourteenth and the
sixteenth centuries, Europe experienced a rebirth—‘the Renaissance’—in which
the classical learning of the Greeks and Romans was rediscovered, substantially
expanding the horizons of the Western medieval world. In particular, this
learning increased understanding of the wide diversity and contextual
dependence of human life and brought recognition that theoretical inquiries
needed to be balanced against discussions of concrete practical issues.
In this regard, Tarnas reminds us that the Renaissance built on an earlier
scholastic awakening that was stimulated in part by increased contact with
Byzantine and Islamic centres of leaning and the rediscovery of a large body of
Aristotle’s writings. This awakening was aided by technological innovations,
which had increased productivity and had highlighted the value of human
intelligence in mastering the forces of nature and acquiring useful knowledge.
These scholastics prepared the way in the late medieval universities for the
Enlightenment and the scientific revolution. Aquinas, in particular, drawing on
Aristotle, denied the capacity of the human intellect to know directly Plato’s
forms—believing instead that we needed sensory experience to acquire an
imperfect but meaningful understanding of things in terms of such eternal
archetypes. In turn, Franciscan philosopher William of Ockham (1288–1348)
contributed to the further breakdown of the medieval view by denying the
reality of such Platonic universals outside the human mind and human language
and claiming that speculative reason and metaphysics lacked any real
foundations.48
These trends tended to undermine the claims of Christian revelation, as they
had been understood, and, importantly, the Church’s spiritual authority. These
trends were helped further by the expansion of the universities, the invention
of printing and an associated enormous increase in literacy and learning, eroding
the monopoly on learning that had long been held by the clergy. Importantly,
it also eroded the claimed authority of the Christian Church to interpret scripture.
About the same time, Nicholas Copernicus (1473–1543) undermined the Ptolemaic
image of the physical universe with his heliocentric theory. Galileo Galilei
(1564–1642), Johannes Kepler (1571–1630) and Newton built on this work to
create the new cosmology—the Newtonian cosmology that is at the centre of
the modern world-view.
One result of the rediscovery of classical learning and the associated intellectual
ferment was that religious Renaissance humanists such as Michel de Montaigne
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(1533–92) and Desiderius Erasmus (c. 1469–1536) came to believe that we could
claim certainty about nothing and that philosophical speculation reached beyond
the scope of experience in ways that could not be defended.49 This acute
awareness of the limits of our practical and intellectual powers—in particular
of our ability to reach unquestioned ‘truth’ or unqualified
‘certainty’—discouraged dogmatism. Accordingly, Montaigne warns us that ‘it
is to place a very high value on your surmises to roast a man alive for them’.50
Consequently, these philosophers showed a new, open-minded, sceptical tolerance
along with practical doubt about the value of theory in such fields as theology,
natural philosophy, metaphysics and ethics. Toulmin tells us that this uncertainty
reflected the attitude of Aristotle for whom the good had no universal form, and
for whom moral, sound judgement always respected the detailed circumstances
of specific kinds of cases.51  For Aristotle, ethics was not a field for theoretical
analysis but for practical wisdom: phronēsis . This humility was part of the price
of our being human and not gods. As a result, throughout the Middle Ages and
the Renaissance, it had been understood that problems in social ethics were not
to be resolved by appeal to any single and universal tradition. Rather, multiple
considerations and coexisting traditions need to be weighed against one another
using all the available resources of moral thought and social tradition.
In contrast, the dream of the Enlightenment—of seventeenth-century philosophy
and science—was Plato’s demand for epistēmē , or theoretical grasp. This Platonic
dream remains at the heart of our contemporary over-valuation of theoretical
speculative stories in public policy formation. The Renaissance brought with it
an increased understanding of the Platonic tradition and a neo-Platonic revival
not unlike the earlier rediscovery of Aristotle. In particular, it brought with it
a renewed interest in the Pythagorean vision of a universe ordered in accordance
with transcendent mathematical forms.52  Galileo believed that God—‘the great
Geometer’—had written the book of nature in mathematical symbols.
Descartes—a considerable mathematician as well as a scientist and
philosopher—similarly conceived of the universe as an atomistic system governed
by a few mechanistic rules. He set himself the task of discovering an irrefutable
basis for certain knowledge. This he sought to do by scrapping inherited concepts
and starting again, using rationally validated methods having the necessity of
geometrical proofs. In this Cartesian program, logical analysis was separated
from—and elevated far above—the study of rhetoric, discourse and
argumentation: ‘In Descartes’ vision, science, progress, reason, epistemological
certainty, and human identity were all inextricably connected with each other
and with the conception of an objective, mechanistic universe; and upon this
synthesis was founded the paradigmatic character of the modern mind.’53
Importantly, as Toulmin explains, such certainty was attractive given the general
state of spiritual, intellectual and political crisis in seventeenth-century Europe,
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in reaction to such events as the assassination of the tolerant King Henri IV of
France in 1610 and the Thirty-Years War (1618–48) between most of the major
European continental powers.54  Loy emphasises the viciousness of this war and
of the underlying religious conflict over what was seen as humankind’s eternal
destiny.55 The increased emphasis on biblical teaching and the ensuing conflict
over interpretation undermined biblical authority as a source of political ideas
and promoted a resort to reason as an alternative source of authority. Similarly,
Tarnas draws our attention to the chaos in the cultural and intellectual life of
Europe resulting from the violent disputes between ever-multiplying religious
sects over whose conception of absolute truth would prevail. These events
undermined tolerance as a way of defusing denominational rivalry, led to an
active distrust of unbelievers and to a belief in belief itself. In this climate, it
became urgent to discover some rational method of demonstrating the truth of
philosophical, scientific or theological doctrines, particularly the theological
doctrines.
Interestingly, Loy, drawing on Arnold Toynbee (1889–1975), links the concurrent
growth of nationalism—which he sees as the worship of the deified
community—with this sense of crisis. He believes nationalism provides one
unconscious secular alternative religion after the breakdown in the authority
of the Christian Church and the ensuing growth in the sense of insecurity.56
Furthermore, he believes that the modern nation-state continues to derive its
power over us from our need to identify with and ground ourselves in something
greater than ourselves.
In the event, as Toulmin tells us, Galileo in physics, Descartes in epistemology
and science and Hobbes in political theory committed Western society to new
and ‘scientific’ ways and to the use of more ‘rational’ ways of dealing with the
problems of life and society. They assumed that there were uniquely rational
procedures for handling the intellectual and practical problems of any field of
study—procedures that involved setting aside superstition, mythology, authority
and tradition, and attacking problems free of local prejudice and transient fashion,
on the authority of reason itself. In this hope to bring all subjects into formal
theory, the Enlightenment philosophers also altered the language of reason itself
in subtle ways. In particular, they became committed increasingly to abstract
universal, timeless theories, setting aside serious interest in the different kinds
of practical knowledge: the oral, the particular, the local and the timely (and, I
would add, the personal).
In particular, moral philosophy followed the theoretical road of natural
philosophy, relegating practical ethics to second place. It set about clarifying
and distinguishing the concepts of ethics and formulating the universal, timeless
axioms that it assumed must lie at the base of any rational system of ethics. As
a result, dogma acquired an imperative sense, with moral questions having
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unique, simple and authoritative answers. Similarly, academic jurisprudence
developed formal and theoretical goals. In political theory too, a new style
emerged, of which Hobbes’ theory was paradigmatic. This flight from the
particular, concrete, transitory and practical aspects of human experience became
a feature of cultural life in general. From this perspective, the essence of humanity
was seen as the capacity for rational thought and action while the emotions were
seen as frustrating or distorting reason. This distrust of emotions is still current
and reinforces the Cartesian, or calculative, idea of ‘rationality’.
Interestingly, Descartes himself acknowledged our fallibility and thus a need
for some other agency to certify the truth of human reasoning. There has to be
some fixed foundation for our knowledge or we cannot escape intellectual and
moral chaos—and this fear continues to worry some philosophers. Descartes
found his escape in his belief in a beneficent, infinite and infallible God, who
was no deceiver and who underpinned our reason and the procedural certainty
of mathematical reasoning.57  In this, he was following Plato and Aristotle. It is
therefore ironic that his vision—combined with the empirical vision of Francis
Bacon—became the basis of the West’s new faith: a faith in science, scientific
rationalism and human progress—the last being a secularisation of the Christian
hope in the coming of the Kingdom of God.
Rorty provides a complementary account pointing to 300 years of Enlightenment
rhetoric about the importance of distinguishing sharply between science and
religion, science and politics, science and art and science and philosophy.
According to Rorty, the paradigm of human activity has been that of
‘knowing’—possessing justified true belief, or beliefs so intrinsically persuasive
as to make justification unnecessary.58  It follows from the Greek belief that
what differentiates humans from other animals is our ability to know universal
truths, numbers, essences and the eternal—in short, to acquire epistēmē .
Similarly, Rorty explains that Western philosophy has attempted to underwrite
or debunk knowledge claims on the basis of its special understanding of the
nature of knowledge and of the mind.59  Consequently, the central concern of
Western philosophy has been to construct a general theory of representation in
which the mind is seen to represent faithfully an independent external reality.
The Enlightenment contributed the very idea of an autonomous philosophical
discipline, separate from and sitting in judgement on religion and science. Rorty,
however, rejects this attempt to set philosophy as the foundational discipline of
culture and the judge and jury of other disciplines. He claims that the attempt
since the Greeks to explain ‘rationality’ and ‘objectivity’ in terms of the
conditions of representation is a self-deceptive effort to eternalise the normal
discourse of the day. He further denied the existence of an ‘Archimedean point’
in human understanding that would provide a foundation to all knowledge, and
which would provide the source of certainty that the Enlightenment desired.
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In particular, he denies the concept of knowledge as mental representation or
that we can find within the ‘mirror of the mind’ a special privileged class of
representations so compelling that their accuracy cannot be doubted. This
metaphor of the human being whose mind is an unclouded mirror, and who
knows, is the image of God. It follows that the human aspiration for objective
truth is an attempt to become god-like in the absence of a belief in God. For
Rorty, the whole project of establishing a theory of knowledge for the purpose
of passing judgement on particular knowledge claims is misconceived. He simply
denies that philosophy can adjudicate such claims.60
In the same spirit, American philosopher of science Alexander Rosenberg tells
us that a purely epistemological exploration of alternative theories of knowledge
will not come to any philosophical consensus—nor will it advance science.
Rosenberg argues that far from having priority, such philosophy depends on
science rather than the other way around. Importantly, he argues that philosophy
is nothing more or less than extremely general and abstract theory, on a cognitive
par with the natural and social sciences with no demarcation principle between
them.61  Any distinction between the two relies on the discredited positivist
distinction between analytical statements—true in virtue of the meanings of
their terms—and synthetic statements that have empirical content. As we will
see in greater detail in Chapter 7, this distinction cannot be sustained and, as a
consequence, we cannot draw lines between philosophy and science.
As we saw with Descartes, underlying these Enlightenment aspirations is an
assumption that geometry, mathematics and logic provide the paradigm of
rationality and that that ‘provides a comprehensive standard of incorrigible
certainty against which all other claims to knowledge must be judged’.62  It
assumes that there are definite rule-governed, algorithmic procedures—timeless
universal principles—for arriving at that solution from information that is taken
as given.63 These rules were seen as freeing us from arbitrariness, as providing
the certainty and the reliability sought by the Enlightenment. This algorithmic
view, however, reduces human rationality and judgement to a crude mechanical
system. As such, it reflects the Enlightenment’s mechanical cosmology and its
attempt to locate explanation in that mythological archetype, that master
narrative. This mechanistic objectivism seeks to relieve us of responsibility for
our beliefs.64  In this tradition—influenced by Hume—inductive arguments
were thought suspect because they could not provide such certainty.
Consequently, solutions based on experience do not have the ‘necessity’ that is
thought to characterise reasoned results.
It is these beliefs that are used to justify the distinction made frequently between
the context of discovery and the context of justification. In this view, the way
in which some truth is discovered is to be distinguished from the justification
of that truth and it is the latter that is important, not the process by which we
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come to believe. These beliefs also provide the basis of the contrasts made
between reason and faith and reason and authority. This view, however, opens
up two questions central to this faith in reason: firstly, on what basis are we to
select the rules of argumentation and of reason? And secondly, on what basis
are we to select the assumptions from which to begin? These questions indicate
a need for foundational rules and foundational propositions. In respect of the
latter, we can ask the further question, how am I to know that I have a correct
understanding of any of the concepts involved in my assumptions—including
the concepts involved in my foundational rules—or that there is such a correct
understanding? Indeed, it is unlikely that such a ‘correct’ understanding is
possible, because such correctness assumes that concepts are fully determined,
ideal and timeless entities—Plato’s forms again. As we have already seen,
however, concepts are only the tools we create to classify things and events as
we interact with the world. Consequently, it is extremely unlikely that they
involve complete sets of necessary and sufficient conditions. It is extremely
unlikely that our language can reflect adequately such exacting standards or
that the resulting concepts can be applied consistently.
In this regard, American academic psychologist Kenneth Gergen—following
Wittgenstein and Quine—tells us that the meaning of words and sentences
derives from the context in which they are used and that these contexts are so
many and varied that there is no means of securing word-object identities.65
Additionally, the ways in which we categorise the natural and social worlds are
to some extent tradition bound, because the acquisition of concepts is tied to
the learning and use of language and reflects the ways of life and understandings
current in society.66  Furthermore, German social philosopher and critical theorist
Theodor Adorno (1903–69) warns us against the domination exercised by
concepts, their rigidity and their poverty—their inability to ever capture the
richness of reality.67  Consequently, our concepts are always an imperfect work
in progress. We also have to ask from what source are these variable concepts
to derive their intellectual authority other than from tradition itself—something
the Enlightenment has rejected?
These questions are not finally resolvable because they threaten either an infinite
regress of justifications, vicious cycles or recourse to dogma.68 The conventional
solution to them invokes so-called ‘self-evident’ or ‘self-justifying’ propositions,
intuitions, inductions or perceptions. Such propositions or observational reports
cannot, however, provide an indisputable, self-evident foundation for knowledge
because they already presuppose a learned vocabulary and grammar. As we
have already seen, these are themselves social constructs belonging to a particular
linguistic group. To repeat the point made in Chapter 2, there is no world that
we can ‘know’, experience or argue about independently of our language.
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Importantly, Chomsky’s solution to this problem—the claim that we are all born
knowing a universal grammar—simply does not stack up against the evidence.
It is inconsistent with what we know of the under-organised, flexible nature of
the brains of the new-born, as well as the role of spoken language in shaping
children’s capacity to think—to which we drew attention in Chapter 3. Rather
than being born with an innate grammar specified by a genetic blueprint, we
have a capacity to induce the conventions of language use from exposure to that
language.69 This capacity derives from the manner in which the neural networks
in our brains function, develop and structure experience. I would go further,
believing that this innate capacity to induce patterns from exposure to relatively
small numbers of examples is an important part of human intelligence, even if
it fails to provide the formal certainty sought by rationalists. Even if Chomsky’s
claim of an innate grammar were true, it would still not tell us that arguments
from true premises that used that grammar were true in the sense in which the
rationalists used the word true. We are forced, therefore, to agree with eminent
Catholic theologian Hans Kung when he concluded:
People often do not realise that in all their thinking and doing they for
all practical purpose constantly presuppose the rationality of reason and
so rely upon the ambivalent reality of the world and humanity. That
means, in all our doubting and thinking, in our intuitions and deductions
there is a priori, a prior act of trust, that is in charge.70
These problems are compounded by the insight that metaphors are pervasive
in everyday language, thought and action.71 They are not purely a linguistic
construction but are essential to the development of thought. This is because
the ordinary unconscious conceptual systems embodied in our language, culture
and religion—by which we live on a day-to-day basis—are fundamentally
metaphorical in nature. Let me say that again for emphasis: the way in which
we think and structure experience involves an imaginative understanding of
thing in terms of others—metaphors that tend to form coherent systems. Only
purely physical reality is describable in non-metaphorical language, while many
of our important concepts are either abstract or not clearly delineated in
experience. The greater the abstraction, the more layers of metaphor required.
For example, the concept of ‘argument’ and the language used about it is partially
structured, understood, performed and talked about in terms of the concept of
‘war’. This metaphorical structuring includes our language about language and
our language about reasoning. In particular, we typically conceptualise the
non-physical in terms of the physical. It follows, as Lakoff and Johnson confirm,
that it is simply not true that ‘what is real is wholly external to, and independent
of, how human beings conceptualise the world’.72
Importantly, the systematic character of such metaphors necessarily conceals
other aspects of the concept or experience because there can never be an exact
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fit between the metaphor and the reality it seeks to describe. In particular, they
can prevent us from focusing on aspects inconsistent with the metaphor.
Furthermore, this metaphorical structuring is partial. It can be extended in some
ways but not in others. Consequently, this structuring can provide only a partial
understanding of experience. These metaphors can vary from culture to culture
and need not fit together—being based on different kinds of experience. For
example, not all cultures give the priority that we do to an up–down orientation;
some cultures give a much more important role to balance or centrality.
Our experience of physical objects and substances provides an additional basis
for understanding that goes beyond orientation. Understanding our experience
in terms of objects and substances allows us to pick out parts and to treat them
as discrete entities or substances of a uniform kind. This enables us to refer to
them, categorise them and quantify them, and consequently to tell stories and
to reason about them. In particular, our experience with physical objects provides
a basis for a very wide variety of ontological metaphors. Such ontological
metaphors are so natural and pervasive in our language and thoughts that they
are usually taken as self-evident direct descriptions. Ontological metaphors in
which a physical object is specified as being a person allow us to understand a
wide variety of experiences in terms of human motivations, characteristics and
activities. Because concepts are structured metaphorically in a systematic way,
it is possible to use expressions from one domain to talk about corresponding
concepts in the metaphorically defined domain. For example, the idea of
knowledge having a ‘foundation’ (used above) has been taken from the metaphor
of theories as buildings. Lakoff and Johnson argue that the idea that basic
concepts are primitives that cannot be decomposed is mistaken. Rather, we
experience some things as a complex of properties occurring together, as an
experiential gestalt—that is, the experience of them occurring together is more
basic than their separate occurrence. The consequence is that these complexes
of experiences cannot reasonably be reduced to a more basic set of properties.
We therefore classify particular experiences in terms of the experiential gestalts
in our conceptual system. Metaphorical entailments also play an essential role,
linking the metaphorical structuring of a concept. Additionally, there are often
many overlapping metaphors that partially structure a concept. Consequently,
our understanding takes place in terms of entire domains of experience and not
in terms of isolated concepts.
This has an important implication for the understanding of definitions. The
standard, objective view assumes that experiences and objects have inherent
properties and that we understand and define them in terms of these properties.
An objective view involves saying what those inherent properties are, by giving
necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of a concept. It follows
from Lakoff and Johnson’s account that we understand concepts only in part
in terms of such inherent properties. For the most part, we understand concepts
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primarily in terms of concepts from other natural kinds of experience, in terms
of what Lakoff and Johnson call their interactional properties, having to do with
such things as perception, motor activity, purpose and function. Our concepts
of objects—like our concepts of events and activities—are characterisable as
multi-dimensional structured gestalts, whose dimensions emerge from our
experience of the world. It appears that we categorise things in terms of
prototypes and that members are admitted to a category because they have a
sufficient family resemblance to the prototype. Consequently, Lakoff and Johnson
argue along with Wittgenstein that there need be no fixed core of properties of
prototypes that are shared by members of the category. Interactive properties
are important in determining what counts as a sufficient family resemblance.
Categories can be extended in various ways for various purposes and are open
ended. Further, we conceptualise sentences metaphorically in spatial terms.
These spatial metaphors automatically structure relationships between form and
content. The regularities of linguistic form cannot be explained in formal terms
alone. The consequence is that syntax is not independent of meaning. Rather,
the logic of a language is based on the coherence between the spatialised form
of the language and the metaphorical aspects of the conceptual system. It also
follows that many of the similarities that we see are a result of the conventional
metaphors that are part of our conceptual system, rather than being inherent in
the entities themselves.
The fact that our normal conceptual system is structured metaphorically has an
important consequence for us. There is no such thing as a direct physical
experience—something emphasised in Chapter 2. Every experience takes place
within a vast background of cultural presuppositions. Cultural assumptions,
values and attitudes are not a conceptual overlay that we can choose to place or
not place on an experience; rather, all experience is cultural through and through.
Consequently, there is no such thing as objective truth. Rather, truth is always
relative to a conceptual system that is defined in part by metaphor. Importantly,
such truth is always partial. We have no access to the whole truth or to any
definitive account of reality. Importantly, metaphors play a central role in the
construction of social and political realities. Additionally, we have the capacity
to create new metaphors, giving us the capacity to give new understandings of
experience, to create a new reality and to create a new truth. All of this has a
profound implication for our understanding, in particular, of the social
disciplines. In these disciplines, we cannot talk truthfully about objective reality,
but only about our particular understanding of it, which is itself a social artefact.
As we saw in Chapter 2, the people in power are often in a position to impose
their metaphors on the rest of us and consequently their understandings of the
social and natural worlds. Because most people in our society have been sold
the idea of objective truth, those who do so define what is then believed to be
absolutely true. The upshot of all of this is that there is no ground for supposing
142
The Cult of the Market
that that there exists a body of self-evident propositions that would allow us to
justify substantive beliefs.
Nor can we simply assume that we have discovered the appropriate rules of
argumentation. In this regard, American philosopher Harold Brown tells us that
‘there are trade-offs between accepting certain rules of inference and achieving
other cognitive goals, and once this is recognised, we can no longer accept the
claim that familiar inferences require no justification’.73  It is such problems as
these that led Popper, a contemporary champion of rationalism, to depart from
traditional epistemology and to accept that it is not possible to establish a priori
foundations for knowledge and to accept that there can be no certain knowledge.
It is quite clear from the above that the entire structure of rational analysis rests
on a non-rational basis. At the heart of the rationalist claim to provide a
foundation for knowledge are acts of faith in the rationality of reason itself and
its rules—the ‘reasonableness’ of the assumptions underlying any particular
argument and of the language in which it is expressed. More than this, for
Hungarian –British polymath Michael Polanyi (1891–1976), the decisive issue
for the theory of knowledge is that ‘into every act of knowing there enters a
tacit and passionate contribution of the person knowing what is being known,
and that this coefficient is no mere imperfection, but a necessary component of
all knowledge’.74  He also confirms that our believing is conditioned at its source
by our belonging to a society and its cultural machinery and is therefore
influenced by the forces holding on to social privilege.
In any event, these particular forms of reasoning have themselves come under
sustained attack. With the realisation that alternative, useful geometries were
possible, mathematicians and geometers recognised that geometries were formal
logical systems, based on arbitrary assumptions with no necessary connection
to reality. In particular, the existence of alternative geometries undermined the
view that Euclidean geometry was a body of a priori necessary propositions.75
There is no a priori method by which we can decide which geometry to apply.
It is also possible to conceive of different logics and different arithmetic. There
are even doubts about the consistency of conventional arithmetic. To make
matters worse for the logicians, Gödel demonstrated that it was theoretically
impossible to produce any final solution to the problem of the foundations of
mathematical logic. As English–Australian theoretical physicist Paul Davies
reports:
[T]he grand and elaborate edifice of mathematics was built on sand.
Mathematical systems rich enough to contain arithmetic are shot through
with logical contradictions…[H]owever elaborate mathematics becomes,
there will always exist some statements…that can never be proved true
or false. They are fundamentally undecidable. Hence mathematics will
always be incomplete and in a sense uncertain.76
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Similarly, leading American mathematician Morris Kline confirms this loss of
certainty: ‘[T]he present state of mathematics is anomalous and deplorable. The
light of truth no longer illuminates the road to follow…The loss of truth [is]…a
tragedy of the first magnitude [in which] the concept of a universally accepted,
infallible body of reasoning…is a grand illusion…The age of Reason is gone.’77
Furthermore, it was not possible for such an axiomatic system to be
self-contained.78  Consequently, Penrose tells us that mathematical understanding
is not something that can be formulated in terms of rules. Consistent with the
claims made here, Penrose goes on to say that there is something in our
understanding that is not computational.79
One consequence of the indeterminacy of mathematics is that all physical theories
are also uncertain because they are cast in the language of mathematics. The
same applies to all social theories cast in the same language. Not only does this
mean that there are limits to rational inquiry, it precludes us from ever
developing a complete theory of everything in the grand manner sought by
some physicists—an impossibility acknowledged recently by leading
contemporary theoretical physicist Stephen Hawking.80  Mathematics is simply
a tool created by the human mind and it has no necessary connection to any
metaphysical or theological absolutes.81  Consequently, for American logician
Clarence Lewis (1883–1964),
There are no ‘laws of logic’ which can be attributed to the universe or
to human reason in the traditional fashion…Rather all logical systems
and ‘laws’ were human conventions honoured only for their
utility…Logical truth could not possibly serve as an ultimate criterion
since the nature and form of that truth necessarily depended upon the
prior choice of a particular logical system.82
This critique undercuts all pretensions to a priori and absolute knowledge.83
For Edward Purcell, summarising American pragmatists John Dewey (1859–1952),
William James (1842–1910) and Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914), truth ‘was
not to be found in the abstract logic of ideas, but in their practical consequences.
There were no absolute or a priori truths, only workable and unworkable
hypotheses.’84
Indeed, Toulmin believes that an exclusive preoccupation with what he calls
logical systematicity in science and philosophy has been destructive of historical
understanding and rational criticism.85  He believes further that people
demonstrate their rationality not by ordering their concepts and beliefs into tidy
formal structures but by a willingness to respond to novel situations,
acknowledging the shortcomings of their former procedures and moving beyond
them. Consequently, he attacks the logicians’ claim to exceptional insight into
the nature of argument and their erection of a special class of argument—the
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class of unequivocal, analytical, formally valid argument with a universal
statement as a major premise—as the paradigmatic case of sound argument and
rationality. He sees this idealisation as an extreme view, a vast over-simplification
that is unrepresentative and misleading:
The over-simplified categories of formal logic have an attraction, not
only on account of their simplicity, but also because they fit in nicely
with some other influential prejudices. From the time of Aristotle logicians
have found the mathematical model enticing, and a logic which modelled
itself on jurisprudence rather than geometry could not hope to maintain
the mathematical elegance of their ideal. Unfortunately, an idealised
logic, such as the mathematical model leads us to, cannot keep in serious
contact with its practical application. Rational demonstration is not a
suitable subject for a timeless, axiomatic science; and if that is what we
try to make of logic, we are in danger of ending up with a theory whose
connection with argument-criticism is as slight as that between medieval
theory of rational fractions and the ‘music’ from which it took its name.86
Acceptance of these idealisations in practice would radically constrain our
reasoning abilities, because they make impossible demands on our intelligence.
They also stop us from asking when rational inquiry is useful.87  Further, they
inhibit us from examining the techniques of argument that we use in practice,
and which techniques are best for which purpose. It is also clear that it is not
possible to reduce all decisions to the application of algorithms. The development
of cognitive skills is closely analogous to the development of physical
skills—involving skilful performance.88  In particular, the human capacity for
judgement, for selecting the information most relevant to the situation or question
at hand and for balancing competing priorities or perspectives is not a mechanical
skill and is not reducible to rule-following. As Brown says, ‘The classical model
of rationality takes rule-following to be a fundamental cognitive ability and
attempts to capture skills in sets of rules, but this has things backwards since
the ability to act in accordance with a set of rules is itself a skill.’
The exaggerated claims for deductive reasoning disguise the moral or political
choices that are inevitable between possible inferences in long chains of
reasoning. Likewise, deductive reasoning—by using contradictory
assumptions—can produce radically different ethical systems and geometrical
forms of argumentation give us no means of choosing between those assumptions.
For Rorty also, it is a mistake to believe that there are ahistorical standards of
rationality by which we can discover who is rational and who is not. This is not
to abandon all standards, but simply to recognise our fallibility and finitude.
Consequently, justified true belief can be no more than conformity to the norms
of the day. Words take their meanings from other words—not their representative
character—and vocabularies acquire their privilege from the people who use
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them not because they are transparent to the real. As a result, we must give up
our desire for a uniform and normalised sense of truth while maintaining a sense
of the transience of ideas along with the realisation that the latest vocabulary
could just be one of the potentially limitless vocabularies in which the world
can be described. Every culture is entitled to judge matters of rationality by its
own lights. Similarly, MacIntyre requires us to look behind questions of abstract
rationality and ask whose conception of rationality is being used in any
situation.89
It follows from the above that there can be no all-encompassing discipline that
legitimises the others.90  Rather, justification is a social phenomenon—a
conversation—and not a transaction between a knowing subject and reality.
Consequently, words such as ‘rational’, ‘objective’ and ‘cognitive’ are simply
marks of distinction applied to matters about which there is agreement. This
conversational justification is naturally holistic, in contrast with the reductive
and atomistic habits of the epistemological tradition. It is also associated with
the dissolution of the philosophical dualisms that have characterised theoretical
debate since the Enlightenment. This attempt to devise mutually exclusive
categories seems less and less convincing.91
This conversational view of truth and knowledge does not devalue human
knowledge. Rather, it sees us as finite, historical, dialogical beings, always in
conversation and always in search of understanding and who must accept
responsibility for our decisions. Importantly, it is a view that employs a more
realistic concept of truth—that is, that which can be justified to a community
of interpreters open to tradition, according to the standards and practices that
have been developed in the course of history. It recognises that nothing can
count as justification except by reference to what is already accepted—and that
there is no way to get outside our language and beliefs to find better tests. These
‘prejudices’ should not be seen as a contamination of what would otherwise be
a pure and objective view, because there is no such thing.92 This view therefore
attacks what the decisive figure in twentieth-century hermeneutics, Hans-Georg
Gadamer (1900–2002), called ‘the peculiar falsehood of modern consciousness
the idolatry of scientific method and the anonymous authority of the sciences’.93
This metaphor of culture as a conversation, rather than a structure erected on
foundations, is central to the hermeneutical tradition. This European
philosophical tradition—which is concerned with human understanding and
the interpretation of texts—throws further light on the questions raised above
and occupies a central role in contemporary philosophical discourse. This
tradition arose from biblical and literacy criticism, which sought understanding
of a text in the context of its production. It was then extended into the study
of history and the nature of historical knowledge. Subsequently, it has developed
into the understanding of understanding itself, in which understanding is
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conceived of as universal and underlying all activities: ‘Understanding must be
conceived as a part of the process of the coming into being of meaning, in which
the significance of all statements…is formed and made complete.’94
Meaning and understanding are essentially and intrinsically linguistic and not
psychological processes.95  Like Rorty’s approach, this approach does not provide
another kind of epistemological theory, but discards epistemological and
foundational concerns altogether.96  Its key insight is that the interpretation of
a text involves a dialogue between the author and the text and the text and the
reader. Consequently, there is no definitive interpretation of a text. Rather, the
meaning of a text changes over time according to how it is read and received.
Similarly, the meanings of the concepts with which we try to make sense of the
world are subject to continuous negotiation.97  Consequently, the determination
of specific meanings is a matter for practical judgement and not a priori theory
and scientific proof. Indeed, understanding involves a circular, iterative, dialectic
process—a hermeneutical circle.
Bergstein describes hermeneutics as a defensive reaction against the universalistic
and reductive claims made in the name of science—that it is science alone that
is the measure of reality, knowledge and truth. It abandons the belief that all
contributions to a discourse are commensurable—that is, can be brought under
a set of rules that tell us how to reach ‘rational’ agreement. This is a reason that
is conceived of as being a technical instrument, the means to manipulation and
control. Further, it emphasises the historicity of all understanding and
interpretation, and criticises the basic dichotomy between the subjective and
the objective. In consequence, it attacks the Cartesian belief that it is possible
to free human reason completely of bias, prejudice and tradition. Rather, reason
gains its power within a living tradition. Consequently, in Truth and Method,98
Gadamer rejects the dichotomies between reason and tradition, reason and
prejudice and reason and authority that have been entrenched since the
Enlightenment. This is the essence of reason rooted in human finitude, rather
than a deficiency.99
For Gadamer, these limits can be transcended through exposure to other
discourses and cultural traditions. He places language at the centre of
understanding, stressing its role in opening the interpreter to other subjectivities.
Importantly, for Gadamer, understanding does not involve reconstructing a
speaker’s intention, but instead mediates between the interpreter’s immediate
and emerging horizons. Understanding is bound and embedded in history,
employing the interpreter’s personal experience and cultural traditions to
assimilate new experiences. As John Mallery et al. tell us: ‘This purely subjective
and continual unfolding interacts with and is conditioned by experience,
particularly the experience of language, which tends to mould the developing
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subject in conformity with the traditions encoded in linguistic utterances and
in the language itself.’100
Nevertheless, an interpreter’s imagination can carry the understanding of a text
beyond her or his initial understanding. Even so, interpretations are constrained
by the questions posed. Similarly for Habermas, truth and meaning do not await
discovery, but are negotiated by actors through social discourse.101
Within this approach to knowledge, Rorty suggests a distinction between normal
discourse and abnormal discourse, generalising Kuhn’s normal and revolutionary
science, which we will discuss shortly. Normal discourse is that which is
conducted within agreed conventions, while abnormal discourse involves
ignorance of—or the setting aside of—these conventions. No discipline can
explain such abnormal discourse.
It is important to note that this view—that we can have no certain knowledge—is
now conventional wisdom. Its acceptance entails a rejection of intellectual
arrogance and dogmatism, particularly the lack of intellectual humility that
seems to have infested the entire Western intellectual tradition, particularly
since the Enlightenment. As with the Reformation, the lack of a convincing
theoretical base—and the radical disagreement it engenders—undermines the
magisterium of the theorist. Indeed, we need to take seriously the possibility
that the total social environment is too complex, and the human mind too limited,
for us to understand102  —a view with echoes in Hayek,103  Niebuhr104
(1882–1971) and, more recently, Brian Arthur.105
The next chapter will explore the implications of this critique for the status of
science and the social disciplines.
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Chapter 6: The Privileged Status of
‘Science’
Plato is dear to me, but dearer still is truth.
— Aristotle1
If we see knowing not as having an essence, to be described by scientists
or philosophers, but rather as a right, by current standards, to believe,
then we are well on the way to seeing conversation as the ultimate context
within which knowledge is to be understood.
— Michael Oakeshott2
Introduction: Science and Rationality
In the previous chapter, I critiqued the Enlightenment and the more extreme
claims made for human reason in that tradition. In particular, I rejected the
proposition that it was possible for human beings to possess certain objective
knowledge. This chapter explores the implications of those insights, looking in
particular at the status of those activities going together under the rubric of
‘science’ and of the knowledge they produce. The chapter is not intended to
decry the enormous achievements of scientists in the past several centuries in
throwing light on the natural world and the contribution that those achievements
has made to our standard of living. Clearly, the institutionalised search for new
scientific knowledge is a very important part of contemporary civilisation. What
is intended in this chapter is a critique of the story told about the nature of that
search in the past century and a half.
Rorty reminds us that in our culture the ideas of ‘science’, ‘rationality’,
‘objectivity’ and ‘truth’ are bound up with each other, where ‘truth’ is conceived
of as correspondence with reality.3  It has been usual to claim that ‘science’ is
the very paradigm of rationality. The meaning of this claim is, however, uncertain
as it is now quite clear that there is no logic of science as such—no certain single
mechanical rubric for choosing and evaluating scientific hypotheses. Indeed,
American philosopher of science Harold Kincaid tells us that the attempts to
identify the defining features of science have a long and disappointing history.4
The claim is a throw-back to the discredited positivism discussed in the previous
chapter and to the hypothetical-deductive view of science associated with it.
Such claims are part of the rhetoric surrounding the Enlightenment’s search for
absolute knowledge—a knowledge that enjoys a privileged status over
commonsense perceptions and understandings.5 The critique outlined in Chapter
5, however, undermines the epistemological claims on which Western science
has been based since the Enlightenment. Furthermore, as physical chemist and
philosopher of science Michael Polanyi tells us, the rules of rational inquiry can
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be of little practical importance to the scientist: ‘[D]iscovery, far from representing
a definite mental operation, is an extremely delicate and personal art which can
be but little assisted by any formulated precepts.’6
In the same spirit, philosopher of science Ernest Nagel (1901–85) described
science as an institutionalised art of inquiry and, as we will see shortly, that is
a far better description.7  It should also be clear from Chapter 5 that the particular
Enlightenment view of rationality—which sees science as the
paradigm—misrepresents the nature of human intelligence itself. Therefore,
British philosopher of social sciences Peter Winch (1926–97) writes:
Now it is of course true that the role played by such [scientific] work in
the culture of [W]estern industrialised societies is an enormously
important one and…[it had] a very far-reaching influence on what we
are and what we are not prepared to call instances of ‘rational thought’.
But it was an essential part of my argument…to urge that our own
conception of what it is to be rational is certainly not exhausted by the
practices of science.8
Rorty challenges this identification of ‘rational’ with a special method; rather,
he suggests it names a moral virtue: the virtue of being reasonable, encompassing
tolerance, respect for the opinions of others, a willingness to listen, reliance on
persuasion rather than force and eschewing dogmatism, defensiveness and
righteous indignation.
Furthermore, it might be more appropriate to consider scientific investigations
as being a response to our limited cognitive abilities—an attempt to create closed
systems of belief to enable us to get by in the world—rather than an expression
of a God-like capacity for generating understanding through ‘rationality’. As
social psychologist Paul Secord tells us, such closed systems rarely occur in the
world, and only then in the laboratory.9
The above claim also assumes that Newtonian physics is the exemplar of a single
archetypal scientific method whose laws are valid universally. Not only has this
admiration for Newtonian physics faded, physicists are speculating that the
so-called fundamental natural laws of physics are not immutable and transcendent
but could be no more than local by-laws—valid only in our particular patch of
the cosmos.10  Davies reminded us only recently that conventional physics had
no idea of what the external source of these laws might be.11  Some theorists are
speculating that they emerged as part of the evolution of the universe itself and
our observation of it.
The assumption that there was a single scientific method was reflected in the
work of Comte, who asserted that there was a hierarchy of knowledge in which
‘science’ was the pinnacle. Consequently, Comte argued that even sociology
could be a positive science modelled after physics12  —an ambition that sociology
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has long since abandoned, but one to which economics clings. Implicit in this
belief is the proposition that the generalisations in physics are somehow more
basic than those of the other sciences and certainly more basic than in the social
disciplines, and that somehow everything can be reduced ultimately to physical
generalisations. Reductionism in the spirit of Greek atomism lies at the heart of
this assertion. This reductionism, this reification, this scientism, is, however,
inconsistent with the wide range of real scientific practices and theories that are
not reducible to physics. This inconsistency suggests that changes in belief and
terminology are required. What is more, American philosopher Norman
Swartz—drawing on Wittgenstein’s model of family resemblances in which
there is no core property shared by all members of a family—tells us that it is
exceedingly difficult to tell precisely what a scientific law is. Like all concepts,
there is no single defining set of necessary and sufficient conditions for a
statement being a scientific law. While we would all accept that there is
considerable order in the natural and social worlds, the generalisations we use
to describe that order are social artefacts that are not literally true—being at
best approximations, idealised reconstructions or instrumental tools going beyond
the evidence available to us.13
Similarly, from the Enlightenment, we have inherited a cultural image of the
scientist as a hero overcoming ignorance and bringing reality under control.
The effect is to privilege particular types of inquiry, particular social practices
and their associated stories over other forms of inquiry. It is not so much that
one should necessarily object to the use of a general term such as ‘science’ to
encompass the wide range of systematic inquiries carried out into the character
of the physical and social worlds; rather, it is that ‘science’ now carries too many
misleading entailments, implying a privilege and a unity of method that cannot
be sustained.
Blaug reports that in the mid-nineteenth century, the usual story told about
scientific investigations was that they started with the free and unprejudiced
observation of facts. Such investigations were then supposed to progress by
inductive inference to the formulation of universal laws and theories about those
facts. The induced laws and theories were then to be checked by comparing
their empirical consequences with all the observed ‘facts’—including those with
which they began.14  In this context, scientific progress was seen as a linear
process with the inclusion of more and more kinds of phenomena under laws of
greater and greater generality—a reflection of the Enlightenment’s faith in
reductionism and in progress.
This image of science reflects the ideas of Bacon—one of the fathers of empiricism
referred to in Chapter 2. This story has, however, been discredited. All perception
and language is theory impregnated. Only those sensory impressions that are
significant from some particular perspective become ‘perceptions’.15  Similarly,
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the positivist claim that only the statements that are verifiable by observation
are meaningful is contradicted by positivists’ own claims and by the large
numbers of scientific theories that are based on far more than direct conclusions
from sensory data—on ideas that are not observable directly.16  Since Hume
pointed to the inability of induction to establish logical certainty, the idea that
induction formed the basis of a rational scientific method has been problematic.17
Importantly, it is now said that these images of science give a distorted picture
of the way in which scientific investigations have been conducted. In particular,
the belief that it is possible to verify scientific theories has had to be discarded
because rival theories can always be developed to fit the data in any particular
case and there is no formal method that allows us to choose between such
competing theories.18  It is also clear that the picture of science as a cumulative
linear process cannot be sustained. As positivist Donald Fiske (1917–2003) and
cultural psychologist Richard Shweder tell us, ‘[T]he criteria for progress in the
sciences are task-specific, diverse, ambiguous, and shifting. No criterion has
served as a general standard or a universal ideal.’19  Furthermore, not all science
is concerned with a search for general laws. Indeed, political scientist Phillip
Converse argues that each science has its own texture; while educational
psychologist Lee Cronbach (1916–2001) claims that the social disciplines are
progressive because they possess an ever-richer repertoire of questions—not
because they have ever more refined answers about fixed questions.20  Nor does
the above image take adequate account of the institutionalisation of scientific
investigations in the modern world.
So let us be quite clear: this story, this legitimising mythology—the legacy of
the Enlightenment—has been discredited. A fundamental change in our
understanding of scientific investigations has resulted from the work of recent
philosophers of science21  —an understanding that is not positivist and that
makes far humbler claims. In particular, as we have already seen, the
foundationalist claim that philosophy can describe on a priori grounds the
standards for scientific knowledge has been discredited.22  As a result, the late
Australian philosopher of qualitative research, Michael Crotty, advises us to
hold all our understandings of the natural and social worlds lightly, tentatively
and far less dogmatically—‘seeing them as historically and culturally affected
interpretations rather than eternal truths’.23
It is now clear that scientific inquiry cannot provide us with the certain
knowledge sought by the Enlightenment. That has proven to be a utopian dream.
There is no certain truth to be found through method or technique. All
knowledge is tentative and subject to revision. At best, all we can have is
‘justified’ belief, wherein the criteria for justification are themselves contestable.
It is also agreed generally that all scientific knowledge is constructed
socially—the work of an interpretive community. Furthermore, Descartes’
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method of radical scepticism has very little attraction for real scientists. The
majority of scientific knowledge—including knowledge of the appropriate
methods—is accepted on authority, as an act of trust in a particular scientific
tradition with its corpus of knowledge, norms, ideals, heroes and heroic stories,
as passed on by teachers and colleagues either through direct instruction or by
example. Any individual scientist does not build her or his field anew, but lays
down new deposits on the theoretical sediments already in place.24  Importantly,
critical theory warns us that these inherited constructed meanings can serve
particular hegemonic interests and power structures in a world in which there
are strong disparities in the distribution of power.25
According to Kincaid, there is a common thread to nearly all contemporary
philosophy of science: it is not positivist.26  Also, many of the differences
between the above theorists are matters of emphasis.27  It is questionable whether
a strong differentiation is possible or desirable. Bernstein sums up this new
perspective in the following terms:
Awareness has been growing that attempts to state what are or ought to
be the criteria for evaluating and validating scientific hypotheses and
theories that are abstracted from existing social practice are threatened
with a false rigidity or pious vacuity and that existing criteria are always
open to conflicting interpretations and applications and can be weighed
in different ways. The effective standards and norms that are operative
in scientific inquiry are subject to change and modification in the course
of scientific inquiry. We are now aware that it is not only important to
understand the role of tradition in science as mediated through research
programs or research traditions but that we must understand how such
traditions arise, develop, and become progressive and fertile, as well as
the ways in which they can degenerate.28
The Contemporary Philosophy of Science
Let us look at these issues in a little more detail. Physicist and philosopher of
science Pierre Duhem (1861–1916) taught us that there were no critical
experiments in physics that could establish that a hypothesis was true. Theories
face experimental refutation collectively. An experiment that refutes a hypothesis
refutes a network of interconnected ideas—rather than a single idea—pointing
to a problem within that network rather than pinpointing the problem. This is
because predictions that are tested are deduced from theoretical hypotheses,
auxiliary hypotheses and other knowledge. Consequently, it is always possible
for the scientist to save a hypothesis by adjusting the auxiliary hypotheses.
Duhem pointed out further that the choice of hypotheses to test is governed by
considerations of order, symmetry and elegance rather than by their ability to
describe the world accurately. Quine extended Duhem’s idea to take in the whole
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of science, suggesting that it was an entire web of belief—even a
world-view—that faced refutation as a whole. He also points out that it is possible
to save any belief if we are prepared to make the necessary adjustments
elsewhere. This is a phenomenon that is widespread and has been well
documented by anthropologists in the case of beliefs in such things as magic.
Norwood Hanson (1924–67) taught us that what we took to be facts depended
on our conceptual system.29
Consistent with the above body of criticism, Popper rejected the
nineteenth-century attempt to prescribe a method of discovery or of verification.
He tells us:
Science is not a system of certain, or well-established, statements; nor is
it a system which steadily advances towards a state of finality…The old
scientific idea of epistēmē—of absolute certain, demonstrable
knowledge—has proved to be an idol…It may indeed be corroborated,
but every corroboration is relative to other statements which, again, are
tentative. Only in our subjective experience of conviction, in our
subjective faith, can we be ‘absolutely certain’.30
Popper does not provide us with a logic of science, nor does he believe that such
logic is possible. He also rejected the positivist attempts to distinguish the
meaningful from the meaningless along the lines proposed by the positivists.
Instead, he sought to divide all human knowledge into two categories: science
and non-science. In his view, science is distinguished from non-science by its
method of formulating and testing propositions, not by its subject matter and
not by a claim to certainty of knowledge. Nevertheless, Popper draws no absolute
line between science and non-science, as falsifiability and testability are matters
of degrees. All ‘true’ theories are merely provisionally true—having so far defied
falsification. Because no individual scientific hypothesis was ever falsified
conclusively, Popper suggested certain normative limits on the methods that
could be used to safeguard theories against falsification based on what he believed
to be sound practice. Let me emphasise the point: there exists no formal method
to rule out ad hoc assumptions to save a hypothesis, and Popper has to employ
normative rules to save his conjecture–falsification approach from such tinkering.
The empirical basis of objective science has thus nothing ‘absolute’ about
it. Science does not rest upon solid bedrock. The bold structure of its
theories rises, as it were, above a swamp. It is like a building erected on
piles. The piles are driven down from above into the swamp, but not
down to any natural or ‘given’ base; and if we stop driving the piles
deeper, it is not because we have reached firm ground. We simply stop,
when we are satisfied that the piles are firm enough to carry the structure,
at least for the time being.31
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This does not mean, however, that falsification thereby ceases to be a valuable
practical scientific tool—though there will be occasions when a hypothesis fails
a test because of the inadequacy of auxiliary assumptions. Importantly, for
Popper, a theory is scientific only if it gives rise to a known set of conditions
that are testable and which will falsify that theory if they do not occur. This
was the basis of his critique of Marxism: that it could not be subjected to
empirical test and therefore was not scientific. A similar criticism is often made
about the core of the neoclassical economic program. Blaug complains—with
considerable justification—that mainstream economics preaches falsification but
does not practise it. He sees this as a problem all through the social disciplines
and even in the natural sciences.32
Hungarian Imr Lakatos (1922–74) followed in Popper’s footsteps but talked
about progressive and degenerating research programs, suggesting that it was
a research program as a whole as it developed over time that should be the focus
of attention, rather than its state at a particular point in time. He sees research
programs as comprising a hard core, which is essentially untestable, and auxiliary
hypotheses, which are testable. He suggests that a research program is
theoretically progressive if it predicts some novel, hitherto unexpected fact, and
empirically progressive if each new theory leads to the discovery of some new
fact. He also cautions about being too hasty in assessing a program, while
acknowledging that it is possible to persist with a degenerating research program
for too long. This approach, however, while apparently reflecting real practice,
weakens the normative significance of Popper’s message. It also gives little
practical guidance to a researcher or observer evaluating such a program at any
particular point in time.
Importantly, Thomas Kuhn (1922–96), the most influential modern philosopher
of science, argues that the appeal to falsification is misleading, because in practice
scientists seem to be trying to verify rather than to falsify theories, and because
theories that are falsified by particular experiments are rarely abandoned. His
seminal work, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, looked at the history of
scientific practice and concluded that all science was based on an agreed
framework of unprovable assumptions about the nature of the universe, rather
than simply on empirical facts. These assumptions—a paradigm—comprise a
constellation of beliefs, values and techniques that are shared by a given scientific
community, which legitimise their practices and set the boundaries of their
research.33  Importantly, this view undermines directly the claimed objectivity
and value-free neutrality of scientific investigations.34  Kuhn argues that what
he calls ‘normal science’ ‘aims to elucidate the scientific tradition in which [the
scientist] was raised rather than to change it’.35  It uses the same methods that
the rest of us use in everyday life. He suggests, therefore, that examples are
checked against criteria, data are fudged to avoid the need for new models and
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guesses—formulated within the current jargon—are tried out in the search for
something that covers the cases that cannot be fudged.36  He goes on to argue
that radically new theories arise not as a result of falsification but by the
replacement of a hitherto explanatory model—or paradigm—with a new one.
Such revolutionary science—the overthrow of a paradigm as a result of repeated
refutations and anomalies—is the exception in the history of science. Implicit
in this view is the idea that science does not advance in a steady, linear process.
Normal science is a thoroughly social process in which the problems to be
examined and the general form the solutions should take are the result of
agreement among a scientific community. It is a self-sustaining, cumulative
process of problem solving within the context of a common analytical framework.
The breakdown of normal science is marked by a proliferation of theories and
by methodological controversy. In this climate, a new framework can appear
offering a decisive solution to hitherto neglected problems. Conversion to the
new approach takes on the nature of an identity crisis or a religious experience.
Importantly, Kuhn tells us that there is no neutral algorithm or systematic
decision procedure that will determine choice between competing paradigms.
He claims that new paradigms are not only incompatible with their predecessors,
they are incommensurable. This is because there is no third, neutral language
within which rival paradigms can be expressed in full.37
Importantly, Bernstein likens this decision process to Aristotle’s practical
reasoning—the type of reasoning in which there is a mediation between general
principles and a concrete situation that requires wit, imagination, interpretation
and the judicious weighing of alternatives—reasoning that is shaped by the
social practices of the relevant community. Resolution does not take place by
an appeal to the canon of deductive logic or by any straightforward appeal to
observation, verification or falsification. Rather, ‘the cumulative weight of the
complex arguments advanced in favour of a given paradigm theory, together
with its successes, persuade the community of scientists’.38
Kuhn subsequently listed five criteria for choice—accuracy, consistency, scope,
simplicity and fullness—stressing that these criteria, which functioned as values,
were imprecise and were frequently in conflict. He explains that this does not
involve a total abandonment of rationality in science, but rather a shift to a more
realistic understanding—to a different model of rationality. Indeed, this shift
from a model of rationality that searches for determinate rules to one that
emphasises the role of exemplars and judgemental interpretation is a theme that
pervades all of Kuhn’s thinking. It is a view that picks up on Michael Polanyi’s
strong emphasis on the tacit knowledge of the scientist—knowledge acquired
in the practice of science, which cannot be formulated explicitly in propositions
and rules.39
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Importantly, for Bernstein, the real character of rationality in the sciences in
general—but especially in theory choice—is closer to the tradition of practical
reason than to the image of epistēmē .40  MacIntyre puts it this way:
Objective rationality is therefore to be found not in rule-following, but
in rule-transcending, in knowing how and when to put rules and
principles to work and when not to. Consider how practical reasoning
of this kind is taught, whether it is the practical reasoning of generals,
of judges in a common law tradition, or surgeons or of natural scientists.
Because there is no set of rules specifying necessary and sufficient
conditions for large areas of such practices, the skills of practical
reasoning are communicated only partly by precepts but much more by
case-histories and precedents. Moreover the precepts cannot be
understood except in terms of their application in the case histories; and
the development of the precepts cannot be understood in terms of the
history of both precepts and case histories.41
As the new framework achieves dominance, it becomes the normal science of
the next generation.
Kuhn subsequently acknowledged that his earlier description of scientific
revolutions involved some rhetorical exaggeration. Paradigmatic changes during
scientific revolutions do not imply total discontinuities in scientific debate. In
this later account, scientific development is characterised by overlapping and
interpenetrating paradigms, some of which can be incommensurable. Paradigms
do not replace each other suddenly; rather they achieve dominance in a long
process of intellectual competition. Nevertheless, Kuhn’s stress on the role of
normative judgements in scientific controversies—and sociological factors such
as authority, hierarchy and reference groups—remains intact, along with a
mistrust of the role of cognitive factors as determinants of scientific behaviour.42
Because it is a social process, scientific research is heavily dependent on the
norms and ideals underpinning society in general and the norms embedded in
inter-subjective communication in particular.
Reflecting on the above literature, Kincaid has suggested that good science
requires at least the following evidential virtues—though he acknowledges that
they are abstract and simplistic and admit multiple interpretations:
• falsifiability as the first line of empirical adequacy
• empirical adequacy—the more predictive success the better
• wide scope—predicting a wide variety of different kinds of phenomena
• coherence with the best information from other sciences
• fruitfulness in terms of a past track record and a future promise
• objectivity.
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Kincaid goes on to stress the importance of fair tests, independent tests and cross
tests. Given what has already been said, we might baulk at the possibility of
achieving objectivity, but at a practical level this seems a useful
suggestion—particularly in respect of normal science—as long as we do not get
carried away with its status as ‘the method’ to the exclusion of other lists or
with the knowledge status of the results.
Austrian-born Paul Feyerabend (1924–94) goes further than Kuhn and Kincaid.
He points out that the physical sciences—the usual exemplars of scientific
practice—have not advanced in a manner consistent with the canon of the strict
methodologists, including those of Popper. Rather, he believes that progress has
depended on a willingness to breach those canons. In part, this is because he
sees normal science as a process of indoctrination;43  and, because science cannot
be grounded philosophically in any convincing way, he warns us expressly that
scientific findings are no more than beliefs that should not be privileged over
other beliefs. Indeed, there is a substantial anthropological literature arguing
that the religious stories and beliefs of other cultures are no less rational than
our own scientific beliefs—making good sense of experience to the members of
those cultures. It is simply that the frames of reference, the paradigms and the
tools available differ significantly. It is the height of ethnocentric intellectual
arrogance to suggest otherwise. In this regard, Shweder tells us:
A remarkable feature of the entities of religious thought is that they are
thought to be external, objective, and real. But it seems to me, it is
precisely that feature that marks a point of strong resemblance with
scientific concepts, for one of the features of scientific thinking is that
‘representations’ of reality are typically treated as though they were real,
and unseen ideas and constructs are not only used to help interpret what
is seen but are presumed to exist externally, behind or within that small
piece of reality that can be seen.44
Nevertheless, Feyerabend believes that scientists should test their
perceptions—seeing this willingness as the difference between science and
non-science, though these beliefs are no less culturally, socio-politically and
historically conditioned.45  He also draws our attention to the ways in which
scientific communities can become closed, rigid and intolerant of new ideas,
even though science is often seen as the very model of openness. It is an important
part of the argument that will be advanced in Chapter 8 that the community of
neoclassical economists has become such a closed group.
The fact that the creation of scientific knowledge is a social process has an
important corollary. There are power relationships within any scientific
community, as within any other community. Those power relationships,
associated with such things as prestigious professorships, the editorship of
journals, the referring of papers, participation in funding and appointment
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committees and positions within the broader community, can have a big influence
on the acceptance or rejection of particular theories. And, of course, scientists
are no more virtuous than the rest of us. American social scientist and
methodologist Donald Campbell (1916–96) described this social construction of
knowledge as a quasi-conspiratorial social negotiation involving ambiguity,
equivocality and discretionary judgement.46 This group identification can
suppress intra-group disagreement, while exacerbating disagreements between
groups and restricting the flow of information and people between them.47
Let me reiterate that there is significant agreement on some essential points
among these critics of the nineteenth-century image of science. They are all
anti-positivist. Strict justification cannot be achieved. In particular, we cannot
stand outside our current language and structure of thought. Ultimate justification
is not achievable; neither is inquiry free of presuppositions. Consequently, the
belief that scientific knowledge is an accurate representation of reality has had
to be abandoned. As Rorty put it: ‘We understand knowledge when we
understand the social justification of belief, and thus have no need to view it as
accuracy of representation.’48
It is also clear that any explanation is an explanation from a particular partial
point of view—an attempt to reduce the unfamiliar to the more familiar—so
that there can be multiple, even inconsistent explanations. All such explanations
are tentative.49  All theories involve abstraction from the complexity of the
world and any particular theory highlights particular attributes only. It is an
extraordinary leap of faith to believe that any particular point of view can capture
successfully the essence of any phenomenon.
In particular, Rorty tells us that the attempt to isolate science from non-science
through the use of words such as ‘objectivity’, ‘rigour’ and ‘method’ assumes
that scientific success can be explained in terms of discovering the language of
nature. Galileo—in claiming that the book of nature was written in the language
of mathematics—meant that mathematics worked because that was the way
things really were.50  For Rorty, this was simply a bad metaphor; rather, Galileo’s
reductionist mathematical vocabulary just happened to work—something that
lacked a metaphysical, epistemological or transcendental explanation.51
Consequently, for Rorty, the moral that seventeenth-century philosophers should
have drawn from Galileo’s success was that scientific breakthroughs were not
so much a matter of deciding which of various alternative hypotheses were true
but of finding the right jargon in which to frame hypotheses in the first place.52
What is clear is that the extent to which our mathematical vocabulary matches
that of nature—whether nature can reasonably be described as having a
vocabulary—will always remain problematic.
It follows that empirical sciences cannot claim an essential grasp of reality and,
as a result, a privileged status in the human conversation. It also follows that
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economics, sociology, political science or even philosophy cannot claim to be
objective and rational in a way that moral philosophy, aesthetics and poetry are
not.53  In all cases, justification is a search for persuasive arguments—a fully
social phenomenon—not a transaction between the inquirer and reality. In this
connection, Peirce54  referred to the ‘indefinite Community of Investigators’,
while Mead55  spoke of the ‘Community of Universal Discourse’. As we will see
in Chapter 7, these concepts have much in common with Habermas’s ideal speech
conditions. When it comes to matters of the basic structures of society and major
issues of public policy, this community is to be found in the ordinary citizens
of the society—not in some intellectual elite who would be the equivalent of
Plato’s guardians.
The real problem lies with us and the excessive faith we want to place in scientific
knowledge—including knowledge about economics—and the faith we want to
place in its practitioners, and in their capacity to free us from anxiety. As
Gadamer tells us, ‘[T]he problem of our society is that the longing of the citizenry
for orientation and normative patterns invests the expert with an exaggerated
authority. Modern society expects him to provide a substitute for past moral
and political orientations.’56
Further, he says that philosophical hermeneutics ‘corrects the peculiar falsehood
of modern consciousness: the idolatry of scientific method and of the anonymous
authority of the sciences and it vindicates again the noblest task of the
citizen—decision-making according to one’s own responsibility—instead of
conceding that task to the expert’.57
The above difficulties in grounding rationality and science undermine any sharp
distinction between science, philosophy and any other critical
inquiry—undermining the special status that we have hitherto attached to
science. They also point to our inability to insulate scientific inquiry from the
need for practical reason, for judgement and even wisdom. As German critical
rationalist philosopher Hans Albert tells us, ‘[T]he problem of adequate criteria
is a very general problem. It is to be found in every field of social activity—in
every kind of problem-solving activity; in law, morals, politics, literature, the
arts, etc—and not merely in the enterprise of acquiring knowledge in science.’58
The Particular Difficulties of the Social ‘Sciences’
Theorists have often sought to differentiate the social disciplines from the natural
sciences on the grounds that the latter are more objective. Indeed, an invidious
comparison is often made between the social disciplines and the natural sciences.
This follows from a tendency to idealise the natural sciences and to see Newtonian
physics as the exemplar of scientific practice. It is then assumed that the
production of universal laws characterises the natural sciences in general—but
this is far from being true.59  Such a sweeping generalisation does not do justice
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to the diversity of scientific practice in the natural sciences or to the variety of
criteria of success negotiated within those diverse fields.60  Simple law-like
behaviour and predictability are elusive in the natural sciences also—though
in the natural sciences it is possible more often to get away with simple
idealisations, to isolate a system and to treat its properties as context
independent.61  In any event—as the above account makes clear—the broad
claims of the natural sciences to objectivity—in the sense advanced by the
Enlightenment tradition—cannot be sustained.
Nevertheless, there are particular difficulties with the social disciplines, which
add to the above problems, and which are reflected in unease about their status.
The result has been the development of a separate theoretical discussion of the
philosophy of the social sciences, which can be quite esoteric. This discussion
is at pains to distinguish itself from the positivism criticised earlier—though
there are still unreformed positivists in economics. William Outhwaite categorises
this discourse into three schools—involving realist, hermeneutic and pragmatic
perspectives—though there appears to be significant overlap between them.62
Nevertheless, the main issue separating these perspectives is the extent to which
any social discipline can describe a social reality independent of the observer
and her or his description of it. This discourse overlaps with that in the natural
sciences described earlier. Critical realism—following Roy Bhaskar—is possibly
the current dominant school. It agrees that a distinction is to be made between
the natural and the social sciences, that the latter do not operate in the same way
as the former and cannot be studied with the same methods, and that social life
is constructed continually through practice.63  Nevertheless, in neglecting the
limitations of language, they attempt ‘to privilege a concept of the real that can
be definitely discovered, described and activated under definable conditions’.64
In this, they appear to be too optimistic. As educationalist and methodologist
John Schostak explains, symbolic representation—including through
language—can never be the full measure of the ‘real’.65 There is something
missing of the ‘real’ in any representation that we cannot recover, however much
we try to tame it. Schostak suggests that for critical realism to be useful, it has
to deal successfully with representation in all its possible articulations, and with
the emergence of understanding as acts of creative imagination shared through
discourse. This is why I lean towards the pragmatic and hermeneutical schools.
None of the above positions suggest that we should not try to understand the
social world. The disagreement is about the extent to which we are likely to
succeed and the confidence with which we are prepared to apply the resulting
insights. No one is claiming that in any particular investigation there is a single,
ultimately true theory that is accessible to us. Nor can we ever fully escape the
language with which we describe the social system. In short, the ‘TRUTH’ about
society is not available to us.
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For example, Kincaid, who describes himself as a realist—believing the idea that
things exist and act independently of our descriptions—claims that because
there is no simple logic of science we cannot evaluate social science by looking
at simple formal traits. At the same time, he believes that good social science
cannot be ruled out on a priori conceptual grounds. Rather, he claims we have
to look in detail at the methods used and the kinds of evidence adduced.
Importantly, he concludes that large parts of the social disciplines have failed
to produce such good science.66  He goes on to claim that the philosophy of
science can contribute to the study of society only if it eschews a priori armchair
theorising in favour of a philosophy tied intimately to the real practice of social
science research. In respect of that social science practice, Fiske and Shweder
tell us:
It is obvious that social science is not a single integrated discipline; rather
it is a collectivity of endeavours sometimes working cooperatively,
sometimes borrowing from each other, and only occasionally collaborating
in joint enterprises. It is a range of disciplines and methodologies, above
and beyond the somewhat anachronistic categories in university
catalogs.67
Kincaid agrees that the social disciplines employ methods that are not found
anywhere in the natural sciences.68  Nevertheless, he claims that the social
disciplines can be good science by the standards of scientific adequacy of the
natural sciences—describing basic patterns found in nature—but only by meeting
those standards. This is because he believes that human beings are part of the
natural order and are amenable to scientific understanding. This, he declares,
is simply an extension of an Enlightenment tenet. Given our critique of the
Enlightenment, this is hardly a persuasive argument. Furthermore, he believes
that behind the diverse methods of the natural sciences there is a common core
of ‘scientific rationality’, which the social disciplines sometimes share.69
Importantly, he believes that social science is distinct from psychology—with
its own domain of inquiry largely to do with understanding large-scale social
structures—and in the process rejects the methodological individualism of much
of the social disciplines. Interestingly, Kincaid goes on to define those scientific
standards in terms of ‘scientific virtues’—virtues promoting confirmation and
those promoting explanation—standards that deny that scientific justification
can be reduced to a certain method. It should already be clear that Kincaid agrees
with Rorty and that methods do vary across the sciences and do not provide a
foolproof, mechanical basis for choosing theories. Nor does Kincaid believe all
is well with social research. Nevertheless and confusingly, Kincaid appears to
believe that there is something special about science, that, in effect, it possesses
a privileged form of justification—a belief I have already discounted.
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Kincaid’s belief that human beings are part of the natural order goes to the heart
of the problem of social inquiry. This is a belief that we must reject as being
much too strong. In effect, Kincaid seeks to defeat the dichotomy made in our
vocabulary between the natural and the social—a vocabulary he uses while
denying its import. While the phenomena studied in the natural sciences could
have an existence independent of the concepts used to describe them, this might
not be true very often, if at all, of the social disciplines.70  Rather, the social
disciplines are concerned with human beings who—as we saw in Chapter
2—construct their social reality, defining themselves in symbolic forms with
shared understandings of the world, which they use to structure their actions.71
Consequently, it is not the way the world is, but the way we conceptualise it,
that influences our actions.72
This is the reason why leading Canadian political philosopher Charles Taylor
makes a distinction between human ‘behaviour’ and human ‘action’, in which
the former is caused by forces over which the individual has no
control—analogous to the forces of nature—and the latter results from that
person’s intentions. He then points out that the language describing human
conduct is mainly an intentional one and it is about human action rather than
human behaviour. It is the language of reasons and not of causes. This is
important because—as we have seen already—the interpretation of any
phenomenon depends on the language available to us, bringing with it particular
theoretical entailments. The meaning of everyday behaviour and even the very
fabric of society are woven into our ordinary vocabulary.73  It is also clear that
the meaning we attach to human actions depends on the particular circumstances
with which we are dealing. Importantly, social structures and institutions play
a large role in determining our actions. Secord seeks to clarify the situation,
telling us that while social structures have real effects, they are different from
natural structures in that they do not exist independently of our conceptions;
nevertheless, they precede the individual. Such ‘structures preceded the entrance
of individuals into society, and individuals act within them as a medium’.74
This is a view I endorsed in Chapter 2.
Additionally—as has been pointed out already—language, including the language
used in the social disciplines, is inherently metaphorical. Similarly, the
interpretation of any text and of any situation is dependent largely on historically
situated conventions. Gergen draws our attention to the way in which the
particular literary figures used dominate the process of interpretation.75  He
reminds us that, once a particular metaphor is selected, it restrains what else can
be said. The root metaphors differ across the social disciplines, providing different
perspectives—ideologies even—which are difficult to reconcile.76 These
stories—these definitions of ourselves—reflect to some extent the stories that
social researchers tell. Our stories, therefore—our language games—cannot be
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objective or normatively neutral, as we will see in greater detail in the next
chapter. While this is also true of the natural sciences, there is almost a qualitative
difference in the extent to which these respective disciplines can aspire to
objectivity. One further consequence is that generalisations in the social
disciplines are generally narrow in scope.77  Nagel suggests:
[The] conclusions reached by controlled study of sample data drawn
from one society are not likely to be valid for a sample obtained from
another society. Unlike the laws of physics and chemistry, generalisations
in the social sciences therefore have at best only a severely restricted
scope, limited to social phenomena occurring during a relatively brief
historical epoch within special institutional settings.78
Similarly, Gergen tells us that there are few patterns of human action that are
not subject to significant alteration, while cultural anthropologist Roy D’Andrade
records that the different fields of science have different canons of
generalisation.79 While researchers aspire to tell integrative stories, it could be
simply inappropriate for social researchers to seek to emulate the natural sciences
in an attempt to derive ‘fundamental general laws’ describing human conduct.
Cronbach argues that this particular idealisation of scientific research—the
development of general lasting laws on the model of parts of physics80  —is not
achievable in the social disciplines.81  It might also not be achievable in much
of the natural sciences. Nor is there any good reason to expect a unity of method
across the social disciplines. On the contrary, Fiske tells us that such knowledge
is fragmented, composed of multiple discrete parcels—a consequence of the
different objects of inquiry and different methods of knowing. As a result, these
bodies of knowledge are likely to always remain separate.82  In particular,
generalisations and theories in the social disciplines are rarely abandoned because
most conceptual statements in those disciplines are formulated in such a way
that they cannot be falsified. Fiske suggests that, in part, some of these difficulties
arise because of too high a level of aspiration on the part of the social researcher.
All of this suggests that a strong onus lies with the theorist intent on developing
systems of interrelated generalisations in a particular area of human activity to
demonstrate that such generalisations do exist and then to delineate their scope.
Consequently, the question arises as to whether neoclassical economics has
discharged that obligation. I think not. As Ormerod tells us, the idea that people
respond to economic incentives could be a universal generalisation, but the
strength of any response to any particular set of incentives is emphatically not
universal; it depends on the social, institutional and historical context. Human
beings are not compelled to act by social ‘forces’ in the same deterministic way
that natural phenomena respond to natural forces. Weber suggested therefore
that the natural sciences were concerned with erklären or explaining focused on
causality, while the social disciplines were concerned with verstehen or
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understanding. Such things as meaning, intention, ideas, values and emotions
were, according to Descartes, non-things and were beyond the reach of the
mechanical sciences.83
One approach used in an attempt to get around this problem is to consider reasons
as causes. While Weber agreed that there was a logical distinction between
natural and social reality, he did not believe that these differences required
different scientific methods. He believed that uniqueness and historicity were
features of natural as well as social phenomena. In any event, with his positivist,
rationalist bent, Weber sought a rigorous method that would enable claims made
about the social world to be subjected to empirical validation. While Weber
accepted that no conceptual system could do full justice to the complexity of
particular social phenomena, the tool he adopted for this purpose was the concept
of an ‘ideal type’—an idea used also by Mill and his contemporaries. This idea—a
reflection of the perfectionism and transcendentalism embedded in Western
thought and in particular the positivism popular at the time—is the conceptual
source of the idealisation of the market in economics. An ideal type is an
analytical construct, a rationalised reconstruction, a stereotype, a fiction even,
deliberately exaggerating what are thought to be typical actions to produce a
coherent whole in an attempt to get to the essence of a social reality—assuming
in the process that there is such an essence to be got at. As such, it looks
suspiciously like an attempt to revive Plato’s forms in the context of the social
disciplines. The ideal type was to be derived inductively from historical reality,
though it would never correspond with reality. Importantly, Weber thought
this tool could be applied only to social behaviour that was rational and goal
oriented, which he believed was increasingly dominating Western society. In
this regard, it is important to remember that Weber conceived of four different
orientations towards social action—instrumentally rational, value rational,
affective and traditional—though these categories were not intended to provide
an overall classification. As we will see in the next chapter, the rational,
instrumental nature of much economic activity is open to devastating criticism.
In these circumstances—on the basis of Weber’s own qualification—it can hardly
be assumed to apply to economics.
Furthermore, the technique is open to misinterpretation resulting from the
common metaphysical assumption that ‘scientific laws’ are authoritative—that
is, that they determine the way the world is (that scientific generalisations,
‘laws’, are causal agents) rather than being simply descriptions of the way the
world is. In the absence of a god—conceived of as a lawmaker, dictating the
laws of nature and of human conduct in the way that the Enlightenment and
Smith had assumed—it is hard to imagine where any authoritative force could
come from. No one these days, however, thinks that the invisible hand of the
market is the hand of God. Perhaps, given Weber’s restriction of this method
to the analysis of rational social action, it is rationality that is to provide this
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authoritative force. If so, it will just not do. To claim that the world is inherently
rational or even mathematical, as the Pythagoreans thought, is only to postpone
the question momentarily, as well as to overlook the problematic nature of those
concepts. What gives rationality or mathematics an authoritative force? In any
event, the critique of rationalism and mathematics in Chapter 5 undermines all
such pretensions. Additionally, the work of the Nobel Prize-winning economists
Simon, Daniel Kahneman and Vernon Smith on our cognitive limitations has
undermined it at the empirical level. The fact that scientific laws do not have
authoritative force has another important implication: the natural and social
worlds are not, in principle, ultimately explicable.
If, on the other hand, one assumes that social laws are simply attempts at
describing the way the social world is, the meaning to be ascribed to any such
‘laws’ based on unrealistic idealisations is problematic. While it might be
interesting to some people to speculate about how people might behave if they
were entirely economic beings, the value of such speculation and their ‘tendency
laws’ to policy decision is far from certain when we all know that the assumption
is false. Such idealisation is a highly reductionist strategy, with its origins in
ancient Greek atomism, which attempts to reduce physical reality to fundamental
and identical particles. One can complain justly that economic systems cannot
be dissected in this fashion. Weber was not aware of the difficulties later theorists
found in modelling interdependent complex systems. They are not open to this
reductive strategy. Importantly, the idea that the factors left out can be added
back in to form a more complete description—for example, the idea that economic
analysis deals with ‘tendency laws’—assumes that such entities are separable
in the first place and are independent. They might not be if, for example, we
are dealing with non-linear dynamic systems.84  If they are not independent and
it is improbable that they would be, such influences cannot simply be added
together. Complex or non-linear dynamics could produce multiple possible
solutions, while even very small changes in initial conditions could produce
drastic changes in outcomes.
What this means is that human behaviour is not describable by simple
deterministic models. Such reductionism has a systematic bias in that it ignores
or over-simplifies the importance of the context of the system being studied.85
This simplification of the context ‘also often legislates higher-level systems out
of existence or leaves no way of describing inter-systemic phenomena
appropriately’.86  Indeed, ‘assumptions that appear benign at such an individual
level may be dangerous over-simplifications when viewed from a higher level’.87
This is, of course, what we find with Margaret Thatcher’s claim that there is no
such thing as society and with the methodological individualism practised by
economics. It is this reductionism and methodological individualism that leads
directly to the modelling of society as if it is based on self-serving individuals.
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I have already drawn attention to the fact that this modelling is not a neutral
strategy, and have expressed concern about the potential impact of such
modelling on society itself. This concern leads me to question whether
methodological individualism is a legitimate, albeit potentially dangerous,
analytical strategy or simply a cloak disguising the ideological prejudices
embedded in neoclassical economic analysis. If our study is intended to influence
our policy decisions—and if there are reasons to believe that there are
higher-level social structures that impact on our social problems—we are honour
bound to study them. Additionally, the conclusions drawn from such simplifying
assumptions could simply be the artefacts of those assumptions with little or no
connection with the phenomena that we are supposed to be studying.
A further problem surrounds how to choose the ideal type—what is to sit within
the system to be examined and what sits outside as the ‘context’. This is hardly
a normatively neutral exercise and it is a problem for which no persuasive answer
has been given. A further and fundamental question surrounds whether such
ideal types lead to generalisations that are, in fact, empirically falsifiable. Given
what was said above, they certainly cannot be verified. We will return to this
topic in Chapter 8 when we discuss the content of economics more directly. It
is important in the interim to remember that while Weber was a positivist, he
never intended these ideal types to be used as normative ideals. For Weber, any
understanding of causation in the social disciplines is a result of ‘an interpretative
understanding of social action and involves an explanation of relevant antecedent
phenomena as meaning-complexes’.88 This seems a far cry from the deterministic,
mechanical modelling of neoclassical economics.
In 1953, American economist Milton Friedman (1912–2006) offered a radical and
highly influential new defence of economic idealisation in The Methodology of
Positive Economics. Friedman accepted that experience reflected the complex
influences of numerous causes and therefore could support numerous
interpretations. This is consistent with the position taken here. Friedman believed
that it was possible to subject our policy beliefs to empirical test and that the
role of economic theory was to provide a system of generalisations able to
generate predictions that could be checked against experience. Because no
decisive disproof was possible of any hypothesis, however, we should have
confidence only in those hypotheses that survived many tests and performed
consistently better than the alternatives. Friedman was interested only in
empirically meaningful and testable hypotheses as an engine of analysis for the
problem at hand, rather than as a description of reality. For Friedman, the reality
of a hypothesis was simply irrelevant. He claims that ‘the more significant the
theory, the more unrealistic the assumptions…To be important a hypothesis
must be descriptively false in its assumptions…the relevant question to ask
about the “assumptions” of a theory is not whether they are descriptively
“realistic”, for they never are.’89
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To most of us this seems transparent nonsense—a further ad hoc rationalisation
to defend the indefensible. Perhaps, however, he was just confused, as claimed
by leading institutional economist Geoffrey Hodgson90  and applied economist
Daniel Bromley.91  Hodgson points out that this position is not only theoretically
incoherent; it has not been adopted in practice.92  Hodgson draws a distinction
between different kinds of assumptions: negligibility, domain and heuristic.
Negligibility is where some factor will have a negligible impact on the result;
domain assumptions specify the domain in which the theory is applicable; and
heuristic assumptions are simplifying assumptions made in the early stages of a
theory to allow successive approximations. Hodgson argues that Friedman is
talking about negligibility assumptions and that it is not true that such
assumptions are descriptively false, only that they have a negligible influence
on the phenomenon being explained and consequently can safely be disregarded.
Clearly, the core assumptions of neoclassical economics are not ones leaving out
factors that have a negligible influence, but are truly descriptively false. This
does matter.
Of course, Friedman’s claims could be defended on the instrumental ground that
the truth of a theory is irrelevant and that all that matters is the accuracy of the
resulting prediction. Surely, however, the objective of such studies is not simply
to make predictions—desirable though that might be—but rather to provide
credible explanations? This is the generally accepted position in the philosophy
of science. This instrumental approach would eliminate explanation and
falsification from science and that should be the end of the matter. Friedman
does not apply this criterion consistently in his own work. Rather, he uses
Popper’s falsification criterion in the case of the maximisation hypothesis. He
neglects, however, to provide any relevant evidence for his claims and asserts
that a failure of critics to develop any coherent, self-consistent alternative
provides evidence of the worth of the maximisation idea. In any event, it is
extremely doubtful that this approach has, in fact, led to successful prediction.
Indeed, given the complex nature of economic systems and the sensitivity of
non-linear models to initial conditions, the very possibility of making reliable
predictions is being undermined.
German philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911) goes further than Weber,
contrasting verstehen with erklären and suggesting that natural and social reality
are different kinds of reality requiring different investigative methods—a position
more in line with the position taken here.93  British sociologist Anthony Giddens
describes this aspect of the social disciplines as a ‘double hermeneutic’:
The theory-laden character of observation-statements in natural sciences
entails that the meaning of scientific concepts is tied to the meaning of
other terms in a theoretical network; moving between theories or
paradigms involves hermeneutic tasks. The social sciences, however,
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imply not only this single level of hermeneutic problems, involved in
the theoretical meta-language, but also a ‘double hermeneutic’, because
social-scientific theories concern a ‘pre-interpreted’ world of lay
meanings. There is a two-way connection between the language of social
science, and ordinary language. The former cannot ignore the categories
used by laymen in the practical organization of social life; but on the
other hand, the concepts of social science may be taken over and applied
by laymen as elements of their conduct. Rather than treating the latter
as something to be avoided or minimised as far as possible, as inimical
to the interests of ‘prediction’, we should understand it as integral to
the subject–subject relation involved the social sciences.94
There has been a broad recognition that a proper understanding of the social
disciplines requires an appreciation of the hermeneutical dimension of them. In
fact, there is a convergence between the insights of the hermeneutical tradition
and the insights derived from the pragmatism that is influencing the philosophy
of science outlined above. As Gadamer tells us:
When Aristotle, in the sixth book of the Nichomachean Ethics,
distinguishes the manner of practical knowledge…from theoretical and
technical knowledge, he expresses, in my opinion, one of the greatest
truths by which the Greeks throw light on the ‘scientific’ mystification
of modern society of specialisation. In addition, the scientific character
of practical philosophy is, as far as I can see, the only methodological
model for self-understanding of the human sciences if they are to be
liberated from the spurious narrowing imposed by the model of the
natural sciences.95
For Aristotle, there were three intellectual virtues: epistēmē, phronēsis and techne.
As we have already seen, epistēmē is the kind of certain geometric knowledge
to which the natural sciences aspire. Phronēsis is the kind of practical wisdom
we all use in the expert social practice and moral judgements we make in
day-to-day life; this was, for Aristotle, the most important of the intellectual
virtues.96 Techne is technical knowledge or technology. For Aristotle—as for
Toulmin, Gadamer, Mary Hesse and Bent Flyvbjerg—it is phronēsis that provides
the appropriate methodological model for the social sciences. From this
perspective, the natural and social sciences are simply different intellectual
ventures. In short, not only have the social sciences—including economics—not
achieved practical success in providing certain predictive epistemic theory, they
cannot in principle aspire to that certain geometric knowledge of epistēmē.
Importantly, it is a view that denies that knowledge of human activity can ever
be universal and context-independent in the same way as knowledge in the
natural sciences. As Flyvbjerg—following Dreyfus—argues, ‘a theory which
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makes possible explanation and prediction, requires that the concrete context
of everyday human activity be excluded, but this very exclusion of context
makes explanation and prediction impossible’.97
The actors in a concrete situation will not necessarily conceive of any action in
the same way that any attempt at a context-free definition of a social action based
on abstract rules or laws might do. Importantly, context-dependence does not
imply a more complex form of determinism but an open, contingent relationship
between context, action and interpretation. Consequently, it is not meaningful
to speak of theory in the natural science sense in the social disciplines. We will
return to the ontological consequences of context and openness for neoclassical
economics in Chapter 8. This limitation of the disciplines is no real failing, as
epistēmē in turn cannot provide the reflective analysis of values that is at the
heart of political, economic and cultural life. In this spirit and consistent with
Toulmin, Flyvbjerg calls for the social sciences to be restored to their classical
position as practical intellectual activities, clarifying the problems, risks and
possibilities involved in social and political praxis.
Bernstein and prominent American economist Deirdre McCloskey tell us that
part of the problem arises from the English word ‘science’ and the distinctions
we English speakers make between the natural sciences, the social sciences and
the humanities. In contrast, in German, a distinction is made between the natural
sciences and the moral sciences only. The consequence has been that English
speakers tend to think of the social sciences as natural sciences concerned with
individuals in their social relations, on the assumption that the social sciences
differ in degree but not in kind from the natural sciences. In contrast, German
speakers have a much greater tendency to think of the social disciplines as moral
sciences, sharing essential characteristics with the humanities. McCloskey goes
on to advocate the adoption of the word ‘discipline’ to describe these social
investigations.
From this perspective, the sciences should be seen as a confederation of
enterprises, with methods and patterns of explanation to meet their own distinct
problems—not the varied parts of a single, comprehensive, ‘unified science’.98
The Platonic image of a single, formal type of knowledge is replaced by a picture
of enterprises that are always in flux and whose methods of inquiry are adapted
to the nature of the case. Importantly, the belief that we can start again by
cutting ourselves off from inherited ideas is as illusory as is the hope for a
comprehensive system of theories. The hope for certainty and clarity in theory
has to be balanced with the impossibility of avoiding uncertainty and ambiguity
in practice. We need to reappropriate the reasonable, tolerant, but neglected
legacy of humanism more than we need to preserve the systematic, perfectionist
legacy of the exact sciences. In particular, formal calculative rationality can no
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longer be the only measure of intellectual adequacy; one must also evaluate all
practical matters by their human ‘reasonableness’. Consequently, for Toulmin:
[T]he charms of logical rigour must now be unlearned. The task is not
to build new, more comprehensive systems of theory with universal and
timeless relevance, but to limit the scope of even the best-framed theories,
and fight the intellectual reductionism that became entrenched during
the ascendancy of rationalism. It calls for more subdisciplinary,
transdisciplinary, and multidisciplinary reasoning.99
In particular, Toulmin believes that biology provides less constricting analogies
for thinking about social relations than does physics. In the organic world,
diversity and differentiation are the rule and not the exception. The universality
of physical theories is rare. In this spirit, Wimsatt recommends that, in studying
human behaviour, we should use a variety of models and approaches in the hope
that we can thereby detect and correct for biases, special assumptions and the
artefacts of any one approach.100 This perspective sees science as being like
other human investigations employing a variety of heuristics that, while not
guaranteeing success, is the best we can do. A reductionist, mathematical
deductive heuristic is only one possible approach to such modelling. While I
am not rejecting the mechanistic modelling of neoclassical economics in its
entirety, I am cautioning that it provides only one limited perspective, which
could well be mistaken, and there might be more fruitful metaphors. Importantly,
it is up to the advocates of reductionism and mathematical deduction to
demonstrate its usefulness—particularly as a policy tool—to a justifiably sceptical
audience. Furthermore, rather than clinging stubbornly to physics envy and
the illusion of certainty provided by what appears to be a degenerating research
strategy, economists should learn to embrace pluralism for the richness of the
insights it can provide. In particular, economists should open themselves more
fully to the possibility of explanation at various levels of organisational
complexity throughout the economic system and not stick stubbornly to a
reductionist story.
It is within such a framework that American anthropologist Barbara
Frankel—drawing on Bateson and Mead—suggests that it might not be forces
and objects that are central to human action but rather the information and
messages that define the social context and order behaviour within those
contexts.101  She argues, in particular, that there is a danger of confusing
biological individuals with social persons—leading to an inability to deal
conceptually with contexts and meanings—as opposed to objects and forces.
She suggests, therefore, that it might be more appropriate to consider the selves
studied by the social disciplines as the sum of an individual’s achieved and
ascribed social roles, as nodes in a network of communications, avoiding the
distraction of biological boundaries. Consequently, she suggests that we need
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to take seriously ‘the notion of social persons created by and existing only within
systems of interaction, and as bounded, not by the skins of biological individuals,
but by contextual boundaries that may be…of indefinite extent’.102
One consequence of the positivist approach to the social sciences and the
associated attempt to appropriate the prestige associated with the natural sciences
has been to suppress political and moral discourse, to confer a privileged position
on the status quo and on the professional expert with a capacity for judgement
based on the unsustainable claim to technical expertise, neutrality and
impartiality. All of this should lead us to be wary—as leading American legal
theorist Grant Gilmore (1910–82) advises—of abstract and impersonal values,
of universal solutions and of logical imperatives103  within economics, the law
and social life more generally. We should also be wary of grand theory, sacred
rules and mystical absolutes that have little connection to reality—especially
since we have been taught to be wary of such claims in our spiritual life. As
legal historian Morton Horwitz confirms, the belief in the explanatory possibility
of general laws capable of making predictive statements in the social sciences
has plummeted: ‘The result has been a dramatic turn towards highly specific
“thick description” in which narrative and stories purport to substitute for
traditional general theories…a complex, multi-factored interdependent world
has lost confidence in single-factor “chains of causation” that were embedded
in most nineteenth-century explanatory theories.’104
In this spirit, English economist Edward Fullbrook recently argued for pluralism
among the knowledge narratives with which we organised and interpreted
experience, each of which would offer a different view of the object of inquiry.105
This is because all representations—even the most sophisticated and
comprehensive of scientific narratives—involve a radical, stylised and somewhat
arbitrary simplification of reality, a choice among an infinite number of possible
perspectives or conceptual frameworks. Such a choice rests ultimately on the
explanatory usefulness of the narrative and the entities it connects. Fullbrook
cites American-born quantum physicist David Bohm in support:
What is called for is not an integration of thought, or a kind of imposed
unity, for any such imposed view would itself be merely another
fragment. Rather, all our different ways of thinking are to be considered
as different ways of looking at the one reality, each with some domain
in which it is clear and adequate. One may indeed compare a theory to
a particular view of some object. Each view gives an appearance of the
object in some aspect. The whole object is not perceived in any one view
but, rather, it is grasped only implicitly as that single reality which is
shown in all these views.106
Any such perspective brings with it a system for classifying the empirical domain,
which in turn limits possible descriptions, possible facts, possible questions and
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possible stories and thus uniquely circumscribes our possible understanding of
reality. In particular, the meaning of any concept depends on the framework
within which it appears. Viewing a domain from a new perspective brings with
it the possibility of new dimensions of understanding. Fullbrook goes on to
distinguish between closed narratives such as those of Newtonian mechanics
and neoclassical economics and open narratives such as those of evolution, which
admit indeterminacy arising from chance, contingency, choice, uncertainty,
randomness and spontaneity. In the process, he challenges the hegemony of
such closed narratives and the hostility they exhibit to ‘alien’ and open
narratives. Rather, he argues that a plurality of narratives enriches our
understanding and is essential to the advancement of knowledge.
It might be thought that a rejection of the search for general criteria for judging
theories poses problems when it comes to judging economic theories.107 The
undermining of the pretensions of science should not, however, detract us from
the task of reasonable judgement in research. It seems that we just have to learn
to live with the understanding that all knowledge is a social and linguistic
construct, and that this applies with particular force to the social disciplines.
Recognition of these difficulties does not justify the proposition that empirical
tests are unnecessary. The fact that we are unable to guarantee the truth of a
proposition—fulfilling utopian demands of the rationalists—does not absolve
us from attempting to develop the best methods we can, even in the absence of
an absolute criteria for ‘best’. In particular, it provides no excuse for a failure
to take falsification seriously or to subject our theoretical speculative narratives
to serious examination. On the contrary, it should provide a good reason to take
these tasks and narrative pluralism much more seriously. The awareness of the
limitations of one’s tools and how best to use them does not provide an excuse
for using them badly—or not using them at all—but rather points to the need
to develop the ability to employ them skilfully and honestly. Nor does it license
a sloppy use of statistical inference within economic research—a practice that
McCloskey has documented.
Of course, it is a standard critique of neoclassical economics that it has abandoned
realistic assumptions and has insulated its core beliefs from empirical testing,
and does not meet the canons of any reasonable methodology. We will discuss
these implications for economics in greater detail in Chapter 8.
Summary
Summing up, it can be concluded that the claim that science has a privileged
epistemological status in virtue of its empirical basis cannot be sustained. Rather,
scientific and other inquiry uses much the same approach—a conclusion that
applies in particular to normative reasoning. Against this background, the next
chapter will turn to the examination of two interrelated issues—the distinction
that has been made between positive and normative theorising, and the status
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of economics—before going on to consider the suggestion that economists should
study moral philosophy.
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Chapter 7: What, Then, Can We Say
of the Status of Economics?
I think that Aristotle was profoundly right in holding that ethics is
concerned with how to live and with human happiness, and also
profoundly right in holding that this sort of knowledge [‘practical
knowledge’] is different from theoretical knowledge. A view of
knowledge that acknowledges that the sphere of knowledge is wider
than the sphere of ‘science’ seems to me to be a cultural necessity if we
are to arrive at a sane and human view of ourselves or of science.
— Hilary Putnam1
Introduction
In the previous two chapters, we looked at the critique that has developed of
the Enlightenment project and the implication of that critique for the status of
science in general. That critique challenges also the right of reason and
philosophy to be the final arbitrators of moral issues.2 The Enlightenment’s
utopian search for epistēmē in moral, political, economic, legal and social theory
more generally has failed and will continue to fail. It is now time to turn towards
a more detailed application of those ideas to economics. This is necessary because
most practising economists retain positivist methodological beliefs that
philosophers have long since abandoned.3  As we have seen above, no science
and particularly no social discipline can claim to produce absolute knowledge.
Rather, the insights of any conversation, of any story, of any discipline, are
forever subject to revision. Economics has sought to appropriate the prestige
attached in modern societies to the natural sciences because of their success in
the past several centuries in unravelling some of the mysteries of the natural
world. Accordingly, we saw the claim in Chapter 1 that economics is the universal
grammar of the social sciences—or, as some would say, the queen of the social
sciences. A little later, I will have something to say about the attempt of
economics to appropriate the particular language of physics. For the moment,
however, let us concentrate on the distinction that economists claim can be made
between positive and normative theorising.
The Distinction Between Positive and Normative Theorising,
Particularly in Economics
The attempt of Enlightenment philosophers to give a naturalistic, individualistic,
‘scientific’ and universal account of our moral codes was recounted above.
Intertwined was the attempt to insulate that account from any divine authority,
while at the same time trying to base those codes on empirical observation of
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human nature. The natural-law tradition—so central to Locke’s justification of
his social-contract theory—became increasingly secularised over several
centuries. The effect of those attempts was merely to justify existing moral and
political arrangements. Since then, much social thought has been preoccupied
with finding a method that will either determine values objectively or avoid
questions about values altogether.4
Notwithstanding the ambitions of Hobbes and Locke and their successors to
found our moral judgements on science, recent social scientists have generally
made a distinction between science and normative theorising. As a result, it is
often claimed that value judgements lack the objective validity of science, and
science must, as a methodological ideal, be kept free from them.5  Similarly,
economists have usually drawn a distinction between positive and normative
economics. It has, of course, been admitted readily that the application of the
‘positive’ science of economics to real public policy problems is a normative
issue. This—somewhat deceptively—usually took the form of suggesting that
it was in the choice of ends that the normative issue arose, while positive
economics could safely address the best way of achieving those specified ends.
The fact that ends and means are usually intertwined escaped notice.
It should already be clear to the reader from the account in previous chapters
that the idea of a value-free social discipline is not possible. All social knowledge
and moral narratives are stories told from a particular normative perspective,
employing language imbued with normative values. As Webb tells us, ‘[T]here
is no human action of any importance which does not become imbued with moral
and normative significance and hence develops an abstract and symbolic
dimension.’6
The distinction between the positive and the normative is usually traced to
Hume, who is taken to have held that there is a watertight distinction to be made
between the realm of facts and the realm of values:
I have always remark’d, that the author proceeds for some time in the
ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes
observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz’d
to find, that instead of the usual copulation of propositions, is, and is
not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or
an ought not. This change is imperceptible, but is, however, of the last
consequence. For as this ought or ought not, expresses some new relation
of affirmation, ’tis necessary that it should be observ’d and explain’d;
and at the same time that a reason should be given for what seems
altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from
others, which are entirely different from it. But as authors do not
commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to the
readers.7
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In economics, the distinction was picked up by Nassau Senior and Mill,8  and
was subsequently endorsed by Weber9  and Robbins.10  As such, it formed part
of the process by which economics shed any overt moral, historical and
institutional concerns and was transformed into a mathematical discipline. This
transformation reflected the growing influence of positivism with its view that
true scientific knowledge was divorced from metaphysical beliefs. As already
pointed out, it reflected also the growing prestige of Newtonian physics and the
desire of economists to emulate what they saw as the archetypical science.
Accordingly, it was claimed that economics as a positive science could treat
economic processes in isolation from their social environment, narrowing the
scope of the discipline significantly.11  In this formulation, the ‘art’ of policy
formulation was considered to rest in the establishment of attainable policy
goals, while the ‘science’ of political economy furnished the economic frameworks
by which the actions of economic actors pursuing their self-interest ensured the
attainment of the desired ends. As institutionalist Wesley Mitchell (1874–1948)
told us in 1918, however, this move served an important ideological purpose:
‘No one can read the Austrian writers, whose general scheme was similar to
Jevons’, without feeling that they are interested in developing the concert of
the maximising of utility largely because they thought it answered Marx’s
socialistic critique of modern economic organisation.’12
Typically and more recently, Richard Lipsey and Colin Harbury made the
distinction between positive and normative economics in their introductory
textbook.13
Macintyre points out that this distinction between facts and values relies on the
Enlightenment’s dismantling of the Aristotelian teleological tradition of the
medieval world, so that it becomes possible to conceive of the individual as prior
to and independent of social roles. In contrast, in the medieval world, the
argument that a ‘ought’ could not be deduced from an ‘is’ was clearly wrong,14
and remained clearly wrong in any world where socially defined roles continued
to exist.15  Such socially defined and enforced roles carrying normative
obligations are, however, an irreducible feature of any real social system,
including our own.
The distinction can be traced to the Cartesian mind–body dualism in which facts
are said to belong to the ‘objective’ realm of the body, whereas ‘values’ are said
to belong to the subjective realm of the mind.16  More recently, the distinction
is to be found in the positivist view of science, which considers that all statements
other than those that are empirical, logical or mathematical are without
content—are nonsense. The idea that economics—while being a scientific
discipline—is also a moral discourse is inconsistent with this demand and the
latter idea had to be ditched.
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Under the influence of Max Weber and the logical positivists, this distinction
was transformed into a dualism between facts and values. Only judgements
relating to the regularities of empirical phenomena were said to be either true
or false, while normative judgements could not be considered in this way—being
incapable of objective truth and objective warrant—or could not be considered
at all, being left to individual judgement. Carnap, for example, called all
non-scientific problems a confusion of pseudo-problems, claiming that all
‘statements belonging to Metaphysics, regulative Ethics, and [metaphysical]
Epistemology have this defect, are in fact unverifiable and, therefore, unscientific.
In the Viennese Circle, we are accustomed to describe such statements as
nonsense.’17
As Rorty points out, this is effectively a demand that the only language that is
cognitively meaningful should resemble the language of physics. Despite the
silliness of the claim, it held sway for many years and has come to seem like
conventional wisdom within economics. It is also wrong—and, according to
leading American philosopher Hilary Putnam, profoundly wrong, being
self-refuting! Explanatory theories do not occupy a privileged epistemological
position compared with normative theories.18  Such claims rest on untenable
arguments and over-inflated dichotomies.19 The idea of an absolute dichotomy
between ‘facts’ and ‘values’ depends on a strict dichotomy, applying to all
judgements, between ‘analytical’ judgements—which are tautological or true
by virtue of their meaning—and ‘synthetic’ judgements, which are subject to
empirical falsification (terms borrowed from Kant). In reality, very few things
are black or white.
Both these claims provided the foundations for logical positivism, ignoring Kant’s
own claim that the principles of mathematics were synthetic and analytical.
Indeed, Kant also held that moral judgements could be justified rationally—his
moral philosophy being an attempt to do so. Putnam goes on to argue that the
fact–value dichotomy has corrupted our ethical reasoning and our descriptions
of the world. Further, he disputes whether Hume would have approved of the
way in which his advice has been used in an attempt ‘to expel ethics from the
domain of knowledge’, because he was an important ethical thinker himself.20
Putnam also tells us that the original positivist view of a ‘fact’ was of something
that could be certified by mere observation or a report of a sensory experience.
As we have seen earlier, however, this view of fact has been discredited
thoroughly. Further, the key philosophical terms used by logical
positivists—‘cognitively meaningful’ and ‘nonsense’—are not observational
terms, theoretical terms or logical/mathematical terms, and yet these are the only
kinds of terms that they are prepared to allow in their language of science. They
are, therefore, being internally inconsistent. In any event, Quine showed to the
satisfaction of most philosophers that scientific statements could not ever be
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neatly separated into ‘conventions’ and ‘facts’, and that the idea was a hopeless
muddle:
The lore of our fathers is a fabric of sentences. In our hands it develops
and changes, through more or less arbitrary and deliberate revisions and
additions of our own, more or less directly occasioned by the continuing
stimulation of our sense organs. It is a pale grey lore, black with fact and
white with convention. But I have found no substantial reasons for
concluding that there are any quite black threads in it, or any white
ones.21
Facts and values are deeply entangled throughout our vocabulary. As we have
seen in Chapter 6, normative and aesthetic judgements are essential to science
itself, being the ‘good reasons’ used to justify empirical belief. In any event,
little in the social disciplines meets Weber’s test of universality. On the other
hand, many value judgements do meet the criteria specified by Weber: a shared
method and adequate data. They are, therefore, in Weber’s terms, ‘scientific’.
What Weber failed to appreciate was that the terms used in the social disciplines
were invariably ethically coloured—including in his own description of his
‘ideal types’. It could, however, be preferable to speak of the ‘justifiability’ of
a proposition, rather than to use the honorific ‘scientific’. It is the shared
standards for such truth and knowledge claims that are important, but these
standards are determined socially—including, as we have already seen, among
the scientific community. What is seen as true or scientifically justified is the
result of an organised and contingent consensus among an intellectual or scientific
community. Consequently, a normative claim is just as susceptible to justification
as any empirical or theoretical claim. The consequence of this line of argument
is that the conceptual distinction between positive and normative serves no
convincing intellectual purpose, while serving to privilege a particular type of
discourse—a political tactic in the broad sweep of discourse.
Science is a learning process, a social process, which develops in some
subcultures, and is characterised by the acceptance of an ethic—a strong value
system.22  Knowledge of the social system is an essential part of the social system
itself. Consequently, objectivity—in the sense of investigating a world that is
unchanged by the investigation of it—is also not achievable. The social
disciplines do not merely investigate the world; they simultaneously help create
the world that they are investigating. At this point, it is appropriate to recall
the point made in Chapter 1 and again in Chapter 6 that the stories we tell and
the vocabulary we use create our understanding of who we are and how we
should act. What scientific discourse creates becomes a problem of ethical choice.
Even the epistemological content of science has an ethical component. Under
these circumstances, the concept of a value-free science is untenable.
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Leading Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal (1917–92)—consistent with the
constructionist view outlined in Chapter 2—endorsed this point of view:
Throughout the book [The Political Element in the Development of Political
Theory] there lurks the idea that when all metaphysical elements are
radically cut away, a healthy body of positive economic theory will
remain, which is altogether independent of valuations…This implicit
belief in the existence of a body of scientific knowledge acquired
independently of all valuations is, as I now see it, naïve empiricism. Facts
do not organise themselves into concepts and theories just by being
looked at; indeed, except within the framework of concepts and theories,
there are no scientific facts but only chaos. There is an inescapable a
priori element in all scientific work. Questions must be asked before
answers can be given. The questions are all expressions of our interest
in the world; they are at bottom valuations. Valuations are thus
necessarily involved already at the stage when we observe facts and
carry on theoretical analysis and not only at the stage when we draw
political inferences from facts and valuations.23
Valuations are critical to the determination of facts and to all stages of inquiry.
Consequently, value commitments are inevitable in the social disciplines. In
particular, every social discipline carries an implicit definition of what it is to
be human, to provide a focus for its research and to distinguish its field from
those of the logician, physicist or biologist.24 There are, however, no grounds
for deciding what is an acceptable definition. It follows that the argument that
neoclassical economics is a formal system—which merely explores the
implications of its assumptions, the idealisations on which it is based—is not
convincing. No one develops such a system for pure pleasure, but to provide a
guide to policy decisions or as a justification of their ideological beliefs.
Additionally, the assumptions themselves incorporate normative valuations.
Furthermore, the social disciplines are moral disciplines by the very nature of
the problems they deal with. Scarcity, conflict, inequality, domination,
exploitation and war necessarily create problems for a stable and legitimate social
order.
In any event, ‘social science’ is part of the Enlightenment tradition that
instrumentalises nature and is now tending to instrumentalise human society
itself. The claim for the value neutrality of science—particularly social science—is
simply another highly questionable aspect of modernity. For Rorty also, the
distinction between facts and values can be sustained only if there is a value-free
vocabulary that renders sets of ‘factual’ statements commensurable.25 There is,
however, no such vocabulary. He argues that in choosing Galileo’s vocabulary
as a model, science and philosophy have confused its apparent lack of
metaphysical comfort and moral significance with the fact that it worked within
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a particular narrow range. Consequently, the positivists sought to eliminate
subjective elements by avoiding terms that could not be linked definitionally
to the terms denoting primary qualities in Galileo’s and Newton’s vocabularies.
This is the seventeenth-century myth of nature’s own vocabulary—the idea
that only a certain vocabulary is suitable for describing human beings or human
societies and that it is the only vocabulary in which they can be understood.
For Rorty, therefore, the issue between those who seek an objective, value-free,
truly scientific social science and those who think it should be acknowledged
as something more hermeneutical is not a disagreement about ‘method’ but a
disagreement about the sort of terminology to be used in moral and political
reflection.26 To say that something is better understood in one vocabulary than
another is simply a claim that a description in the preferred vocabulary is more
useful for a particular purpose.
The growth of scientific and quasi-scientific knowledge has not been as beneficial
socially as the Enlightenment imagined it would. The ethos of scientific rationality
has consistently undermined and eroded the particular, the local, the implicit
and the traditional in the name of individual human emancipation.27  As scientific
knowledge and technical expertise have grown ever more specialised, scientific
experts are often able to wield power and authority through their monopolisation
of esoteric knowledge and the prestige that this knowledge brings. This is the
very criticism I have made of economists throughout this book. Additionally,
the uncritical pursuit of social scientific knowledge works to reinforce the
existing powers in society that fund that research.28
The common thread in this critique is the realisation that the social disciplines
have an intrinsic connection with the moral and political life of society.29 While
the social scientist has an obligation to view reality as dispassionately as possible,
our perceptions of reality and our assumptions about it are radically moral. There
is no neutral platform of pure science utterly free from value commitments.
Rather, social science is a product of the development of a particular kind of
society and its lexicon. The development of Enlightenment economics clearly
took place in parallel with the development of the market system and served to
justify that system morally and scientifically. Nowhere is that connection more
closely observable than in the period of the ideological conflict between
capitalism and communism, when economics was deployed as a ‘scientific’
justification for the capitalist system.
Consequently, there is a growing body of opinion that again sees social disciplines
and economics in particular as moral inquiries. Furthermore, the particular
idealisations on which neoclassical economics is based are themselves based on
particular ideological commitments, particularly individualism. The distinction
becomes even less convincing when placed alongside the real public policy
questions on which economists provide advice. Inevitably, they involve leading
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normative questions. The nature of property rights developed by a society clearly
involves normative choices. Pareto-optimality—the major criteria for policy
choice used by economists—is dependent on, and biased in favour of, the existing
distribution of power, wealth and property rights, and consequently is not
normatively neutral. Likewise, the choice of the goal of maximising the value
of output is a normative one. Importantly, the price structure itself is not neutral.
It is a function of the distribution of income, wealth and power.30 The question
of the regulation of unfair conduct is also a normative one, and the arguments
used in that discourse are normative. Indeed, the advocacy of economic efficiency
as the general goal of public policy is plainly a moral choice.
Importantly, the policy world is also one in which the distinction between ends
and means quickly breaks down. While the distinction could have served to
draw attention to the normative content of policy advice, in practice it has been
used to camouflage the moral judgements being made by economists and the
normative presuppositions of the market system—behind the cloak of alleged
scientific objectivity. Consequently, while the idea and ideal of value neutrality
persists, the confidence put in it is misplaced.
Among prominent contemporary economists, Daniel Hausman and Michael
McPherson agree that the simple picture of the economist providing value-free
technical information does not fit the economist who is asked for advice.31 They
summarise that economists should care about moral questions for at least the
following four reasons.
1. Behaviour, and hence economic outcomes, is influenced by the moral values
of economic agents. Economists rarely describe moral commitments without
evaluating them, and they affect that morality by how they describe it.
They should, therefore, think about the morality that should be accepted,
as well as the morality that is, in fact, accepted in society.
2. Standard welfare economics rests on strong and contestable moral
presuppositions. The standard definition of a social optimum compares
social alternatives exclusively in terms of their outcomes—rather than the
rightness of their procedures—and identifies the goodness of outcomes
with satisfaction of individual preferences. These commitments are neither
neutral nor uncontroversial. Consequently, they question the moral basis
of the concern with efficiency, and whether it is any less controversial than
the moral commitments that lie behind equity.
3. Politicians and non-economists talking about welfare employ concepts that
do not translate easily into the language of standard economic theory. Ideas
of fairness, opportunity, freedom and rights are more important in policy
making than individual preference rankings. Equating welfare with the
satisfaction of preferences—which could be short-sighted or
ill-informed—begs questions of justified paternalism. They question the
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quality of a world in which our humanity is always under the control of
rational calculation.
4. In practice, positive and normative concerns are often intermingled in
policy advice.
Hausman and McPherson point out that economics embodies a commitment to
a certain mode of modelling and to a normative theory of prudence. The theory
of rationality is already a part of the theory of morality. The view of rationality
that economists endorse—utility theory—might not even be compatible with
moral behaviour, and does not provide a rich enough picture of individual choice
to permit one to discuss the character, causes and consequences of moral
behaviour. As Saul says, ‘If you confuse self-interest with ethics, you stumble
into a false rationality— instrumentalism—in which ethics is meant to be
profitable.’32
The Questionable Status of Economics within the Human
Conversation
This account has already rejected the proposition that there can be such a thing
as positive economics. Economics—particularly its application to public policy
choices—is inherently normative. The systematic investigation of social
phenomena—including economic phenomena—cannot be decried simply because
it is normative. It is, however, a lot more difficult than it appeared to
Enlightenment philosophers. At best, economics is a normative science, but
given the false connotations of the word ‘science’ in English, it might be better
to rename it a normative discipline. The dominant school of
economics—neoclassical economics—has involved the application of a particular
metaphor to social affairs. This, in itself, is legitimate. There is no other way of
proceeding. The Newtonian metaphor is, however, only one among possibly
countless numbers of such metaphors, and it might simply be an inappropriate
one to use. After all, it is no longer fashionable within physics and that is where
it came from. It also follows from the earlier argument that there are no final
criteria for determining its worth. The criteria that are used in practice include
its simplicity, its usefulness and its elegance—but our understanding of these
cannot be tied down. They also are matters of human invention. It is,
consequently, up to the advocates of the use of the Newtonian metaphor in
economics to convince the rest of us of the worth of their project, independent
of the ‘truth’ claims that were simply assumed by the Enlightenment.
In the spirit of this criticism, McCloskey claims that economics fits poorly within
the hypothetical-deductive model of science and that its methodological theory
has never been coherent. She recommends that economists turn from such
positivism and recognise that what they do is to persuade.33  She argues that all
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economists use rhetorical devices such as analogies and appeals to authority as
thoroughly as poets and preachers—though with less understanding of why.
There is a danger, however, that a hermeneutical approach to economic analysis
could be used to encourage the uncritical acceptance of modern economics.34
The hermeneutical approach would not oppose the call for much greater empirical
testing of economic theories. The falsification criterion is central to the coherence
test applauded earlier. While still a minority view within the economics
profession, the hermeneutical approach is being taken seriously by some. For
example, economists Arjo Klamer and McCloskey35  claim that economists have
begun to see that their talk is rhetorical—an honest argument directed at an
audience. This does not warrant a casual indifference to truth as newly
understood. Consequently, they question what constitutes economic knowledge.
In so doing, they point to specific influential papers as examples: one in the
rhetoric of the hypothetical-deductive model of science, but which looks more
like a charming metaphor; and another in the rhetoric of empirical finding, but
which looks like a reading of history. Furthermore, prior convictions appear to
have a large effect on the econometric results of normal economics. They question
the point of publishing one’s prior convictions dressed up as findings. They go
on to argue that ‘all conversations are rhetorical’ and to recommend ‘a rhetorically
sophisticated culture for economists, following Richard Rorty in which neither
the priests nor the physicists nor the poets nor the Party were thought of as
more “rational” or more “scientific” or “deeper” than one another’.36 They
suggest, however, that being a good conversationalist asks for more than
following some method. It asks for goodness. Presumably this means serious
adherence to the norms of the scientific subculture, including the subjection of
claims to serious and honest examination.
In the same spirit, American historian of economic thought Robert Heilbroner
(1919–2005) reminded us that for Smith, rhetoric—the art of speaking
effectively—was the rock on which economics stood.37  He sympathises with
McCloskey’s attack on the pretentious scientism in which economists couch
their mutual persuasions. He sees such scientism as dangerous, in that it conceals,
or minimises, the elements of judgement and moral valuation that are an intrinsic
part of economics. Indeed, for Heilbroner, economics is ideological, by which
he means an earnest and sincere effort to explain society as its ideologists perceive
it—an effort to speak the truth at all costs: ‘What is “ideological” about such
an effort is not its hypocrisy but its absence of historical perspective, its failure
to perceive that its pronouncements are a belief system, conditioned like all
belief systems by the political and social premises of the social order.’38
From this perspective, economics is intrinsically normative and directive in that
it embodies the constitutive beliefs of its parent society. These beliefs are
intrinsically political, in part the result of the self-justifying intentions of their
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spokespeople. It is also because all societies presuppose structures of
subordination and superordination, of cooperation and conflict-resolution and
of the justification and use of power. Consequently, all systems of social thought
must contain that political character, knowingly and explicitly, or unknowingly
and in disguise.
Of course, many economists dismiss methodological questions on the grounds
that all the effort to determine whether economics is a science or not has never
advanced economics in any practical sense.39 This is not a tenable position in
this inquiry. In practice, economists do pronounce with apparent authority on
policy issues. What is the source of that authority?
Can Moral Philosophy Assist Economists in Providing Policy
Advice?
The above critique of modernity calls into question the claim that moral and
legal reasoning could imitate geometrical forms of argument. As indicated above,
this particular idealisation of human rationality—this attempt to legislate how
we are to think so as to achieve certainty, to privilege a particular class of stories
and story-tellers—has been subject to quite destructive criticism. Contemporary
philosopher Christopher Cherniak concludes as a result that ‘the pervasively
and tacitly assumed conception of rationality in philosophy is so idealised that
it cannot apply in any interesting way to actual human beings’.40
In the face of these philosophical and methodological conclusions, the extent to
which economists can have anything special to say on public policy development
as a result of their ‘economic expertise’ is deeply problematic.
It is, however, at this point that we encounter the superficially helpful suggestion
that economists should turn to the study of moral philosophy if they are to offer
relevant policy advice. This turn to moral philosophy is, however, no turn at
all. It is where economists have been all along—albeit disguised behind
mathematical jargon. They seem to have forgotten that Smith, their hero, was a
moral philosopher who considered his Theory of Moral Sentiments his greatest
work. Indeed, neoclassical economics is inherently utilitarian and hedonistic.
An appeal from economics to utilitarianism is therefore no more than an appeal
from Caesar to Caesar. It is simply a further appeal to the Enlightenment’s failed
search for epistēmē in social, political and moral theorising.
The suggestion assumes that moral philosophy can produce rational answers to
the moral questions raised by public policy questions, but it is that very concept
of rationality that is in question. In any event, this search for basic principles
of ethical action has run into the sand. The metaphysical and teleological
superstructures that held the medieval and classical worlds together were
dismantled by the Enlightenment project, which began as a rejection of religion
as the guarantor of legitimacy and meaning. That project’s search for a
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replacement collapsed and left a vacuum. As MacIntyre concludes, ‘[I]n spite of
the efforts of three centuries of moral philosophy and one of sociology, [we] lack
any coherent, rationally defensible statement of a liberal individualist point of
view.’41 The project has privatised all sources of meaning and belief, ensuring
that no other tradition can assert itself as the sole claimant of a shared and public
conception of good.42  Saul makes a similar point: ‘There is an ever-growing
difference between theory and practice—that is, between theories of ethics and
the ethical reality we know and understand. The result has been…the irrelevance
of much of ethical theory to the ethical lives that people are actually striving to
lead.’43
Importantly, why should we attach more weight to the pronouncements of
philosophers on moral issues than those of other people?44 There is little reason
to believe that the academic practice of moral philosophy has any privileged
authority to determine the style and method of thinking on moral matters, what
the serious problems are and how they should be characterised.45 The normative
assumption underlying this form of justification is never justified. Apparently,
we are somehow required by reason to accept certain basic moral injunctions;
but where reason acquires this power to compel is never explained, it is simply
assumed. This is a major problem:
Again and again over the last 2,500 years we have been subjected to the
assertion that reason alone allows us to identify and use ethics. The
intention has often been good. But the effect each time has been to turn
ethics into a creature of reason…It is this assumption about intellectual
form which is central to distancing ethics from real use.46
Despite their high claims, however, moral philosophers do not start from a blank
slate when they begin their system building. They start from an impression of
the everyday social reality embodied in culture, language and tradition. For
example, at the end of the day, Rawls seeks to justify the norms that he thinks
are the critical ones in his society and to legislate them. As Saul points out,
however, his procedure—which identifies justice with fairness and defines a
person’s good as the successful execution of a rational plan of life—is
embarrassing in its naïvety.47  Similarly, Yale philosophical theologian Nicholas
Wolterstorff—noting that Rawls is trying to resolve the conflict in the American
tradition between freedom and equality—questions how one could reasonably
expect to extract principles from that American culture that could resolve that
conflict.48  Many other philosophers, including Nozick, could be accused of
similar naïvety. In Nozick’s case, the fundamental premise that we are born with
certain intrinsic rights, which override all other considerations, is simply not
true. That is only something that some of us say in a particular cultural
environment. The consequence was that at the end of his life Nozick was left
wondering why what he thought worked in theory did not work in practice.
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For his part, Habermas rejects the idea of value-free inquiry, and instead advances
a critical dialectic-hermeneutic approach to social and moral theorising.49  He
distinguishes between practical and technical instrumental knowledge, seeing
the practical as the sphere of fully human activity—knowledge of which can be
reached only by open human discourse. He believes that there is a crisis of
legitimacy in the contemporary capitalist world arising from the fundamental
conditions of capitalist societies and the social-welfare responsibilities of mass
democracies. While this is a continuing problem for political and social
discourse—as political and social theorists have always recognised—this
particular crisis lies at the heart of the popular dissatisfaction with economic
fundamentalist policy prescriptions. Habermas, however, retains his faith in
rational discourse, believing that norms and institutions can be justified through
rational discourse and consensus linked to the intention of a good and true life.
For Habermas, legitimacy rests on rational justification. He therefore searches
for the ideal speech conditions under which rational consensus can be achieved
through unrestrained universal discourse. The ideal speech community, he
postulates, can then provide a critical standard against which to judge the
consensuses reached in practice. In this he is attempting, like Rawls, to define
an ideal situation in which agreement can occur. Habermas and Rawls value
freedom, rationality, equality and knowledge as essential preconditions for
achieving consensus and valid moral principles.
Since we do not live in such a world, we cannot know what would command
agreement, and consequently what ethical principles to recommend.50  Both
accounts, however, are important in reminding us that such judgements, to be
legitimate, must rest on social consensus. They point to the fundamental
importance of maintaining the health of our democratic traditions and institutions
in the hope of approaching a basis on which we can all accept the legitimacy of
the government’s normative decisions. Let us face it, however: our public political
discourse is in disarray. In particular, our federal parliament has degenerated
into a farce devoted to the manipulation of the electorate, with Question Time
a circus involving childish point scoring on all sides. Worse, ill-conceived,
rapidly drafted complex legislation is rammed through the parliament with the
minimum of examination. We deserve better! More broadly still, dishonesty in
public discourse, the manipulative exploitation of the public’s fears for political
advantage, the demonising of political opponents or other individuals and groups
and using public funds to finance political propaganda all threaten our traditions
and institutions. As Hitler, Goebbels and Stalin taught us, such conduct is part
of a slippery slope that ends in tyranny and death camps.
Accordingly, we need to look to the quality of our public discourse and the real
reform of our democratic institutions. I believe, for example, that there is a
strong case for a constitutional bill of rights. We should also limit the present
excessive power of the prime minister and the Executive. An elected presidency
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might make sense in providing an additional check to the accumulation of
excessive power by the prime minister, as would fixed terms for both houses of
parliament and proportional representation in the House of Representatives. In
addition, we need to increase the accountability of ministerial staffers. Other
highly desirable changes include an independent speaker in the house, a greatly
strengthened committee system in the house, senate scrutiny of appointments
to the courts and statutory bodies and the restoration of some autonomy and
balance to the Australian Public Service. Re-establishing an independent Public
Service Board and restoring tenure and appeal rights at senior levels would help
the last. In addition, we need to find some way to better balance the influence
of central coordinating agencies over other departments. This could involve, in
particular, a reduction in the size and influence of the Department of Prime
Minister and Cabinet so that it operates more as a coordinating agency rather
than as a super department second-guessing and overseeing all others. Similar
concerns apply to the excessive influence of the Departments of Treasury and
Finance and Administration. Accountants make good servants but poor masters.
Finally, as a community, we have to stop our governments using public funds
for party-political advertising. Such conduct is of questionable morality as is
systematic pork-barrelling in marginal electorates.
This democratic need is reinforced by the realisation that in practice there are
different and incompatible schools in moral and political philosophy, each
claiming rational justification.51  Moral and political justifications take many
different forms and people give many different justifications for these
judgements. It follows that moral disagreements are the essence of political
debate. These conflicting moral and political traditions are embedded in our
moral vocabulary, culture and tradition: ‘[W]e live with the inheritance of not
only one, but a number of well integrated moralities. Aristotelianism, primitive
Christian simplicity, the puritan ethic, the aristocratic ethic of consumption and
the traditions of democracy and socialism have all left a mark on our moral
vocabulary.’52
Weber made a similar point when he claimed that modern people lived in a
world of warring gods, presiding over highly organised but incompatible value
systems. The extraordinarily powerful demands of kinship, economics, politics,
art, love and science are inconsistent.53  Indeed, Steven Tipson points out that
such moral ideas change their meanings and social usage over time within all
cultures.54
These incompatible traditions—when taken with the Enlightenment’s
privatisation of morality—mean that moral values are now often taken to be a
matter for individual choice. The practical result is that arguments alone can
give no definitive answer to moral questions, and all such philosophers do is
disguise the answers they want to give as the verdict of philosophical inquiry.
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Thus, ‘expert’ policy advisers are in a position to pick their school of moral
thought to suit their rhetorical and ideological purposes, hiding their choice
behind a cloud of impressive rhetoric. Hausman and McPherson warn us also
of the many dimensions of moral appraisal and against reducing these many
dimensions to one or two.55  In practice, however, moral discourse seems to be
afflicted with a very bad dose of reductionism.
This appeal to moral theory leads to a reliance on theoretical stories to explain
moral values rather than real reflection on experience. At the heart of many such
theoretical accounts remains the Enlightenment idea that social life is logically
secondary to an unconstrained non-social life in which what people do is a matter
of their individual ‘natural’ drives and choices. This psychological vocabulary
presupposes an established web of social and moral relationships.56  Moral
justifications are always justifications to somebody who accepts the relevant
standard.57
Indeed, MacIntyre58  points out that contemporary moral philosophy is
characterised by radical disagreement, interminable arguments and
incommensurable premises. There is no rational way of securing moral agreement
in our culture. We have competing and conflicting theories. For example, there
are deontological theories such as those of Rawls, Nozick and Gerwith, which
focus on the individual and usually take duty or rights as the basis of morality.
We also have teleological theories, which judge actions on the basis of their
consequences alone. From this teleological perspective, we can know whether
something is right only if one knows the fundamental aims or ends that our
activities are to promote.
The arguments MacIntyre cites are logically consistent, but their premises are
such that there is no way of weighing their respective claims.59 These premises
employ quite different normative concepts, so that their claims are of different
kinds. Furthermore, there is no established way of deciding between these claims
in our society. The invocation of one premise against another is pure assertion
and counter-assertion. The different conceptually incommensurable premises
of rival arguments can be traced easily to a wide variety of historical origins,
but we should not underestimate the complexity of the history and ancestry of
such arguments. We need to recognise that the various concepts that inform our
moral discourse were originally at home in larger totalities of theory and practice
in which they enjoyed a role and function supplied by a context of which they
have now been deprived.
This has led MacIntyre to complain that moral philosophy is often written as
though the history of the subject were of only secondary and incidental
importance. Some philosophers have even written as if moral concepts were
timeless, limited, unchanging, determinate species of concept necessarily having
the same features throughout their history. The history of ethics demonstrates,
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however, that moral concepts change as social life changes. For example, the list
of virtues in the Nicomachean Ethics reflects what Aristotle takes to be the code
of a gentleman in contemporary Greek society.60 To understand a concept is
always to learn the grammar that controls the use of such words and so to grasp
the role of the concept in language and social life. There are, however,
continuities as well as breaks in the history of moral concepts. The complexity
is increased because philosophical inquiry itself plays a part in changing moral
concepts.
Consequently, it is not clear that an investigation of how a concept is used will
yield one clear and consistent account. Furthermore, if part of our ethical
knowledge is tacit—as argued in Chapter 2—it might not even be possible to
articulate the concepts successfully. Moreover, the current state of moral
philosophy involves a whole range of interconnected, different views. The
parties to these different views will not agree that they can be settled by empirical
inquiry into the way in which evaluative concepts are really used. The ordinary
use of moral concepts could on occasions be confused or even perverted through
the influence of misleading philosophical theory. For MacIntyre, therefore, it is
important for us to discover the narratives we inhabit, recognising that competing
groups inhabit incommensurable universes of discourse.61
For his part, Rorty questions whether we already possess the moral vocabulary
necessary to determine whether we are doing justice to others.62  He argues that
since Kant and Bentham, moral philosophy has identified moral perfection with
doing justice to others, taking for granted that we already possess the necessary
vocabulary. From this perspective, the problem is to split the difference between
Kant and Bentham— between the categorical imperative and the utilitarian
principle as formulations of ‘the moral law’. This reduction of morality to the
moral law has twin roots in the Christian and scientific traditions. On the one
side, it is an attempt to update and make respectable the Judaeo-Christian idea
that all the laws and the prophets can be summed up in respect for one’s fellow
humans. On the other hand, it is an attempt to secularise ethics by imitating
Galileo’s secularisation of cosmology, finding nice, elegant little formulae with
which to predict what will happen. Consequently, when Aristotelians,
Kierkegaardian Christians, Marxists or Nietzscheans argue that there is more to
moral philosophy than that—that we might not yet know the words that will
permit us to deal justly with our fellows—they are said to confuse morality with
something else, something religious or aesthetic or ideological. When philosophers
protest that what is needed is not rules that synthesise the utilitarian principles
and the categorical imperative but rather a morally sensitive vocabulary, they
are seen as doing something rather odd and ‘literary’, not to be confused with
moral theory.
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For Rorty, the difficult moral cases are ones in which we grope for the correct
words to describe the situation, not ones in which we are torn between the
demands of two principles. The fiction of real moral and political questions being
resolved by finding the morally relevant features of the situation—those that
can be described in the vocabulary in which classical moral principles are
stated—should not be taken seriously. We should not think of our distinctive
moral status as being ‘grounded’ in our possession of mind, language, culture,
feeling, intentionality, textuality or anything else. These numinous ideas are
simply declarations of our awareness that we are members of a moral community,
phrased in pseudo-explanatory jargon. This awareness is something that cannot
be further ‘grounded’; it is simply taking a certain point of view on our fellow
humans. It is the ability to wield complex and sensitive moral vocabularies that
counts as moral sophistication. What makes the modern West morally advanced
is not a clear vision of objective moral truths but its sense that we are creating
morality—a moral text—rather than discovering nature’s own moral vocabulary.
What needs to be emphasised is that the moral vocabulary does not stand alone,
but, in any culture, is supplemented greatly by endless narratives, which aim
to explain the way in which the vocabulary should be used.
This emphasis on the existing moral vocabularies stands as a healthy correction
to the Platonic system-building tendencies of Western rationalism. Indeed,
Wolterstorff argues that we must carry on politics without a foundation. There
is no neutral or coherent set of principles—no single story—that can adjudicate
such conflicts as that between freedom and equality. Rather, Wolterstorff seeks
a unity that emerges from dialogue in a society characterised by religious, moral
and philosophical pluralism.63  In this same spirit, American developmental
psychologist Norma Haan looks to the construction of an empirically based,
consensual theory of everyday morality.64 This morality of everyday life is not
a capacity that resides exclusively in individuals; it is social exchange in itself.
For Haan, several Platonic ideas have obscured the simpler features of everyday
morality. For example, it is assumed that for a moral theory to be adequate, it
should provide clear and absolute guidance for all the important problems of
living. Consequently, formulations of everyday morality have usually been
depreciated as being relativistic and inferior.
In the spirit of Toulmin, Haan argues that such absolute claims attract human
beings because they seem to deliver the security of moral clarity. Associated
with this is an assumption that we can know a complete morality only when it
is presented by a higher authority or by morally elite figures. The consequence
of this way of thinking is that leaders can then employ morality and manipulate
guilt as an instrument of political control. People’s deep commitments to their
various groups make them highly vulnerable and responsive to this form of
manipulation. Leaders’ public judgements of moral merit quell the efforts of the
disadvantaged to promote their own good: those of lower status are guilty,
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intrinsically unworthy and have not earned the right to expect more. For Haan,
however, everyday morality has no source other than the experience and
agreements of people themselves. She therefore questions whether moralities
must be in the form of complete, formalised systems, rather than the more
proximate forms that emerge from the details of human interchange. In such a
morality of everyday life, specialists are not needed. Under the influence of
Piaget’s work, Haan believes that the mind is active, rational and constructivist,
and that morality must, therefore, be inductive and creative rather than compliant
and rule deductive. She questions whether it is realistic to consider ‘moral
character’ as a fixed faculty; rather, she sees moral responsiveness as a sensitivity
and skill in social interaction. This would seem to require an ability to access
the appropriate social text.65  In this connection, psychology is moving towards
the explicit recognition that humans are thoroughgoing social beings from birth
and that infants are far less egocentric than previously thought.
When social interaction is taken as the pivotal feature of morality, a different
view of moral processes, decisions, guidelines and individual capacities emerges.
Moral dialogues occur continuously as major or minor events throughout the
life of every person. People have a clear and strong expectation of engaging in
moral dialogue as a means of organising the patterns of social thought and
interchange. Consequently, moral dialogue can be regarded as the prime moral
structure. The question of why people are willing to consider others’ moral
claims has some empirical answers. Haan66  considers that people are willing to
consider the moral claims of others for the following interrelated, empirical
reasons:
• the need to conserve our view of ourselves as moral
• the mismatch between the moral person one thinks one is and the immoral
person one is afraid one has been
• enlightened self-interest
• integrity among people, a matter of good faith.
This interactive view puts citizens and society in the difficult role of working
constantly to achieve moral agreements. In order to be moral, people must really
and authentically participate in building the morality they endorse and use. In
particular, for Haan, a just society cannot exist without an interactive morality
requiring equitable participation. The more remote justice is from the real
experience of people, the less sensible it is for them to accept society as morally
legitimated. This is a position very close to that advanced by Habermas—shorn
of its Platonic tendencies. It also has much in common with the evolutionary
account of the development of moral order advanced in Chapter 2. It is not,
however, a position that rejects critical analysis, but it gives far greater weight
to other forms of prophetic proclamation.
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Conclusion
Earlier I argued that self-interest was not the fundamental ordering principle
operating in society. This was in response to the argument from many economists
that social norms and social groups could be explained as a result of a voluntary
contract between self-interested individuals who made a rational calculation
that cooperation was in their long-term interest. Rather it was claimed that
human beings have always been social animals drawing their identity from their
social relations and from their culture. Consequently, neither the self nor society
had explanatory priority. As a result, the methodological individualism inherent
in the social contract idea could not be sustained. It was also argued that our
moral and legal infrastructures were essential to the social and economic
system—the economic system being seen as a subsystem of the social system.
An evolutionary account was given of the development of that social system.
The neglect of the social underpinnings of economic activity by contemporary
economists is surprising given the weight of earlier discussion. An account was
provided in the previous chapter of the various ways in which that relationship
has been described.
Chapter 4 developed a critique of the foundations of economic fundamentalism,
examining a number of closely interrelated themes. The chapter has examined,
firstly, the historical emergence of the intellectual basis of modernity and
economic fundamentalism, recounting the waning of the medieval idea—inherited
from Aristotle through Aquinas—that human beings are social and political
beings necessarily involved in a network of social relations. This view was
replaced by what was termed the natural-law outlook, in which the divine
underpinnings of the inherited idea of natural law were gradually secularised.
This was a trend associated with the developments of science and a desire to
find a scientific and increasingly more natural explanation of the social order.
Therefore, appeals to reason and nature—both increasingly divinised—provided
a source of meaning and justification as comprehensive as the religion they had
replaced. Social-contract theory emerged to provide a Newtonian and
individualistic account of the social and political system. Gradually, the concept
of contract replaced law and custom as the source of law and social obligations.
Locke’s account—with its emphasis on pre-social property rights—was
particularly agreeable to the propertied classes. While the various theories
recounted did not add up to a coherent whole, they reflected the Enlightenment’s
ambition to produce a secular, naturalist and rational justification for our moral
allegiances and social arrangements.
Economics is the inheritor of this tradition of scientific discourse. This leads
directly to the question of what kind of discourse is economics. Is economics a
positive science or is it a moral discourse? Notwithstanding the ambitions of
Hobbes and Locke and their successors to found our moral institutions on science,
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in the past century economists have generally made a distinction between positive
and normative economics—a distinction traced to Hume’s distinction between
facts and values. Normative economics involved the application of the positive
science of economics to policy problems in which the choice of ends was seen
as normative, with positive economics addressing the best way of achieving
those ends. It has been argued that it is a mistake to think that explanatory
theories occupy a privileged epistemological position compared with normative
theories. There is no value-free vocabulary. It was concluded, therefore, that
the distinction between positive and normative economics could not be sustained,
and that economics was a moral discipline.
The question then arises as to what can be said about the status of economics as
a science. It is clear that the positivist pretensions of science—in which scientific
progress is viewed as the inclusion of more and more phenomena under natural
laws of greater and greater generality—have themselves been undermined.
While there is not complete agreement among critics of the positivist view of
science, there is broad agreement on essential points. The belief that scientific
knowledge is an accurate representation of ‘reality’ needs to be abandoned.
Accuracy of representation is not achievable. Rather, science is a social practice
in which knowledge is constructed socially to produce coherence—a social
practice that in the physical sciences has just happened to work so far.
Consequently, the empirical sciences cannot claim an essential grasp of reality
and thus a privileged status.
This is no minor quibble but a fundamental attack on the whole Enlightenment
project. What is involved is a decisive break in our world-view. In particular,
the Newtonian mechanistic world-view—which has dominated Western thought
since the sixteenth century—has been undermined along with any sense of
objective certainty in the physical sciences or the political-cultural sphere. As
a consequence, we have to live with a profound sense of historical relativism
and the belief that there can be no overarching absolute principle that can
reconcile all the relativities of human thought and experience. In particular, the
possibility of demonstrating the truth of ethical propositions has been
undermined. This critique has also undermined the credibility of much economic
theorising, particularly its use—at a high level of abstraction—to support
arguments for a minimalist government, arguments that have their origins with
Locke.
Within the economics profession there are those who are taking this
hermeneutical view of science and economics seriously. Others have sought
refuge in moral philosophy as a means of supporting their policy
recommendations. As might be expected from the critique of rationalism, moral
philosophy is itself in disarray. In any event, it is where economists have been
all along. Furthermore, the idea that we already possess the moral vocabulary
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necessary for determining whether we are doing justice for others is disputed.
It is the ability to wield a sophisticated moral vocabulary that counts, along with
the awareness that we are creating—rather than discovering—morality.
It is against this background of deep scepticism about the claims of economics
to moral neutrality that I turn in the next chapter to critique the content of
mainstream economic theorising—or what is known as neoclassical economics.
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Chapter 8: The Critique of Neoclassical
Economics and its Influence on Policy
Decisions
Adam’s Smith’s invisible hand may be invisible because, like the
Emperor’s new clothes, it simply isn’t there; or if it is there, it is too
palsied to be relied upon…But let us be quite clear about the
epistemological basis of the neoclassical proposition: It is not a deductive
proposition…The neoclassical synthesis was put forward as dogma, an
article of faith.
— Joseph Stiglitz1
Hitherto men have constantly made up for themselves a false conception
about themselves, about what they are and what they ought to be. They
have arranged their relationships according to their ideas of God or
normal man, etc. The phantoms of their brains have gained the mastery
over them. They, the creators, have bowed down before their creatures.
Let us liberate them from the chimeras, the ideas, dogmas, imaginary
beings under the yoke of which they are pining away.
— Karl Marx2
Where Are We Going?
Until now, I have confined my account to a critique of the historical,
philosophical and scientific foundations of economic fundamentalism, pointing
to general concerns about the practical value of economic theorising and the
tradition of political and moral theorising of which it forms part. It is now time
to turn more directly to the content of that theorising and its impact on economic
policy. In this chapter, I propose firstly to make some further preliminary remarks
about the influence of mainstream economics on economic policy settings. I then
propose to draw attention to the long-running critique of neoclassical economics
and the tendency of economists to run up the shutters in defence of their ‘normal
science’. The account will then turn to the nature of the knowledge that is
involved in public policy making and the stubborn search for epistēmē rather
than for practical wisdom among policy advisers. The account will then move
to a description of the consequences of that search for epistēmē in the form of
the idealisations and unrealistic assumptions of neoclassical economics. These
are falsely supposed to result in an analytical situation analogous to the
experimental situations of the natural sciences.
We will then take a brief diversion into the normative consequences of that
idealisation—the fact that the idealisations assumed have become normative
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ideals. We will then return to a more detailed description of those flawed
assumptions and their implications for faith in unregulated markets. From there,
we will move to the formal ontological critique of neoclassical economics, which
brings together the above ideas. In the absence of a secure theoretical foundation
for economic policy making and the irrelevance of recent dabbling in game
theory, I will describe briefly the appreciative justification for competitive
markets that the above theoretical story is supposed to underpin. We will then
move to the absence of a convincing growth theory in neoclassical economics
and then to a brief description of alternative approaches to economic analysis.
The chapter ends by drawing attention to proposals for the reform of economic
teaching.
Mainstream Economics
It is important to note as a first step that mainstream economics is divided into
two streams of theorising: macro and microeconomics. Macroeconomics is the
study of the behaviour of the economy as a whole. It studies such things as
aggregate trends in national income, unemployment and inflation.
Microeconomics takes a bottom-up view of economic activity, abstracting from
the institutional framework within which the economy operates and attempting
to study the demand for goods and services, the formation of prices and the
allocation of resources. It provides one of the central intellectual underpinnings
for economic fundamentalism and its worship of markets.
Economic fundamentalism has influenced macro and micro policy—for example,
influencing the willingness of governments to run budget deficits and to finance
infrastructure investment through borrowings, the degree of independence
given to monetary authorities, the policy emphasis given to monetary stability
over full employment and the heed paid to the views of the financial industry
and financial journalists on policy settings more generally. Perhaps the most
pernicious recent influence of economic fundamentalism in Australia has been
in the area of microeconomic policy, where it has motivated a wholesale
restructuring of our institutional arrangements under the mantra of
microeconomic reform.
The mainstream economist might ask what I am complaining about given that
the Australian economy has been performing very well lately. It is important to
acknowledge the enormous economic growth and improvement in material living
standards achieved in developed countries and some developing countries in
living memory and more broadly since medieval times. Economic fundamentalists
are quick to attribute our recent good performance to the impact of their favourite
microeconomic reforms. The current Secretary to the Treasury, Ken Henry,
recently claimed that this much better performance was due overwhelmingly
to the numerous economic reforms that were implemented progressively in
response to the policy failures of the 1970s.3  Henry points in particular to what
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he believes to have been the importance of flexible labour markets. He goes on
to suggest that reforming the supply side of the economy will remain an enduring
feature of Treasury advice. The question that these claims gloss over is whether
Australians and their families want to be the servants of ‘the supply side of the
economy’, and whether the claimed benefits of flexibility translate into real
improvements in social welfare—properly conceived and measured. Furthermore,
are any so-called efficiency benefits more important to Australians than fairness,
stability and leisure?
There have been other things going on that have probably been much more
influential, including the biggest mineral boom in our history. In the past 50
years, we have witnessed the extraordinary growth of Japan, South Korea,
Taiwan and more recently China and India. As these countries are the major
markets for our commodity exports, Australia has benefited enormously from
that growth. Along with the rest of the Western world, Australia has also
witnessed extraordinary change in educational attainment, health standards and
the movement of women into the paid workforce. In addition, we have witnessed
extraordinary technological changes in recent decades.
Then there has been the relatively successful record of the Reserve Bank in
managing monetary policy after the Keating recession of the early 1990s, which
finally killed the inflationary psychology of the previous two decades. That
relative success in the face of its limited policy instruments has enabled low
inflation and continued growth despite, in particular, the Asian meltdown. In
addition, there have been positive influences from the numerous recent pragmatic
departures from economic fundamentalist policy prescriptions; and there has
been some benefit from the progressive removal of tariff protection in
encouraging a more competitive economic environment. Those tariff policies
were, however, particularly badly designed in the first place—being entitlement
policies directed towards import replacement rather than export-driven growth.
Their failure was inevitable given the lack of even a minimum commitment to
strategic planning or enforceable industry investment commitments. The
consequence was the development of production capabilities that lacked
internationally competitive scale and were unsustainable in the long run.
In short, in my view, our recent good economic growth results from a complex
of factors and good luck, and cannot be sheeted home solely or primarily to
economic ‘reform’.
That relatively good growth record has helped blind us to the costs involved in
specific policies—particularly the costs of increased economic insecurity
throughout the community, the increased intensity in our working lives, the
heavy environmental costs and the uneven distribution of the benefits, often as
a result of the abuse of market power, but also as a result of the reluctance of
governments to invest in public goods. Recent research has demonstrated that
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most Australians want a reversion to regular working hours.4  Further, while it
is a cause for rejoicing, it is questionable whether Australia’s current relatively
low unemployment rate is a record low. More significantly, little attention is
paid to the particularly tight definition of unemployment used in the headline
unemployment rate—a definition that conceals the true level of unemployment
and underemployment.
Our recent relatively good record has also blinded us to the opportunities that
have been forgone as a result of our under investment in infrastructure and
education and our reluctance to embrace more active and effective innovation
and industry policies. Preferring the mantra of the level playing field, recent
Australian governments have refused steadfastly to learn from history and, in
particular, the recent strong growth of the Asian Tigers and a number of smaller
European countries. That history has demonstrated the benefits of more effective
coordination of economic activity through a partnership between the public and
private sectors. Rather, we have pursued a utopian dream of separating roles
and trying to perfect markets in the image of the neoclassical idealisation of
those markets under the positivist illusion that doing so will maximise
welfare—instead of the more sensible, practical task of learning how to compete
and prosper in the very imperfect, fallible world of contemporary, oligopolistic,
mercantilist capitalism with high levels of coordination by the State.
Let me emphasise the point. Policies that would optimise resource allocation in
the perfect, static, predictable, mechanical, fantasy world of neoclassical
economics have little to do with competing successfully or maximising real
welfare in the very imperfect, uncertain, dynamic, oligopolistic and somewhat
dishonest, manipulative and thuggish real world. Furthermore, self-flagellation
over past policy failures—including industry-policy failures—provides no
substitute for serious policy analysis and policy learning. In a world of Knightian
uncertainty, such failures are inevitable and are to be planned for and learned
from, not commiserated over. Relatively rich though we might be, why would
we not want to improve real general welfare still further? Why would we be
satisfied with crude national income and growth estimates as a measure of real
welfare? And why would we not want to share that good fortune nationally and
internationally? In this regard, Donald Horne warned us in 1964 against the
complacency that our good fortune had bred—a warning we have largely failed
to heed. I have already expressed my concern about the increasingly selfish
nature of our society and the associated adulation of consumption, wealth and
selfishness legitimised by economic fundamentalism and the excessive focus on
economic values at the cost of other, more important values. It is no accident
that Business Sunday has replaced Divine Service on our Sunday television sets.
206
The Cult of the Market
The Long-Running Critique of Neoclassical Economics and
its Limited Relevance to Policy
Notwithstanding its dominance as an economic policy tool, neoclassical economics
has been the subject of devastating criticism from leading economists directed
at its scientific standing, its lack of methodological rigour, its lack of empirical
testing, its unnatural fascination with mathematical formalism, the grossly
unrealistic and normative nature of its assumptions and the irrelevance of its
conclusions for policy analysis. Even Alfred Marshall (1842–1924), an astute
mathematician and leading microeconomist, expressed considerable reservations
about the use of mathematics in economics. Hayek, a member of the Austrian
school and an opponent of neoclassical economics, complained in 1945 that:
[M]any of the current disputes with regard to both economic theory and
economic policy have their common origin in a misconception about the
nature of the economic problem of society. This misconception in turn
is due to an erroneous transfer to social phenomena of the habits of
thought we have developed in dealing with the phenomena of nature.5
He went on to criticise the scientific standing of economics in his Nobel Prize
acceptance speech in 1974, warning us that market processes were so complex
that the knowledge of them by economists was incomplete and virtually
impossible to measure.
While in the physical sciences it is generally assumed, probably with
good reason, that any important factor which determines the observed
events will itself be directly observable and measurable, in the study of
such complex phenomena as the market, which depend on the actions
of many individuals, all the circumstances which will determine the
outcome of a process…will hardly ever be fully known or measurable.6
Hayek also warns us against a strong tendency in the social disciplines to focus
exclusively on factors that are measurable—arbitrarily excluding factors that
are not measurable. One important policy consequence of this focus on the easily
measurable is the current obsession with growth in national production to the
detriment of better measures of human welfare. The focus on growth in
production has helped blind economists to the broader criticism of the capitalist
system and its effects from the environmental and anti-globalism movements
and from Marxists. Nevertheless—and somewhat inconsistently—Hayek remains
the darling of economic fundamentalists because of his advocacy of a minimalist
state arising primarily from his fear of political tyranny. This inconsistency
reflects the inconsistency between the two primary sources of economic
fundamentalism: libertarian political philosophy and neoclassical economics.
Similarly, another Nobel Prize-winning economist, Wassily Leontief, told us in
1983:
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Not having been subject from the outset to the harsh discipline of
systematic fact finding…economists developed a nearly irresistible
predilection for deductive reasoning. As a matter of fact, many entered
the field after specialising in pure or applied mathematics. Page after
page of professional economic journals are filled with mathematical
formulas leading the reader from sets of more or less plausible but entirely
arbitrary assumptions to precisely stated but irrelevant theoretical
conclusions.7
In fact, Leontief made numerous attacks on the poverty of a priori theorising in
economics, and on the neglect of adequate statistical work.
Similarly, in his Nobel Prize lecture in 1991, Ronald Coase criticised in particular
what he saw as the narrow focus in economics on market-price determination—a
criticism that is relevant particularly to the fundamental theorems of welfare
economics. Coase claimed:
The concentration on the determination of prices has led to a narrowing
of focus which has had as a result the neglect of other aspects of the
economic system. Sometimes, indeed, it seems as though economists
conceive of their subject as being concerned only with the pricing system
and that anything outside this is considered as no part of their business.
What is studied is a system which lives in the minds of economists but
not on earth. I have called the result ‘blackboard economics’. The firm
and the market appear by name but they lack any substance. The firm
in mainstream economic theory has often been described as a ‘black box’.
And so it is. This is very extraordinary given that most resources in a
modern economic system are employed within firms, with how these
resources are used dependent on administrative decisions and not directly
on the operation of a market. Consequently, the efficiency of the economic
system depends to a very considerable extent on how these organisations
conduct their affairs, particularly, of course, the modern corporation.
Even more surprising, given their interest in the pricing system, is the
neglect of the market or more specifically the institutional arrangements
which govern the process of exchange. As these institutional
arrangements determine to a large extent what is produced, what we
have is a very incomplete theory.8
More recently, Coase confirmed: ‘Economics, over the years, has become more
and more abstract and divorced from events in the real world. Economists, by
and large, do not study the workings of the actual economic system. They
theorise about it.’9
Of course, Coase is too kind to neoclassical economics: because neoclassical
economics largely ignores the role of the corporation, it does not have an adequate
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account of price formation. Ironically, Coase can also be accused of the above
sins. Despite recent discussion of transaction costs, moral hazards and information
asymmetries, mainstream economics on the whole makes do with a primitive
reductionist view of the firm, ignoring the vast differences in their sizes and
disparate goals, assuming that they are profit maximisers. Apart from recent
contributions from new institutionalists—a movement within neoclassical
economics focusing on transaction costs—this view largely ignores the internal
organisation of firms, the practical difficulties of coordination and assumes that
they are run as if they had a single owner. It is assumed that firms choose between
different inputs in a manner analogous to consumer choice.10 This simply lacks
credibility.
In the same spirit, leading contemporary economic methodologist Mark Blaug
told us in 1997:
Modern economics is sick. Economics has increasingly become an
intellectual game played for its own sake and not for its practical
consequences for understanding the economic world. Economists have
converted the subject matter into a sort of social mathematics in which
analytical rigour is everything and practical relevance is
nothing…Economics was once condemned as ‘the dismal science’ but
the dismal science of yesterday was a lot less dismal than the soporific
scholasticism of today.11
In short, the conceptual foundation of neoclassical economics and economic
fundamentalism is a shambles. If it were not for its institutional momentum and
ideological usefulness it would long ago have been abandoned.
The consequence for Blaug is that we now understand less of how real markets
work than did Smith or even Leon Walras (1834–1910). Consistent with Leontief
and Coase, he suggests that the real trouble is a belief among economists—going
back to Ricardo—that economics is essentially a deductive science in which
economic behaviour is inferred on the basis of some assumptions about
motivations and some stylised facts about prevailing institutions, suppressing
the temptation to ask whether these are realistic assumptions or accurately chosen
facts. Contemporary economic teaching and the associated textbooks reinforce
this focus. Whereas economics consists of a plurality of conversations, most of
today’s textbooks are dogmatic, one-dimensional and neoclassical, crowding
out other and more fruitful forms of analysis.12
The Mainstream Reaction to this Torrent of Criticism
These criticisms are not new. They are echoes of criticisms that were directed
against political economy, Ricardo and Mill and then neoclassical economics
from its beginnings with Walras, William Jevons (1835–82) and Carl Menger
(1840–1921). These criticisms came in particular from the German and English
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historical schools in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These schools
attacked the claimed universalism and abstract scientism of these economic
schools, seeing economic phenomena as dependent on their historical, social and
institutional context. They therefore saw the study of economic phenomena as
a normative, historical and social discipline. The transition from classical to
neoclassical economics brought a new mathematical formalism and the
abandonment of interest in the institutional and historical underpinnings of the
market system—and an intensification of the belief in the ahistorical, scientific
and value-free nature of economic discourse. While neoclassical economics
exercised a strong influence from its beginnings, it was only in the post-World
War II period that it established itself finally as the dominant school across the
profession. These criticisms have failed to dent the enthusiasm that economic
fundamentalists and economists more generally have for that school. Rather, the
response to the torrent of criticism has been to reassert belief in the hard core
of the neoclassical research program—acceptance of which is now mandatory
for any ‘true’ economist.13
None of this would matter if economics were merely an academic game for
theorists fascinated by the intellectual beauty of their formal systems. Very few,
however, study economics as an intellectual game. Rather economists are looking
for insights into how to manage economic affairs. That is what they claim to
have found. Consequently, this descent into scientism and scholasticism is simply
not good enough. By default, neoclassical economics now provides the underlying
political legitimisation for our market system and for the drift to the political
Right to which I drew attention in Chapter 1. Consequently, it is unreasonable
for economists to ignore the fundamental flaws in the dominant school of
economics—flaws that give a false view of how the economy really operates—as
if they are of little account. Paradoxically, the criticism has inspired many
economists to argue more strongly for action to perfect markets—and in particular
for the removal of social constraints such as minimum wages—rather than to
criticise their fundamental theoretical framework.
Nor is it good enough for economists to say that, while neoclassical economics
could be flawed, it is up to the critic to provide a better account—particularly
when there are competing perspectives struggling to get attention from
mainstream economists and policy makers, and when dissenters are purged from
the profession and the policy discourse. This is a scandalous attitude given the
frequently realised potential for economic advisers to ruin the lives of their
fellow citizens—particularly the most vulnerable. Why shouldn’t economists
want to have a better understanding of the operation of the economic system?
Why wouldn’t we want to have a better understanding of the sources of human
welfare and happiness and to reflect that better understanding in our policy
decisions?
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Importantly, what mainstream economists generally mean by a better account
is another set of mechanical, deterministic, linear equations that will not disturb
their mechanical, deterministic world. Indeed, the desire for closure and certainty
and an abhorrence of open, indeterminate systems probably accounts for some
of the continuing attraction of neoclassical economics and its Newtonian
metaphor. In any event, as Phillip Ball reminded us recently, the tenets of
neoclassical economics—which are the starting points for economic training—are
gross caricatures that have hardened into rigid dogma. ‘[N]eoclassical theory is
such an elaborate contrivance that there is too much at stake to abandon it.’14
Nevertheless, Ormerod believes that what is required is the reconstruction of
economic theory virtually from scratch15  —a reconstruction that abandons the
core assumptions of neoclassical economics and its Newtonian metaphor.
Furthermore, Australian political economist Evan Jones has suggested that the
past century of economic conceptualisation has been a complete waste of time.
Mainstream economics has simply failed as a predictive and explanatory research
program.16
What we are confronting here is the struggle between an increasingly discredited
but entrenched ‘normal science’ with its particular ideological baggage, and new
economic paradigms offering fresh and hopefully more realistic and more fruitful
insights. These insights could involve elements of the neoclassical program but
those elements will be useful only in a significantly different conceptual
framework. As Kuhn has warned us—and as Galileo’s experience
demonstrates—such struggles are not easily resolved, involving as they do
significant threats to the intellectual, social and political standing of existing
mainstream economists. In addition, it is hard to give up ways of thinking that
have been central to one’s professional life; and no one wants to be told that
they have wasted their lives talking rubbish. The result is that abandoning such
false beliefs requires something akin to a religious conversion. For most
economists, this vehement criticism of their paradigm has led to a hardening of
their commitment to the mainstream story, and a continuing search for ad hoc
rationalisations to justify that continuing commitment.
The Newtonian metaphor at the heart of neoclassical economics has a particularly
destructive consequence for economic fundamentalism, which is usually
overlooked. It commits the theorist to viewing the person as reactive to and
dependent on inputs from the environment. It stands in direct contradiction to
the views of the libertarian philosophers, who stress the individual’s autonomy.17
There is, therefore, a fundamental conceptual inconsistency at the very heart of
the economic fundamentalist project.
Furthermore, in its physical form, the Newtonian metaphor presupposed the
existence of a prior harmony established by God, and its import into economics
via Smith and Walras involved the assumption of a continuation of some
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pre-established balance. The mechanical model cannot explain the emergence
of a spontaneous order, but presupposes it.18
Economic Policy and Epistēmē
Classical economists claimed they had discovered nature’s socio-economic
laws—that is, universal laws of nature with the same status as those of physics.
They assumed also that what was ‘natural’ was also good.19 This moral
assumption persists throughout economics. It is assumed implicitly that the
capitalist market system is ‘natural’ and therefore good—despite the fact that
the capitalist system is clearly a social and historical artefact. As we have already
seen, this silly assumption flows from the Enlightenment’s attempt to secularise
God, along with the medieval concept of natural law, combined with an attempt
to avoid moral responsibility for our institutions and conduct. Therefore, it is
taken for granted by economists and economic policy analysts that economic
policy analysis involves the search for—and the application of—unqualified,
authoritative, universal, scientific laws and principles capable of providing
unique, definitive and good answers to our policy questions.20  As we saw
earlier, this approach to policy analysis—this resort to epistēmē—has deep roots
extending back beyond the Enlightenment to Christian transcendentalism and
then to the central doctrine in Plato’s philosophy: his ‘Theory of Forms’. This
transcendentalism was revived and reinforced by the Enlightenment’s search
for certain, ahistorical, positive knowledge. Aristotle warned us, however, that
not all knowledge was of this type—nor could we have this theoretical certainty
in every field. He made a distinction between epistēmē—or theoretical grasp—and
phronēsis—or practical wisdom. In particular, Aristotle argued that the good
had no universal form and, consequently, judgements about what was good for
society and the individual had always to respect the detailed circumstances of
the particular case.
Practical knowledge does not require a prior grasp of definitions, general
principles and axioms, as in the realm of theory. Rather, it depends on
accumulated experience of particular situations and this practical experience
leads to a kind of wisdom— phronēsis— different from the abstract stories of
theoretical science. Practical knowledge differs from epistēmē in that it is concrete,
temporal and presumptive and might not hold true universally but only typically.
Importantly, it involves judgement or wisdom. In contrast, theoretical statements
can make universal claims that hold true at any time or place only if they are as
idealised as the axioms or theorems of Greek geometry. At best, very little, if
any, knowledge is capable of approaching the exacting demands required of
epistēmē. Conservative political philosopher Oakeshott shared Aristotle’s emphasis
on phronēsis in his later works, in which he was highly critical of utopian
rationalist projects in politics and stressed the importance of tradition and the
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practical knowledge it gives us.21 This emphasis is reinforced by Michael
Polanyi’s insight that most of the knowledge by which we get by in the world
is tacit, rather than consciously known, and is acquired through experience.22
One important consequence is that what counts as convincing evidence in
practical matters differs from what counts in epistēmē. In particular, it legitimises
reliance in policy analysis on accumulated experience, policy learning and
anecdotal information rather than reliance on theoretical arguments.
Consequently, any reform of contemporary policy analysis needs to acknowledge
that public policy decisions involve phronēsis rather than epistēmē. Despite the
many warnings above, it is Plato’s dream of epistēmē—as revived by the
Enlightenment—that is privileged in contemporary economic policy debates in
the form of the theoretical speculative stories of neoclassical economics, whereas
the practical economic learning of the business person, consumer and policy
administrator is dismissed arrogantly as anecdotal, unscientific and irrelevant.
Idealisation in Neoclassical Economics
This contemporary search for epistēmē in neoclassical economics involves a series
of ‘idealisations’ of the economic agent and the setting in which ‘he’ operates.
As we saw above, the particular idealisations were driven by a desire to describe
human beings and their interactions as if they were a deterministic, mechanical
system characterised by equilibrium—by the Newtonian metaphor. Smith was
a great admirer of Newton and his moral analysis is thoroughly Newtonian and
carries over into his understanding of self-interest as it appears in his economic
analysis. Therefore, Smith, in the Wealth of Nations, speaks of the price of
commodities ‘gravitating towards the natural price’.23  More broadly, those
Newtonian tendencies dominated physics, which came increasingly to provide
the model for science in general. The marginalist movement pioneered by Walras,
Jevons and Menger in the nineteenth century strengthened these tendencies in
economics, which were strengthened still further by the post-World War II
fascination with formalism. All three claimed specifically that economics—as an
exact universal natural science—resembled classical mechanics, involving a
calculus of the natural ‘forces’ of pleasure and pain.24 This reflected the
utilitarian inheritance of neoclassical economics as well as the desire of economists
to emulate the mathematical formalism of physics, which they saw as the
archetypical science, whose prestige they wished to share. Although Phillip
Mirowski distinguishes the physics that Walras relied on from that of Newton,
he nevertheless objects strongly to the resulting mechanical nature of neoclassical
economic reasoning.25  He traces at some length the powerful influence of physics
on Walras and his colleagues, criticising them for their misunderstanding of that
physics and their misapplication of the associated equations to economics. Despite
Mirowski’s minor reservations, there can be little doubt that general equilibrium
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theory is fundamentally Newtonian in concept. For example, Jevons claimed in
1871 that ‘the theory of Economy…presents a close analogy to the science of
Statical Mechanics, and the laws of Exchange are found to resemble the laws of
Equilibrium of the lever as determined by the principle of virtual velocities’.26
This adoption of the equations of physics and the renaming of the relevant
variables to give them an economic meaning was criticised by Mirowski in the
following terms:
The most curious aspect of this program to make economics more rigorous
and more scientific is that not one neoclassical economist in over one
hundred years has seen fit to discuss the appropriateness or
inappropriateness of the adoption of the mathematical metaphor of energy
in a pre-relativistic gravitational field in order to discuss the preferences
and price formation of transactors in the marketplace.27
As Clark points out—following Guy Routh—these developments are intended
also to support their political views. Asserting—on the basis of scientific
credentials—that the economy is an equilibrium system regulated by nature in
the same way as the solar system lends weight to the claim that such an economy
exists in harmony and is best left to itself without government intervention.
There were, however, non-mainstream economists who objected strongly to this
identification.28  Knight argued as long ago as 1935 that any reconstruction of
economics had to reject this mechanical analogy.29
Within this mechanical framework, Homo economicus—economic man—created
originally by classical economics, is a reductionist attempt to obtain an idealised
creature defined by economic motives only—a machine for making decisions,
an atomistic economic billiard ball on which economic ‘forces’ act, which at the
same time remains perfectly ‘rational’. This contradiction in terms is made only
remotely credible by the instrumental mechanical understanding of rationality
employed. This understanding is itself an unjustified and misleading idealisation
to which we will return shortly. Ceteris paribus—the assumption of other things
being equal—is then invoked on the unsafe reductionist assumption that this
isolates successfully the influence of other phenomena. In the case of
interdependent complex phenomena, it is now clear that this is far from true.
Importantly, Weber also believed that no conceptual system could do full justice
to the complexity of social phenomena. Nevertheless, he believed that his
methodology would enable claims made about the social world to be subjected
to rigorous empirical verification, provided this tool was applied only to rational
and goal-oriented behaviour. These idealisations were thought, falsely, to provide
economics with an analytical situation analogous to those involved in the control
of excluded variables in experimental situations in the natural sciences. Among
the heroic simplifying assumptions used in neoclassical economics are
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assumptions derived from classical economics—those of rational behaviour and
consistent preferences. The claim that economic behaviour is so governed has
allowed economists—drawing on Pareto—to claim that economics is the science
of logical actions and of rational choice. Unfortunately, for mainstream economics,
the empirical evidence shows that the preferences of real people are not
consistent—that is, they are not transitive—and this undermines the claim.30
There is a deeper, more hidden motive for this idealisation. Acknowledging any
diversity among economic agents further undermines the mathematical
tractability of the analysis and has to be avoided at all costs.31 This ‘ideal’ type
is obtained by stripping out most of the ethical, religious, altruistic and other
motives of real human beings.32 The other idealisations are those involved in
the setting, in particular, of the postulation of perfect competition, perfect
information, complete markets and resource mobility. The particular idealisations
have been subject to enormous criticism and it is a moot point whether the
regularities detected by this procedure are artefacts of real economic affairs or
of the analytical system. I hold the latter interpretation.
This approach to economics did not originate with Weber or Pareto. For example,
John R. McCulloch (1789–1864), the leader of the Ricardian school after Ricardo,
in his Principles of Political Economy published in 1825, gave an early defence
of this practice.33  Interestingly, McCulloch was trying to deal with objections
to what he claimed to have been political economy’s ‘best established
conclusions’.34  Nevertheless, he thought that the conclusions of political
economy applied only in the majority of cases, because special circumstances
could differentiate particular cases. Even so, McCulloch believed that those
conclusions were an appropriate basis for government policy decisions. In
practice therefore, McCulloch avoided dealing with those objections. Mill, in
turn, did the same, while drawing attention to the practical men who objected
to what they believed to be the inappropriate conclusions that economists drew
from invented assumptions. Mill rejected those objections on the basis that while
Euclid’s ‘laws’ were also true only in the abstract, they were, nonetheless, useful.
He claimed that all ‘phenomena of society are phenomena of human nature,
generated by the action of outward circumstances upon masses of human beings;
and if, therefore, the phenomena of human thought, feeling, and action are
subject to fixed laws, the phenomena of society cannot but conform to fixed
laws’.35
While aspiring to exactness, Mill nevertheless drew a distinction between exact
sciences such as astronomy and inexact sciences such as the moral sciences,
which he saw as lacking the necessary information. While Mill claimed to have
a richer conception of human beings than Bentham, it nevertheless involved a
deterministic view little different from Bentham’s.36  Any placidity in human
nature operated in the longer term. Mill also drew a distinction between general
215
The Critique of Neoclassical Economics and its Influence on Policy Decisions
and specific causes and—going further than McCulloch—believed that the
causes operating in political economy were laws of human nature, something
he believed the individual could check for themselves by introspection.
Consequently, he argued that political economy was an abstract and aprioristic
science such as geometry. For him, economic conclusions—which are derived
from assumptions that resemble real circumstances—are true in the abstract and
express tendencies present in human behaviour. These ‘truths’ are applicable
in practice when the influences of the neglected effects are added. Of course,
these universal truths were said to be manifest most completely in Britain—the
most advanced industrial country in the world. Importantly, however, Mill did
not extend these claims to the distribution of production—this, in his view,
being subject to the laws and customs of mankind.
Marx went further again, postulating a hierarchy of factors, believing that his
law of value represented the deepest essence of society. These increasing levels
of abstraction have an important consequence. Whereas for McCulloch the
conclusions of political economy were generally valid, for Mill they were laws
of human nature, while with Marx we finally arrived at something even more
abstract: a Platonic form. Of course, neither Mill’s abstract truth nor Marx’s
deepest essence was open to empirical falsification. Ironically, for those on the
Right, it is this Platonic form— articulated most strongly by Marx—that
unconsciously underpins economic fundamentalism and much neoclassical
economic theorising.
The positivist movement associated with the Vienna Circle in the 1920s and
1930s strengthened these positivist tendencies in economics. For his part, Pareto
sought also to develop a scientific economics based on what he thought were
natural phenomena based on natural laws independent of social institutions and
using an analogy with mechanics and the concept of general equilibrium.
Nevertheless, Pareto was conscious of the limits of pure economics and saw a
need to add back into the analysis the factors left out by these idealisations
before one could make predictions about real phenomena, and before these
analyses could be applied in the world. He also thought that the applied scientist
should turn to other disciplines for those other analyses.37 That was the reason
why he turned to the study of sociology. Pareto tells us, for example, ‘In order
to judge whether customs protection is harmful to people, we need help not
only from political economy but also from all those sciences which in their
totality constitute that branch of human knowledge called social science.’38
The contemporary economist feels no such need before offering policy advice.
Indeed, there is no greater insult for mainstream economists than to describe
someone as a sociologist.39 There is little doubt, therefore, that Pareto would
have rejected the particular positivist use that economists now make of
Pareto-optimality and the economic imperialism of many economists.
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If we are going to use economic analysis as a framework to erect hurdles to policy
initiatives, we have to have a great deal of confidence in that analysis. The
confidence that is currently placed in the mainstream framework is, however,
mistaken. That framework should be replaced by a framework demonstrating
relevance to the continuing transformation of the economy and to the
achievement of real improvements in social welfare—particularly among the
disadvantaged. In this regard, it seems bizarre to look for regularities in human
conduct by grossly exaggerating one aspect of the apparent reality, and then to
claim that this exaggeration represents a simplification rather than a distortion.
I doubt this is a fair description of what the natural sciences seek to do. In a
scientific experiment, one can hold all other things as being equal through careful
experimental design. In the social disciplines, in a non-experimental environment,
it seems a wild leap of faith to assume that an idealisation enables one to ignore
possible interactions with other influences. This reductionism is a fundamental
mistake, as it is highly likely that when we are dealing with human beings we
are dealing with non-linear dynamic systems; and if we are, such influences
cannot simply be added together. It is an approach that also legislates higher-level
systems out of existence. In any event, the uncorrupted layperson’s complaints
that the neoclassical assumptions and the conclusions drawn from them are
unrealistic are simply dismissed—usually with a sneer.
The Normative Use of Neoclassical Economic Idealisations
Part of our problem arises because it is too easy to slip unconsciously between
very different understandings of the word ‘ideal’ and to end up believing
that—with Hirshleifer, Becker, Posner and Thatcher— the true nature of human
beings is being described by Homo economicus. Similarly, it is too easy to make
a similar slip in respect of the idealisation of the situation. What was justified
initially as being a helpful analytical tool to get around some of the complexities
of human behaviour has ended up being used as a normative ideal. Without a
doubt, the most important policy sleight of hand in the neoclassical story—its
reversal of the onus of proof—is a consequence of these idealisations. In
neoclassical economics therefore we have an idealisation of ‘THE
MARKET’—another of Plato’s forms and the god of economic fundamentalists.
It is then easy to further assume that the market system is the ideal form of
economic organisation and, for the true believers, the ideal form of social
organisation. What Weber justified as idealisations to illustrate only one aspect
of social phenomena and to enable empirical investigations have been turned
into a normative ideal contrary to his intention and to good sense. This slide has
been assisted by the fact—as we saw in the previous chapter—that it is simply
not possible to separate the positive from the normative. All the talk about
positive economics serves only as a smoke screen to hide the fact that economics
is legislating one form of social organisation. One particular result is that most
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government action is now categorised by economists as intervention in market
processes, which has to be justified in terms of the neoclassical idealisations and
the associated theology, rather than as collective action furthering collective
goals.
Market failure
Of course, economists usually admit that the transactional situations we all face
in daily life could be different from those assumed in their idealisation, but they
leave it to us to demonstrate that those differences matter in the context of their
particular flawed conceptual framework; that they result in ‘market failures’
and that government correction is less costly than maintaining the status quo.
In the absence of any convincing empirical confirmation of the validity of this
form of modelling, this reversal of the onus of proof—this demand that policy
activists demonstrate that real markets are not perfect before they can act—is
inconsistent with any reasonable interpretation of good scientific practice. This
tactic also places the policy activist in an impossible position because, in the
absence of action, it is impossible to demonstrate the benefits of any particular
action or even the costs. It is also impossible to know what the economy—or
particular sectors of the economy—will look like if there were complete and
perfectly competitive efficient markets and free trade.
One further important effect of this search for market failures is that it endorses
tacitly the above flawed conceptual framework. The result is a theoretical
discussion couched in neoclassical terms even where the activists reject that
neoclassical framework. It is like trying to persuade the Pope that birth control
or abortion may be permissible in certain cases when one rejects the theological
and authority claims of the Catholic Church. These concerns are amplified when
economists and libertarians apply these flawed simplistic concepts to political
systems and voting patterns as if they were economic phenomena and start
talking about the dangers of ‘government failure’. This is just pseudo-scientific
nonsense—a very limited rediscovery of the concept of original sin. We all know
that human beings are fallible, have questionable motives and make
mistakes—but to refuse to do anything on the ground that we could be wrong
is not prudence; it is simple cowardice.
The Flawed Assumptions of Neoclassical Economic
Idealisation
Atomism
Among the flawed assumptions of neoclassical economics is its reliance on
methodological individualism as its ‘official’ methodology. This is a research
stratagem imported from Greek atomism via Descartes—with his atomistic system
and mechanical rules—and then the individualistic political theorising of Hobbes
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and Locke. In those stories, explanation was to be located in the actions of
individual actors interacting in a mechanical fashion rather than in the complex
organic interplay of social institutions, groups and individuals. As we saw in
Chapter 5, the emerging dominance of theoretical reasoning in political and
moral theorising through the Enlightenment marked a sharp discontinuity with
the practical approach to political and moral reasoning that had been derived
from Aristotle and which characterised the medieval world. One important
element in this transformation was the abandonment of forms of explanation
based on organic metaphors and the emergence of a mechanical Newtonian
metaphor as the dominant form of explanation. This atomism is an essential
feature of this form of explanation, in which causal relationships are seen as
being analogous to the forces operating in the movement of the planets or in
classical mechanics, with individuals taking the place of the planets or of billiard
balls and interacting in a mechanical fashion. As we saw in Chapter 5, however,
the Newtonian mechanistic world-view has been undermined. Newtonian physics
has been completely discredited as an answer to any fundamental question about
the nature of the world.
Physics has come to understand reality not in terms of atomism—of discrete
particles that can be described independently of all others—but as a complete
network, the most basic elements of which are not entities or substances, but
relationships. The properties of things are no longer seen as being fixed
absolutely with respect to some unchanging background; rather, they arise from
interactions and relationships.40 This abandonment of Newtonianism within
its parent discipline should cause economists to pause and wonder whether the
Newtonian metaphor provides an adequate master narrative for economics.
Having stressed the fundamental importance of our social relationships and our
socially constructed moral codes in Chapters 2 and 7, I don’t believe
methodological individualism can deal adequately with these continuing social
relationships.
In any event, Kincaid warns us that individualism is a fuzzy doctrine: ‘Sometimes
it makes ontological claims, for example, that social entities do not act
independently of their parts. Other individualists put the issue in terms of
knowledge: we can capture all social explanations in individualistic terms or no
social explanation is complete or confirmed without individualist mechanisms.’41
Kincaid argues that the debate about holism and individualism is primarily an
empirical issue about how to explain society. The upshot for Kincaid is that
individualism is seriously misguided: ‘When individualism is interesting, it is
implausible; when it is plausible, it is uninteresting.’42  It should already be
clear from Chapter 2 that the claim that methodological individualism provides
the exclusive proper explanatory strategy in the social disciplines is deeply
flawed. It mistakes the biological entity for the complete human. To use a modern
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metaphor, it mistakes a discrete piece of hardware for the whole system,
forgetting that the ‘software’ is an open social construct and that together they
form part of a large network. In the spirit of narrative pluralism, this does not
mean that methodological individualism might not be useful in some instances.
It is up to the analyst using that assumption to demonstrate its usefulness and
the ‘validity’ of the results. The Enlightenment tradition from Descartes and
Locke onwards to contemporary mainstream economics has just assumed this
question away. In economics, this strategy assumes that all individual choices
are self-serving and promote individual welfare. Not only does it fail to
acknowledge the social constraints on choice, it fails to confront the possibility
of mistaken choices and the normative consequences of that possibility. In those
cases, one could always respond that people should bear the consequences of
their mistaken choices. This, however, is a normative judgement that is open to
question and is something economists claim not to be making. It is also a
judgement with which the rest of us might disagree—though not necessarily
all the time. There is a dynamic element in choices as people learn over time
what is important to them in the changing circumstances of their lives. Mistakes
are an important part of that learning process.
Individual preferences again
The empty concept of revealed preferences is—as we have already seen, and as
Sen confirms—simply ‘a robust piece of evasion’43  to avoid a serious examination
of the formation and nature of ‘preferences’. This is to preserve the ideological
usefulness, analytical structure and mathematical tractability of mainstream
analysis. Sen calls this theory and the associated rational-choice theory a
remarkably mute theory. This is because it explains behaviour in terms of
preferences, which in turn are defined only by behaviour. This circular reasoning
has no explanatory power. It does, however, require consistency in choice—but
that is something that is not observed in practice. Furthermore, there is much
evidence, including in economics, to show that in practice people’s choices are
often not selfish. For most of us, this would seem to undermine the whole idea.
Sen goes on to argue that, while choices based on sympathy for others could
perhaps be accommodated in mainstream models, choices that are made on the
basis of moral commitments are counter-preferential and cannot be so
accommodated. Of course, this is something that most of us knew already, even
if we did not know the jargon in which the argument is expressed. At most,
only some choices are made on the basis of their contribution to personal welfare.
As Sen points out, this conclusion is particularly important in respect of the
provision of public goods and in work motivation. In the latter case, it would
be impossible to run any organisation entirely on the basis of personal
incentives—and they have necessarily to rely on moral commitments and social
cohesion in order to operate at all.
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Rational choices and optimisation
The above critique undermines the normative instrumental view of rationality
used in mainstream economics.44 This was a view of rationality that was rejected
firmly in Chapter 5. Human judgement cannot be reduced to static optimisation.
People do often act in a self-interested fashion, but it can be rational to do things
that are not in one’s personal interests. Indeed, it is normal to do so. It can be
rational to make choices in accordance with moral values and it is normal to do
so. It can also be rational to disregard the consequences in making choices. Some
things are just not done and some things have to be done regardless. Some
economists might respond to these arguments by making a distinction between
short-term and long-term self-interest, and then try to accommodate our moral
commitments to those long-term interests. Really, this is just further
consequentialism and, as we saw in Chapter 7, it is an attempt to legislate a
particular moral theory that is part of the same tradition of moral reasoning as
mainstream economics. In that regard, it is now obvious that our moral principles
cannot be reduced to a single conceptual system and that the moral rules that
regulate life in contemporary Western society derive from several incompatible
historical sources augmented constantly by contemporary cultural influences.
These in turn are different from those operating in other societies. Consequently,
the appeal to long-term interests is simply further evasion. One could play that
game forever; but the average punter should just decline to play.
Nevertheless, mainstream economists continue to claim that economic agents in
their choices optimise the benefits to be derived and that it is only rational to
do so. Behavioural economists have, however, demonstrated successfully that
everyday human economic behaviour is not consistent with this claim. This
demonstration undermines much of the associated analysis. In particular, real
human beings simply lack the cognitive abilities to maximise the benefits from
their choices. Furthermore, the contexts within which we make decisions are
such that optimisation—either ex anti or ex post—is simply not possible. This
brings us back to the realisation that human choices involve a dynamic process
relying on practical wisdom based on experience, learning about opportunities
and tastes and balancing different attainable goals—rather than a crude
optimisation process.
Among economists, this realisation has led to a long discussion of ‘bounded
rationality’ and of ‘satisficing’—concepts associated with Kalneman and Simon,
more dissident Nobel Prize winners. For example, Tversky and Kalneman make
a distinction between intuitive judgements and deliberative decisions,
demonstrating that even statistical experts make systematic errors in their
intuitive probability-based judgements.45  Even significant research decisions
are guided by flawed intuitions. Tversky and Kalneman have undermined the
proposition that choices involving risk are made on the basis of a rational analysis
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of the risks involved. Their prospect theory describes how such choices are
made in practice involving a two-stage process: editing and evaluation. In editing,
possible outcomes are ordered following some heuristic, choosing a reference
point against which to evaluate the possible outcomes. In the evaluation phase,
people choose an outcome with the highest utility based on the potential
outcomes and their respective probabilities. Importantly, the way people frame
an outcome subjectively in their mind affects the utility they expect or receive.
What is more, it has been demonstrated empirically that people not only consider
the value they receive, but the value received by others.
Similarly, Simon pointed out during a long career beginning with his first book
in 1947 that real people have only limited abilities to formulate and solve complex
problems. In particular, we have only limited abilities to acquire, process, retrieve
and transmit information. In addition, we often have conflicting aims and
frequently our goals and the means to achieve them are interrelated and cannot
be separated. Furthermore, it is simply impossible to make a logical search though
the myriad options open to us, and their consequences. Consequently, we use
heuristics or rules of thumb and our emotions as well as logical analysis in our
decision making. Any attempt to optimise in practice just leads to confusion.
Therefore, we make decisions that are satisfactory rather than optimal. The
‘normal science’ of economics has tried to maintain its framework by introducing
the concepts of search, deliberation and time costs into the decision-making
process and claiming as a result that satisficing is effectively the same as
optimising. In doing so, mainstream economists have trivialised Simon’s
devastating theoretical insights in the interests of their research program. To
my mind, these are very different worlds and the above attempt to maintain the
neoclassical framework is just another form of evasion.
Pareto-optimality and welfare
Neoclassical economics goes on to claim that, subject to a broad range of
assumptions, a competitive market will allocate resources between competing
uses in an optimal fashion. This is the contemporary version of Smith’s belief in
the ‘invisible hand of the market’. Smith believed that God had so arranged
creation and human affairs that self-interest balanced by sympathy for our fellow
humans would produce the best of all possible worlds. Now, in the absence of
God, mainstream economists would have us believe that the rational choices of
the individual, exercised in perfectly competitive markets with perfect
information and mobility of resources, will have the same effect. This idea of
the theoretical primacy of competition and markets is developed in first-year
microeconomic courses as an extension of the ‘laws of supply and demand’ and
the properties of market equilibrium.
This scheme draws on utilitarianism’s search for the ‘greatest happiness of the
greatest number’ to propose that the consumer is motivated to purchase goods
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by the ‘utility’ she or he derives from it—a reflection of her or his preferences.
Then it is claimed that with competition in demand, the benefit or utility received
by the individual consuming the last unit of goods—for example, an
apple—equals the price she or he is willing to pay. Similarly, with competition
in supply, it is claimed the resource cost to produce that last apple equals the
price the producer receives. Voluntary exchange between the producer and
consumers in a market-clearing auction will then yield a set of prices that equates
the marginal benefit of each commodity with its marginal cost. This has the
practical effect of assuming out of existence the problems for the achievement
of the greatest happiness that result from the existing socio-economic order and
its power relationships. To the limited extent that these problems are recognised,
they are seen as constraints on preferences that disappear into the background.
At one stage, it was hoped that utility might be measured and thus provide an
objective measure of the benefit derived. This quickly proved an illusion, leading
ultimately to the development of the empty concept of revealed preferences. As
we saw earlier, this means that people buy only what they prefer and they prefer
what they buy; and, as it turns out, they are not logically consistent in those
purchases.46
There are even further technical problems with this most basic of models in the
marginalist movement.47 The model assumes that supply and demand curves
are continuous and well behaved, but that is not necessarily the case. Prices can
also be resistant to change. In any event, can this model be operationalised? The
most damaging criticism of these models is that they impose impossible
computational demands on individuals and firms. Real people cannot be making
production and purchasing decisions on the basis of such computations.
Consequently, in the real world prices cannot be established in this manner
except in the crudest possible sense. The result is that it seems likely that the
marginalism implicit in the model is an artefact of the analytical system rather
than an accurate description of real behaviour. The whole model appears to
exaggerate the influence of pricing signals on economic decisions, reducing all
other influences to ‘costs’, however difficult it might be to attribute a monetary
value to those costs. Nevertheless, these concerns are generally ignored.
The first fundamental law of welfare economics is then derived by generalising
from such single-commodity models to general equilibrium of the economy,
abstracting from much detail. This involves the unrealistic assumptions of
optimisation in all other markets and independence from them. We are then told
that under very restrictive and unrealistic assumptions, a competitive market
equilibrium is ‘Pareto-efficient’ or ‘Pareto-optimal’ or ‘socially optimal’—where
Pareto-optimality is defined as that state in which it is impossible to improve
the welfare of some members of society without reducing the welfare of others.
In practice, those restrictive assumptions are quickly forgotten.
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Although superficially attractive as a definition of maximum welfare,
Pareto-optimality is more than deeply flawed; it is simply not true. As Blaug
writes: ‘Pareto welfare economics…achieves a stringent and positivist definition
of the social optimum in as much as Pareto-optimality is defined with respect to
an initial distribution of income. The practical relevance of this achievement for
policy is nil.’48
Bromley is among the many other economists who have attacked the scientific
objectivity of Pareto-optimality as a decision rule in policy analysis, seeing it as
being inconsistent and incoherent with no special claim to legitimacy.49 The
claim that economic efficiency is an objective measure of objective scientists is
simply wrong. Warren Samuels, for his part, has described in some detail the
large number of normative assumptions underpinning the definition, showing
that the concept of Pareto-optimality necessarily involves moral judgements
about the existing distribution of wealth and power and the legal system, which
enforces ownership rights.50  Its imposition as a decision rule in economic policy
making—the requirement that ‘economic efficiency’ ought to be the decision
rule for collective decision making—is also a normative choice.51  In short, it is
nothing but a pseudo-scientific defence of the economic and social status quo.
This approach also prohibits interpersonal utility comparisons on the ground
that there is no ‘scientific’ method for doing so, that interpersonal utility
comparisons involve normative judgements and on the principle of consumer
sovereignty. The fact that the principle of consumer sovereignty is itself a
normative judgement and that we make such interpersonal comparisons every
day seems to have passed the economics profession by. In doing so, it contravenes
a fundamental insight of the marginal movement in economics: the everyday
experience of declining marginal utility—that is, the experience that the benefit
derived by any consumer from one unit of consumption declines as the total
amount of that consumer’s consumption increases.52  It is possible, therefore,
in practice, to improve welfare by taking from the rich and giving to the
poor—regardless of what Pareto’s disciples might claim.
Furthermore, this measure of welfare depends on the subjective judgements of
individual consumers and producers; however, we all know from painful
experience that not all subjective choices are welfare enhancing—and those
exceptions are very important. Furthermore, as is readily conceded by most
economists, the price system does not operate as an adequate signalling system
for public goods or for goods where there are either positive or negative
spill-overs. Those prices never reflect their real social and economic worth and
cost. Importantly, while this is a well-recognised phenomenon within mainstream
theorising, we give almost no policy attention to the negative externalities
associated with advertising. The subjective willingness of individuals to pay for
many advertised goods does not necessarily reflect their contribution to welfare.
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Finally, in practice, beyond a minimum level, real people do not judge their
well-being in absolute terms. Rather, we judge our subjective welfare by
comparing ourselves with each other—particularly those in our immediate social
circle. The net result is that in a world in which there are differences in individual
welfare, there is never an occasion when it is not possible to improve our
subjective welfare by redistributing income. Nevertheless, the search for
efficiency is usually—and unreasonably—considered by mainstream economists
to be the best available decision rule in the circumstances. In contrast—in concert
with Blaug and Bromley—I argue that these fundamental flaws mean that
Pareto-optimality is not a legitimate decision rule in public policy. Its continued
use reflects an improper unwillingness on the part of policy advisers to undertake
the messy, non-algorithmic task of judging the likely real welfare consequences
of possible actions. This does not mean that welfare improvement is unimportant,
only that this is not the way to judge it.
Of course, these criticisms are well known to mainstream economists, but they
tend to pass over them in embarrassed silence as they press on with their normal
science. The consequences for their normative prescriptions are simply ignored.
A cynic might conclude that the whole idea of Pareto-optimality was invented
to deflect a strong conclusion from marginalist theory in favour of redistribution
to the poor.
General equilibrium
The strongest version of the contemporary economist’s faith in competitive
markets is the concept of general equilibrium—the core concept of neoclassical
economics, that best of all possible worlds. The idea of a social equilibrium dates
back to Smith’s moral theorising, but the direct application of the idea to
neoclassical economics originates with Walras. In its modern form it dates from
the mathematical modelling of Arrow and Gerard Debreu in the 1950s. One
cannot but wonder whether this particular development resulted from a need
to find a ‘scientific’ justification for the claimed superiority of the capitalist
system in the face of the ideological challenge posed by communism at that time.
In any event, it follows from Kurt Gödel’s work on mathematical logic that no
such formal logical system can be self-contained and consequently such systems
cannot contain within themselves the rules for their application.53  Nevertheless,
the basic idea in its present form is that the prices, consumption, production
and distribution of all goods and services in an economy are interrelated, with
a change in the price of one product affecting all others. Another way of saying
the same thing is that the economy is composed of a set of interrelated markets.
Of course, this simply ignores the large part of the economy that is not in the
market sector and the social determinants of the operation of the market sector.
In a ‘perfectly competitive economy’, it is claimed, the economy operates so that
at a unique set of prices there exists equilibrium of production and consumption
225
The Critique of Neoclassical Economics and its Influence on Policy Decisions
that is Pareto-optimal and in which there are no under-utilised resources. That
assumption of perfect competition involves the idea that no economic agent has
sufficient market power to affect the price paid for goods or services—that is,
they are too small to affect the price. While it is central to the whole framework,
this is clearly not true. Huge multinational corporations that have very
considerable and enduring market power dominate modern economies. They
also enjoy massive increasing returns to scale and scope, rather than the
diminishing returns assumed in this theory.
In any event, leading British economist Joan Robinson (1903–83) argued in the
Impossibility of Competition that there was a logical contradiction in the basic
conception of competition as a state of equilibrium.54 The tendencies for
competition to make markets imperfect through product differentiation, towards
oligopoly in the presence of economies of scale and for excess capacity to lead
to collusion are all rooted deeply in the very nature of the competitive system.
As a result, she strongly doubted that it was proper to treat competition as a
normal equilibrium state. Further, she was a very strong critic of the value of
this formalism and its ‘thicket of algebra’.55
Nothing has really changed to undermine this early critique. Rather, it has been
repeated regularly since that time. There has been a recent tendency for
economists to claim that the potential for firms to enter a market guards us
against the exploitation of market power. As entry into markets dominated by
one or more large companies can be very costly, however, this claim simply
lacks credibility. Similarly, Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen criticised the economic
value of such general equilibrium modelling and even its value as a mathematical
exercise: ‘There are endeavours that now pass for the most desirable kind of
economic contributions although they are just plain mathematical exercises, not
only without any economic substance but also without any mathematical value.’56
In his more recent critique, Ormerod calls the model a travesty of reality, singling
out the assumption of a ‘continuum of traders’, meaning an infinity of infinity
of traders—an absurd mathematical assumption necessary for the solution of
the equations in the model.57  In any event, this formal system drastically
over-simplifies the complexity encountered in real economies and abstracts from
their differing institutional frameworks. In addition, firms in all their complexity
do not appear in this model. Furthermore, it is simply assumed that the price
system exists and that economic agents are simply price takers without any real
freedom of choice. To get over this difficulty, the fantasy was invented of an
auctioneer who would set prices but would disallow trade until equilibrium was
achieved. In practice, however, people do buy and sell at prices that would not
clear the market. Any such trade could undermine the possibility of any
convergence towards equilibrium. Furthermore, any auctioneer—and economic
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agents more generally—faces a task that is a computational impossibility. The
whole idea is just more nonsense.
Importantly, it is far from clear whether the model will result in a single stable
unique equilibrium.58  Rather, multiple equilibria could exist and could be path
dependent. This possibility alone undermines the generality of the policy
conclusions of the mainstream model and opens the possibility of successful
coordination by governments.59  Furthermore, it is not clear how these prices
and resource allocations are arrived at or whether, in the event of a shock, the
economy will converge back to the same equilibrium. As we have seen, the
theory involves the standard assumptions that economic agents are rational, that
there are no externalities, that information is perfect and that there is a complete
set of markets. The theory also requires consumer preferences to be subject to
diminishing marginal utility and that there be no economies of scale. As we have
seen, these assumptions are just not credible.
Much of the normal science in neoclassical economics therefore involves trying
to relax these assumptions while retaining the fundamental conclusion of the
Pareto-optimality of markets and the proposition that they will clear. None of
this can deal successfully with the consequences of introducing uncertainty into
the model. David Newbery and Stiglitz have shown that, in an uncertain world,
a competitive equilibrium is in general not a Pareto-optimum. The real world is
an uncertain world. This undermines the whole point of the model, except in
extremely restrictive conditions.60
The attempt to relax the assumptions of the neoclassical framework looks like
medieval scholasticism and is a waste of time. In this respect, Stiglitz sees ‘the
pervasiveness and persistence of unemployment’ as the ‘critical experiment
which should lead to the rejection of the basic equilibrium model which
[depending on how you view it] either predicts or assumes full employment’.61
The general theory of the second-best
Further, a powerful neoclassical qualification to the use of neoclassical economics
as a policy tool—the ‘General Theory of the Second-Best’, which questions
whether any incremental move towards the market idealisation will, in practice,
produce an improvement in social welfare (still defined in positivist terms)—is
ignored as being incapable of application in practice. Lipsey and Kelvin Lancaster
have, however, demonstrated convincingly that all violations of the assumptions
of the general equilibrium model would have to be removed in order to be
confident that any move towards the market idealisation would lead to increased
welfare.62  Indeed, Lipsey confirms that Pareto and Paul Samuelson had a similar
insight.63  It follows that one cannot assume the contrary in practice. As we saw
above, market failures are pervasive in the real economy—or, as Lipsey says,
the proportion of economic space affected by distortions is close to 100 per cent.
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Furthermore, there are no general policy rules that can be applied to piecemeal
improvements. This undermines the policy usefulness of the whole idea of market
failures.
Information economics
Information economists have unpicked the information assumptions underlying
the fundamental theorem of welfare economics—undermining the long-standing
presumption that markets are necessarily efficient. They have shown—using
conventional analysis—that where information is costly, which it almost always
is, appropriate government intervention could make everyone better off.64 This
alone undermines the standard presumption in contemporary policy discourse
against government action. This has the effect of confirming the view that market
failures are pervasive in real economies—further undermining the policy
relevance of the whole framework. Nowhere are the insights of information
economics more important than in respect of financial markets—a central
mechanism for the allocation of resources in capitalist economies. Stiglitz argues
from a mainstream and information theoretical perspective that since financial
markets are concerned essentially with the production, use and processing of
information, they are somewhat different from other markets: ‘Market failures
are likely to be more pervasive in [financial] markets; and…there exist forms of
government intervention that will not only make these markets function better
but will also improve the performance of the economy.’65
For example, given the casino-like atmosphere in stock markets, the prevalence
of information cascades, misinformation, insider trading, booms and busts and
downright fraud, how anyone can think that capital raising in these markets
will maximise welfare is beyond me. If, however, financial markets are not
efficient in the neoclassical sense, there is little prospect that the rest of the
economy could ever be efficient either. Of course, some might claim that
regardless of their short-term deficiencies, financial markets are efficient in the
long run, but that is more evasion, as there can be little doubt that the short run
does matter in the allocation of resources by these markets.
The separation of efficiency from distribution
One of the consequences of the neoclassical framework is that economists usually
claim that issues to do with economic efficiency can be separated from
distributional issues. This separation is used to justify their focus on efficiency
issues and on the importance of economic growth in policy discourse—leaving
it to governments to deal with distributional issues in a somewhat ad hoc and
illegitimate manner. Stiglitz has, however, also undermined the practical
usefulness of that distinction: ‘Government cannot and does not rely on lump-sum
taxes as a basis of redistribution…One of the central consequences of the second
fundamental welfare theorem was the ability to separate efficiency issues from
228
The Cult of the Market
distribution issues. In the absence of lump-sum taxes, this separation is not
possible.’66
The practical consequence is that measures that are claimed to promote efficiency
will inevitably have distributional impacts, while measures to promote equity
will have efficiency impacts. This lack of separation complicates greatly the task
of economic management. This complication has, however, usually been
overlooked in the recent priority given to efficiency in the optimistic hope that
the benefits of greater efficiency will somehow trickle down to the
underprivileged. In any event, this inability to separate efficiency and
distribution effects further undermines Pareto-optimality as a minimal measure
of welfare.
It should be noted that because of its idealisation of the market and its absurd
assumptions, neoclassical economics has almost nothing useful to say about the
achievement of efficiency—defined in any realistic fashion—in real economies.
Game theory
In an attempt to bolster its shabby claims to credibility, mainstream economics
has taken to playing games based on simple optimisation assumptions comparable
with those of neoclassical economics but with uncertainty of outcomes thrown
in—claiming that this is a scientific procedure akin to the natural sciences and
that it throws light on how real humans behave. As Frank Stilwell confirms,
game theory has shown that the focus in mainstream economics on rational
individuals is internally inconsistent and descriptively inaccurate. What it really
demonstrates is that real people—even in highly artificial games—tend to behave
in an altruistic way, assuming that other people are guided by social norms. It
has, therefore, strengthened the critique of neoclassical economics.67
The Formal Ontological Critique of Neoclassical Economics
Throughout this book and especially in the above chapter, I have been highly
critical of the positive image of science that still pervades economics and the
associated Newtonian metaphor. Similarly, in drawing attention to the historical
emergence of the capitalist system and its institutions, I have been questioning
the ahistorical nature of economic analysis and the ahistorical human nature it
claims to investigate. Additionally, I have been critical of the narrow
mathematical formalism of the neoclassical program and the fictional assumptions
it employs to maintain the mathematical tractability of its analysis. In this, I am
joining distinguished economic company, as we saw earlier in this chapter.
Despite such objections, the use of mathematics has become the unifying feature
of the neoclassical program and that modelling is often employed for its own
sake—rather than for the light it is believed to throw on economic phenomena.68
This formalism results from the unfounded belief that mathematical methods
are an essential part of the scientific method—a belief derived from classical
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physics and ultimately from Pythagoras via Plato and the Enlightenment. It is
also an essential part of the illusion that neoclassical economics is a positive
rather than a normative discipline. It is simply assumed that these methods can
be applied irrespective of the nature of the domain being studied. As we saw
earlier, however, the use of this method cannot be equated with ‘science’ in
general.
Lawson, a critical realist, makes the same point in the language of ontology—that
is: the study of the nature and structure of being, of the nature of what exists
and, in the particular case, of the nature of social reality. To transfer mathematical
deduction and the Newtonian metaphor successfully from classical physics to
economics requires both domains to share underlying ontological
characteristics—that is, that they are special cases of the same general thing. It
is this sharing of characteristics that can allow parallel forms of analysis. Clark
expands this point by suggesting that there are two types of analogy that involve
shared characteristics that are used in this transfer. In the first, the formal
structure of the model must correspond in some way with the phenomena being
explained. In the second, the shared characteristics involve a material analogy—as
in the assertion of a uniform invariant human nature.
Human economic behaviour does not, however, share characteristics with the
physical entities of classical physics. They are very different things, not special
cases of the same general thing. Lawson calls their confusion the abductionist
fallacy. As Clark points out: ‘Societies are not natural phenomena ruled by natural
laws, nor created by natural forces. They are the creation of humans, as are their
institutions, culture and history.’69  Consequently, mathematical deduction is
not a tool that is appropriate for the use to which it is being put.
To reiterate, there is a mismatch in most cases between the nature of social and
economic phenomena and the nature and structure of reality presupposed by
mathematical deductive modelling and its world-view. Furthermore, Lawson
points out that the occurrence of event regularities of the sort that can be
analysed scientifically by mathematical modelling are rare even in the natural
realm—being restricted mostly to well-controlled experiments. Mathematical
deductive modelling as an explanatory form or structure requires a closed,
self-contained, atomistic, deterministic system that allows the deduction of
consequences or predictions. This follows from Hume’s conception of causality
as constant conjunctions of brute, atomistic events in which ‘same cause, same
effect’ applies everywhere.70  In this view, causal laws are empirical regularities
that are reducible to sequences of events and those events to experiences.71
These are essential features of the particular explanatory form. Such atomistic
entities are required to have separate, independent and invariable properties.
This is not true of human beings, who are active agents in an open, complex
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world. In this world, there are no constant conjunctions among events and we
cannot rely on empirical generalisations as law-like statements.72
Adolph Lowe drew attention to this fundamental objection to neoclassical
modelling as long ago as 1935, when he argued that neoclassical economics rested
on a highly questionable conception of mechanistic rationality and the constancy
and uniformity of individual behaviour.73  Interestingly, Lowe points out that
even the laws of supply and demand involve adjustments of a much more
complex nature than proposed in the mechanics of a pendulum, which do no
more than maintain a preordained equilibrium.
He therefore rejected the idea of uniform economic laws, including the so-called
laws of supply and demand. As he claimed, ‘[T]here are today no reliable laws
of economic behaviour on which prediction can be based.’74  Similarly,
Knight—also in 1935—criticised the mechanical analogy in economics, and in
particular the idea that the motive causing an economic action was understood
as a force, similar to that idea in classical mechanics. That idea in mechanics—as
well as having been discredited—was also criticised by March and Heinrich
Hertz as being metaphysical. It acquired respectability only because in mechanics
it was experimentally reproducible, not because it provided any ultimate
explanation of mechanical behaviour. That experimental reproducibility is not
true, however, for economic preferences.
Lowe, in his 1965 book On Economic Knowledge, develops his early critique into
a formal argument with similarities to Knight’s and Lawson’s. Like them, he
questions whether the logical structure of economic systems can be defined
properly in mechanical terms. Lowe finds three features that are cornerstones
of classical mechanics, which do not match those of real economic systems: the
atomistic hypothesis; the mode of behaviour of these ‘atoms’—what he calls the
extremum principle, the economic equivalent of a force, the universal action
directives operating in economic affairs, maximisation and minimisation; and a
conservation hypothesis in which market processes are understood in terms of
the conservation of energy in a closed system. As in Newtonian mechanics, the
atomised entities of neoclassical economics are entirely independent and entirely
reactive in a predictable manner to the forces acting on them with no independent
freedom of movement. This simply denies human agency; and this feature of
mathematical deduction requires economists to specify their theories in terms
of atomised entities that are isolated so that only a few factors bear on phenomena,
and to produce constant and invariable responses to given conditions so that
event regularities are guaranteed. In such a closed system, event regularities
occur in a causal sequence.
Economic ‘idealisation’ is, then, falsely supposed to produce a situation analogous
to the experimental situations in the natural sciences, which attempt to close
the system and to prevent any interference with the operation of the mechanism
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under study. Explanation, however, requires a move from phenomena at one
level to underlying causal conditions. In experimental conditions in the natural
sciences, most event regularities are restricted by experimental control so that
the workings of specific intrinsically stable causal mechanisms are isolated from
the effects of countervailing factors. The purpose of experimentation in a
controlled environment is to identify empirically an underlying causal
mechanism—not to produce event regularities for its own sake. It must also be
assumed that the powers attributed to agents must always be exercised in
non-experimental situations and in the given ways, regardless of the real outcome.
This is so in the experimental situations used in the natural sciences: the
underlying causal relationships identified by any experiment also operate in a
predictable way in non-experimental situations and the event regularities
produced relate to an underlying empirical causal relationship.
Such isolated event regularities in the social disciplines are rare because aspects
of social systems are not static, but are open and intrinsically dynamic, involving
a multitude of shifting causes. Such social systems exist in a constant state of
becoming, exhibiting emergent properties and causal power dependent on human
agency and practice but not reducible to that agency and practice, and dependent
on internal relationships with other social entities. We are all involved in a very
large number of different and changing, relatively stable social positions or roles
that are independent of the individuals occupying them and which influence
what we can do. These roles involve rights and obligations with normative force
only and are related in turn to other roles occupied by other individuals with
their different rights and obligations. Our reactions to social situations are related
internally and are highly context specific, with primary importance probably
attaching to the relations between roles rather than between people. Nevertheless,
human beings possess intentionality or agency: they are not just passive reactors
to the environment but are forward looking and make variable choices. Lawson
argues that individuals form their longer-term goals in terms of the enduring,
highly abstract aspects of society with the intention of adapting those plans to
the specific contexts they encounter in action through life. They are therefore
involved in the emergence of a sense of identity of the individual—the
autographical narrative of the individual. Lawson warns us also against treating
the features of social reality that are rather abstract as though they are concrete,
and of mistaking the particular for the general. As we saw in Chapter 2, such
social behaviour involves a skilled performance that is not reducible to analytical
rationality involving the simple application of rules, but involves the
transcendence of rationality by intuitive, experience-based, situational behaviour.
In short, social entities are not invariable in behaviour, they are not atomistic
and they are not reducible to a representative agent. Indeed, because of the way
in which the social structure and human agency depend on each other—but are
not reducible to each other—methodological individualism is not a tenable
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position in social theorising: ‘Mainstream economics continually falls back on
states of affairs, etc, that could not possibly come about.’75
In any event, in economics, the fictions assumed are not employed as a means
of isolating the influence of other phenomena so as to identify an underlying
causal relationship that explains how the surface phenomena was produced, but
as essential preconditions to the mathematical deductive form of analysis and
to the generation of the results. At the same time, abstractions such as
representative agents and preferences are treated as if they are concrete and can
successfully isolate the real phenomena of interest from other influences. Because
of the above interdependencies, it is highly unlikely that social behaviour can
be manipulated in any useful way by the experimental researcher. In short,
Weber’s qualified justification for his idealisations is misconceived.
To summarise, the closed atomistic and deterministic system of deductive
mathematical modelling—this modern manifestation of a priori reasoning in
economics—cannot, in general, fit the open, non-deterministic and non-atomistic
social world. This lack of fit renders mathematics an inappropriate tool in the
study of most economic and social phenomena; and this is the reason why this
sort of modelling has been unsuccessful. It simply lacks the ability to illuminate
most of the social realm. This is what Aristotle effectively told us 2,300 years
ago. This is the fundamental reason why it is illegitimate to use this form of
modelling and the associated Pareto-optimality decision rule in policy analysis.
In addition, Lawson sees these methods as a barrier to true progress in
economics—preventing us from uncovering any real causal relationships in
economic phenomena. Although not excluding entirely the possibility of using
mathematical deductive methods, Lawson is pessimistic about the prospects of
their successful use. Consistent with the views expressed in Chapter 6, he calls
for a pluralistic and interdisciplinary approach to economic analysis, but one
involving a critical reflection on the ontological assumptions being used.
The Appreciative Justification for Competitive Markets and
its Association with Lockean Political Theorising
In the absence of convincing empirical support for the neoclassical
framework—an impossible task given the above ontological
criticism—mainstream economists have usually taken the much stronger
performance of capitalist economies compared with socialist economies as broad
justification for their emphasis on market-based competition. Of course, very
few people today are prepared to advocate the bureaucratic stupidity that was
central to the command economies of the Soviet era. Nor is anyone denying that
competition suitably channelled by cultural and legal norms plays a role in
capitalist economies in sharpening the performance of firms. Is competition,
however, the only thing that is important to capitalism? And, since capitalism
is not a monolithic system, which capitalist system are we talking about? Why
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not, for example, imitate Denmark, a capitalist country that is very prosperous
and has a comprehensive welfare state? Why pick the mean-spirited social
policies of the contemporary United States? If one is to copy the United States,
why not copy its active industry and innovation policies? Better still, why not
pick the best of everyone’s experience? Complacently satisfied with economic
fundamentalism, we do not devote anything like sufficient resources to studying
what other people do—or how the world is changing. Experience does not
support the adoption of pure-market policies. As Ormerod points out, free-market
policies are contrary to the whole of economic history since the Industrial
Revolution:
With the possible exception of the first wave of industrialisation in
Britain, every country which has moved into the strong sustained growth
which distinguishes industrial, or post industrial, societies from every
other society in human history, has done so in outright violation of pure,
free-market principles.
Markets, competition and entrepreneurship are all very important, but
by themselves they are not enough. Infant industries—even when they
have become industrial giants—have sheltered behind tariff barriers;
government subsidies have been widespread; there has been active state
intervention in the economy; and, perhaps most important of all,
successful companies have exercised power and control over their
markets.76
Indeed, this is true of the whole of economic history.
The evolutionary and information schools of economics see this stronger
performance as a reflection of the restlessness of capitalist economies—seeing
economic growth as being driven not by market equilibrium but by the lack of
such equilibrium. Market imperfections such as knowledge asymmetries,
knowledge spill-overs, monopolies and disequilibrium could drive innovation
and economic growth.77 The stronger economic performance of capitalist
economies might be due, therefore, not to a lack of government coordination,
but to the combination of largely decentralised decision making and incentives
and particular forms of government coordination involving strategic positioning,
a very broad interpretation of market imperfections, strong investment in social
capital and knowledge creation, social mobility and social risk sharing.
Despite these powerful objections, unregulated markets continue to be seen by
economic fundamentalists, mainstream economists and many contemporary
policy makers as the general rule, the natural state of affairs and the normative
ideal, which real markets should emulate. As we have already seen, contemporary
economic analysis then perceives government action as an intervention in the
market, which has to be justified as a correction that will move the real situation
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towards that idealised state. This approach erects a sharp dichotomy between
the public and private spheres—spheres separated by sharp boundaries enclosing
distinct roles, which the above alternative approach denies. This dichotomisation,
with its sharp separation of roles, has more to do with our rationalist heritage
and with Lockean political philosophy than with the more nuanced relationships
and permeable boundaries we encounter in practice. Importantly, different
societies conceptualise these relationships differently, suggesting that these are
culturally determined distinctions rather than universal principles. These
distinctions also reflect our reductionism, which makes it difficult to
conceptualise higher levels of organisation, collective purposes and coordinating
roles.
This strategy produces an essentialist view of the State, which effectively
excludes governments from any role in coordinating economic activity or
redistributing income or risks—beyond providing a limited number of public
goods such as maintaining property rights, enforcing contracts and maintaining
public order—a position inconsistent with long historical practice. Economists
in central agencies then act as Plato’s authoritarian guardians in enforcing this
questionable approach to policy analysis, with non-acceptance of this framework
seen as irrational and not deserving respect. Of course, this stance conveniently
ignores the unequal structural impacts of the macroeconomic instruments welded
by central agencies and the Reserve Bank.
Economics and Economic Growth
Because of the static heritage of mainstream economics, it is a commonplace that
mainstream economics lacks a convincing explanation of growth and dynamic
change within an economy. Mainstream economics typically treats the growth
of knowledge as a matter that is independent of the economic system—an
assumption that is transparently false. This is not because economists do not
recognise the central role of the growth of knowledge in economic development,
but rather because they have been unable to incorporate this insight successfully
into their mainstream models. The growth of knowledge is simply not a
mechanical process. Though many have tried, it is not possible to simply add a
new parameter for knowledge to a production function to get a sensible growth
model.78 The very idea of an aggregate production function that combines such
disparate activities as cleaning shoes and building hydrogen bombs seems
incoherent. The ‘Cambridge Capital Theory Controversies’ have undermined
the logical coherence of the concept by showing the insurmountable theoretical
problems involved in measuring capital. It follows that the concept of an
aggregate production function is unhelpful, as is the empirical work based on
it.79  In this regard, Lipsey tells us: ‘I have slowly come to accept that models
of growth that use aggregate production functions and stationary equilibrium
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concepts, whether in the neoclassical tradition or the new growth tradition,
offer only limited assistance in studying long term economic growth.’80
As much policy analysis is about economic growth, this lack of a convincing
explanation of growth is something of an embarrassment to the profession.
Similarly, the long-term strategic economic development decisions that confront
governments—and which involve significant uncertainty—do not lend
themselves to the mechanical method of mainstream economics. As George
Shackle (1903–92) demonstrated convincingly, the future that flows from any
particular decision is unknowable, involving as it does an infinite exponential
cascade of different possible futures—undermining the possibility of any
calculable probability analysis and consequently of any so-called rational
analysis.81 Therefore, the future is uncertain and any strategic positioning
requires practical judgement.
In the absence of a successful growth theory, mainstream economists have been
forced to rely on a wide range of statistical analyses to try to identify the
significant influences underpinning economic growth, but such studies involve
formidable conceptual and data issues. It is clear, however, that growth is not
just about the accumulation of physical capital. These statistical studies are
tending to provide empirical support for the importance of such things as
innovation, knowledge, education and skills in the growth process. This reflects
a strong consensus that innovation and technological development have
underpinned economic development. Consequently, it is clear that comparative
advantage is not simply a matter of natural endowments but can be created.
Indeed, economic development is a contingent, path-dependent process and
often occurs in clusters. As a result, developed countries throughout the world
are placing increasing emphasis on these factors in their economic policies. It is
also clear from Weber and North that economic development is heavily dependent
on the complex of institutions and beliefs that underpin high trust and initiative
in society. This is now seen as a major factor explaining the uneven nature of
economic development throughout the world. The existence of mechanisms
sharing risk and uncertainty in social and economic life could well be important
to economic development.
New and Revived Schools of Economics
A number of relatively new and revitalised schools of economic analysis are
attempting in complementary ways to address the fundamental inadequacy of
the conventional conceptual framework. As indicated above, the information
school has—contrary to the conventional assumption of perfect
information—pointed to the costliness of information, to its asymmetrical
distribution and to the inadequacy of pricing signals for coordinating economic
activity in the real world. Revised institutionalist and sociological approaches
are seeking to explain more fully how economic behaviour occurs in a complex
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web of social relationships and institutional arrangements, which vary from
society to society and which exhibit features of historical contingency and path
dependency. The effect is to undermine the belief that there is a universal model
of the capitalist system that we can aspire to imitate. In this regard, the ‘National
Systems of Innovation’ approach to innovation studies emphasises that innovation
by firms cannot be understood in terms of decisions at the firm level and
emphasises the role of the complex interactions between the firm and its economic
and social environment in promoting innovation. This approach draws attention
to the importance of country-specific institutional arrangements for innovation,
technological development and economic performance more generally. Similarly,
political economy schools point to the pervasive presence of power relationships
in the economic system—and the impossibility of isolating the two influences.
Of course, the impacts of those complex power relationships are not open to
simple modelling, least of all by neoclassical models.
Importantly, the evolutionary school denies that the social and economic world
is a machine. Furthermore, it has abandoned the idealisation of the market,
methodological individualism, Pareto-optimality, the concepts of market failure
and the Newtonian metaphor in favour of the biological metaphor of a living
system. In such an interdependent system, the behaviour of the system in
aggregate cannot be deduced by simple extrapolation from the behaviour of
typical individuals. Rather, it is the result of complex interactions throughout
the system—a system that learns and adapts.82  Furthermore, it means that there
is also macroeconomic behaviour that cannot be traced to microeconomic
foundations. Consequently—and contrary to Thatcher—there is such a thing
as society,83  something the rest of us knew already.
What this all means is that the evolutionary school has abandoned the
Enlightenment’s utopian dream of reorganising society on the basis of a priori
reasoning. This represents a historically important paradigm shift, and a return
to an earlier and more fruitful master narrative. It also denies the possibility in
practice of achieving an optimal allocation of resources. Consequently, Ormerod
tells us:
The behaviour of the system may well be quite different from what might
be anticipated from extrapolation of the model of [the] behaviour of
individuals. Individual behaviour does not take place in isolation. On
the contrary, there are impacts on the behaviour of other individuals,
which in turn cause feedbacks elsewhere in the system, and so on and
so forth. Behaviour is altogether too complex to be captured by a
mechanistic approach.84
Instead, the evolutionary approach sees the economy as an emergent complex,
interdependent system subject to positive feedback, uncertainty, path
dependency and historical contingency. The last two teach us that history matters
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in economic development. Ormerod, citing mathematician Henri Poincaré, tells
us: ‘The distinguishing feature of chaotic systems is that their behaviour is
impossible to predict in the long run, a property which cannot be encompassed
by a view of the world which regards it as an enormous machine.’85
There has therefore been a great increase in interest in chaotic and non-linear
systems in the natural sciences. Importantly, in such systems, the connection
between the size of an event and the magnitude of its effects is no longer simple
or linear. Small initial differences can lead to enormous differences in outcomes
and, consequently, outcomes are extremely difficult to predict or control. For
example, although such systems might remain stable in a wide range of
circumstances, the presence of tipping points could lead to wholesale changes
of behaviour. This has led Ormerod to emphasise that ‘unpredictability is an
inherent part of the processes that underlie a very wide range of economic and
social phenomena’.86  In contrast with mainstream economic analysis, it employs
a very sophisticated form of mathematical analysis made available only recently
through the development of chaos and complexity theory.
This perspective is not open to the reductionist modelling employed in
mainstream economics, or to simple prediction. Nevertheless, it employs
simulations to compare theoretical speculations with real-world data. For example,
its simulation of the growth and decline of business firms has successfully shown
patterns that are encountered in experience. Interestingly, the evolutionary and
institutional economists are generating new growth models that dispense with
the neoclassical assumptions and which are proving to be consistent with real
data. Similarly, such modelling is capable of generating the main characteristics
of movements in unemployment over time, in volatile financial markets and in
the clustering that results from the geographical location decisions of
businesses.87  As Michael Porter has already told us, there could be good sense
in trying to seed cluster development.88  Such modelling can also throw light
on the impact of random decisions on the selection of new technologies. In
respect of the latter, it follows clearly that government support to get new
products to market quickly is well justified. Indeed, the evolutionary perspective
fits well with organisational theory, with its emphasis on the strategic
interdependence between firms, uncertainty, asymmetrical information and
increasing returns.89  Nevertheless, this form of modelling cannot finally escape
the ontological objections raised by Lawson, as it also is inherently deterministic.
While it could illustrate phenomena that occur in practice, it cannot provide
adequate causal explanations. That does not apply, however, to non-mathematical
forms of evolutionary theorising, which seem to offer significant promise.
An evolutionary perspective—although not discounting the above insights into
the inability of prices to capture fully the social costs and benefits of economic
activity—draws particular attention to the experimental nature of all economic
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institutions, policy decisions and policy structures. Additionally, in the presence
of uncertainty, decisions can be made only on the basis of guesswork, and
economic agents and decision makers learn as they proceed, groping towards
better outcomes and arrangements. In particular, such uncertainty can result
from the path-dependent nature of innovation, where things are learned
sequentially as experience accumulates through time, where the range of choice
defies analysis or where the situation is ill defined. This approach therefore
places great store on the capacity and willingness of economic agents to
experiment and absorb knowledge and experience and—contrary to the recent
emphasis on rationalisation—on the value of redundancy and variety.
This situation, contrary to Hayek, does not reduce the policy maker to impotency.
It does require phronēsis or practical wisdom. It should lead to a far stronger
emphasis on learning from international experience and from policy experience
more generally. Policy development should, therefore, wherever possible, rest
on experience, including the tacit learning of market participants, with all the
contingencies that this involves rather than on the reductionist analysis of
conventional theorising. Importantly, this perspective denies the conventional
assumption that returns to investment—adjusted for risk—tend to equalise in
practice. It points to areas of investment that will potentially deliver greater
benefits than others. This is a policy approach that fits well with the recent East
Asian, European and US experiences with their strong emphasis on the creation
of comparative advantage through innovation.
Consistent with the above, Lipsey, Ken Carlaw and Clifford Bekar argue that the
long-term growth that has raised our living standards to undreamed of levels
has been driven by technological revolutions that have periodically transformed
the West’s economic, social and political landscape in the past 10,000 years and
allowed the West to become, until recently, the world’s only dominant
technological force.90 They point to a series of technological revolutions, from
the domestication of plants and animals, through writing and printing, to the
factory system, the dynamo and information and communications technology
(ICT). Because of their widespread effects throughout the economy, these
general-purpose technologies have driven economic growth in the past 10,000
years. Importantly, they suggest that the development of such technologies has
sped up in recent centuries and that this provides a point of strategic policy
leverage. They therefore suggest that policy makers should pay particular
attention to the development and diffusion of technologies with these
general-purpose characteristics, and in particular to ICT, nanotechnology and
biotechnology.
Bromley, an ‘old’ institutionalist, draws attention to the important distinction
between the institutional framework within which day-to-day economic decisions
are made and those day-to-day decisions themselves. He reminds us that the
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market is simply the artefact of a large number of prior collective actions. The
market cannot, therefore, logically constrain other collective actions.91
Nevertheless, Bromley counsels particular care in making institutional change.
I would also counsel particular care in making significant organisational changes
with widespread impacts. Because it sets the framework for economic activity
in general, and the distribution of its benefits, institutional and significant
organisational changes should not be treated as if they are simple
welfare-enhancing transactions. It is in that context—and with a firm recognition
of the gross limitations of the concept of economic efficiency—that many of the
changes made in the name of microeconomic reform should have been considered.
What was required was not simply a trite assertion that competition was
inevitably good because it promoted efficiency, which in turn promoted welfare,
but a historically informed analysis of the purposes served by those institutions
and arrangements, and a more realistic assessment of the real welfare
consequences of change. In short, we deserved more from our political leaders
and policy advisers.
It should by now be clear that economics, Lockean political philosophy and their
advocates can claim no privileged position in public discourse, standing in
judgement of the public’s collective policy wishes and of government action.
The Reform of Economic Teaching
In Australia, only a few universities teach alternative economic perspectives or
try to place economic behaviour in its historical and institutional setting. This
is true also of economics teaching world-wide. The widespread criticism of
mainstream economics and of the extreme policy agendas of economic
fundamentalists have led to calls for the reform of economic teaching, including
by economics students in France, Britain, the United States and Australia.
Students at Cambridge University have called for an opening up of economics.
They wish to encourage debate on contemporary economics and have criticised
the monopolisation of the discipline by a single mode of reasoning.92 They
complain that the content of the discipline’s major journals, its faculties and its
courses all point in this one direction. They doubt, like the analysis above, the
general applicability of this formal approach to understanding economic
phenomena and call for the foundations of the mainstream approach to be debated
openly along with competing approaches. In particular, they believe that the
status quo is damaging to students who are taught the ‘tools’ of mainstream
economics without learning the domain of their applicability. They believe this
situation is harmful to society in that it is holding back a deeper knowledge of
economic phenomena and is denying the possibility of more fruitful policy
approaches. It is also inhibiting the funding of alternative research approaches.
Consequently, they advocate pluralism in economic research, calling not merely
for its tolerance but for its flourishing. To this, I say Amen!
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I therefore suggest that the teaching of economics should be changed so that the
core content of undergraduate courses consists of the philosophy of the social
disciplines, the history of economic thought, contemporary schools of economic
thought—and then, and only then, more detailed study of particular schools.
This should be complemented by a resumption of the study of economic history
and the history of approaches to economic policy problems.
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Chapter 9: The Doctrine of Freedom
of Contract
Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain; for the Lord
will not hold him guiltless that taketh His name in vain.
— Exodus 20
But governments do not limit their concern with contracts to a simple
enforcement. They take upon themselves to determine what contracts
are fit to be enforced…There are promises by which it is not for the
public good that persons should have the power of binding themselves.
— J. S. Mill1
Few who consider dispassionately the facts of social history will be
disposed to deny that the exploitation of the weak by the powerful,
organised for purposes of economic gain, buttressed by imposing systems
of law, and screened by decorous draperies of virtuous sentiment and
resounding rhetoric, has been a permanent feature in the life of most
communities that the world has yet seen.
— R. H. Tawney2
Introduction
Contract law is one of the fundamental institutions that underpin the market
system. It is not often understood that the religious and governmental regulations
that underpin agreements have a very long history. Therefore, it is not often
realised that the above quotation from the Ten Commandments refers not to the
uttering of obscenities, but to the process of oath taking in ancient Israel,
which—among other things—helped enforce contractual arrangements. A rigid
view of contract law in the form of the doctrine of freedom of contract is a central
element in economic fundamentalist rhetoric. It is desirable, therefore, for critics
of economic fundamentalism to equip themselves with some understanding of
the origins of this doctrine and how it emerged and then declined as part of the
nineteenth-century view of social theory and laissez-faire economic doctrine.
Our account now turns to an examination of the emergence of classical contract
law towards the end of the nineteenth century in England and the United States.
It will be shown that the doctrine has its origins in the breakdown of medieval
ideas regulating social and economic life and the emergence of social contract
ideas as a basis for explaining social order and for justifying the property rights
of the elite. Natural law, the natural lawyers and the gradual secularising of that
tradition also heavily influenced the growth of the doctrine. Consequently, my
account parallels the earlier account of the rise of social contract ideas. As we
saw then, many philosophers and economists used the concept of a contract as
245
their fundamental explanatory device in explaining or justifying social order.
The doctrine of freedom of contract is therefore central to the conceptual
framework within which economists and, in particular, economic fundamentalists
operate.
The development of common law and the associated growth of contract law in
England and the United States parallel the rise of capitalist society and its
adherence to social-contract theory.3 That law was influenced heavily by the
Enlightenment and by its natural-law outlook while English judgements and
theorists continued to exercise considerable influence in the United States after
the War of Independence.4
Chapter 4 pointed to the gradual breakdown in the medieval idea that people
owed a wide range of social and religious duties. In that medieval world,
relationships were largely customary, but law backed that custom. Indeed, law,
custom and morality are not distinguished clearly. In particular, while there
were some elements of bargaining and free choice in economic life, that freedom
was constrained severely by ethical ideas, which ensured that economic
relationships occurred in ways that were thought to be fair and just. The notions
of a just price and a just wage were central to medieval economic thought.5
Custom and law imposed a duty on those exercising authority to enforce those
just prices and wages. Any bargain in which one party obviously gained more
advantage than the other and used his power to the full was regarded as usurious.
Similarly, no one doubted that everybody was entitled to subsistence. As a
result, there were repeated attempts to impose price controls on staple items as
well as to regulate wages. Until the end of the fifteenth century, all lending at
interest was, in theory, prohibited. A sale in which there was a defect in either
quantity or quality was sinful and was void. A seller was obliged to reveal a
secret flaw in the product being sold. In this world, the doctrine of caveat
emptor—the companion to the doctrine of freedom of contract—had no standing,
while the possession of property involved temporary custodianship and carried
duties as well as rights.6
The system of justice included the King’s tribunals and local and special courts
in which administrative and judicial functions were blended. These functions
included a wide range of regulations controlling trade and ensuring an open
market, a fair price and good quality. These arrangements became even more
formalised as market towns succeeded fairs. As ecclesiastical authority broke
down, the secular realm—particularly the Crown—took a larger and larger role
in maintaining these fair-trading regulations. By the end of the sixteenth century,
the system of justice was shared between the common law, the courts of custom,
the liberties of the towns and special tribunals. Importantly, customary law had
not yet emerged as the common law.
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The above attitudes towards the regulation of economic activities were associated
with a view of the law as a body of essentially fixed doctrine, derived from
divine and natural law, and to be applied in order to achieve a fair result in
particular cases.7  As a consequence, judges in England, and later in the American
states, conceived of their role as merely discovering and applying pre-existing
legal rules. This brought with it a strict conception of precedent in which judicial
innovation was not permissible. At the same time, statute was conceived of
largely as an expression of custom.
With the gradual breakdown of these ideas, the lords and freeholders came to
question to some extent the legitimacy and privileges of the Crown and of
government more generally. They also began to see themselves as the owners
of the land they occupied, while at the same time ideas about the ownership of
property become more absolute. Similarly, ideas about freedom also became
more absolute. The breakdown of central government during the Civil Wars
(1642–51) also disorganised the system of market control, which had come to
depend on national authority.8 That authority to regulate economic life never
completely recovered even though the supervision of an expanding trade and
commerce was maintained with decreasing effectiveness until well past the
Restoration (in 1660).
As recounted in Chapter 4, these changes made it easier for the propertied elite
to see civil society as based on a social contract, rather than socially defined
moral obligations backed by divine law. Unlike the traditional natural law,
natural-rights theories were based on conflict between the individual and the
State. As the basis of legal obligation was redefined in terms of popular
sovereignty and contract, the natural-law foundations of common-law rules
began to disintegrate.9  By the eighteenth century, political theorists and men
more generally thought of their relationships with each other, and the State, in
contractual terms in which a key role was assigned to individual choice.
With this came a growing perception that judges did not merely discover law,
they made it. Therefore, judges began to gradually feel free to disregard earlier
precedent and to make law consistent with the prevailing contractual ideology.
There developed, as a result, a close connection between liberal economic ideas
and the rule of law as it came to be understood after 1688. In this regard, the
idea that the law should be regular, certain and subject to interpretation by
independent judges is not normatively neutral, but has a powerful value
content—valuing individual freedom and free choice above some other values
such as equity. Nor is the rule of law normatively neutral because by promoting
procedural justice it enables the shrewd, the calculating and the wealthy to
manipulate its forms to their advantage.10
English common law gained its supremacy over the prerogatives of the Crown
largely through the efforts of Sir Edward Coke (1552–1634).11  Coke was opposed
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to what he saw as the usurping of power by the King, and appealed to the
common law as a traditional barrier to the interference by government with the
economic and other freedoms of the individual.12  In the process, Coke distorted
and misinterpreted the past common-law tradition to make it seem more strongly
favourable to economic liberalism than it was in fact. In particular, the doctrine
of caveat emptor had no ancient ancestry. It was Coke who helped establish it
by setting it down in his treatises on law.13  Lord Mansfield, Chief Justice of the
King’s Bench from 1756 to 1788, was another economic liberal, who did much
to consolidate and develop commercial law. During his tenure, the overthrow
of the traditional role of the courts in regulating the equity of agreements began
in earnest.
Mansfield’s conception of a general jurisdiction of commercial law—which
emphasised its claimed universal character and its supposed correspondence
with natural reason—had an overwhelming influence in the United States. This
involved a new stress on the functionality and rationality of the legal rules free
from every local peculiarity, and brought with it a growing distinction between
morality and the law. Horwitz,14  in particular, notes the influence of a new
utilitarianism in nineteenth-century US law in general and in the erosion of
concern for the fairness of contracts in that country. What was involved was a
change in the moral conception underlying contract in which the express contract
became paramount. Horwitz also notes the influence of a new alliance between
the mercantile classes and the legal profession—firstly in trying to subvert the
influence of equity and of juries on commercial cases, and ultimately in moulding
legal doctrine to accommodate commercial interests. This growth in commercial
law also reflected the increasing complexity of economic transactions.
While there had never been an overt principle of fairness in the common law of
contracts, lawyers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were not
indifferent to such concerns. There were signs of a broad principle of good faith
emerging in the common law of contracts in the late eighteenth century—a
development that ultimately came to naught. This could have been because jury
control over damages rendered it unnecessary to strive for such a substantive
doctrine. For Atiyah, it was the jury that bridged the gap between morality and
the law.15  In any event, grossly unfair contracts were liable to be upset in
chancery, and it was in chancery that the greater part of contract litigation took
place.
Chancery was the second of two different traditions in English legal practice.
Equity consisted originally of a body of rules and procedures that grew up
separately from the common law and were administered in different courts. From
the time of Edward II or earlier, the chancellor and his officials—later the Court
of Chancery—as ‘keeper of the King’s conscience’, could give equitable relief
where the common-law courts might provide no remedy. The chancellors until
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the appointment of Sir Thomas Moore in 1529 were churchmen. With the
rationalisation of legal practice, the common law and equity are now merged
and administered by a single set of courts almost everywhere. While the merger
of law and equity is usually portrayed as a rationalisation of civil procedure, for
Horwitz, it represents the final and complete emasculation of equity as an
independent source of legal standards.16
As the law moved increasingly to recognise the generality of the binding nature
of contracts, they began to be seen as being about promises, wills and intentions
and not about particular relationships and particular transactions. The
rationalisation of the common law was influenced by a new legal literature
looking for legal principles based on rational first principles. Further, there was
a particularly close relationship between law, economics and the social sciences
in the first 40 years of the nineteenth century. The economic ideas that influenced
the development of the common law were those of the classical economists
between 1776 and 1870. While they assumed that the law must provide for the
enforcement of contract, they gave little thought to why the enforcement of
contracts was not itself a form of government intervention.17
Laissez-faire principles might well have had more influence on judges—and
judge-made law—than on the other organs of the State. Atiyah makes much of
the emphasis on principle in Victorian life and on its tendency to become more
absolute.18 The rise of formalism in the law, particularly in the United States,
played a role in this attitude. This formalism—the attempt to place the law under
the rubric of science—was a further development of the rationalism noted earlier.
It involved a belief that all law was based on abstract legal doctrines and
principles, which could be deduced from precedents, and that there was only
one correct way of deciding a case. The formalists aspired to create formal general
theories that would provide uniformity, certainty and predicability in legal
arrangements and which would distinguish sharply between law and morals.19
This formalism served to reinforce the recently developed law of contract by
giving the impression that the principles of the law of contract were inexorable
deductions drawn from neutral principles. Within this framework, it was the
market that supplied the so-called neutral principles, free from all political
influence. This attempt to separate law from politics has been a central aspiration
of the American legal profession in particular.20  It served the interests of the
legal profession to represent the law as an objective, neutral, apolitical and
scientific system. This encouraged a search for fixed principles that would govern
a large number of cases without too close an inquiry into the facts. As a
consequence, every law not fitting the pattern of the free market was defined
simply as being outside the law of contract, as some other exceptional body of
rules: company law, factory legislation, building laws, sanitary laws and so on.
Such statutes were excluded from the emerging conceptual scheme of a general
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law of contract based on free-market principles—the classical theory of contract.
Nevertheless, Atiyah cautions that legal writers, in commenting on the influence
of caveat emptor and laissez-faire, attribute a much greater significance to
particular legal cases than is warranted by the practice of the courts more
generally. Nevertheless, the effect of these changes in values was to reshape the
legal system to the benefit of business and to the detriment of less powerful
groups. The selection of ‘leading cases’ and the dismissal of the ‘anomalous’ were
clearly influenced by the ideological commitments of the system builders.
Ironically, while the nineteenth century was the very heyday of sanctity of
contract and of laissez-faire, it was also the period when Britain was creating its
modern machinery of government. Despite the widespread support for free
markets, the role of government and of government regulation expanded greatly.
Atiyah comments that one of the main inhibitors of such government regulation
had been ignorance of the social evils associated with rapid population growth,
industrialisation and urbanisation, and of how to deal with them.21 The growth
of a professional bureaucracy—and the activities of royal commissioners and
parliamentary select committees—overcame this ignorance and led to much
legislative and regulatory activity. Many of the participants—who started as
disciples of Smith and Ricardo, and as firm believers in individualism and
self-reliance—were converted by their inquiries into zealous public servants
demanding more legislation, better enforcement and more administrative staff.
This enormous change in the character and quantity of legislation had a profound
impact on the very idea of a contract-based society. With the growth in
increasingly sophisticated legislative activity, the courts abandoned overt
law-making activity. Atiyah argues, therefore, that by 1870, the influence of
individualism had largely broken down, and had been replaced by a different
order in which control, regulation, licensing and institutional arrangements had
become the dominant mode of social organisation.
Atiyah also qualified his account of the dominance of the doctrine of freedom
of contract by suggesting that English judges were stronger in doing justice in
a pragmatic fashion than in providing theoretical justifications for their decisions.
In addition, the weight of earlier tradition was influential in particular cases.
As a result, laissez-faire and the doctrine of freedom of contract had a much
greater influence on contract law in the United States than in England. Gilmore
attributes this to the influence of ‘the great systems-builders’ seeking to develop
self-contained and logically consistent systems of rules and doctrines.22  Gilmore
also speculates that the Puritan ethic was somehow involved, noting the moral
fervour with which judges insisted on the performance of contractual obligations.
For Horwitz,23  nineteenth-century US judges professed a contractual ideology
that was instrumental in promoting economic development and laissez-faire, in
being hostile to legislative or administrative regulation. Moreover, the idea of
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property as a pre-political Lockean natural right—not created by law—remained
at the centre of American legal thought.24
Under this influence, the US Supreme Court in 190525  elevated the principle of
freedom of contract to the level of a sacred constitutional principle. In the
common law in England, however, the tide was about to turn. Even in the United
States, the dominance of the doctrine of freedom of contract was short-lived.
The US Supreme Court decision of 1905 provoked a progressive reaction and
fundamental attacks on this form of legal thought. With these attacks came a
breakdown in these absolute concepts of property and contract.
In England, the idea of caveat emptor did not long survive the growth in
consumption of manufactured goods and the reality that people did rely on their
suppliers when it came to the quality of the goods they supplied. For example,
in Piggott v. Stratton in 1859, Lord Campbell and the Lords Justice of Appeal
ruled that ‘the business of life could not be conducted if it were required that
men should anticipate and expressly guard against the wily devices to which
the deceitful may resort’.26
From the 1860s onwards, the English courts started to limit the application of
the principle of caveat emptor. Consequently, some inquiry by the courts into
the facts was needed from this date onwards. In 1884, in Foakes v. Beer, the
House of Lords started to move back towards the idea of fairness in an exchange
and away from the idea that a bare agreement was always binding. At the same
time, the idea of freedom of contract was itself subject to increasing political
challenge, particularly with the expansion in franchise. This involved a
significant shift in political thinking—a shift that occurred in England and the
United States. For example, in the 1880s, George Bernard Shaw opposed the
appeal to free contract, free competition, free trade and laissez-faire against the
regulatory activities of the State.27
Similarly, philosopher T. H. Green set out to challenge the primacy of freedom
of contract in his Liberal Legislation and Freedom of Contract: ‘To uphold the
sanctity of contracts is doubtless a prime business of government, but it is no
less its business to provide against contracts being made, which from the
helplessness of one of the parties to them, instead of being a security for freedom
becomes an instrument of disguised oppression.’28
Joseph Chamberlain in 1885 also criticised the faith that had been placed in
freedom of contract for the best part of the nineteenth century:
The great problem of our civilisation is still unresolved. We have to
account for and to grapple with the mass of misery and destitution in
our midst, co-existent as it is with the evidence of abundant wealth and
teeming prosperity. It is a problem which some men would set aside by
reference to the eternal laws of supply and demand, to the necessity of
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freedom of contract, and to the sanctity of every private right of property.
But gentlemen, these phrases are the convenient cant of selfish wealth.29
Increasingly, the common law and legislation interfered with that freedom of
contract and with the principle of caveat emptor. The effect was to narrow
significantly the field of activity over which freedom of contract and contract
law held sway. This change is perhaps marked most clearly by the passage in
England in 1893 of the Sale of Goods Act, dealing with such matters as title, quiet
possession, freedom from encumbrances, correspondence with description,
merchantable quality, fitness for purpose and sales by sample. This legislation
was adopted virtually unchanged by every Australian state and territory.30
It is clear, therefore, that the idea of freedom of contract as an absolute ideal
gained credibility and influence in the nineteenth century but was eclipsed by
the end of the century as the practical consequences of reliance on this principle
began to be realised and began to offend the sense of justice of the bulk of the
population.
Surely it is now clear that property and contract are not natural rights but social
and legal artefacts, or even ‘techniques’. Atiyah argues that there is much about
the modern world that suggests an affinity with some of the older traditions and
suggests that, at least in England, the law is returning to these traditions. This
is a theme that arose in Chapter 4 with Toulmin’s suggestion that there is a need
to return to the humanism characterised by Erasmus and away from the
dogmatism of the Enlightenment.31
Some Reflections on the Doctrine of Freedom of Contract
As indicated above, the doctrine of freedom of contract was the central doctrine
of the classical contract law that came to full development in the last half of the
nineteenth century. The very idea of a general law of contract is part and parcel
of the same positivist era. This law was the creation of judges and thesis writers
influenced by social-contract ideas dating back to Locke, by classical economic
thought and the associated ideology of voluntariness. Among legal theorists of
the late nineteenth century, the law of contract was the archetypical branch of
what was conceived of as legal ‘science’. This involved an attempt to systematise
the various doctrines and decisions of the courts to do with contract issues into
a consistent and logical theory in which the legal rules were to be deduced from
general concepts such as property.
The classical view of contract involved a process of abstraction, generalisation
and systemisation in an attempt to create a unitary theory that was thought to
be free of moral valuations and could therefore be described appropriately as a
science. This development formed part of the more general attempt to substitute
scientific discourse for moral discourse at a time when the traditional religious
underpinnings of moral values were coming under increasing attack with the
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decline in formal, traditional religious belief. There was, therefore, an attempt
to distinguish between what was conceived of as public law and contract or
private law—law that individuals legislated for themselves. This distinction
between public and private law was part of the Enlightenment’s attempt to
separate the public from the private realm in political and legal theory. Central
to this conception of contract was the idea that contract obligations arose from
the wills of the individuals concerned, and not as a result of a socially and
historically constructed legal institution. It has much in common with the
Lockean idea of property as a pre-social natural right. Indeed, the obligation to
fulfil promises—central to classical contract law—was at its heart a Lockean
natural law, but a natural law increasingly bereft of its metaphysical foundations.
In retrospect, this development could be seen as a process of reification—a
manifestation of an excessively legalistic mentality in which legal rules and
universal abstractions acquired sanctified status and became absolutes. What
was also involved was an attempt to claim that the rule of law provided norms
independently of politics. There is a close connection between this ideal of a
rule of law and not of men and laissez-faire ideas. It was assumed that rules fixed
and known beforehand would make it possible for economic actors to foresee
how the courts would use their coercive powers and would allow those economic
actors to plan their activities effectively. Hayek made much of these ideas in his
defence of the market system.32 They involve an underlying assumption that
predictability is associated with generality. It is also a view that conceives of
courts as enforcers of rules rather than as settlers of disputes. This is a view that
also conceives of judges as rulers on the truth—a view that encourages the
adversarial approach of common-law courts. From this rule-based point of view,
any movement away from the strict enforcement of rules towards
multi-dimensional standards such as fairness is to be deplored. Herein lies the
source of the conflict between equity as it had been developed in earlier times
and classical contract law. The nineteenth-century desire for uniformity, certainty
and predictability could not be reconciled with the discretionary element implicit
in equity. Herein also lies the source of the reluctance to inquire too closely into
the particularities of the subject matter of an agreement, the circumstances of
its making, the expectations of the parties and especially of the outcomes realised.
In practice, what came to be important in contracts was the written document
as interpreted by the courts in a highly literalist manner, independent of any
substantive inquiry of the parties (the parole evidence rule precluded such
inquiry into the circumstances surrounding written contracts). All of this
involved a commitment to a rigid and mechanical decision rule, to be
implemented in a mechanical manner—a replica of the determinism of Newtonian
physics.
This view of contract law has increasingly foundered on the evidence of
experience. Too rigid an enforcement of contracts on the basis of freedom of
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contract led to what were recognised clearly as unjust outcomes. Legislatures
and, over time, the courts themselves did not tolerate these. As a matter of
practical politics, legislatures everywhere moved to legislate and regulate to
remove the grosser abuses of the contract system. These measures have not been
confined to simply addressing issues associated with contract formation but
have been concerned increasingly with the substantive outcomes of contractual
arrangements. Therefore, contract law came to be robbed systematically by
legislatures of much of its subject matter. As a consequence, pure contract law
has ceased to occupy so central a position in the economic system.
Among legal theorists, it was recognised increasingly that the refusal to inquire
into the circumstances surrounding a contract was obviously inconsistent with
the will theory on which classical contract theory rested.33 This in turn led to
the replacement of the will theory with the development of the objective theory
of contract—a theory that acknowledged openly that contracts were enforced
for reasons of public policy. It has come to be recognised—particularly in the
work of the theorists of the American realist school—that classical contract
theory is neither neutral nor natural; it is instead a historically contingent social
and legal construct.34
In consequence, the very idea of contract law as a neutral system has had to be
abandoned. Rather, all valuations at law are moral choices. Contract law—and
decisions in particular cases—involves a balancing of conflicting social values,
not a deduction from consistent scientific principles. This realisation has posed
an overwhelming challenge to deductive legal reasoning, as it is impossible to
reason down from very general principles to particular decisions. Furthermore,
this viewpoint leads directly to a good deal of scepticism about the practicality
of general rules of the kind Hayek advocated.35  It also became clear that classical
contract law conferred a privileged position on the status quo, the intelligent
and the powerful.
Even the ideology of voluntariness has come under attack. The first point to be
made in this regard is that methodological individualism in economic and moral
theorising does not necessarily lead to any justification for a policy of
self-reliance, however much the two are confused in practice. Secondly, it is
obvious that individuals are frequently not the best judges of their own interests.
In any event, individual interests are often subordinated to social and political
goals, including in the law of contracts. It has been pointed out also that markets
are to some extent coercive. Consequently, the problem is to decide what forms
of coercion are to be regarded as legitimate.
The ideology of voluntariness has been seen to provide the more powerful party
to a contract a freedom of manipulation and motivation, a freedom from any
onus of articulation and a freedom from any other legal duties that cannot be
fitted under the rubric of contract as promise.36  Consequently, there has been
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a growing reluctance to concede to big business the right to dictate contract
terms to less powerful parties—particularly consumers—through standard-form
contracts. Equally, there is a problem of deciding to what extent deception and
concealment of information in contractual negotiations are also to be regarded
as legitimate.
More generally, having acknowledged that contracts are enforced for reasons
of public policy, and that contracts involve a balancing of conflicting value
choices, the idea that contracts should always be enforced is open to question.
This is what has happened as a result of legislative action and as a consequence
of judicial enlargement of the law of contract and various equitable doctrines.
Adding to the confusion has been the realisation that the grounds for equitable
intervention in the enforcement of contracts cannot be fitted under a unified
doctrine or theory. The law is not in fact static. Judges are required frequently
to rule on novel situations requiring departure from precedent. In such cases,
even perfect knowledge of precedent and other case law applying to the situation
will not protect the subject of litigation. In these cases, the judge retrospectively
rules certain conduct to be contrary to law—that law being the decision just
made. In practice, one can conduct oneself in accordance with the law only to
find out some time later that when a judge considers that conduct it is ruled to
be contrary to the law. Only at that point does the conduct become,
retrospectively, contrary to law. No degree of knowledge or foresight can prepare
someone for a judgement such as this.
As Joseph Schumpeter pointed out, it is inevitable that the creative destruction
inherent in capitalism will create new situations. The destructive and creative
impulses of capitalism create novel situations requiring novel judicial treatments.
If judges were not free to create novel legal pronouncements, commercial activity
would move progressively beyond the influence of law. While precedent binds
judges, if they were not free to rule creatively in novel situations the law would
ossify.
Equity is always available as a remedy in a court of law, even though equity is
distinct from law. Being governed by vague maxims rather than strict rules—and
gifted with great flexibility with regard to remedies—equity has been criticised
by many legal scholars and practising jurists as too unpredictable to be relied
on to produce the proper result. Nonetheless, all lawyers within the common-law
tradition are examined in equity during their training, and equitable arguments
are always available to litigants. It is the reputation of equity as soft, vague and
unpredictable that prevents it from occupying a similar place of renown as the
law proper. Only a brave barrister will resort to an equitable argument in place
of a legal one, despite vast quantities of case law recording successful equitable
arguments.
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All of these influences have led to a period of confusion in contract theory. Here
in Australia there has been a growing acceptance of the objective theory of
contract at the very time that theorists in the United States detect a process of
doctrinal disintegration. There, it has been perceived increasingly that contract
law—as modified by the various equitable doctrines—involves a complex of
diffused principles.37  Even the idea of—and a need for—a general law of
contracts as a uniform body of rules has been questioned.38
Some theorists such as Gilmore predict the death of contract and its collapse into
the law of torts.39 While it might be going too far to suggest that a uniform law
of civil obligations might emerge, there is certainly an increasing recognition of
an obligation of good faith and a development in the direction of a duty of care
in contractual arrangements. The former is not as radical as some of its opponents
might like to suggest. For example, the German civil code has had such an
obligation for more than a century and a doctrine of good faith is now firmly
entrenched in the US Uniform Commercial Code and in the Restatement of
Contract. More generally, contract theorists such as Atiyah40  and Ian Macneil41
have questioned whether contracts should be seen as a legal mechanism for
establishing long-term business relationships, rather than the risk-allocation
mechanisms that economists have conceived them to be. This point of view
emphasises the relational element involved in any commercial arrangement that
is not a simple one-off exchange transaction. Atiyah,42  for example, sees
contractual obligations arising primarily from the reliance one party places on
another, while Macneil stresses the fact that all longer-term contracts are
incomplete. It is simply not possible, in practice, to anticipate all the possible
eventualities and risks involved in a continuing commercial relationship. Macneil
sees the solution to this incompleteness as involving the development of
intermediate contract norms to govern the continuing relationship. This is
consistent with empirical evidence of real commercial behaviour, particularly
between large companies where the existence of a valued long-term relationship
induces companies to resolve difficulties that occur in the relationship without
reference to the written agreements between them, and without reference to the
courts.
The Recent Fair-Trading Debate in Australia
These debates in eighteenth and nineteenth-century England and the United
States have had their parallels in other jurisdictions that share the common-law
tradition, including Australia—most recently, in the fair-trading debate that
occurred at the federal level between 1974 and 1997. That debate arose out of
continuing complaints from the small-business sector regarding the conduct of
big business towards small business. It revolved around a series of proposals
aimed at effectively broadening, by statute, the Equitable Doctrine of
Unconscionability—the doctrine that carried the remnant of the medieval concern
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for fairness in trade and contracts, and which permitted courts to decline to
enforce contractual arrangements. As we saw above, while the remit of contract
law diminished progressively in the past two centuries, the Equitable Doctrine
of Unconscionability within contract law had been progressively
emasculated—being restricted to tightly defined procedural issues. Consequently,
the proposals at the heart of the fair-trading debate challenged directly the
classical doctrine of freedom of contract.
Lack of space prevents me dealing with the movement away from the doctrine
of freedom of contract in the Australian states through detailed legislation
covering such matters as weights and measures, sale of goods, safety and
hire-purchase legislation. In particular, attention will not be directed at the New
South Wales Contract Review Act 1980, which authorised the NSW courts to
rewrite unfair contracts or to refuse to enforce them. Rather, attention will be
directed to Commonwealth legislation intended to apply broadly to all trade and
commerce. Nor will a detailed account be given of the constitutional limitations
that confine the application of that legislation.
The first Commonwealth trade practices legislation was the Australian Industries
Preservation Act 1906, which was inspired by US antitrust laws. The act proved
ineffective, being subjected to a successful High Court challenge in 1910 and a
successful Privy Council challenge in 1912. Similar state legislation was also
rendered ineffective. The second major attempt was the Trade Practices Act
1965–71, which took a limited approach, influenced by the UK’s Restrictive
Trade Practices Act of 1956 rather than the broad prohibitions of the US law. It
established a process of registration and adjudication of the lawfulness of a
practice by an administrative tribunal. This act and related successors were
criticised as being inefficient, slow and costly and because examinable agreements
or practices remained operative until restrained by the tribunal.43
The Trade Practices Act 1974 was the third major attempt to introduce effective
general trade practices legislation in Australia:
Restrictive trade practices have long been rife in Australia. Most of them
are undesirable and have served the interests of the parties engaged in
them, irrespective of whether those interests coincide with the interests
of Australians generally. These practices cause prices to be maintained
at artificially high levels. They enable particular enterprises or groups
of enterprises to attain positions of economic dominance which are then
susceptible to abuse; they interfere with the interplay of competitive
forces which are the foundation of any market economy; they allow
discriminatory action against small businesses, exploitation of consumers
and feather bedding of industries…The consumer needs protection by
law and this Bill will provide such protection.44
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The Trade Practices Act 1974 involved a substantial statutory interference in
freedom of contract. Not only was it intended to promote economic efficiency,
it was intended to promote fairness in competition and in dealings between
businesses and between businesses and consumers, and to promote honesty in
the provision of information. The inference to be drawn was that in enacting
this legislation, the government and parliament had accepted that market forces
left to themselves would not produce either just or economically satisfactory
outcomes.
Since the enactment of that legislation in 1974, there have been at least 18 major
reports or proposals to amend the act to strengthen the regulation of unfair
business practices. The most influential of these inquiries was the Fair Trading
Inquiry by the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Industry,
Science and Technology (the Reid Committee).45 The Reid Committee tabled a
bipartisan report, Finding a Balance Towards Fair Trading in Australia, in the
House of Representatives in May 1997. It concluded that concerns about unfair
conduct towards small business were justified and should be addressed urgently.
To this end, the report made wide-ranging recommendations to induce
behavioural change on the part of big business towards small business and to
provide adequate means of redress. In summary, the recommendations covered:
• major amendments of the Trade Practices Act 1974 prohibiting unfair conduct
in trade or commerce
• Commonwealth facilitation of uniform state and territory retail tenancy
legislation and a retail tenancy code backed by the Trade Practices Act 1974
• generic franchising legislation
• representative actions by the Trade Practices Commission in respect of Part
IV of the Trade Practices Act
• a range of measures regarding the financial sector’s treatment of small
business
• mandatory pre-trial mediation of unfair conduct disputes
• an educational campaign for small-business entrants.
The committee believed that an inequality of power in commercial transactions
was the underlying cause of the unfair business conduct raised with it. The
result was a bias in business dealings in favour of powerful companies with the
financial resources to engage in lengthy litigation. This left small-business people
open to arbitrary or opportunistic conduct with an associated economic and
social cost. The committee pointed also to a lack of adequate research into
small-business failures in Australia, and to an absence of any formal research in
evidence tendered to the committee. Nevertheless, the anecdotal evidence
provided by the numerous small-business people convinced the committee that
unscrupulous conduct of big business towards small business was a serious
problem causing significant economic and social damage. The committee was
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conscious that in a competitive economic environment many businesses would
fail, but that awareness did not exclude the need to examine the causes of
failure—and action to alleviate its adverse consequences.
While acknowledging the inadequacies of the previous regulatory control regime,
the committee was strongly critical of the efforts of the Australian Competition
and Consumer Commission (ACCC) in relation to small-business disputes. It
believed that there was a need to establish a body of precedent under proposed
new provisions in the Trade Practices Act 1974 as quickly as practicable.
The strength and breadth of the committee’s report came as a surprise to many
observers, including small-business representatives. It ran directly counter to
the rhetoric of deregulation that had surrounded much recent public policy
debate, including the rhetoric contained in its own terms of reference. As could
be expected, small-business representatives welcomed the committee’s report
warmly, while big-business representatives were much more reserved. Typical
of the critical reactions was an editorial in the Australian Financial Review on
26 June 1997, which attacked the report as naïve, claiming that economic
competition was desirably deliberate and ruthless. The editorial also claimed
that requiring fair conduct from banks or large shopping centre managers in
dealing with their clients and tenants would be a restriction on their ability to
compete and that small businesses would suffer as a result. For its part, the
Property Council of Australia commissioned economic consultancy firm Access
Economics to produce a so-called ‘independent’ response. Their document,
Tipping the Balance?,46  which focused on retail tenancy issues, claimed the Reid
report was not consistent with its terms of reference in that it would promote
‘sub-optimal economic outcomes’ as well as increasing the regulatory burden
on retail businesses. Additionally, the Reid report was said to be internally
inconsistent and to have paid scant regard to hard data on retail-industry
performance. Tipping the Balance? criticised the Reid report’s reliance on
anecdotal evidence from small-business operators and small-business groups
and from competing expert witnesses. Of course, the claim to independence
lacks credibility, given that the Property Council was paying. Rather, Tipping
the Balance? provides an example of the partisan use made of economic analysis
in public policy debate. It also provides an example of the demands made by
economists generally that the forms of analysis used in public policy debate be
confined to formal economic analysis relating to economic efficiency, as they
define it, and that the direct experience of those involved in markets be
disregarded.
Prominent economic fundamentalist P. P. McGuinness claimed that the Reid
Committee’s report relied on emotion, prejudice and a desire to cater to the
voters.47 This reflects an elitist contempt for the political process typical of
many economic fundamentalists. McGuinness claimed that the report was a
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classic case of an attempt to enrol political power and anti-competitive regulation
in the cause of ripping off consumers. This one-sided application of capture
theory also appears typical of economic fundamentalism: only economic
fundamentalists can be trusted to present views untainted by self-interest—a
view peculiarly inconsistent with their own theories. It also attempts to exploit
the Enlightenment’s depreciation of the role of emotions in human judgement.
On the other side, Professor Andrew Terry argued in the Australian Financial
Review on 27 June 1997 that the committee’s recommendations would not damage
the economy, but would lead to a much needed extension and clarification of
the law. The chief executive of the Council of Small Business Organisations in
Australia, Rob Bastian, dismissed big-business concerns about uncertainty as
‘crap’, pointing to the uncertainty that had previously confronted hundreds of
thousands of small businesses.48
Press reports claimed that the government had been subjected to heavy lobbying
by several business groups strongly opposed to the committee’s proposals to
adopt a new Section 51AA banning unfair conduct. The Treasury and the
Department of Industry, Science and Technology were also reported to have
been opposed. On the other hand, there was said to be support from coalition
backbenchers.49  Interestingly, a significant proportion of the government’s
backbench had experience with small business, including members of the Reid
Committee.
On 11 July 1997, the Minister for Small Business, Geoff Prosser, who was hostile
to the committee’s recommendations, was forced to resign his portfolio after
weeks of political controversy because of a perceived conflict of interest on these
issues. Prosser was replaced by one of the government’s most experienced and
effective politicians, Peter Reith, whose portfolio, Workplace Relations, acquired
responsibility for small-business matters. This represented a significant upgrading
in the importance of the small-business portfolio.
The government responded to the committee’s report in a statement by Reith
to the House of Representatives, ‘New Deal: Fair deal—giving small business a
fair go’, on 30 September 1997. As far as the rhetoric of the statement was
concerned, the minister said:
Make no mistake about it, this Federal Coalition Government, this Prime
Minister, and this Minister, is [sic] pro-small business, and proud of
it…This response on fair trading policy…is the strongest message ever
sent from Canberra to Australia’s small business community that they
now have a national Government that has listened, has understood and
has acted.50
The minister announced that the government would act on the recommendations
of each of the seven areas of reform identified by the committee: unfair conduct,
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retail tenancy, franchising, misuse of market power, small-business finance,
access to justice and education. Nevertheless, while claiming full credit, the
government did not implement the committee’s recommendations in full. The
minister said that, in a number of important respects, the government response
had gone further than the committee’s recommendations, particularly in the
area of effective enforcement of fair-trading issues by the ACCC. In summary,
the government action involved:
• a new provision in the Trade Practices Act to give small business genuine
access to protection against unconscionable conduct
• a new provision that would allow industry-designed codes of practice, in
whole or part, to be underpinned legally and made mandatory under the
Trade Practices Act and enforced as breaches of that act
• a new provision that would allow the ACCC to take representative action on
behalf of small business for misuse of market power by big business
• a new provision that would give small-business interests equal importance
to consumer interests when appointments were made to the ACCC
• a directive to the ACCC under the Trade Practices Act 1974 requiring the
ACCC to enforce small-business legal rights against unfair business conduct.
The government also provided funding to enable test cases to be undertaken.
In respect to the first of these, the new provision extended the existing
common-law doctrine of unconscionability by mirroring the legal rights available
to consumers under the existing Section 51AB and incorporating most of the
matter included in the committee’s proposed Clause 51AA. Importantly, however,
the government legislation persisted with the term ‘unconscionable conduct’
rather than ‘unfair conduct’ proposed by the committee. The committee had
recommended that the term ‘unconscionable conduct’ be replaced with a term
without its limiting legal entailments and proposed the term ‘unfair’ as covering
all the circumstances that would be covered by the terms ‘unconscionable’,
‘harsh’ and ‘oppressive’. The government’s bill also dropped the terms ‘harshness
of the result’ from the matters that the courts could take into account.
Importantly, the new provision was also limited to transactions under $1 million
and publicly listed companies were excluded from instigating action under the
provision. This limit was subsequently raised to $3 million and is currently
being increased to $10 million. In addition, a new provision is being added to
include the use of a unilateral right to alter a contract as one of the matters the
court can have regard to. Perhaps the most important recommendation that
survived the government’s consideration of the Reid Committee’s proposals was
the requirement that corporations covered by the section were effectively
required to act in good faith.
While the committee recommended clearly that the law should be extended to
cover procedural and substantive circumstances, it was unclear to what extent
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the government’s legislation achieved that widening. The government’s response,
therefore—which, in other respects, was very much in the spirit of the
committee’s recommendations—fudged the central issue in the inquiry, and
limited the application of the changes to unconscionability to relatively small
transactions. Consequently, it will be necessary to await the reaction of the
courts over time to the new clauses before it is clear how extensive the change
has been. In this regard, Bob Baxt recently criticised the ACCC for its failure to
bring more meaningful unconscionability cases to the courts in the past five
years.51
Throughout this debate, the issues remained essentially the same: whether, and
to what extent, the Commonwealth should legislate to regulate unfair conduct
by big business towards small business. Similarly, the arguments used throughout
changed in style only, not in content. The debate also exhibited the tendency
for public policy to follow a path of incremental change, which the early Charles
Lindblom advocated as the best form of policy development.52  It exhibits also
the entrenched power of big-business groups that the less optimistic late
Lindblom feared would forever provide a barrier to more radical change.53  It
is also unusual among contemporary policy debates in that, for the most part,
it finds big and small-business lobby groups on different sides of the debate.
Governments had sought to chart a course through two powerful business
lobbies—advancing two different conceptions of justice—neither of which
governments wished to offend. Consequently, throughout the debate,
governments of both persuasions conceded as little to the pressure of
small-business groups as they could get away with at the time.
The debate also provides a good illustration of the entrenched power of economic
methodologies and values as the dominant evaluative considerations used in
contemporary policy debates. Big business used the rhetoric of classical contract
law—along with the contemporary economic rationalist rhetoric of minimum
effective regulation—as the means of deflecting the political pressure. Indeed,
the debate has been conducted almost entirely under this rubric. For example,
during the Blunt Committee Inquiry in 1979, in commenting on a proposal from
the Law Council of Australia for a general prohibition of harsh, unconscionable
or unfair conduct, the Blunt Committee expressed the view that the Trade
Practices Act 1974 was directed primarily at enhancing competition and should
not deal with the ‘moral’ issues involved in business conduct.54 The Business
Council of Australia endorsed this view in its submission to the Reid Inquiry.55
The claim is, of course, unsustainable. It is a view that relies directly on the
positivist separation of law and morals—a separation that is largely discredited.
In the particular case, protecting competition—as the Trade Practices Act 1974
does in some of its sections—is not an end in itself. It is done because of the
belief that competition enhances economic outcomes and that in turn enhances
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human welfare. That is, it is done for moral reasons—economic efficiency being
one of the intermediate moral values served by that Act. Competition is seen
also as producing fairer economic outcomes, as enhancing equity. Consequently,
the competition provisions of the Act are intended to enhance welfare and
fairness. Conduct that directly reduces welfare or fairness can hardly be thought
to be consistent with the aims of that Act. Even the Blunt Committee
acknowledged that competition laws operated directly on business conduct and
accepted that the Act’s thrust against anti-competitive conduct was tempered
to some extent to protect small business and to promote fairness.56 This should
come as no surprise as this is what the minister said when introducing the
legislation in the first place. The Act was intended to enhance competition and
protect against unscrupulous conduct.
There is some similarity between the position of the Business Council of Australia
and Posner’s economic theory of the law, in which the law is seen as serving
wealth maximisation.57  Of course, the law to which he refers is judge-made law,
which he considers morally superior to statute law, which tends to depart from
his efficiency norm.58  Posner’s theory is, in fact, an extreme manifestation of
the economic fundamentalism of the Chicago school. It is such a transparently
impoverished account of justice—running in the face of our contemporary moral
vocabulary—that it warrants little serious consideration. For Posner, suffering
is irrelevant to his conception of justice unless it is accompanied by a capacity
to pay. It equates justice with economic efficiency, but an economic efficiency
that is defined purely in terms of wealth maximisation. It is clearly intended to
be a descriptive and a normative theory. It is a theory that attaches importance
to freedom of choice, but only to the positive rights and values intrinsic to
capitalism, the protection of private property rights, promise keeping and
freedom of contract—those rights and obligations that are also central to Locke’s
social-contract theory.
The Blunt Committee went on to define ‘desirable economic performance’
specifically in terms of ‘economic efficiency’—a concept that it took to be the
equivalent of Pareto-optimality. The Blunt Committee acknowledged—in a
footnote only—some limitations of this concept, but its analysis remained
unaffected by that acknowledgement, a deficiency shared by subsequent
references to ‘economic efficiency’ throughout this debate, and in recent public
policy debate more generally. Similarly, the Business Council of Australia’s
submission to the Reid Inquiry mounts a standard economic argument based on
Pareto-optimality: that there should be ‘regulatory intervention’ only when
‘economic efficiency’ is lessened by distortions in a market—interventions that
hinder the movement of resources to their most valuable and efficient use, and
where the benefits of that intervention outweigh the costs. It went on to suggest
that this calculus is one that should properly be performed by the Productivity
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Commission, the successor body to the Industry Commission, an organisation
believed popularly to be committed to economic fundamentalism.
Throughout the debate, the Trade Practices Commission and its successor—the
ACCC—consistently argued that economic efficiency would be enhanced by
action directed against unconscionable conduct in commercial transactions.
Similarly, small-business groups responded with theoretical arguments to the
effect that economic efficiency would be enhanced by legislation of the type
they had proposed. There seems little recognition of the fact that mainstream
economics has little to say about productive and dynamic efficiency.
Similarly, the Treasury responded with concerns about the impact of regulatory
action on transaction costs throughout the economy. It went on to argue that
there were two primary reasons for government intervention: market failure
and equity/fairness. As we saw earlier, this use of the word ‘intervention’ is not
neutral, as it implies interference in the normal, or even the ideal, state of
affairs—an interference that has to be justified. The implication is that the normal
or ideal is an unregulated market. It carries with it a commitment to the
minimalist account of the role of the State derived from Locke. Treasury agreed,
however, that inadequate information, high transaction costs and substantial
market power might give rise to a ‘market failure’. This failure can result in
efficient small businesses being discouraged from entering the market or being
forced out of business, thereby producing a sub-optimal allocation of the
community’s resources. Treasury also acknowledged that unfair business conduct
could lead to other social costs, such as increased bankruptcies and social
dislocation. It was concerned, however, that general legislative action to deal
with these issues—and associated equity considerations—could have adverse
consequences on business certainty and the competitive process. In relation to
the economic arguments, neither the relevant departments nor the big-business
lobby paid any serious attention to ‘distributional’ or equity issues. In the case
of the Treasury, the existence of equity concerns is acknowledged briefly, but
not discussed. There seems to be no recognition that, in practice, it is impossible
to separate efficiency from distribution issues, however much economists like
the conceptual distinction. More broadly, the word justice is never uttered.
In Chapter 3, attention was directed in particular to the role of trust in promoting
social and economic interaction. In the language of neoclassical economics,
however, trust and similar values—loyalty or truthfulness—are called
‘externalities’.59 The very language seems to marginalise their importance even
though technically they are called externalities only because they are external
to the price system—those areas in which the price system fails to operate. In a
climate in which the importance of externalities is discounted, there is a danger
that the importance of those moral values will be forgotten. This is relevant
particularly to contracts in contemporary society that rely on informal constraints
264
The Cult of the Market
to ensure that parties will act honourably when unforeseen circumstances arise
during the course of contracts, which, in practice, are necessarily incomplete.
The dangers associated with a transaction depend not only on the nature of that
transaction, but with the trading environment of which it is a part. Consequently,
opportunistic behaviour on the part of one party to a transaction or a contract
can increase risks attached to all transactions and the costs of doing business
generally. Consequently, the moral and legal sanctions that reduce opportunistic
conduct also reduce transaction costs generally. In particular, they can have the
effect of infusing trading confidence into transactions that are characterised by
costly information and power asymmetries. Moral standards and a complementary
legal framework provide infrastructure fundamental to the efficiency of the
market system—our moral and legal institutions are an essential part of the
capital of the economic system. As Arrow has noted, a lack of mutual trust is
among the properties of many societies whose economic development is
backward. This argument runs directly counter to Treasury’s claim that unfair
trading laws could raise transaction costs generally.
Such social demands can be expressed through the internalised demands of
conscience or they can be embodied in formal legal rules. Reliance on the more
informal demands of conscience could well have efficiency benefits in some
situations because of their adaptability to different circumstances. The calculation
involved in the application of rigid rules could well be dysfunctional if
cooperative attitudes—with their positive spill-over effects—are undermined.
It follows that an exploitative business culture is likely to be less efficient than
one in which there is a greater degree of give and take. A number of specific
studies have looked at the role played by social convention in helping to sustain
collaborative relationships—even where recourse to the courts might have been
preferred. In particular, Stewart Macauley researched non-contractual relations
in the manufacturing industry in Wisconsin in 1963.60  He found that business
people often preferred to rely on a person’s word in a letter, a handshake or
common honesty and decency—even when the transaction involved exposure
to serious risks—rather than seek professional legal advice and protect themselves
with a tightly worded contract. Macauley discovered that in some cases, business
people considered that recourse to legalism in relationship-building indicated a
lack of trust, turning a cooperative venture into an antagonistic horse-trade.
Any weakening of the social and moral sanctions promoting such give and take
could well increase the need for the codification of such standards through law.
The potential exists for significant conflict between the internalised social
demands of conscience and the social demands expressed through formal legal
rules, particularly in a litigious culture. Lacking extensive experience of the
rigid application of the formal rules of contract law, inexperienced small-business
operators are likely to expect that standards of conscience will govern—or at
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least moderate—the business relationships they enter into. Further complicating
this situation is the likelihood that unscrupulous businesses will exploit these
expectations in contract negotiations so as to impose harsh contract terms. Of
course, unscrupulous businesses have been known to lie about their intentions
in order to obtain the agreement of the other party.
It is argued, therefore, that such competition as is permitted is the servant of
our fundamental social values, not the determinant of our values. In particular,
it is those fundamental values that define what is meant by social welfare.
Consequently, such fundamental values as fairness or justice in social
relationships are not to be conditioned by more instrumental values such as
competition. Competition must therefore always remain bounded; the question
that then has to be decided is to what extent? What is also evident is that the
debate cannot be settled on the basis of theoretical arguments based on
mainstream economic analysis or current moral theories based on individualistic
premises. It involves the complex empirical issue of whether, in practice,
unregulated markets can produce efficient or equitable outcomes. It appears to
be an economic issue that can be answered only by experience—by
experimentation. Economic categories do not, however, cover all the possible
issues adequately. Some forms of behaviour are simply considered wrong,
regardless of the consequences. Consequently, resolution of the question involves
the application of practical moral wisdom and can be mediated only by the
political process.
Curiously, it appears that we are unable to come to terms with the meanings of
the words ‘unconscionable’ and ‘unfair’, while being obliged to pretend that all
legal words should have an objective and identifiable meaning available to all.
Of course, most people will not have heard of the word ‘unconscionable’, let
alone how the courts have used it in recent times. This stands in marked contrast
with the word ‘fair’, which is used daily by everyone in our society.
There is a particular irony about the closing phases of this debate as well. At a
time when small-business groups were pressing strongly for justice in their
dealings with large businesses—pointing in particular to oppressive terms and
conditions of contractual arrangements, to the unilateral alterations of terms and
conditions and to unfair terminations of long-term contractual
arrangements—these same lobby groups were also opposing unfair dismissal
laws intended to protect employees from similar unfair conduct by small-business
employers.
The next chapter will turn to a more general reflection on the long journey we
have shared together.
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Chapter 10: Some Normative
Reflections
Man’s fate will forever elude the attempts of his intellect to understand
it…The quest for the laws which will explain the riddle of human
behaviour leads us not towards the truth but towards the illusion of
certainty, which is our curse.
— Grant Gilmore1
The love of money is the root of all evils…Warn those who are rich in
the world’s goods that they are not to look down on other people; and
not to set their hopes on money…Tell them they are to do good, and to
be rich in good works, to be generous and willing to share—this is the
way they can save up a good capital sum for the future if they want to
make sure of the only life that is real.
— St Paul2
Reiteration
This book has—like Gilmore above—been highly critical of the ‘abstract
impersonal values, the universal solutions and the logical imperatives’ being
relied on by contemporary governments and international economic organisations
to formulate economic policy.3  Human knowledge narratives—including
economic theories—like human laws, should not be seen as mystical absolutes
but as tentative and imperfect social constructs, open to challenge and change.
In particular, economic and social theories and laws—like the classical law of
contract—cannot be understood independently of their social and historical
contexts, and of the traditions of thought of which they form part.4 Therefore,
the rise and the subsequent fall of the doctrine of freedom of contract—recounted
in the previous chapter—has much to do with the rise and the subsequent
disintegration of the nineteenth-century concept of explanation in the natural
and social disciplines. That doctrine and the associated forms of explanation lie
at the heart of economic fundamentalism.
Nineteenth and twentieth-century social theory—in the tradition of Descartes,
Hobbes and Locke—sought to find general laws of society modelled on the
natural sciences, just as Spencer, Marx and numerous others sought to find
general laws of history and social progress. Classical contract law in its fully
mature state—as exemplified in Langdell’s casebook of contract law towards
the end of the nineteenth century—was an abstraction from which all the
particularities of person and subject had been removed.5  Indeed, for theorists
such as Langdell (1826–1906), law was a science and his casebook was an attempt
to select and classify all the important contract cases ever decided, and to
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determine what he thought to be the small number of logically consistent and
self-contained principles and doctrines that lay beneath those cases. For classical
contract law, there was only one true, universal and unchanging rule of
law—what Gilmore6  calls a ‘mystical absolute’ or a ‘logician’s dream of heaven’.
This view of contract law had a close intellectual and historical relationship with
laissez-faire economics and with the free market of classical and neoclassical
economic theory.
This ‘positive’ tendency of the social disciplines and of law had its origins in
the Enlightenment project, enjoyed a renaissance in the 1920s and 1930s and
persists in economics to this day. Elsewhere, as such authorities as Horwitz,
Toulmin, Rorty and Lyotard tell us, belief in the possibility of general laws
capable of making explanatory or predictive statements in the social disciplines
has plummeted: ‘The result has been a dramatic turn towards highly specific
“thick description” in which narrative and stories purport to substitute for
traditional general theories.’7
We should therefore be wary of the seductions of grand theories, sacred rules
and idealisations that have a problematic connection to the ‘reality’ they purport
to describe.
In Chapters 5, 6 and 7, the privileged epistemological status of scientific reasoning
was seriously challenged along with the separation between fact and value as
the basis of value-free social disciplines. This challenge has been associated with
a growing understanding of the contingency of the categories and frames of
reference employed in the social disciplines, along with a growing awareness
that knowledge is itself constructed socially. There has also been a growing
understanding of the world as complex, multi-factored and interdependent.
This, in turn, has led to a loss of faith in the single-factor chains of causation
that were embedded in most nineteenth-century explanatory theories.8
This critique also points to the collapse of the philosophical dualisms that have
characterised all forms of theoretical debate since the Enlightenment. The
representative schemes of our language cannot sustain these efforts to formulate
categories that are mutually exclusive and final. This insight led, for example,
to Dewey’s refusal to accept a deep chasm between ‘principled’ and
‘results-oriented’ ethics and jurisprudence, and to neo-pragmatism’s rejection
of the choice between deontological and utilitarian moral theory.9 These
developments have tended to undermine the hope of finding rational ethical
foundations for our social, political and economic arrangements and, with it,
the special right of philosophers and other theorists to preach about those
arrangements. For Dewey, James and Peirce, truth ‘was not to be found in the
abstract logic of ideas, but in their practical consequences. There were no absolute
or a priori truths, only workable and unworkable hypotheses.’10 The very idea
that human reason could discover immutable metaphysical principles that could
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explain the true nature of reality was an illusion. This, of course, undermines
faith in all forms of dogmatism—and dogmatic explanatory schemes—including
absolute property rights, absolute human rights, absolute markets and absolute
rules more generally.
Among American legal theorists of the progressive and realist schools, the
challenge to nineteenth-century legal orthodoxy—with its scientific pretensions
rooted in natural rights, individualism and absolute property rights—involved
a fundamental re-examination of the idea of a rule of law independent of politics
and the idea of a ‘self-regulating, competitive market economy presided over
by a neutral, impartial, and decentralised “night-watchman” state…Classical
legal thought and contract law was neither neutral, nor necessary, but was
instead a historically contingent and socially created system of thought.’11
This attack questioned the dichotomy between the State and the market, between
ends and means, between procedure and substance and between public and
private law. The last dichotomy was a central feature of classical contract thought,
with its will theory of contract. Over time, it came to be recognised that the
institution of contract was itself subordinate to social and political goals. The
market, property rights and the law more generally were social
creations—products of social and political struggle. Importantly, there was no
privileged category of economic relations that could be regarded as voluntary.12
Rather, property was a delegation of coercive state power to individuals, while
the market was an organised form of coercion of the weak by the strong. The
Lockean idea of natural property rights helped to disguise the coercive nature
of these institutions. Since there was no such thing as a completely voluntary
market, there could be no completely normatively neutral market because rules
were needed to regulate that coercion. Of particular relevance to this book are
the rules that regulate the coercive enforcement of contracts by the State.
These developments in American legal thought—influenced by American
pragmatism—and the claim that truth was not to be found in the abstract logic
of ideas, but in their practical consequences, also called into question the claim
that legal reasoning could imitate geometrical forms of argument. Such deductive
reasoning suppressed the moral or political choices that were inevitable between
possible inferences in long chains of reasoning. Likewise, deductive
reasoning—by assuming contradictory postulates—could produce radically
different ethical systems. In any event, such forms of reasoning have themselves
come under sustained attack. Mathematicians and geometers had come to
understand that geometries were formal logical systems based on arbitrary
assumptions whose only essential attributes were self-consistency, with no
necessary connection to reality. Similarly, it was possible to invent different
logics such as the different non-Euclidean geometries. Consequently, there are
no universal laws of logic attributable to the universe or to human reason; they
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are merely human conventions, valued only for their usefulness. Similarly,
mathematics was simply a humanly devised tool with no connection to any
metaphysical or theological absolutes. All logical and mathematical reasoning is
purely tautological—the elaboration of implications contained in the definition
used, according to problematic, socially created, formal systems of thought. This
critique of logic and mathematics undercuts all pretensions to a priori and
absolute knowledge. There was no such thing as abstract reason and impartial
legal or any other theory. Moral beliefs and social preferences were prior to
reason, and we needed to be conscious of the philosophical assumptions
underlying our actions.
Within the American legal profession, objective contract theory—and legal
theory more generally—has been recognised as ‘Euclidean’, proceeding
deductively from what are claimed to be ‘self-evident truths’ about the judicial
process. Many of the a priori assumptions of traditional legal theory are, however,
themselves subject to significant attack. For Jerome Frank, the legal profession
manipulated abstract concepts to construct a façade of certainty and absolute
rationality over a confused legal process.13  Such positivist legal theory—and
positivist social science—suppresses political and moral discourse by
appropriating the prestige associated with the natural sciences and conferring
a privileged position on the status quo and on the professional expert—be it a
judge or social scientist—with a capacity for judgement based on claimed
technical expertise, neutrality and impartiality. It is also reflected in the
increasing professionalisation and credentialism of political, social and academic
discourse and the need for such professionals to justify their prestige and
influence. Such ‘scholasticisms’ were merely escapes and delusions. In practice,
judges shared and implemented their personal standards, the moral standards
of the legal profession or the moral standards of those members of society they
admired, with the reasons given for judgements being rationalisations that
manipulated the language of precedents to produce the desired result. All of
this should sound familiar to critics of economic fundamentalism.
The rejection of the possibility of demonstrating the truth of ethical propositions
has left such moral ideas without a convincing theoretical basis. This does not
in itself undermine the fundamental significance of such ideas for the stability
of society. Paradoxically, the declining faith in the expertise, neutrality and
impartiality of experts has led—in the United States in particular—to a
reinvigorated emphasis on proceduralism within political theorising and the
law. It is, however, a proceduralism that, imitating the alleged neutrality of the
market, is biased in favour of the existing distribution of wealth, power and
privilege, and which refuses to look at substantial outcomes of legal and market
processes. Indeed, the market system is proceduralism writ large. In the case of
the equitable doctrine of unconscionability within Australia, it has been seen
that, while there has been a steady increase in concern about procedural
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unconscionability, there has been a considerable reluctance to extend the doctrine
formally to cover substantive issues.
More broadly, with such theories as Rawls’ ‘Theory of Justice’ and Habermas’s
ideal speech conditions, there has been a major theoretical effort to revive
social-contract theory and procedural accounts of justice. These reflect a desire
to accommodate the positivist claim that values were incapable of objective
determination—a claim that assumed a privileged epistemological status for
scientific knowledge. Hart and Sacks therefore make the claim that:
These institutionalised procedures and [the] constitutive arrangements
establishing them are obviously more fundamental than the substantive
arrangements in the structure of society…The principle of institutional
settlement expresses the judgment that decisions which are duly arrived
at as [a] result of duly established procedures of this kind ought to be
accepted as binding upon the whole of society unless and until they are
duly changed.14
We see a similar attempt in the use of economic concepts to model politics.
Consensus theorists attempted to achieve the same accommodation with the
positivists by trying to locate social and political norms in widely shared customs
and conventions. The extent to which there are such widely shared norms—or
even underlying shared norms—remains, however, problematic. It could simply
be that values conflicting with the interests of the economic and political elites
are suppressed. Others have sought to return to a natural-law tradition or to
some form of Aristotelianism. The attempt to find a rational, ethical foundation
for our social, political and legal systems remains hotly contested. As our
discussion in Chapter 7 indicates, it is ever likely to remain so. This general lack
of agreement has, however, the effect of undermining the credibility of our
moral and philosophical theorists and of this form of theorising.
Joseph Hutchison sees dangers in four intellectual ‘cults’, which infect such
attempts at theorising: a cult of scepticism holding that all beliefs, with the
possible exception of scientific discoveries, are simply matters of opinion; a cult
maintaining that only the present is meaningful; a scientism that assumes that
empirical knowledge is the answer to all human problems; and, finally, an
anti-intellectualism that downgrades the intellect and raises the human will to
a position of primacy.15  Consistent with the account given by Rorty and
Toulmin, the first three cults flow directly from the Enlightenment project. The
radical scepticism of the Enlightenment has, however, undermined its own
project: there is nothing of which we can be absolutely certain, and there is no
way of avoiding belief as the ground of our moral values or anything else. As
for the fourth cult, this seems to be a well-justified reaction to the arrogance and
dogmatism of past intellectual optimism and pretension.
273
Some Normative Reflections
The total social environment could be too complex—and the human mind too
limited—for us to understand fully the scope and operation of our social
activities, a view with echoes in Hayek,16  Habermas17  and Arthur.18  Abstract
ethical theories are simply a historical, cultural phenomenon, the progressive
invention of humans striving to deal with the uncertainties of day-to-day life,
the mystery of human existence and to give themselves some purpose. They can
do so only from within a paradigm—or, as MacIntyre would prefer, from within
a tradition.19  As such, they are only a limited part of a much broader human
conversation.
Development
The above marks a profound loss of confidence in scientific rationalism and in
the associated moral speculation that dates from the Enlightenment. It points
squarely to the normative basis of such speculation. Consequently, it also
challenges the application of that speculation—particularly economic
speculation—to public policy problems. Economic speculation in its Newtonian
guise is simply one way, among many possible ways, of speaking about the
social world. It heralds a search for alternative ways of talking about, and trying
to make sense of, the world and its bewildering confusions—as a source of
existential comfort and as a guide to actions. In the face of this confusion,
however—and our inability to firmly ground our speculations—public policy
formulation has to be seen as an experiment in which the criteria for success
and the evaluative vocabulary are cultural artefacts—inventions of the human
heart and mind.
Speaking within the Protestant tradition, leading American theologian Reinhold
Niebuhr (1892–1971) shared this loss of confidence. For him, there was simply
not enough intelligence to conduct the intricate affairs of a complex civilisation,
though he believed initially that intelligent analysis and experimentation could
help overcome social evils. He believed also in the incommensurability of
individual and group morality. Like James, Niebuhr was convinced of the
indeterminateness of the universe and the relativity of all human knowledge:
God, though revealed, remains veiled; His thoughts are not our thoughts,
nor His ways our ways. The worship of such a God leads to contrition;
not merely to a contrite recognition of the conscious sins of pride and
arrogance which the human spirit commits, but to a sense of guilt for
the inevitable and inescapable pride involved in every human
enterprise.20
For Niebuhr, as for a majority of the population including me, God exists, and
consequently, absolute truth exists. This provides an absolute basis for human
hope and morality. God’s transcendence, however, places that truth beyond our
reach. Consequently, God’s absolute truth can never become fully our truth,
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nor can we know how much we possess. This should come as no surprise, as
Sidharta Gautama (the Buddha) warned us 2500 years ago to stop speculating
about absolutes. The human search for knowledge is necessarily tainted by
self-interest. Consequently, the truth we know is necessarily personal and limited.
Nevertheless, we continually proclaim our personal truths as universal in the
vain belief or hope that we are masters of the universe. The Enlightenment
merely succeeded in displacing the Christian vision of God—as creator, redeemer
and sanctifier—from the centre of the universe. It replaced this vision first with
a more limited and non-Christian, anthropomorphic, masculine vision of God as
a rule-maker, and then, in turn, with man within nature and, for some true
believers, with humans as the servants of ‘THE MARKET’. Surely in this age,
the idea of men, let alone their artefacts—markets—being at the centre of the
universe is bizarre. Furthermore, the idea of nature as the ultimate ground of
all being is not much of a god around which to build a life or a moral discourse.
The Enlightenment’s assumption that the universe is rational and benevolent is
fundamentally wrong. The price of freedom, of change and of progress is finitude,
failure, uncertainty, decay and sin. At best, the universe provides a partially
stable background against which we make our play and narrate our stories,
including the stories of our own lives. All too often, the social worlds in which
we create our knowledge narratives are dominated by power, selfishness and
passion. In this climate, the scientific tradition and economic thinking all too
often become the tools of the dominant social group. ‘No society and no social
group can ever escape the vicious circle of the sin which aggravates human
insecurity in seeking to overcome it. All societies and individuals must therefore
remain under the judgment and the doom of God.’21
Consequently, Niebuhr rejected faith in progress, pointing out that necessarily
selfish groups dominated societies and that scientific knowledge, popular
education or universal Christian love could not end group conflict.22  Belief in
human progress and scientific achievement were the height of sinful pride and
led unavoidably to disastrous failure. The greatest intelligence and the noblest
ideals inevitably led humans to set themselves above God’s teachings. Only a
profound humility before a transcendent God—which acknowledged our
finiteness—and limited vision could help alleviate much social oppression. Of
course, this critique of human dogmatism extends to dogmatic absolutist claims
within Christianity itself. Consequently, for Niebuhr:
[T]here is no historical reality, whether it be the church or government,
whether it be the reason of wise men or specialists, which is not involved
in the flux and relativity of human existence; which is not subject to
error and sin, and which is not tempted to exaggerate its errors and sins
when they are made immune to criticism.23
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If the ‘Children of Light’ were ever to establish a humane and stable society,
they had to abandon excessive faith in the goodness and rationality of humanity
and recognise human sinfulness and self-interest. This vision was attainable
only on the basis of revelation. I would not limit that revelation to the canonical
texts of the Bible but would extend it to that revelation of the divine mystery
in other religious traditions . This view does not lead to any reinstatement of
natural law, certainly not to any assertion of absolute human rights, let alone
absolute property, or to the reinstatement of some form of Aristotelian virtue,
however much the moral vocabulary derived from those traditions might continue
to figure in social and political discourse. Rather, it leads to a humble journeying,
an uncertain search for the right and the good. It is always uncertain; it is always
a groping. Dogmatism has therefore to be forsworn as we can see only a partial
and distorted vision of the kingdom. The kingdom that can be grasped is not
the kingdom. Reality always falls short of the kingdom, though it is an image
of the kingdom that inspires a striving for newness of life.
In summary, Niebuhr added to pragmatic and relativistic social theory a profound
appreciation of human evil, an appreciation founded in his Christian tradition,
but absent from Enlightenment optimism. This optimism was, however, an
illusion. Marxism was distinguished from liberalism only by sharper and more
specific schemes for identifying and providing an elite with power. This critique
of Marxism’s particular claim to certain knowledge of the end towards which
history must move—and its associated willingness to sacrifice every value to
that end—applies with equal force to alternative pretensions about the end of
history and to any absolutist faith in markets and freedom of contract.
Importantly, for Daniel Boorstin:
To say that a society can or ought to be ‘unified’ by some total
philosophical system—whether a Summa Theologica, a Calvin’s Institute
or Marx’s Capital—is to commit oneself to an aristocratic concept of
knowledge: let the elite know the theories and values of the society: they
will know and preserve for all the rest.24
Such elitism was the very reverse of the intellectual humility that Niebuhr called
for. Of course, the acceptance of a relativist position can all too easily lead to an
acceptance of the political and economic arrangements of the current dominant
state—the United States—as the norm.25 The particular danger for us is that
the American anti-statist tradition that dates from Locke—and which was
encouraged by secularised American Calvinism and by Spencer’s social
Darwinism—will become the moral standard by which we should judge our
institutional and organisational arrangements.
Consistent with Niebuhr, Stackhouse26  advances a biblical covenantal view of
justice, supplementing the Catholic model of ‘subsidiary’ with ‘fairness as equity’.
As we saw in Chapter 4, the idea of covenant comes from the social and religious
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history of the ancient Middle East, where divine authority was invoked as a
witness to morally binding agreements. The Old Testament related how this
‘“basic”, “mutual”, oath-bound creation of responsible relationships’27  was
recognised to be a close analogy of the way in which God related to humanity
and a model of how we should relate to each other under God. It involves also
a revelation of the nature of a just, merciful God who engages directly in the
formation and sustainment of righteous living in community. This justice of a
covenanting God is pre-given in that it is constituted by a standard and ultimate
end that humans do not make; it is unfinished in that the standards of right and
wrong, good and evil are neither fully recognised nor completely fulfilled in
this life. Thus, the deontological right and the teleological good must be fulfilled
and joined for full justice. Stackhouse recognises, however, as does moral
philosophy more generally, that a tension exists between these two views of
justice, which has not been reconciled.
As was shown in Chapter 4, the development of the idea of a social contract was
influenced by those Old Testament covenant ideas. A fuller understanding of
the implication of those ideas was, however, lost in Locke’s appeal to the
natural-law rights and in deism’s limited vision of God as a rule giver. This
covenant view leads directly to the rights of humans to develop religious,
educational, social and political organisations to exemplify their best vision of
the ultimate good and how it is related to what is right. It recognises, however,
that an individualistic understanding of human rights provides only a partial
understanding, for it fails to recognise that humans are inevitably relational
beings, called to live in groups and to assume associated responsibilities. Freedom
and rights are best used to fulfil responsibilities in interpersonal and civil life.
Consequently, Stackhouse sees contract theories among those who see no need
for a higher moral law or greater purpose—and for whom morality consists of
whatever is agreed—as a degeneration of the covenantal idea and the greatest
temptation in the West.28  Rather, ‘the full actualisation of the right and the
good in our inner lives, in our human relationships, and in the matrices of social
life cannot be attained on humanistic grounds alone but…a divine initiative
must be taken’.29
The social-contract tradition involved a progressive impoverishment of the
covenant idea with the progressive secularisation and impoverishment of the
natural-law ideas that underpinned Locke’s account and resulted, inter alia, in
the reification of the concept of freedom of contract. It is, however, degeneration
implicit in Locke’s appeal to a natural law assessable by human reason. It was
only late in the day that we came to realise that the appeal to nature involved
in that process of secularisation effectively removed the moral content of the
tradition. In contrast, Stackhouse’s covenantal account of justice would lead
directly to a relational view of the law of contract such as that advanced by
Macneil—a view concerned far more with the substantive outcomes of contractual
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relationships, which recognised a substantial duty of care on the part of the
parties towards each other.
Of course, none of this means that I believe we should accept direction on
particular moral issues from self-righteous, authoritarian churchmen—in fancy
dress or otherwise—who claim to mediate between God and the rest of us. It
should be clear also that I have little sympathy for Calvinism with its claims of
divine election—in either its traditional or secular forms. For non-believers also
there should be little attraction in the residual transcendentalism in Western
epistemology, moral and political philosophy and science. There could also be
an understandable reluctance to accept any moral guidance from the above
overtly theological traditions, particularly when they are in conflict.
Nevertheless, at a practical level, non-believers might be prepared to see them
as particular distillations of human experience and as legitimate contributions
to moral and political discourse and to the application of the practical reasoning
and wisdom that Aristotle advocated. Overt theological insights are not the only
or necessarily the most important source of moral insights in contemporary
society. We are the inheritors of a long political and moral history and we would
be unwise to disregard that history and its lessons, particularly in respect of our
willingness to exploit our compatriots in the name of high principle. In addition,
we are the beneficiaries of an extraordinarily active popular discourse on the
human condition—all of which can contribute to our moral understanding. In
that sense, religious authorities are not the only, or necessarily the most
important, source of revelation in contemporary secular society. After all, Bob
Geldof and Bono are among the great prophets of our age, challenging individual
and communal indifference to Third-World suffering, particularly in Africa.
Economics as a Secular Religion
Importantly, the Enlightenment’s search for rational principles as a secular
alternative to traditional religious authority and beliefs to justify our moral
decisions is itself a religious search, serving the same dogmatic and legitimating
functions of what Bergson calls static religion.30  Economics claims to provide
that secular justification for many contemporary policy choices. As a result,
economics threatens to become the dominant rationalist and fundamentalist
religion of contemporary capitalist society and of the emerging global civilisation.
This threat is aided by its attempt to appropriate the prestige associated with
the natural sciences. Importantly, it is easy to slip between the uses of
individualism as an analytical tool to a promotion of individualism as a normative
ideal. This religion is of particular appeal to business and political elites because
it tends to legitimise greed, love of money and power. It is leading to the
commercialisation of all human activity, while aiding the atomisation and
privatisation of competing values and groups. It has elevated money beyond a
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convenience to the means of salvation and the source of meaning, values and
security, turning it, and the mechanism for acquiring it, into idols.31
Economists—the prophets and priests of this new religion—preach about and
have a major impact on public policy and our institutional arrangements.
Economics therefore provides an alternative faith tradition, complete with values,
ideas of welfare and of progress—usually defined in terms of quantitative
economic indicators, which dominate public discourse and which seek to reshape
our institutions and organisations.32 With their influence on government,
economists are the new theocracy, the contemporary manifestation of Plato’s
guardians. In particular, the economic theologian’s rhetoric resembles
contemporary process theology. In this school, although God will possess the
classic attributes of omnipotence (all power), omniscience (all knowledge) and
omnipresence (present everywhere), He does not yet possess them in full. Such
a theology offers considerable comfort to the economic theologian, explaining
the dislocation, pain and disorientation that are the results of transitions from
economic heterodoxy to free markets. THE MARKET is becoming more like
Yahweh of the Old Testament: not just one superior deity contending with
others, but the Supreme Deity, the only true God, whose reign must now be
accepted universally and who allows no rivals. There is no conceivable limit to
THE MARKET’s inexorable ability to convert creation into commodities. In the
church of THE MARKET, everything—no matter how sacred—eventually
becomes a commodity. This radical de-sacralising dramatically alters the human
relationship to land, water, air and space. Indeed, human beings themselves
start to become commodities as well. This comprehensive wisdom of THE
MARKET is something that, in the past, only the gods knew. In ancient times,
seers entered a trance and informed anxious seekers of the mood of the gods and
whether the time was auspicious for particular enterprises. Today, the financial
media are the diviners and seers of THE MARKET’s moods, the high priests of
its mysteries. THE MARKET has become the most formidable rival to traditional
religions, not least because it is rarely recognised as a religion. The contradictions
between the world-views of traditional religion and the world-view of THE
MARKET religion are so basic that no compromise seems possible.
This critique has much in common with the critique of ‘autonomous technology’
developed by Jacques Ellul33  and by Langdon Winner and Weber’s critique of
the ‘iron cage of reason’.34  For Ellul, la technique is sacred in our society. No
social, human or spiritual fact in the modern world is so important. It transforms
everything it touches—including the socio-politico-religious software that runs
the system—into a machine. It is the pattern of organisation, the rationalisation
of society, beyond the willingness of anyone to accept responsibility. Technical
means have become ends in themselves. This attack is directed particularly
against the technocrats to whom we have handed over our ethical responsibilities.
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In the process of implementing their utopian vision, a narrow technological and
theocratic elite is in the process of redefining the evaluative methodology for
social action, our social goals, our social institutions and who we think we are.
Efficient ordering is the only principle of the ever-expanding and irreversible
rule of technique. It is the unconscious response to every challenge and is being
extended to all areas of life. Means are remade into ends as we are committed
increasingly to continually improved means to ends that are examined only
poorly. Of particular concern to Winner are the changes that have taken place
in ordinary language, traditional social institutions, earlier kinds of artefacts,
human identity, personality and conduct. Efficiency, speed, precise measurement,
rationality, productivity and technical improvement have all become ends in
themselves and are applied obsessively to areas of life from which they had
previously been excluded. In particular, efficiency has become a more general
value—the universal principle for all intelligent conduct. It is not that such
instrumental values are themselves perverse, but the fact that they have escaped
from their proper sphere.
Technique refuses to tolerate competing moral judgements, excluding them from
its field in favour of its own technical morality. Consequently, human beings
have become objects—no longer choosing agents, but devices for recording the
results obtained by various techniques. Decisions are no longer to be made on
the basis of complex and human motives, but only in favour of the technique
that gives maximum efficiency. In the process, the qualitative becomes
quantitative and every stage of human activity is forced to submit to
mathematical calculations. Whatever cannot be expressed numerically is to be
eliminated. All the technical devices of education, propaganda, amusement,
sport and religion are mobilised to convince us to be content with our condition
of mechanical, mindless ‘mass man’, and to exterminate the deviant and the
idiosyncratic.
In particular, technique forms the very substance of economic thought. Technical
economic analysis has been substituted for political economy and its concern
with the moral structure of economic activity. In seeking to grasp, but also to
modify, it is no mere instrument but possesses its own force. This technical
orientation is evident particularly in the application of mathematics and statistical
techniques to economics. In the economic sphere, as in others, the technicians
form a closed fraternity with their own esoteric vocabulary from which the
layperson is excluded.
Technique involves the progressive dehumanisation of the economic sphere in
which the abstract concept of Homo economicus becomes real. Not only has the
entire human being been absorbed into the economic network validating the
producing–consuming parts of the human, the other facets have been
progressively devalued. Consequently, all values have been reduced to money
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values. The whole of human life has become a function of economic technique.
This is particularly so in respect of work.
Politics in turn becomes an arena for contention among rival techniques. The
consequence is the progressive suppression of ideological and moral barriers to
technical progress. In this environment, the conflict of propaganda takes the
place of the debate of ideas. Technique permits public discussion only of those
ideas that are in substantial agreement with the values created by a technical
civilisation. This technical economy is anti-democratic and a form of slavery.
Despite all the talk about freedom and popular sovereignty, people are unable
to exert any genuine influence on the direction of the economy, and their votes
count for very little.
For technique, there is there no mystery, no taboo and no rules outside itself.
Because people cannot live without a sense of the secret, or the sacred, they have
created for themselves a new religion of a rational and technical order. Since the
religious object is that which is worshipped uncritically, technology has become
the new god. Technique has become the essential mystery. For the technician
in particular, technique is the locus of the sacred, an abstract idol and the reason
for living. Without technique they would find themselves poor, alone, naked
and stripped of all pretensions. They would no longer be the heroes, geniuses
or even ‘archangels’. Technique is thus the god that brings salvation.
These technological influences—these economic influences—have become so
much part of everyday life that they have become virtually invisible. For Ellul
and Winner, there can be no human autonomy in the face of technical autonomy;
people have lost their roles as active, directing agents:
Each individual lives with procedures, rules, processes, institutions, and
material devices that are not of his making but powerfully shape what
he does. It is scarcely even imaginable what it would mean for each of
us to make decisions about the vast array of sociotechnical circumstances
that enter our experience.35
Consequently, technical rationality and modernisation pose a particular and
significant challenge to liberalism. They are incompatible with the central notion
that justifies the practice of liberal politics: the idea of responsible, responsive,
representative government. In the technocratic understanding, the real activity
of governing can have no place for mass participation. All of the crucial decisions,
plans and actions are simply beyond their comprehension. This technological
society is not governable. Rather, the ideal is of a self-directing and
self-maintaining system, requiring no human direction. This is true even of the
means of analysis itself—the meaning of ‘rationality’ having been distorted and
corrupted by these technocratic tendencies. For Ellul, ‘Every intervention of
technique is, in effect, a reduction of facts, forces, phenomena, means, and
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instruments to the schema of logic.’ Similarly for Weber, ‘The fate of our time
is characterised by rationalisation and intellectualisation and, above all by the
“disenchantment of the world”.’36
The price for this rationalisation is the loss of freedom. It is ironic that the
libertarians’ search for increased human autonomy ends, in practice, in the loss
of the value that they claim to hold dearest.
The Need for Intellectual Humility
The critique developed in this book of rationality and of deductive reasoning
does not question the need to use concepts to bring some order to experience.
There is nowhere else to go. Rather, it questions the practical use of concepts
that are so general, at such a level of abstraction, that they lose touch with
empirical reality. This is particularly so when they are conceived of as absolutes.
In such circumstances, their application as a guide to action is inherently
problematic and ideological. The perspective to be drawn from pragmatism—and
from Niebuhr and Stackhouse in particular—should make us wary of such
God-like pretensions and cause us to become more aware of the need for humility
about our limited abilities, our intellectual techniques, our intellectual
speculations and our real policy decisions.37  Absolute truth is not available to
us. All truth, as we know it, is constructed socially and is subject to
revision—sometimes radically.
The substantial judgements involved in public policy development are moral
rather than technical. It is the quality of our moral judgements, the sensitivity
of our moral vocabulary and stories—rather than the quality of our economic
logic—that is the crucial element in public decision making. Judgement needs
to be informed by a moral sensitivity to the needs of others, wide learning, deep
reflection, wide consultation and by wide experience of the practical world. We
therefore need to acknowledge that it is not so much the lack of technical
knowledge that inhibits government policy as it is the dominant moral values
that shape what it is possible to think and do.
We need to be particularly wary when it comes to postulating this or that as an
overarching moral principle with priority over all other values. Despite
pretensions to the contrary, economics does not and cannot provide the moral
equivalent of a unified field theory—an equivalent of the physicists’ Holy Grail,
which can be invoked to justify collective action directed by government. For
example, there is no ideal form of social or economic organisation against which
to measure real organisations; the forms of organisation used in the private sector
do not provide an ideal form or vocabulary that must be emulated. Social
evolution, like biological evolution, does not lead to optimal outcomes, only
satisfactory ones.
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Of particular note is the prevalent tendency to fasten onto particular ideological
interpretations of human rights and of liberty, to make them into absolutes and
then to use those interpretations to exclude collective action based on other
values. We have tended to elevate individualism, freedom of contract and
economic efficiency above values that point to mutual interdependency and
responsibility for our neighbours. Such humility should make us more conscious
of the needs and claims of others in contrast with our own needs and claims. It
should make us more conscious that we frequently lack the knowledge for sound
decisions, and of the need to consult widely, to proceed carefully, to be willing
to experiment and to change direction. Humility should also make us aware of
the pretensions of ‘rationality’ and of the need to accord emotions and values a
legitimate role in decision making.
We should be more careful about such abstractions as ‘the economy’, ‘the market’
and particularly ‘the labour market’. In the practical policy debate, the fact that
these are abstractions has long been forgotten—the dancers have become the
servants of the steps. We should also be more careful about the division of people
and their social groups into rigid categories. Rather, we should admit that is it
difficult to unscramble all the influences that bear on real people in all their
relationships.
This critique should also serve as a reminder to avoid seeing the complex issues
we confront in the world through simple dichotomies. Unfortunately, most
policy debate occurs at a simplistic, markets-are-good/governments-are-bad
level. Rather, as Popper recommends, in the search for knowledge, every source,
every suggestion is welcome, while all are open to critical examination.
Qualitatively and quantitatively, by far the most important source of our
knowledge—apart from inborn knowledge—is tradition.38
In particular, the current distinction made in public debate between the public
and the private sectors is overdrawn. We quickly forget that what we are really
talking about are real, interdependent groups of people engaged in complex
interrelationships, involving different and complex organisational structures
and in a bewildering variety of activities and exchanges. Governance is a
necessary part of all of these activities. It is only the types of governance that
are in question. This is a question that cannot be answered on the basis of a
priori reasoning. Collective action is a necessary part of any complex society
and the government is a legitimate organ of that collective action. Limitations
on government action are not to be established on the basis of abstract a priori
reasoning but on the basis of experimentation within the framework of a political




As has been shown, current Australian public policy debate is constrained
heavily by a belief on the part of many participants that there is some acceptable
theoretical basis for determining the role of the government, or that such a basis
is attainable. The very language of the discussion contains this belief. An artificial
dichotomy has been envisaged between the market and the State, which fails to
recognise the interdependencies within our economic system and the role of the
State and the social system more generally in underpinning economic activity.
It is a dichotomy based on an idealised conception of markets that is grounded
neither in fact nor in credible economic theory.
The claims of neoclassical economics to intellectual rigour are also subject to
innumerable challenges at a more detailed level. In response to these detailed
attacks, many economists have insisted that critics provide an alternative theory.
In doing so, they have not realised that metaphors play the key role in theory
formation. Consequently, they have not understood the extent to which their
economic thinking has been bounded by the Newtonian metaphor, and by their
search for natural laws of the economy analogous with those of mechanics. They
have assumed that economic phenomena can be treated as if they are natural
phenomena, caused by natural forces, and not social phenomena, the result of
social invention and institutions. Running through the history of this economic
thought is a persistent effort to evade responsibility for the outcomes of the
economic system—a responsibility that would have to be faced were the idea
of natural law to be abandoned. In the process, economic theory has been emptied
of its historical and social elements. Nor has economics faced up to the normative
judgements involved in the choice of metaphors and the extent to which they
can serve to legitimate the existing social order and the privilege of the
commercial and policy elites.
Since the Enlightenment, the physical sciences and the reductionist method have
established priority over other ways of knowing because of their ability to
produce reproducible results, accurate predictions and plausible explanations.
This form of mastery is, however, unlikely to be achieved of systems as complex
as the social and the economic. In any event, given human freedom of action,
there is no prior reason to believe that society will exhibit the types of natural
regularities seen in the physical sciences.
Part of a search for a better understanding must be the recognition that we are
part of an indivisible totality that we—in all our complexity and diversity—have
a share in creating, in partnership with our ancestors. Important support is given
to a new holistic approach to economic speculation by the new science of
complexity. Complexity is not simply a new reductionist model, but a new way
of looking at the world, which attempts to deal with the interconnectedness,
interdependence and non-linearity of systems.39  Such a complex system cannot
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be understood through reductionism, as the whole is greater than the sum of its
parts. Real complex systems cannot be modelled successfully mathematically
because of the extraordinary difficulty of the mathematics involved, and the
radical differences that small differences in initial states can make. Furthermore,
there is a mismatch between the ontology assumed by mathematics and the
ontology of social systems. The way ahead is not through the reductionist
approach and a more refined Newtonian model. There is a fundamental mismatch
between our predominant ways of thinking about reality derived from the
Enlightenment’s scientific tradition and the nature of reality in a complex social
system.40
Arthur has argued that the alternative to the Newtonian model is Taoist. It
involves the recognition that there is no inherent order underlying economic
phenomena. Consequently, our economic institutions are matters for social choice;
and we have to learn to live with the relativism and circularity that this involves.
As Arthur explains, ‘The world is a matter of patterns that change, that partly
repeat, but never quite repeat, that are always new and different.’41 There is
no perfect system to be discovered, no magic word that will remove our
responsibility for each other and ourselves. This involves abandoning the
idealisation of THE MARKET that is at the heart of economic fundamentalism.
What this means for policy is that there is no one correct approach to policy or
to organisational arrangements. Just as biological organisms have evolved a
bewildering variety of systems, it is reasonable to expect a wide variety of
approaches in social organisations. Such variety is not to be despised; rather it
is to be valued as it could reflect subtle or even coarse differences in the
environment or a degree of ‘indifference’ between approaches. Secondly,
complexity in environmental circumstances could be so great as to defy analysis.
It is not possible in principle to list in order of importance the influences affecting
a complex system. History cannot be ignored. It shapes the evolution of a complex
system and, consequently, a complex system cannot be understood in isolation
from its history. Similarly, the state of ‘fitness’ of an organisation cannot be
determined by reference to crude reductionist criteria, but could, perhaps, be
reflected in broad measures of confidence and happiness, which reflect some
common judgement.
The ‘organisational capital’ of such a system is not primarily in its physical
endowments but in the complex network of relationships formed within that
system and the knowledge held within that network. Our evolved institutional
arrangements—ethical rules, legal rules, conventional ways of behaving and
popular culture—are all part of the organisational capital of our system, are
critical to the effectiveness of the system, cannot be ignored and need constantly
to be renewed. Such values assume critical importance. One of the features of
complex systems is that they emerge at the edge of order and chaos.
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Consequently, they can be highly unstable. Fundamental changes in the values
and rules that underpin our society—of the type advocated by economic
fundamentalists and, to some extent, implemented in Australia in recent
times—could therefore have unforeseen and radical implications that we will
all regret.
An inability to deduce an appropriate theoretical framework does not, however,
reduce us to impotence. It does mean that there is no alternative to
experimentation. Nor are the criteria to be applied in assessing those experiments
written in the heavens. Therefore, a balanced approach would not be one that
rules some classes of government action as inadmissible on theoretical grounds,
nor would it suggest that all possible government action would be beneficial.
The experiments need not be all ours. Rather the way ahead should be
characterised by a more careful examination of the models and approaches used
elsewhere, and a more careful examination of the policy problem. Effective
policy design has often been seriously inhibited by too much ideology, with too
little attention to the practical problems of policy implementation and behavioural
change.
In framing practical policy, the important question is ‘What works?’ The question
cannot, however, be asked in isolation from our moral, religious and political
traditions. The answer is to be found more in experimentation backed by
empirical investigation of the consequences than in theoretical knowledge, a
priori reasoning and high-level abstraction. It involves substantive moral
judgements and moral sensitivity, not formal logic. It follows that the policy
development process should properly be seen as pragmatic, eclectic and political.
We should acknowledge that public policy decisions legitimately involve
balanced judgements involving potentially conflicting criteria—not a departure
from a postulated market ideal for ‘illegitimate’ social and political reasons. It
should encourage a much closer examination of the environment, a much closer
examination of policy approaches that others have employed along with an
assessment of their impacts and a willingness to engage in careful experimentation
in the full knowledge that we will, from time to time, make mistakes. We also
need to recognise the limitations of past policy development processes and to
commit ourselves to changing those processes.
While structures are very important, their effectiveness—and the effectiveness
of public and private networks—depends ultimately on trust. Economic
fundamentalism has neglected the essential contribution that moral conduct
makes to the capitalist system and to our governance structures. Many economists
have no concept of history and of the delicately constructed social fabric, which
makes the difference between workable and unworkable market economies. Nor
do they have an adequate understanding of the complex motivations that bind
individuals into functioning organisations and effective economies. Sound
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business ethics—and moral conduct more generally—are an essential part of
the social infrastructure. That moral conduct cannot, however, be reduced simply
to compliance with rules; rather it requires an aspiration towards virtue. The
codified law established the minimum standards of behaviour required of citizens
before social sanctions were applied, not the optimal standards for the good life.
Final Thoughts
For Robert Bellah et al. in The Good Society, social science and policy analysis
have not taken the place of public philosophy but, instead, have regrettably
strengthened the notion that our problems are technical, rather than moral and
political. In this, they echo the critique developed by Ellul and Winner. In
particular, they are concerned about the erosion of trust in the political system
and public institutions that results from the current emphasis on Lockean
individualism and the associated economic theorising with its emphasis on
efficiency. It threatens to undermine our democracy. In their words:
If policy elites stand outside the world of citizens, designing social
policies evaluated in terms of outcomes, efficiency, or costs and benefits,
as they define them, they short-circuit the democratic process, and this
is so whether they believe that people are essentially ‘interest maximisers’
or even that they are motivated in part by ‘values’. Politics under these
circumstances becomes the art of image manipulation by expert media
managers.42
The consequence is a gross abuse of power that eats at the heart of the liberal
tradition.
No society can survive without stable moral traditions and social conventions
backed up by effective means of coercion. The prevailing scepticism about the
possibility of establishing any moral principle as true or valid beyond reasonable
doubt troubles some with the theoretical thought that as a consequence we are
unable to identify the difference between might and right.43 This search for
epistēmē in moral matters was, however, always an illusion. At a practical
level—the level of practical wisdom or phronēsis —we nevertheless possess a
highly developed moral vocabulary and a long political tradition, both of which
provide a source of stability. This represents the social and moral capital of our
civilisation. Brennan and Buchanan44  have, however, argued that there is now
a widely sensed deterioration in the social, intellectual and philosophical capital
of Western civil order. Hirsch had a similar sense of foreboding, believing that
an excessive reliance on self-interest as the fundamental social organising
principle would undermine the basis of the market system itself:
In brief, the principle of self-interest is incomplete as a social organising
principle. It operates effectively only in tandem with some supporting
social principle. This fundamental characteristic of economic liberalism,
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which was largely taken for granted by Smith and Mill in their different
ways, has been lost sight of by its modern protagonists…The attempt
has been made to erect an increasingly explicit social organisation without
a supporting social morality…In this way, the foundations of the market
system have been weakened, while its general behavioural norm of acting
on the criterion of self-interest has won ever-widening acceptance.45
The fear is that in acting on the precepts of economic fundamentalism modern
governments have participated in changes in the institutional structures of their
societies that could weaken the matrix of social rules on which their economic
systems depend. For their part, Nancy Foulbre and Thomas Weisskopf argue
that the care and nurture of human capital has always been difficult and
expensive, and that the erosion of family and community solidarity imposes
enormous costs—costs that are reflected in inefficient and unsuccessful
educational efforts, high crime rates and a social atmosphere of anxiety and
resentment.46  Such forebodings are, however, as old as civilisation itself. They
could reflect the prevailing uncertainty about the foundations of our moral
values as well as the intuition that civilisation is always under threat from what
used to be called human sinfulness.
It is at this point that it is wise to recall that it is the control of our greed that
represents one of the prime victories of culture over ‘animality’. If this is so, it
is greed that also represents one of the prime threats to our civilisation; economic
fundamentalism is an ideology that attempts to justify that greed. In particular,
it promotes selfishness and materialism. Even for the non-religious, however,
the acquisition of personal wealth and power is not a satisfactory basis for
self-definition. Consequently, economic fundamentalism is a significant threat
to our civilisation. Its application to public decisions cannot be reconciled with
the ethical import of our cultural heritage, with its Christian underpinnings, its
command to love God and to love one’s neighbour as oneself. Nor can it be
reconciled with other religious traditions, including Buddhism, with its calls for
compassion and detachment. Taking something that is good—such as rational
thought, or economic analysis, or markets, or human rights, or liberty, or law,
or money, or consumption—and turning it into an absolute is the essence of a
new idolatry.
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